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Dissertation Abstract 
 
 
 During the nadir of the Little Ice Age between 1565 and 1720, average European 
temperatures declined by nearly one degree Celsius. While altered weather patterns strained the 
adaptive abilities of Europe’s agricultural societies, the northern Netherlands enjoyed the 
prosperity of its Golden Age. The economy, culture, and environment of the Dutch Republic 
yielded a distinct pattern of vulnerability and resilience in the face of early modern climate 
change. In this dissertation, newly interpreted documents are examined alongside scientific 
evidence, first to establish relationships between local, short-term environmental conditions and 
human activity, and ultimately to identify broader connections between long-term climate change 
and the history of the Dutch Republic. This methodology reveals that the coldest decades of the 
Little Ice Age presented not only challenges but also opportunities for Dutch citizens.  
Central to the increasingly capitalist economy of the Dutch Republic was the 
development, maintenance, and continued expansion of transportation networks that spanned the 
globe. Complex relationships between local environments, weather, and climatic trends 
stimulated new discoveries in Arctic waters, quickened the journeys of outbound United East 
India Company ships, hampered Baltic commerce, and altered how travellers moved within the 
borders of the Republic. Weather patterns that accompanied the Little Ice Age also affected how 
commerce was forcibly expanded and defended. The Anglo-Dutch Wars, fought from 1652 to 
1674, were contested in a period of transition between decade-scale climatic regimes. In the first 
war, meteorological conditions that accompanied a warmer interval in the Little Ice Age granted 
critical advantages to English fleets, which were usually victorious. By contrast, in the latter 
wars, weather patterns that now reflected a cooling climate repeatedly helped Dutch fleets 
prevail over the English and later French armadas.  
Finally, climatic fluctuations affected mentalities within the Dutch Republic. 
Understandings of weather in the Republic may have demonstrated a vague awareness of climate 
change, and cultural responses to weather reflected the resilience of the Republic by expressing 
the conviction that weather could be confronted and endured. Ultimately, the influence of the 
Little Ice Age was ambiguous for the resilient society of the Dutch Republic in its Golden Age. 
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 1 
Introduction 
  
Climate Change and Human History 
 
In 2013 and 2014, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a scientific 
body established under the auspices of the United Nations, published two assessments that 
summarized the expected environmental manifestations and human impacts of future global 
warming. Informed by thousands of interdisciplinary scholars, these synthesis reports reflected 
compromises that ultimately favoured conservative conclusions. Nevertheless, the IPCC 
projected that average global temperatures would likely rise by 0.4 degrees Celsius in the coming 
two decades, particularly over land in the high northern latitudes. Although further predictions 
were subject to different emissions scenarios, models featured in the first report forecasted a total 
increase of between 1.5 and 4 degrees Celsius by the end of the century. While acknowledging 
that regional changes in prevailing weather stimulated by a global increase in temperatures might 
initially benefit some wealthy communities, the second assessment concluded by describing the 
severe water shortages, ecosystem degradation, health challenges, and economic upheaval that 
will likely trouble life on a warmer planet.
1
  
Global warming is inconceivable without an understanding of the past, for temperatures 
cannot rise without having once been lower. The outlines of that past have grown increasingly 
clear to historical climatologists and climate historians, the interdisciplinary scholars of historical 
climates. However, the history of climate remains a battleground in the tortured public debate 
about anthropogenic warming. Even those willing to believe academics over lobbyists frequently 
                                                        
1
 Lisa Alexander et al. Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. (IPCC WGI AR5, 2013), 953. Virgina 
Burkett et al., Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. (IPCC WG II AR5, 2014), 13. These 
conclusions were not much changed from the IPCC’s fourth assessment report, published in 2007. The IPCC’s fifth 
assessment report is expected later this year. Lenny Bernstein et al., Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, An 
Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Valencia, Spain, 12-17 November 2007, 48.  
 2 
hold to teleological narratives in which civilizations, now in peril, emerged and matured in stable 
and relatively benign climates. In fact, equilibrium in natural systems is typically an illusion born 
from the brevity of human experience.
2
  
The Holocene, the climatic regime stretching from the thawing of the last great Ice Age 
to the present, dawned in a world that remained between one and three degrees Celsius warmer 
than twentieth-century averages until as late as 2000 BCE. Relatively moist conditions and high 
sea levels segregated populations that earlier migrated by land to North America or Australia.
3
 
After 2000 BCE a gradual – if uneven – cooling of global temperatures likely resulted in the 
drying of the Sahara, yet in Europe at least temperatures rose again at the height of the classical 
era.
 4
 This “Roman Optimum,” with its drier, warmer climate, faltered in a period of volcanism 
beginning around 180 CE, and the globe’s atmosphere subsequently cooled during the so-called 
“Vandal Minimum.”5 An unusually wet and stormy climatic regime endured for several decades 
in the sixth century, and again from 750 CE until as late as 900 CE. However, by the eleventh 
century the climate of the so-called Medieval Climatic Anomaly prevailed across much of the 
world, and in many regions temperatures were generally warmer than twentieth-century 
averages. Colder, stormier, wetter weather increasingly troubled the thirteenth century in swaths 
                                                        
2
 Paul Edwards, A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming. 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010), 4. 
3
 In this context “twentieth-century averages” refers to global temperatures between 1900-1960. During this period 
global temperatures rose until 1950 before experiencing a brief reduction; the current regime of accelerating global 
warming had not yet emerged in full. Hubert H. Lamb, Climate, History and the Modern World, 2
nd
 Ed. (Rutledge: 
New York, 1995), 260.  
4
 Significantly more detailed evidence exists regarding the history of European climate. Reasons include: significant 
government funding for pan-European databases and research, the continent’s status as home for many of the major 
figures of historical climatology past and present, and the particularly intense, thoroughly recorded impact of 
relatively recent climatic change in Europe given, among other variables, its high latitude, and historically complex 
cultures with high rates of elite literacy. John F. Richards, The Unending Frontier. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003), 69.  
5
 J. D. Gunn, “A.D. 536 and its 300-year Aftermath,” in The Years Without Summer: Tracing AD 536 and its 
Aftermath, ed. J.D. Gunn. (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2000), 10. Tina Wang, Donna Surge and Karen Jo Walker, 
“Isotopic evidence for climate change during the Vandal Minimum from Ariopsis felis otoliths and Mercenaria 
campechiensis shells, southwest Florida, USA,” The Holocene 21:7 (2011): 1089. 
 3 
of the Northern Atlantic; a global “Little Ice Age,” often marked by those conditions and 
accompanying glacial advances, lingered with warmer respites until deep into the nineteenth 
century. With the exception of slight cooling between 1950 and 1970, temperatures have been on 
the rise ever since.
6
 
Before the onset of modern warming, the Little Ice Age was the most significant climatic 
anomaly of the last 8,000 years. Cooler temperatures, and, with them, altered patterns of 
precipitation and enhanced cyclonic activity, strained the adaptive capabilities of Western 
Europe’s agricultural societies. Between 1565 and 1720, the coldest phase of the Little Ice Age 
in Europe coincided with a so-called “general crisis” of violence, starvation, higher commodity 
prices, and demographic stagnation. However, between approximately 1590 and 1714 the 
northern Low Countries experienced the remarkable commercial expansion, cultural dynamism, 
and population growth of its Golden Age.
7
  
Interdisciplinary climate reconstructions and diverse documentary sources reveal that the 
climatic fluctuations of the Little Ice Age presented both challenges and opportunities for Dutch 
citizens. Distinct economic structures, social relations, and cultural attitudes within the Dutch 
Republic allowed Dutch citizens to consciously exploit, or unwittingly benefit from, some of the 
weather patterns that became more common during the coldest phases of the Little Ice Age. Not 
all Dutch citizens shared in this resilience, and indeed some meteorological conditions could be 
disastrous in a low-lying region that depended on trade. Still, in the commercial acquisition and 
                                                        
6
 M.J. Ingram, G. Farmer and T.M.L. Wigley, “Past Climates and their Impact on Man: a Review,” in Climate and 
History: Studies on Past Climates and their Impact on Man, ed. M.J. Ingram, G. Farmer and T.M.L. Wigley. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 17. Hubert Lamb, Climate, History and the Modern World, 260. 
Jean M. Grove, "The Century Time-scale." In Time-scales and Environmental Change, ed. Thackwray S. Driver and 
Graham P. Chapman. (Oxford: Routledge, 1996), 40. 
7
 Sam White, “The Real Little Ice Age.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 44:3 (Winter, 2014): 327. Shaun 
A. Marcott et al., “A Reconstruction of Regional and Global Temperature for the Past 11,300 Years,” Science, 
CCCIX (2013), 1198. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith, ed., The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century. 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2005), 7. 
 4 
military defence of wealth, and the cultural reception of weather, the influence of Little Ice Age 
climatic oscillations was profoundly ambiguous within the Dutch trading empire.  
Historical climatologists exploring relationships between human and climatic histories 
during the Little Ice Age have traditionally considered how cooler temperatures, coupled with 
shifts in prevailing patterns of precipitation, hampered early modern European agriculture in the 
wake of relative medieval warmth. Since the hesitant ambiguity of Le Roy Ladurie’s Times of 
Feast, Times of Famine, historical climatologists have sought links between the climate typical 
of Little Ice Age minima and, for example, the failure of Atlantic Norse agriculture, the Great 
Famine of the early fourteenth century, food shortages during the chaos of the Reformation, 
agricultural decline in Scotland culminating in union with England, and the potato blight in 
Ireland.
8
 In recent years, studies in historical climatology have explored a broadening variety of 
interactions between human and climatic histories, using a continually expanding selection of 
sources from a widening array of geographic regions. New books and articles, both popular and 
academic, have examined topics ranging from the difficulty of colonizing Australia towards the 
end of the Little Ice Age, to music during the cold seventeenth century; from the rising 
popularity of “reason” among early modern European intellectuals during years of extreme 
                                                        
8
 With good reason; in England, for example, the growing season could be reduced by as much as two months in 
years marked by particularly severe winters during the Maunder Minimum. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Times of 
Feast, Times of Famine: A History of Climate Since the Year 1000. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
1971), 293. Lamb, Climate, History and the Modern World, 232. Fred Pearce, Climate and Man: From the Ice Ages 
to the Global Greenhouse. (London: Vision Books, 1989), 31. Neville Brown, History and Climate Change: A 
Eurocentric perspective. (London: Routledge, 2001), 262. Bauernfeind and Woitek, "The Influence of Climatic 
Change on Price Fluctuations in Germany during the 16th Century Price Revolution,” Climatic Change 43:1 (1999): 
307. Christian Pfister, “Climatic Extremes, Recurrent Crises and Witch Hunts: Strategies of European Societies in 
Coping with Exogenous Shocks in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries,” The Medieval History 
Journal 10: 1&2 (2007): 39. 
 5 
weather, to the spread of smallpox on the great plains in the frigid final decades of the eighteenth 
century.
9
  
Accordingly, recent studies in historical climatology have increasingly moved beyond the 
idea that climatic fluctuations limit or expand the energy available to agricultural economies. 
However, declensionist assumptions continue to inform many recent historical accounts of the 
Little Ice Age in Europe and beyond. Even some of the most nuanced narratives that examine the 
most unlikely connections between climate, weather, environment, and humanity continue to 
support the notion that a decline in temperatures, a shift in prevailing patterns of precipitation, 
and a general rise in meteorological extremes rendered life more difficult for nearly everyone in 
early modern Europe. In many cases this was undoubtedly true, but, in general, uncomplicated 
assumptions regarding the detrimental effects of the Little Ice Age in Europe are possible only 
because they ignore, among other events, the rise of the Dutch Republic during the coldest 
decades of the period. A sliver of land, with environmental characteristics that ought to have 
rendered it particularly vulnerable to the meteorological extremes of the Little Ice Age, 
nevertheless developed the most dynamic economy in the early modern world. How can 
historical climatologists make sense of the success of the Dutch Republic during the Little Ice 
Age; what might it say about the likely connections between climatic and human histories? This 
dissertation explores that question, revealing that the Republic’s distinct environmental, cultural, 
and economic structures yielded distinct patterns of both vulnerability and resilience in the face 
of climatic fluctuation.
10
 
                                                        
9
 Joëlle Gergis et al., “The Influence of Climate on the First European Settlement of Australia: A Comparison of 
Weather Journals, Documentary Data and Palaeoclimate Records, 1788–1793.”  Environmental History (2010) 
15(3): 485. Wolfgang Behringer, A Cultural History of Climate. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 141. Adam R. 
Hodge, “‘In Want of Nourishment for to Keep Them Alive:’ Climatic Fluctuations, Bison Scarcity, and the 
Smallpox Epidemic of 1780-82 on the Northern Great Plains.” Environmental History (2012) 17(2): 400.  
10
 The concepts of “vulnerability” and “resilience” here conform to definitions laid out by Georgina Endfield. 
Vulnerability refers to the potential for loss, while resilience can be defined as adaptive capacity that mitigates loss. 
 6 
Typical surveys of Dutch history frequently, if briefly, describe the importance of 
weather conditions for the Republic’s economic or military activity. Moreover, interdisciplinary 
reconstructions of the early modern climate have incorporated references to weather in surviving 
documentary evidence written in the Republic. However, very few published works devote more 
than passing attention to relationships between the oscillations of the Little Ice Age and the 
Republic’s history in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. For example, in a 
series of books and articles, military historian Geoffrey Parker acknowledged the military 
significance of weather but not climate for Spanish and Dutch troops during the Eighty Years’ 
War.
11
 Parker’s interests have recently turned to climate history, and in 2013 he published a 
major volume that attempts to link climatic cooling to global crisis in the seventeenth century. 
Remarkably, this book generally ignores developments within the Dutch Republic, despite 
Parker’s eminence as a historian of the Low Countries. Parker’s omission is not unusual. Most 
climate historians have excluded the Dutch from their narratives, while most historians of the 
Republic have described weather events without mentioning climatic trends.
12
  
There are some exceptions, but even these are problematic. Among historians whose 
interests do not primarily concern environmental issues, Jan de Vries has written perhaps the 
fullest treatment of climate change in the Republic. In 1978, De Vries briefly yet perceptively 
examined how cold winter weather influenced travel by horse-drawn barges through the Dutch 
canal system. Two years later, he published an article that considered the importance of climatic 
variability in Dutch history, yet he was constrained by the limitations of contemporary climate 
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reconstructions. Strangely, when Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude published a provocative 
survey of Dutch economic history in 1997, the historical influence of Little Ice Age weather was 
largely consigned to the ostensibly “unfathomable capriciousness of nature.”13 Slightly more 
detailed was the analysis of climate and meteorological conditions given by J.R. Jones in 1996. 
In the introduction to his survey of the Anglo-Dutch Wars, he very briefly described how 
easterlies and storms during the Little Ice Age facilitated Dutch attempts to leave port while 
disrupting English blockades. On the other hand, he seemed unaware that the European climate 
was not universally cool during the Anglo-Dutch Wars, and his history subsequently made no 
further reference to climatic fluctuation.
14
  
Climate historians have fared no better. In 1995 climatologist Hubert Lamb devoted only 
a few vague sentences to links between early climatic fluctuations, the migration of herring 
shoals, and the prosperity of the Republic in the seventeenth century. Five years later, 
anthropologist Brian Fagan, in his popularizing survey of the Little Ice Age in Europe, briefly 
mentioned ice off the Dutch coast during the winter of 1683/84. While describing the rise of a 
European “merchant class” during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Wolfgang Behringer 
in 2010 wrote that “not by chance did the Netherlands experience its Golden Age at this time, 
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when the rest of the continent suffered periodic famines.” However, the Republic received no 
further mention in Behringer’s A Cultural History of Climate.15  
 On the other hand, Dutch winter landscapes painted in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries have long received special attention from historical climatologists (chapter 
7). Most recently, Ingrid D. Sager and Alexis Metzger completed Masters theses that 
reinterpreted such paintings in light of the climatic fluctuations of the Little Ice Age. Now a PhD 
candidate, Metzger and fellow doctoral student Adam Sundberg have also studied the broader 
social and cultural influence of the Little Ice Age in the Dutch Republic. Metzger is investigating 
descriptions of cold weather in diary entries, while Sundberg has extensively examined the 
perception and material consequences of environmental disasters at the conclusion of the Dutch 
Golden Age. However, the only major published works to address the Little Ice Age in the Low 
Countries at any length are the massive volumes of J. Buisman’s and A.F.V. van Engelen’s 
Duizend jaar weer, wind en water in de Lage Landen (“A millennium of weather, wind and 
water in the Low Countries”). Still unfinished, the volumes do not present coherent historical 
analyses. Instead, they serve as important reference works that feature interdisciplinary climate 
reconstructions, primary sources recording severe weather events, and brief definitions or 
contextual explanations. Ultimately, this dissertation synthesizes several historiographical 
traditions by exploring how the Little Ice Age at its nadir influenced some of the most important 
material and cultural expressions of the Dutch Republic at its height.
16
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Reconstructing Past Climates 
 
Climate can be defined as the sum of weather events – both extreme and ordinary – 
during a particular time, typically a decade or longer, in a particular place, on a scale that can 
range from local to global.
17
 Many early attempts to identify links between human history and 
climate were grounded in the assumption of climatic stability,
18
 and typically served to naturalize 
societal inequalities. In the nineteenth century the popular European notion that immutable 
differences in the world’s climate were responsible for the geographical distribution of human 
achievement was largely supplanted in popular discourse by racism motivated by imagined 
biological differences.
19
 However, even as climatic determinism was largely discarded, and 
European colonists were encouraged to settle in the tropics, the notion of climatic stability 
appeared to have been confirmed by the first century-long records of weather observations 
compiled with relatively accurate meteorological instruments. By coincidence, this hundred-year 
temperature series began in the eighteenth century, and ended in the nineteenth century, during 
years in which average Atlantic temperatures were similar. Despite the recent experience of the 
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last cool phase of the Little Ice Age in the early nineteenth century, it was easier to plan future 
agro-industrial development based on the assumption of a stable climate.
20
 
The notion of past climatic instability was therefore foreign to the relevant disciplines of 
history and climatology when both were professionalized in the nineteenth century. Even in the 
1930s, pioneering attempts by Swedish meteorologist Tor Bergeron and American glaciologist 
François Matthes to explore climatic variability over time found little echo within scholarly 
writing before extreme winters in the following decade reflected the disruption of the relatively 
benign climatic regime of the early twentieth century. Renewed climatic variability stressed 
agricultural monocultures that supported unprecedented human populations, spurring the 
formation of new scientific institutions dedicated to the study of climatic fluctuation.
21
 In the 
humanities Gustaf Utterström in 1955 nuanced earlier climatically deterministic narratives by 
proposing climatic fluctuation as a possible explanation for both the medieval Viking expansion 
and Scandinavia’s subsequent decline in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.22 Just nine years 
later meteorologist Hubert Lamb published a historical analysis of English climatic fluctuations 
and their consequences from the context of a very different discipline. French historian 
Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, a leading figure in the influential Annales School, challenged some 
of Utterström’s conclusions, and in 1967 published his own seminal study of the early modern 
climate in Europe.
23
 
 
Coupled with building scientific awareness of anthropogenic climate change, these early 
studies provided an important catalyst for research into past climates. In subsequent decades 
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scientists and historians including Christian Pfister, Rudolf Bradzil, and Rüdiger Glaser, 
encouraged by the development of environmental history in the 1970s, have painstakingly 
reconstructed climatic fluctuation in the Holocene with the precision necessary to uncover 
convincing relationships between human and climatic histories.
24
 In the process they have 
developed the modern interdisciplinary sub-field of historical climatology, which bridges 
historical and scientific methodology to reconstruct weather records prior to the establishment of 
national meteorological networks, to explore societal vulnerability to climatic fluctuation, and to 
uncover cultural representations or responses to climate.
25
  
Essential to reliable climatic reconstruction is the use of diverse palaeoclimatic evidence 
originating from material structures that respond to climatic fluctuation and can substitute for 
direct instrumental measurements. Such “proxy” data include records from ice cores, tree rings, 
lake sediments, planktonic debris, peat bogs, and other evidence taken from the “natural 
archives” of the cryosphere, hydrosphere, and biosphere. It also incorporates scientific evidence 
of changes in the advance or retreat of tree lines, glaciers, and animal ranges, which predictably 
respond to climatic trends and, when amalgamated with other proxy data, contribute to the 
development of models that reconstruct past climatic variability. Archaeological and, for more 
recent periods, historical evidence derived from written descriptions of weather can help test 
these models while unearthing possible relationships between climatic shifts, weather events, 
ecological networks, and human populations. Surviving written or visual accounts of weather 
both mundane and, more typically, extreme are so plentiful from the medieval period on that the 
reconstruction of climatic fluctuation beyond the eleventh century is necessarily an 
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interdisciplinary pursuit. Consequently the Medieval Climatic Anomaly and, in particular, the 
Little Ice Age are the most studied climatic regimes predating the onset of anthropogenic 
warming, particularly for environmental historians who, notwithstanding their scientific literacy, 
usually operate from the humanities.
26
 
In general, scientific sources provide information relevant to weather and, in turn, climate 
at a different “resolution” than most documentary evidence. Low-resolution climate 
reconstructions involve weather patterns over long time-frames, or across large geographic 
locations. Ice cores, for example, can be interpreted to record no better than seasonal temperature 
variations stretching back hundreds of thousands of years. On the other hand, high-resolution 
climate reconstructions can incorporate hourly meteorological data that are relevant for very 
local environments. Continuous diary entries, for instance, can include extremely precise 
observations of changes in weather. However, such documentary evidence typically does not 
record meteorological conditions for more than several decades, and it must be carefully 
interpreted to test its reliability. For example, in documentary evidence weather events can be 
used as metaphors, or they can be exaggerated in order to prompt, or excuse, human activities. 
The need for precision in climatic reconstruction was not always recognized by 
historians. In 1970, Robert Claiborne, a noted populariser of science, admitted that in order to 
link climatic fluctuations to events in human history he had “guessed – and with a shamelessness 
that would give a professional historian or climatologist the green fits.”27 Born from the 
inadequacy of existing scientific sources and the difficulty of interpreting meteorological 
observations provided in documentary evidence, such guesswork, still ubiquitous in modern 
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popularizing narratives, has done much to discredit climate history for professional historians.
28
 
Lamb’s meticulous amalgamation of scientific and documentary evidence and his subsequent 
climatic reconstructions were pivotal to the emergence of climate as a category of serious 
historical analysis. Still, it was not until the 1980s that historical climatologist Christian Pfister 
and others developed a rigorous methodology for quantifying observations of temperature and 
precipitation in historical documents.  
Subsequently, most European climatic reconstructions employing documentary proxies 
have employed a variant of Pfister’s seven-step ordinal scale, in which seasonal temperatures, for 
example, fell somewhere between 3 (extremely hot) and -3 (extremely cold). The unusual 
density of historical source material compiled in the Low Countries has enabled researchers 
reconstructing regional temperatures to employ Pfister’s methodology on a more precise nine-
grade scale measuring seasonal intensity. Numerical values in that system have, in turn, been 
correlated to temperature through a synthesis of documentary and scientific evidence from 
historical and natural archives.
29
 In recent decades, the precision provided by the Pfister 
methodology, coupled with the continued refinement and increasing scope of analysed material 
proxy data, have allowed historians to reliably link particular historical events to meteorological 
conditions and, in turn, climatic trends. Subsequent studies are particularly persuasive for regions 
in which cultural frameworks stimulated the production of a sufficient density of relevant 
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documentary evidence for the development of new quantitative evidence, and the qualitative 
application of existing quantitative data. That condition existed in many parts of Europe from the 
high medieval centuries.
30
   
 
Reconstruction of the European Climate, 1200-1850 
 
The existence of a “Medieval Warm Period” across much of Europe was dramatically 
supported by Hubert Lamb’s exhaustive climate reconstructions, and it was later popularized in 
works like Brian Fagan’s The Little Ice Age (2000) and The Great Warming (2008). According 
to Lamb and other historical climatologists, the warmth and dryness of medieval Europe reached 
its height in the late thirteenth century, with temperatures exceeding those experienced in the late 
twentieth century.
31
 Newly considered scientific proxy data clearly demonstrate significant 
warming for much of the Northern Hemisphere during the eleventh century. However, they also 
reveal that the early twelfth and late thirteenth centuries were, on average, actually quite cool, 
particularly in Europe (Figure I.1).
32
 Moreover, recent analysis of Lamb’s documentary sources 
using the precise methodology for climatic reconstruction pioneered by Pfister has similarly cast 
doubt on the scope, if not the existence, of medieval warming.
33
 A critical analysis of surviving 
documentary evidence suggests that while much of Europe experienced a warming, drying trend 
                                                        
30
 Brazdil et al. “Historical Climatology in Europe - the State of the Art,” 377.  
31
 By as much as one degree Celsius in England, and perhaps 1.4 degrees Celsius in central Europe. Lamb, Climate, 
History and the Modern World, 260. Fagan, The Little Ice Age, 17. Brian Fagan, The Great Warming: Climate 
Change and the Rise and Fall of Civilizations. (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), xi.  
32
 M. E. Mann et al., "Global Signatures and Dynamical Origins of the Little Ice Age and Medieval Climate 
Anomaly."Science 326 (2009): 1257. Jan Esper et al., “Orbital Forcing of tree-ring data.” Nature Climate Change 
(2012): 2. William J. D’Andrea et al., “Mild Little Ice Age and unprecedented recent warmth in an 1800 year lake 
sediment record from Svalbard.” Geology 10.1130 (2012): 1010.  
33
 Lamb’s documentary evidence included secondary sources that recorded primary sources written well after the 
meteorological events they described, and primary documents written outside Lamb’s geographic focus. Astrid 
Ogilvie and Graham Farmer, “Documenting the Medieval Climate,” in Climates of the British Isles, ed. Mike Hulme 
and Elaine Barrow. (London: Routledge, 1997), 113.  
 15 
around 1200 CE, English temperatures began a lengthy decline only 40 years later. In the Low 
Countries and their surroundings the most significant trend from the end of the thirteenth century 
through the beginning of the sixteenth century was likely an increase in precipitation.
34
  
 
 
Fig. I.1. Multi-proxy reconstruction of fluctuations in mean temperatures for the entire Northern Hemisphere (top), 
the northern Atlantic, the northern Pacific, and the Niño3 region (2.5°S - 2.5°N; 92.5°W - 147.5°W). Both medieval 
warming and early modern cooling are particularly visible in the Northern Hemisphere and Northern Atlantic 
reconstructions. Mann et al., “Global Signatures and Dynamical Origins,” 1257. 
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At the periphery of the medieval European world, sustained cooling was already evident 
before 1200 CE. Inuit populations belonging to the Dorset culture, once present throughout high 
latitudes in Canada and Greenland, began migrating south as early as the twelfth century. The 
severe winter of 1197/98 in Iceland abruptly ushered in a period of far colder temperatures and 
increased sea ice, contributing to a period of crisis for the island’s population. Meanwhile, 
conditions for Norse settlers in Greenland also deteriorated, and in 1250 the Konungs Skuggsjá 
or “King’s Mirror,” a Norwegian work, described the “great superfluity of ice on the sea” near 
Greenland that had no known parallel “anywhere else in the whole world.”35 As yearly 
temperatures fell and sea ice expanded, Norse settlers in Iceland gradually abandoned farming, 
yet their relatives in Greenland generally failed to dispense with sedentary agriculture in favour 
of hunting, trapping, or southerly migration. By 1350 the Vesterbygd, or “West Settlement,” was 
destroyed, while the larger and more southerly Østerbygd, or “East Settlement,” endured with 
great difficulty until 1500.
36
 
 In the late thirteenth century, four major volcanic eruptions released aerosol particles into 
the atmosphere that reflected sunlight and temporarily cooled the Earth. These events likely 
coincided with a change in Earth’s orbit that reduced solar radiation across the Northern 
Hemisphere. Sea ice expanded in the Arctic, and the bright ice in turn reflected more sunlight 
into space than the darker water it replaced. Combined, these changes weakened the Atlantic 
Gulf Stream, allowing colder temperatures to endure long after the volcanic eruptions ended. 
Thereafter, temperatures gradually – if erratically – cooled across Europe, while the continent’s 
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western periphery was repeatedly afflicted with catastrophic storms and associated flooding.
37
 
The Thames froze over for the first time in a century during the winter of 1269/70, but it was the 
torrentially wet spring, summer, and autumn of 1314 that, for many historical climatologists, 
heralded the beginning of the Little Ice Age in Europe. In much of Europe, exceptional wetness 
lingered with little relief until as late as 1321, ruining crops, stimulating disease among cattle, 
and contributing to widespread famine.
38
 Chillier temperatures in a new climatic regime 
encouraged the widespread desertion of villages located across the agricultural periphery of 
Europe, and perhaps 4,000 were abandoned in England alone in the centuries after 1300. Masked 
by the general cooling trend, wild fluctuations in decadal, yearly, and seasonal weather endured 
for over two centuries, culminating in a short-lived reprieve of relative warmth and tranquillity in 
the early sixteenth century.
39
   
 In 1565 a severe winter and chilly summer marked what many historical climatologists 
have identified as the beginning of the first great cold period – or minimum – of the Little Ice 
Age. The expansion of the glacier bordering Grindelwald, a Swiss town, was among the most 
obvious and traumatic manifestations of the cooler climate, prompting historical climatologist 
Christian Pfister to coin the term “Grindelwald Fluctuation” to describe the period. Influenced by 
the lingering effect of volcanism, in vast swaths of the northern hemisphere temperatures across 
all seasons fell at least one degree Celsius below twentieth-century averages until the aftermath 
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of the “year without summer” in 1628.40 Although colder weather typically reduces the rate of 
water evaporation, precipitation and average surface moisture declined in many European 
regions during the coldest phases of the Little Ice Age, particularly along the shores of the 
Mediterranean. On the other hand, precipitation and surface wetness rose across much of 
Northwestern Europe, particularly during spring and autumn.
41
 Meanwhile, the southward 
movement of the Arctic circumpolar vortex, a persistent cyclonic band of high winds 
surrounding the Arctic, also stimulated increased storminess in many European regions. In 
particular, the frequency of gales rose sharply in the continental Northwest.
42
 
 During the coldest years of the Grindelwald Fluctuation the growing season in many 
parts of Europe was reduced by as much as six weeks, encouraging farmers to abandon wheat, 
which thrives in warm, dry conditions, for cold weather crops like barley, oats, or rye.  
In the sixteenth century, expanding agricultural commercialization in slivers of Northwestern 
Europe, and the simultaneous development of increasingly sophisticated networks of 
transportation, ensured that the kind of food shortages that had contributed to famine in the 
fourteenth century often encouraged regional price increases or political change two hundred 
years later.
43
  Nevertheless, regional famines could still afflict the populations of typically less 
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economically developed areas when devastating events in the incessant religious warfare set off 
by the Reformation intersected with years marked by particularly extreme weather during the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation. Malnutrition, coupled with frigid conditions and unusually high or low 
precipitation, frequently rendered vulnerable populations of both humans and dependent animals 
more susceptible to disease. The perception of meteorological change and, in particular, decline 
was nearly as important as the reality, stimulating a wave of suicides during the coldest years of 
the Grindelwald Fluctuation while encouraging a surge in the prosecution of witches blamed for 
destructive weather, famine, and “unnatural” diseases (Figure I.2).44 
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Fig. I.2. Ulrich Molitor, “Witches sacrificing cock and snake to raise hailstorm,” in De Ianjis et phitonicis 
mulieribus. 1489. 
 
By the fourth decade of the seventeenth century, temperatures, precipitation patterns, and 
storm frequency in Europe rebounded to something approximating twentieth-century averages. 
The relatively benign climate of the following thirty years, while rarely considered by historical 
climatologists, reflects the variable nature of a period that is, in some respects, misrepresented by 
the term “Little Ice Age.” If an ice age constitutes a global phenomenon defined by profound 
cooling, it would be better applied to three great minima – “Very Little Ice Ages” – that each 
endured for significantly less than a century. Indeed, even these frigid decades were 
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distinguished less by a suite of meteorological characteristics that returned year after year than 
by weather extremes, expressed most clearly in calamitous storms.
45
  
 The European climate had cooled again by 1662. Continental temperatures dropped 
between 1 and 2° C below their twentieth-century averages as precipitation patterns changed and 
storminess increased in many regions. This “Maunder Minimum,” the second great cold phase of 
the Little Ice Age, was named after the sharp reduction in sunspots discovered by astronomer 
Edward Maunder in the late seventeenth century. A combination of volcanism, orbital variation, 
ongoing reforestation, and the slight reduction in solar radiation that accompanied the decline in 
sunspots likely contributed to the global onset of a cooler climate. European crops had 
diversified considerably since the conclusion of the Grindelwald Fluctuation, yet cultivation 
limits for agricultural staples shifted in conjunction with broader changes in the ranges of 
continental flora and fauna. Owing in part to cooler temperatures, increased rainfall, and perhaps 
greater storm frequency, English and Baltic vineyards had already been abandoned centuries 
earlier. By contrast, during each Little Ice Age minimum the cultivation limit for crops like 
olives shifted to the south, before rebounding in warmer decades.  
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Fig. I.3. An ice fair on the frozen Thames in 1684, during the Maunder Minimum. Abraham Hondius, “A Frost Fair 
on the Thames at Temple Stairs,” painting, 1684, Museum of London, http://www.museumoflondon.org.uk/london-
wall/whats-on/exhibitions-displays/frost-fairs.  
 
In the northern periphery of Europe, cooler temperatures and shifting vegetation ranges 
complicated pastoralism, and more farmers reared sheep instead of cows. Moreover, wild plant 
diversity probably decreased at high altitudes and latitudes. Scavenging wolves increasingly 
entered population centres during cold winters, and vultures departed the frigid Alps. The 
Thames and other European rivers froze over completely during the coldest winters of the 
period, halting seaborne traffic while encouraging frost fairs (Figure I.3). During its nadir in the 
last decade of the seventeenth century, the Maunder Minimum coincided with a rise in witchcraft 
prosecution in regions where cooling was especially pronounced.
46
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European temperatures recovered around 1720, although the warmer, drier climatic 
regime that followed was interrupted by frigid winters during the 1740s. By 1760 global 
temperatures had again declined, with conditions echoing those of the Grindelwald Fluctuation 
and the Maunder Minimum gradually returning across much of Europe. Named for another 
paucity of sunspots, this time detected by astronomer Richard Dalton, the Dalton Minimum with 
its accompanying cold temperatures, unusual patterns of precipitation, and increased storminess 
lingered in Europe until approximately 1850. In 1814 the Thames froze entirely for the last time, 
and by the end of the century precipitation and storminess had moderated while global 
temperatures fitfully recovered, culminating in the current climatic regime of accelerating 
anthropogenic warming.
47
  
   
A Brief History of the Dutch Republic  
 
In the Low Countries, medieval and early modern climatic fluctuations coincided with 
even more dramatic environmental changes. Once dominated by coastal dunes, salt marshes, and 
spongy, dome-like peat bogs, large tracts of the lowland Netherlands bordering the North Sea 
were reclaimed and settled in the medieval period. However, the ditch-digging, surface 
oxidation, and animal trampling that accompanied this transformation steadily lowered the land 
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and necessitated ever more sophisticated defences against the sea. In the fourteenth century, the 
construction of a vast network of dikes, dams, sluices, and eventually windmills, initially 
pursued by individual communities, mirrored social developments that gathered these capital-
intensive technological achievements under collective institutions of increasing scale. By the 
sixteenth century, the economy of the coastal Low Countries was highly developed and 
remarkably “modern,” with far more workers employed in industry than in agriculture. 
Moreover, the rising pace of peat harvesting, the continued construction of wind and watermills, 
and the importance of shipping by sail ensured that the energy foundation of the Low Countries 
was uniquely effective in a continent dominated by agricultural economies. Easy access to 
plentiful energy supplies encouraged industrial development in coastal regions, which, in turn, 
necessitated urbanization while stimulating – and being stimulated by – trade in Baltic cereals 
already passing through the burgeoning town of Amsterdam. Located at the maritime crossroads 
between the Mediterranean and the rising economies of northern Europe, the coastal provinces of 
the Low Countries were connected by a network of natural and artificial waterways that allowed 
imports as well as exports to move relatively efficiently between centres of production and 
consumption.
48
   
In 1549, the historically decentralized seventeen provinces that together constituted the 
Low Countries were united as a single entity within the Holy Roman Empire. After Emperor 
Charles V abdicated in 1555, his son Philip II incorporated the provinces within the Spanish 
Hapsburg Empire.
 
Motivated by the creeping expansion of Protestantism through the provinces 
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of the Low Countries, the imposition and brutality of the Spanish Inquisition coincided with a 
worsening trade war with England, the disruption of the Baltic grain trade, and crop failures 
influenced by the onset of the Grindelwald Fluctuation. The Inquisition was symptomatic of a 
broader attempt by Philip II to centralize the Low Countries under Spanish dominion by 
imposing new taxes, curbing the relative legal independence of towns and nobles, and 
suppressing unsanctioned religious movements.  
 
 
Map I.1. Provinces and territories of the Dutch Republic in its seventeenth-century Golden Age. Holland, the focus 
of this study, is in the centre, on the coast, and filled in with orange. Other important locations in this dissertation: 
the Zuider Zee (the inland sea at centre), Zeeland (the green islands at bottom left), Texel (the southernmost 
perimeter island in the Zuider Zee, orange), and Friesland (purple, the north-eastern coast of the Zuider Zee). 
Johannes Janssonius, Novus Atlas Sive Theatrum Orbis Terrarum. Amsterdam, 1658. 
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Between 1565 and 1568, legal opposition to Hapsburg rule, launched by a cabal of 
powerful nobles, was joined by popular iconoclastic fury and eventually military revolt that 
culminated in the lasting division of the Low Countries between the Protestant North and the 
Catholic South.
49
 In 1579, representatives from the provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, 
Friesland, Gelderland, and Ommelanden (the area surrounding but not including Groningen) 
gathered to sign the Union of Utrecht (Map I.1). An Act of Abjuration that formally renounced 
the King of Spain was passed by the States General in 1581, signifying the emergence of an 
independent Dutch Republic. Thereafter, the Union effectively functioned as a constitution for 
the northern Netherlands. Envisioned as a defensive alliance for the prosecution of the war 
against Spain, the Union entrenched the radically decentralized political structure of the new 
United Provinces of the Dutch Republic. Decisions were reached only through laborious 
consultation between largely bourgeois elites within towns, provincial legislatures (or States), 
and the representatives of the States-General in The Hague. This unwieldy political system 
existed in uneasy parallel with the House of Orange, the Republic’s preeminent noble dynasty. 
The princes of Orange continued to exercise great political influence, and most held the 
hereditary position of stadthouder of the provincial States. In this faculty they served as heads of 
state and consuls in time of war, although their authority was technically bestowed by the States-
General.
50
  
During their long war with contemporary Europe’s greatest empire, the disjointed 
collection of towns and provinces that constituted the Republic, and together housed no more 
than two million people, emerged as the leading economy of the early modern world. The 
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coevolving influences behind this apparent economic miracle were central to the Republic’s 
distinct experience with the climatic fluctuations of the Little Ice Age. Many involved the 
intensification of earlier foundations for prosperity in the maritime provinces. Essential to that 
effort was the deepening of existing canals, and the construction of new canals, which further 
connected the major coastal towns of the Republic. Even more important was the introduction of 
regulated sailing routes, called beurtvaarten, which provided dependable times of arrival and 
departure for travellers.
51
 The rising value of land, and the growing cost of agricultural 
commodities across Europe, also encouraged increasingly wealthy urbanites to invest in massive 
reclamation projects, while the expansion of grain production east of the Elbe prompted many 
Dutch farmers to experiment with new crops. Small-scale improvements completed by individual 
farmers predated the Dutch revolt, yet in the late sixteenth-century market changes intersected 
with the growth of urban commercial networks to accelerate and expand agricultural 
commercialization in the northern Netherlands.
52
 Technical innovations that improved the 
efficiency of windmills were central to increasing the quantity and value of cultivated land, and 
the development of new technologies was encouraged by the Republic’s mercantile elite. In 
1595, the technical adaptation of the full-rigged ship to intra-European trade culminated in the 
creation of the fluyt, or flute, a merchant vessel that required minimal crews and therefore 
generated maximum profit. Flutes helped the Dutch dominate the profitable single-season 
triangle trade in which Baltic bulk goods like timber or grain were exchanged for French and, in 
years free from Spanish embargos, Iberian wine, salt, and other merchandise through the ports of 
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the Republic’s coastal provinces. The herring buss, a floating factory that enabled herring to be 
salted at sea, was an earlier technological innovation that allowed Dutch fishermen to exploit 
herring populations beyond the coast and helped fuel the profitable expansion of the fishery.
53
   
Industrial activity in the northern Low Countries received great stimulus from refugees 
escaping war and religious persecution in the south. After the first years of the Revolt, the 
heavily fortified towns of the coastal provinces were relatively safe from capture. The atrocities 
that accompanied the sack of Antwerp by mutinous Spanish troops in 1576, followed by its 
recapture in 1585, encouraged many refugees to seek the security of the northern Netherlands. 
Once the industrial and commercial centre of Europe, Antwerp had been home to prominent 
mercantile families who brought their wealth and expertise to the major towns of Holland. Many 
settled in Leiden, cultivating a woollen cloth industry that helped the city emerge as one of the 
most important industrial centres in Europe. Ironically, Spanish measures intended to suppress 
the Revolt also indirectly stimulated Dutch commercial expansion, encouraging Dutch merchants 
to finance exploratory voyages that culminated in the development of the East and West India 
Companies (VOC and WIC) in 1602 and 1621, respectively. The VOC, the more successful of 
these companies, transported precious metals to Asia in exchange for spices, textiles, and other 
high-value, low-volume commodities. It dominated trade between Europe and Asia, and within 
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Asia, for most of the seventeenth century, while assuming an increasingly central position in the 
Republic’s economy.54 
Following the creation of the Exchange Bank of Amsterdam in 1609, the province of 
Holland, and in particular the burgeoning city of Amsterdam, emerged as the financial, 
commercial, and industrial capital of Europe. Unlike Antwerp, Amsterdam became a global 
entrepôt, and was host to continuous trade that contrasted with Antwerp’s regular fairs. 
Moreover, Amsterdam’s merchants combined shipping, trade, and distribution, while their 
counterparts in sixteenth-century Antwerp had primarily handled goods brought to the city by 
foreign merchants. The Republic’s ascendency within Europe was stimulated by the refinement 
and, in turn, simultaneous application of existing financial, commercial, and industrial 
technologies within a unique cultural and environmental setting. This process encouraged the 
growth of an economy with sophisticated capitalist structures that displayed unprecedented 
characteristics of modernity, despite the persistence of local privileges, guilds, cash trading, and 
other lingering medieval anachronisms. In its urbanization, monetization, patterns of energy use, 
education levels, social and physical mobility, financial institutions, and interventionist 
governments, the Republic during its Golden Age more closely resembled a stereotypically 
“modern” economy than it did its contemporary European neighbours.55 Frequently stimulated 
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by unsupportable speculation and exacerbated by environmental degradation, its economic 
booms and busts resembled those that accompany capitalism today. Owing to its relative 
modernity, the Dutch Republic’s financial and economic influence was disproportionate to its 
small population and meagre natural resources. By 1636, as many as 1,750 Dutch merchant 
vessels were active in European waters, not including 600 herring busses and more than 200 
cavernous ships belonging to the VOC and WIC.
56
 
The economic dynamism of the Republic’s Golden Age encouraged, and was stimulated 
by, a remarkable flowering of intellectual life in the northern Netherlands. Among many other 
luminaries, Justus Lipsius, Joseph Justus Scaliger, Hugo de Groot, Rembrandt van Rijn, Joost 
van den Vondel, René Descartes, Christiaan Huygens, Johannes Vermeer, Baruch Spinoza, and 
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Pierre Bayle lived in the cities of the Republic. Amsterdam in particular emerged as an 
international centre for publishing, mapmaking, and the other commercial expressions of a 
vigorous intellectual life. Moreover, the vitality of Dutch scholarship was not divorced from 
broader Dutch society.  In the context of seventeenth-century Europe, the Republic, and 
particularly Holland, was exceptionally urbanized, highly literate, and possessed of a striking 
variety of technological innovations that improved the lives of ordinary citizens.
57
  
The conclusion of the Eighty Years’ War with Spain in 1648 briefly left the Republic in a 
position of unchallenged economic primacy within Europe. However, within the strengthening 
states of England and France the Republic’s commercial success encouraged protectionism, 
outright hostility, and ultimately emulation as the seventeenth century drew to a close. The 
coastal provinces of the Republic usually remained secure from invasion, yet incessant warfare 
from 1652 until the conclusion of the War of the Quadruple Alliance in 1720 dangerously 
strained the state’s financial resources. By 1730, the introduction of the paal worm or “pile 
worm” (Teredo limmoria), a wood-boring mollusc, undermined the Republic’s wooden defences 
against the sea and mandated their enormously expensive replacement with stone structures.
58
  
 Despite repeated political, financial, and environmental setbacks, for decades the 
Republic’s economy was distinguished more by transformation and relative decline than outright 
collapse.
59
 Falling commodity prices, rising taxes, the increasing cost of labour, and a series of 
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natural disasters undermined the Republic’s agricultural productivity, while the destruction of 
much of the herring fleet during the War of the Spanish Succession was exacerbated when 
demand for fish faltered as the price for other forms of meat declined. Nevertheless, farmers in 
the coastal provinces responded by implementing labour-saving devices and planting new crops 
like tobacco, while in the early eighteenth century the whaling industry rebounded from a series 
of disastrous years. Shipbuilding, textiles, brickmaking, pottery, brewing, and the other 
traditional industries of the Golden Age all declined after 1670, yet the growth of paper-making, 
sugar-refining, distillery, tobacco-processing, and other new industries in the eighteenth century 
reflected the continued economic flexibility of the Republic. Trade experienced a similar 
transformation, as the importance of intra-European commerce declined within the Republic’s 
economy after the middle of the seventeenth century while the VOC continued to increase the 
volume of its trade, even if its profits stagnated. However, transformation ultimately yielded to 
absolute decline after the first decades of the eighteenth century, and the government of the 
heavily indebted Republic settled into a policy of official neutrality. Nevertheless, Amsterdam, 
still one of Europe’s largest cities, remained the continent’s principal financial, commercial, and 
printing centre for most of the eighteenth century.
60
  
 
The Frigid Golden Age: an Overview of Climate Change in the Dutch Republic 
   
The tumultuous history of the northern Netherlands in the late medieval and early modern 
periods overlapped with five centuries of relentless climatic variability. Climate reconstructions 
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compiled from a variety of scientific and documentary proxy data reveal that variations in 
average temperature in the Low Countries roughly mirrored what was experienced elsewhere in 
northern Europe. As the Medieval Climatic Anomaly drew to a close, the region joined the rest 
of Europe in experiencing the relatively cool, wet, and stormy weather of the late thirteenth and 
early fourteenth centuries. Moderate summer temperatures were juxtaposed with decadal 
fluctuations in average temperatures in winter, spring, and autumn, but in the early sixteenth 
century these fluctuations yielded to general warmth across all seasons. However, the frigid 
winter of 1561 was the first of a series of cold winters that culminated in the remarkably severe 
winter of 1565 and heralded the onset of the Grindelwald Fluctuation (Figure I.4). The summer 
of 1628 was among the coldest of the Little Ice Age, yet relatively mild winters and warm 
summers between 1629 and 1631 demonstrated the influence of a new climatic regime. Two 
decades later, winters in the early 1650s were cooler than average, but summers were 
correspondingly warm until 1658. Despite the hot summer of 1666, 1662 can be considered the 
first year of the Maunder Minimum in the Low Countries given the increasingly cold 
temperatures that subsequently affected most seasons, coupled with the amplified yearly 
variability in temperature, precipitation, and storminess. The Maunder Minimum in the Republic 
concluded in 1718, when a decade of cool summers abruptly yielded to two summers that were 
among the hottest in the history of the Low Countries. Thereafter, seasonal temperatures 
rebounded, with winters in general growing milder and summers usually remaining warm until 
1740, although 1725 was among the coldest years of the century, and a very chilly exception to 
the climatic trend. Following the very warm year of 1759, temperatures again declined in the 
Dalton Minimum, which despite substantial variations in annual temperatures endured in the 
Republic until approximately 1850.
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Fig. I.4. One of many winter scenes created by Pieter Bruegel the Elder. This one, perhaps the most famous, was 
painted from Brussels during the frigid winter of 1565. Pieter Bruegel, the Elder, “Hunters in the Snow,” painting, 
1565, Kunsthistorisches Museum Vienna, http://www.google.com/culturalinstitute/asset-viewer/hunters-in-the-
snow-winter/WgFmzFNNN74nUg?hl=en.  
 
Climate reconstructions reveal the extraordinary variability of seasonal temperatures 
during the height of the Dutch Republic, particularly in the minima that frame the origins and 
climax of its Golden Age. Nevertheless, they also reflect a persistent and severe reduction in 
average temperatures during the coldest phases of the Little Ice Age. During the Maunder and 
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Dalton minima, winter temperatures declined by approximately one degree Celsius below 
twentieth-century averages. Spring temperatures fell by nearly as much, plunging during the 
early Maunder Minimum to a low exceeded only in the middle of the Grindelwald Fluctuation. 
Fall temperatures clearly demonstrated the influence of the Grindelwald Fluctuation, yet dipped 
relatively slightly during the Maunder Minimum, and actually rebounded strongly during the 
otherwise frigid 1690s. Summer temperatures reflect the least variation, yet reveal the influence 
of the Grindelwald Fluctuation more clearly than the Maunder Minimum. Indeed, average 
summer temperature during the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century was likely 
slightly warmer than twentieth-century averages, although summer temperatures were subject to 
unusually pronounced changes from year to year.  Overall, the cool summers of the late 1580s 
appear to have been matched in chilliness only by the summers of the early 1690s, while many of 
the winters during the 1590s, 1680s, and 1690s were among the coldest of the Little Ice Age 
(Figure I.5).
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Fig. I.5. Multi-proxy reconstructions of fluctuations in average temperature in winter, summer, spring and fall for 
the Low Countries, compiled by F. IJnsen. Blue bars represent years during the Grindelwald Fluctuation (left), the 
Maunder Minimum (centre) and the Dalton Minimum (right). Buisman and Van Engelen, (ed.), Duizend jaar weer, 
wind en water in de Lage Landen, Vol. IV, 707. 
 
 Reconstructions of seasonal temperature in the early modern Low Countries clearly 
reflect the meteorological variability and, ultimately, chilliness of the three major minima of the 
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Little Ice Age. On the other hand, attempts to reconstruct seasonal or even annual fluctuations in 
regional precipitation are fraught with difficulty, and have consequently proven less definitive. 
Reliable seventeenth-century reconstructions for North Sea regions do not encompass 
precipitation in all seasons, and reconstructions crafted from proxy data for winter and summer 
do not appear to agree with those developed by the most current models.
63
 Moreover, 
fluctuations in precipitation did not directly correspond to the amount of moisture on land, which 
was also subject to rates of evaporation that were influenced by fluctuations in temperature. 
Overall, it remains uncertain whether all Little Ice Age minima in Europe were similarly 
accompanied by generally wet or dry weather from region to region, in part because fluctuations 
in precipitation did not precisely accompany changes in seasonal temperature.  
Still, trends in precipitation and temperature intersected in a manner that has led scholars 
like Jürg Luterbacher to conclude that European winters during the Maunder Minimum were, on 
average, colder and drier than they were during the twentieth century, while summers were 
cooler and wetter. Moreover, Pfister’s study of Alpine Europe inspired him to propose the 
concept of “Little Ice Age Type-Impacts” to model how cold, rainy mid-summers with cold 
springs and rainy autumns influenced agricultural yields. Nevertheless, ship logbooks compiled 
in the North Sea between 1685 and 1700 examined by Dennis Wheeler recorded significant 
annual variability in the scale of recorded precipitation that does not easily fit with the concept of 
“Little Ice Age Type-Impacts.” While ship logbooks likely underreported precipitation and are 
consequently better suited for the reconstruction of relative rather than absolute frequencies of 
precipitation, their measurements reflect a shift from drier to wetter conditions over the course of 
Wheeler’s study period. Ultimately, low-resolution Dutch reconstructions suggest that 
                                                        
63
 Raible, “Climate variability - observations, reconstructions, and model simulations for the Atlantic-European and 
Alpine region,” 19. 
 38 
precipitation was very abundant during the height of the Grindelwald Fluctuation, while dry 
conditions prevailed in the warmer climatic “intervals” of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. In Northwestern Europe, the coldest phases of the Little Ice Age were likely among 
the wettest, but conclusions regarding changes in the abundance of precipitation during the 
Maunder Minimum, let alone the extent of surface moisture, are less robust than they are for 
other meteorological phenomena.
64
   
In the North Sea region, fluctuations in storminess have also been associated with the 
minima of the Little Ice Age.  Reconstructions of shifts in European temperature and 
precipitation rely largely on scientific proxy data, especially at temporal or geographic 
resolutions of lower precision than the seasonal or the local. Expanding the analysis of regional 
climatic variability to include changes in storm frequency and intensity in the Low Countries, 
however, is more dependent on the interdisciplinary consideration of records compiled by 
contemporary observers. While many of these documentary sources are quantitative in nature, 
their interpretation remains a subjective exercise, and that has stimulated historiographic 
controversy. In her landmark 1977 survey of primary sources related to storm surges and river 
flooding in the Low Countries, Elisabeth Gottschalk charted a surge in storminess during the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation and a subsequent return to relative tranquillity after 1630. To 
Gottschalk, catastrophic storms accompanied the onset of the Maunder Minimum, with a series 
of particularly devastating storm surges afflicting the Dutch coast between 1664 and 1686. 
Gottschalk’s reconstructions revealed that the number of severe storm surges doubled after 1650 
relative to the first half of the century, although overall there were fewer storm surges in the 
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seventeenth century than there had been in the previous century.
65
 Similarly, in 1984 Hubert 
Lamb argued that the frequency of severe gales in the North Sea region rose during Little Ice 
Age minima. According to Lamb, seven severe storms ravaged the shores of the North Sea in 
1660s alone, after just six in the first half of the seventeenth century.
66
  
Fifteen years later, Adriaan de Kraker examined the maintenance accounts of Flemish 
dikes and dunes, concluding that severe storminess increased by 400% during the Grindelwald 
Fluctuation, even as moderate storminess declined slightly after 1550. According to De Kraker, 
storm activity diminished during warm or average winters but intensified in relation to winter 
cooling. However, in 2005 De Kraker tempered some of these conclusions. De Kraker again 
employed accounts of coastal towns and records of dike and dune maintenance in a methodology 
that interpreted only continuous, uniform data gathered over many decades, while ignoring more 
fragmentary sources. Although revealing significant variability in storminess, and confirming 
that the Grindelwald Fluctuation was particularly tempestuous, De Kraker uncovered no clear 
link between cold winters and enhanced storminess.
67
  
De Kraker’s methodology, while meticulous, nevertheless fails to consider that 
quantitative maintenance accounts, which recorded the cost of infrastructural repairs, did not 
document storms but rather storm damage. The impact of storms was mediated by geographical 
conditions, environmental structures, economic transformations, and the subsequent arrangement 
of human infrastructure. If maintenance accounts recorded any meteorological shifts at all, they 
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over-represented gales that blew from the sea and consequently inflicted greater damage to dikes, 
dunes, and coastal towns in Flanders, while under-representing storms that blew from less 
destructive directions. Similarly, Lamb’s striking conclusions reflecting an extreme rise in severe 
storminess along the English coast of the North Sea were likely influenced by the greater damage 
inflicted by winds that blew from the east. Both Lamb and De Kraker therefore measured not 
fluctuations in storm frequency per se, but rather changes in the impact of storms that blew from 
the east or west, respectively, in socioeconomically diverse regions.
68
 
Records that relate to early modern ship journeys can be a much more effective proxy 
than maintenance accounts for measuring changes in storm frequency and severity. However, 
storm reconstruction using such sources can also be complicated by methodological problems. 
For example, seventeenth-century shifts in shipwreck distribution and frequency might, at first, 
suggest changes in contemporary storm behaviour. In fact, the likelihood that a gale would sink a 
ship was also a product of the competence of its crew, the size and seaworthiness of the vessel, 
and the location of landscape features that could threaten the hull. In a storm, the coast and 
underwater sandbanks, known as shoals, threatened a ship only when they were in a lee position 
from that vessel (Figure I.6). In other words, if storm winds did not blow a ship towards a shoal 
or shore, they were far less likely to influence a shipwreck. Similarly, storms were more 
threatening when they struck fleets, as ships could run afoul of one another and so be sunk.  
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Fig. I.6. Location of a lee shore or coast. In sufficiently high winds, the vessel depicted would be in peril. The “lee 
side” of this ship is to the left, while the “weather side” is on the right. The Dictionary of English Nautical 
Language, accessed 28 February, 2014, http://www.seatalk.info/cgi-bin/nautical-marine-sailing-
dictionary/db.cgi?db=db&uid=default&FirstLetter=l&sb=Term&view_records=View+Records&nh=3  
 
On the other hand, ship logbooks naturally recorded not just wrecks but daily or even 
hourly weather conditions. Moreover, ships at sea were generally – if not invariably – removed 
from landscape features and patterns of settlement that affected the manner in which storms were 
recorded. On the Beaufort Scale of nautical wind velocity, wind speeds during a gale blow at or 
above Beaufort (BF) 8 (at least 34 knots), which creates waves more than 5.5 metres high.
69
 In 
2009, Wheeler analysed weather data in 300 English ship logbooks, and confirmed earlier 
studies that demonstrated a remarkable increase in the frequency of weather measurements 
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describing winds at or above BF 8 during the late Maunder Minimum.
70
 These findings are 
echoed in the writings of early modern Dutch weather observers, who did record a surge in 
severe storminess during the minima of the Little Ice Age. Whether storminess in the Low 
Countries rose during all seasons remains uncertain, as does the precise relationship between 
increases in storm frequency and storm intensity, yet the majority of evidence reflects an 
increase in violent weather along the shores of the North Sea during the minima of the Little Ice 
Age that was more severe than what was experienced in most of Europe.
71
  
Hubert Lamb was among the first historical climatologists to chart shifts in wind 
direction, not just velocity, across early modern Europe. By using seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century measurements of wind direction kept in contemporary England, Lamb concluded that the 
frequency of westerly winds rose in the warmer decades of the Little Ice Age, while declining 
during its minima.
72
 Lamb’s conclusions found little echo within historical climatology until the 
very recent rise of interest in the meteorological data contained within ship logbooks. In 2005, 
Wheeler used 52 logbooks compiled by English officers in the English Channel to reconstruct 
shifts in prevailing wind during the heart of the Maunder Minimum between 1685 and 1700. The 
resulting statistics demonstrate a high yearly variability of westerly winds, with a deep nadir in 
1688 and further minima in 1692, 1695, and 1697.
73
 In 2009, Wheeler’s study of additional ship 
logbooks recorded up to 1750 reveals that westerlies during the Maunder Minimum were 
especially rare from January to May, and again in September, while easterlies were more 
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common during colder winters.
74
 The change in the frequency of easterlies during the period was 
therefore most felt during the months in which easterlies were more common even in warmer 
climates, and overall winter easterlies were 10% more frequent than they are today. These 
changes to the patterns of prevailing wind were probably caused by increased meridional airflow. 
In the middle latitudes air usually flows from west to east, but this system can break down, 
enabling so-called “meridional” winds to persistently blow from otherwise unusual directions. 
During the Maunder Minimum such a breakdown probably occurred over the north-eastern 
Atlantic as a result of the changes in the position of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), a 
pattern of atmospheric pressure at sea level between the Icelandic low and the Azores high. 
These changes subsequently permitted the persistent intrusion of frigid Arctic air into the North 
Sea region.
75
  
To Wheeler, the weather data given within the logbooks appear to rule out any direct link 
between persistent winter easterlies and the overall cooling of the North Sea region in the late 
seventeenth century. Still, Wheeler’s summary of cold spells noted in the same logbooks 
between 1685 and 1700 suggests a strong correlation between northeasterlies and periods of 
particularly cold weather.
76
 This is not surprising, because westerly winds funnel heat from the 
Atlantic, sustaining Europe’s mild climate relative to North America at similar latitudes.77 
Indeed, the detailed reconstruction of average temperatures in the Netherlands compiled by 
A.F.V. van Engelen, J. Buisman, and F. IJnsen seems to demonstrate that years distinguished by 
reduced westerly winds – such as 1688, 1692, 1695, and 1697 – were also marked by frigid 
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winters and cool summers.
78
 Furthermore, Rüdiger Glaser and Gerhard Koslowski have revealed 
that frequent westerlies accompanied Little Ice Age maxima and, in turn, periods of diminished 
winter ice in the Baltic region, while Little Ice Age minima brought abundant easterlies and 
severe winter ice. According to Glaser and Koslowski, a prolonged warmer period dominated by 
westerly winds faltered in 1654, after which a cooler period marked by frequent meridional 
blocking and expansive ice coverage endured until 1710. Since these changes corresponded to 
shifts in the position of the NAO, similar fluctuations in average temperatures and prevailing 
winds were likely also felt further south, on the shores of the English Channel.
79
  
 Because changes in wind patterns were as important as decade-scale shifts in temperature 
or precipitation for the mariners and millers of the Dutch Republic, this dissertation will quantify 
Anglo-Dutch ship logbooks previously unexamined by historical climatologists to contribute to 
ground-breaking reconstructions of prevailing wind across early modern Europe. Logs kept 
aboard East Indiamen plying the oceanic rich trades, and warships sailing in the fleets that fought 
the Anglo-Dutch Wars, reflect an increase in storms and easterlies during the Maunder 
Minimum. Moreover, weather diaries and personal correspondence, kept in areas that provided 
little shelter from coastal winds, support these accounts. Ultimately, in this dissertation a rise in 
easterly winds is included among the weather patterns rendered more frequent by the Maunder 
Minimum in the North Sea region. 
  
Methodology and Conceptualization 
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Climate history can be methodologically problematic. Decadal climate change, which 
gradually affects large geographic expanses, influences human history through weather events 
that are immediate and local. Some weather patterns are rendered more or less likely under 
different climatic regimes, but most expressions of weather can occur under any climate. 
Weather that is atypical under a particular climatic regime can influence human history as much 
as weather that conforms to the climatic norm. Environmental historians of past climates should 
consequently establish three broad relationships. The first must plausibly link immediate and 
local environmental changes, usually but not exclusively expressed in weather, to long-term 
climate change. The second must connect a substantial quantity of local or regional 
environmental phenomena – again, including weather events – to activities conducted by human 
beings. Only then can historians of climate consider the third and final relationship, that between 
climate change and human history.
80
 
This dissertation will consider weather to be symptomatic of a given climatic regime if it 
is repeatedly present – if not necessarily continuous – in months where it was atypical during a 
preceding or subsequent climatic regime. For example, in the warmer climate of the mid-
seventeenth century, and again in the twentieth century, westerly winds were typical in June. In 
the late seventeenth century, repeated easterlies in that month can therefore be plausibly, if not 
certainly, associated with a colder climatic regime. On the other hand, during the minima of the 
Little Ice Age, continuous westerlies in February were likely anomalous, worthy of mention but 
probably not associated with the prevailing climate. Furthermore, this study will link weather 
events with a given climatic regime if they were particularly consistent over the course of a 
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month, even where such weather had been common – if not relentless – in the preceding or 
succeeding climatic regime. For instance, during the coldest phases of the Little Ice Age, 
constant, largely uninterrupted easterly winds in February were probably a consequence of a new 
climatic regime, even if easterlies were more common in February than in other months during 
the twentieth century.
81
  
Supercomputer reconstructions of connections between modern climate change and 
short-term environmental fluctuations are only now becoming possible. Lacking the vast, real-
time data networks that measure the global climate today, historians of past climates must 
incorporate probability into their methodology. Some discussion of probability invariably 
accompanies historical analysis, particularly in narratives that identify connections between 
structures and events. Still, few historical narratives hinge on probability the way climate 
histories do. Relationships between weather and human affairs reconstructed in this dissertation 
rest on firmer ground than links between weather and climate change, or climate change and 
human history. Moreover, the environmental consequences of climate change were hardly the 
only influences that shaped the political, economic, social, and cultural histories of the Dutch 
Republic. Weather typical of different climatic regimes during the Little Ice Age limited or 
expanded the choices open to historical actors without determining the course of human action.
 
Nevertheless, this dissertation reveals that climatic fluctuations ultimately contributed to the 
character of the Dutch Golden Age.
82
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Examining relationships between weather, human activity, and climatic trends requires 
constant movement from the particular to the general, from the very short to the very longue 
durée. Because climate change is a gradual process, quantitative comparisons between human 
and climate histories over long timeframes can seem to yield more convincing climate histories 
than those that identify links between particular human or meteorological events and broader 
climatic shifts. However, if discrete human activities cannot be tied to the manifestations of a 
climatic regime through a chain of probable causality, it is difficult to understand how that 
climatic regime can be reliably linked to broader trends in human history. Moreover, quantitative 
records are subjectively compiled, and linking quantitative datasets based solely on the presence 
of similar statistical trends is fraught with peril.
83
 Hence, firm conclusions are only provided in 
this dissertation when convincing qualitative sources are available to link different quantitative 
trends by providing first-hand accounts of how weather influenced human affairs. To further 
unravel these interactions, most chapters in this dissertation will also compare trends or events in 
colder, wetter, stormier decades of the Little Ice Age with those occurring in the warmer, drier, 
and more tranquil periods. These comparisons will verify that Dutch military, economic, and 
cultural developments were indeed influenced by early modern changes in prevailing weather.
84
 
Reconstructing general trends in the development of a particular form of weather – such 
as a storm – requires the unravelling of complex connections between its different expressions 
over time. Overlapping trends for different meteorological expressions can then be gathered into 
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a chronology of climatic fluctuation. However, under the broad scholarly umbrella of historical 
climatology different methodologies and, in turn, different forms of conceptualizing a climatic 
shift can spring from different disciplines. Reconstructions of the climatic oscillations of the 
Little Ice Age provide some of the clearest examples of this potential problem. From the 
perspective of climatologists attempting to unravel natural relationships, the Little Ice Age is 
viewed as a period marked by general if uneven global cooling that, in Northern Europe, 
stimulated a unique pattern of meteorological effects. For historians searching through 
documentary evidence for connections between environment and society, however, the Little Ice 
Age can as easily be conceived as a subjectively defined series of decades marked by a shifting 
catalogue of often-related weather phenomena that usually included cooler yearly temperatures.  
From this perspective, why and how a given weather event endured are less important 
than its human influence and, in turn, the manner of its categorization by historians. Why should 
several years of regional storminess directly preceding the commonly accepted beginning of the 
Little Ice Age, whatever its atmospheric origin, not be included under the umbrella of Little Ice 
Age tempestuousness when examining human affairs? There is no easy answer to this question 
for the historian, since it made little difference for contemporaries whether storminess was 
stimulated by anomalous circumstances, or by what is now termed the “Little Ice Age.” Still, for 
the interdisciplinary study of historical climatology the climatic causes underlying weather 
events and their expression through local environments are as important as the influence of 
weather on human populations. The assumption underlying this dissertation is that there is 
inherent value in uncovering the network of environmental and human influences cascading only 
from weather typical of (that is, more frequent during) a specific, narrowly-defined climatic shift. 
For environmental historians, engaging in such research can not only isolate a previously ignored 
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historical influence, but also provide critical context for the study of anthropogenic global 
warming.   
An analysis of the Little Ice Age in the Dutch Republic can not only shed light on the 
ways in which climate change can be conceptualized, but also on  the history of energy in early 
modern Europe. The “organic economy,” as defined by energy historian E. A. Wrigley, was the 
pre-modern condition in which energy was harnessed largely by sail, mill, and especially human 
or animal muscles. Without the extensive exploitation of the much higher energy potential of 
fossil fuels, trade was limited, populations were diffused, and economies were dependent on the 
produce of the land. Historians have debated whether the economy and society of the Dutch 
Republic tested, or exceeded, the limitations of this organic economy. In this argument, the 
Republic’s high urbanization, extensive networks of trade, thriving industrial centres, and 
commercialized agriculture are often perceived as symptoms of an unusually efficient energy 
supply. Wrigley, for example, has maintained that the Dutch economy achieved its dynamism 
through the exploitation of peat, an ostensibly potent but finite source of energy that ultimately 
limited the maximum duration of the Republic’s Golden Age. On the other hand, burning peat 
provided scarcely more energy than burning wood, while the exploitation of wind, water, and 
coal also accounted for a sizeable portion of the Republic’s energy use.85 Wrigley’s argument, 
therefore, seems incomplete.
86
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More important was the way in which energy was exploited in the Republic. In that 
context, an examination of climatic fluctuations in the Republic reveals that total energy 
consumption actually mattered less than the flexibility and adaptability with which even modest 
sources of energy could be applied to work. Dutch citizens developed financial institutions, 
transportation networks, and technologies that allowed them to exploit, or at least substantially 
mediate, changing patterns of prevailing weather. In this they were often synthesizers rather than 
innovators: the institutions and infrastructure developed in the Republic were usually not 
unprecedented in European history, nor were they confined to the northern Low Countries. 
Nevertheless, waterborne trade, for example, or commercial capitalism were more important in 
the seventeenth-century Republic than they were anywhere else in Europe. This had 
consequences for the Dutch manipulation of energy during the climatic shifts of the Little Ice 
Age.  
Energy from the sun, expressed in light and warmth, is absorbed by plants through 
photosynthesis. This process provides the nutrients that, in turn, yield useable energy for animals 
and human beings. In agricultural economies, cold annual temperatures typically lead to shorter 
growing seasons, reducing the dominant source of useable energy and, in turn, worsening or 
even threatening human life. Farmers in the agricultural societies of early modern Europe were 
capable of adapting to gradual climatic cooling.
87
 Still, interactions between agricultural yields 
and climatic cooling were essentially declensionist in many parts of Europe, which accounts for 
the overwhelmingly negative tone of most climate histories of the Little Ice Age. Of course, 
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Dutch citizens also depended on nutrients created through photosynthesis. However, in the 
Republic many of these nutrients were imported from the Baltic, through trade that was part of a 
commercial network that, in turn, was largely driven by relationships between wind and water. It 
was generally easier for Dutch merchants, mariners, and soldiers to benefit from, or at least adapt 
to, changed wind dynamics or greater ice cover during the minima of the Little Ice Age, than it 
was for farmers elsewhere in Europe to adjust to cooler, wetter conditions. Cold temperatures did 
not necessarily reduce the amount of useable energy for the Dutch economy. Whether or not it 
possessed an organic economy, the Dutch Republic was certainly not an agricultural economy, 
which allowed it to exceed the limitations of such economies in the face of a climate, and an 
environment, in flux.
88
  
Energy is a conceptual tool in this analysis of the Little Ice Age in the Dutch Republic, 
but it is not an explanatory device. The limitations of surviving sources complicate any attempt 
to quantify precisely how the energy employed by the ships, boats, mills, animals, and people of 
the Republic was tied to weather events at a particular point in time. It is therefore impractical to 
link the climatic fluctuations of the Little Ice Age to changes in the efficiency of Dutch energy 
exploitation between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. However, it is possible to suggest 
likely relationships on the grounds of existing evidence. Ultimately, introducing the Republic’s 
adaptable energy exploitation can provide a new method of perceiving, but not explaining, the 
distinct way that the Dutch experienced the Little Ice Age.  
This dissertation is informed by a diverse selection of documentary evidence compiled by 
Dutch and English citizens in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The most 
revealing of these written sources, usually ship logbooks, letters, intelligence reports, or diary 
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entries, explicitly described the ways in which contemporary weather events affected human 
affairs. Such documents were often penned by those whose livelihoods were tied to weather. For 
example, Claas Ariszoon Caeskoper, who lived on the western coast of the Zaan near 
Amsterdam, worked a windmill that pressed oil. Wind and temperature influenced the efficiency 
of the mill, the transport of its commodities, and even the success of Caeskoper’s investments in 
whaling. The activity of sailors was even more closely shaped by weather. Ship logbooks of the 
kind meticulously compiled by Dutch and English officers entered the historical record as 
European mariners sailed more regularly into deep ocean, and were primarily compiled to 
facilitate navigation. Hence, ship logs abound with reliable meteorological information taken 
several times on virtually every day of journeys. With thousands of surviving records from 
across the globe, ship logbooks are among the few premodern sources with continuous, 
standardized, and easily quantifiable weather data. However, they have only recently attracted 
the concerted attention of historical climatologists.
89
   
Other documents that referred to weather were written by those who had the means, and 
consequently the literary training, to meticulously describe environmental conditions even when 
these did not directly affect their lives. For instance, Adriaen van der Goes, a lawyer for the 
Court of Holland in The Hague, was scarcely impacted by meteorological conditions in other 
towns, yet he nevertheless reported them to his brother. Finally, many of these sources were 
written by those whose responsibilities were tied to affairs of state that, in a maritime country, 
were frequently shaped by weather. Grand pensionary Anthonie Heinsius, for instance, routinely 
sent and received correspondence that outlined precisely how weather events had affected the 
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movement of a fleet, the conduct of diplomacy, or the arrival of Baltic commodities. Ultimately, 
most of the documents that explicitly detail the influence of weather were written by men of at 
least middling means. When reconstructing the influence of past weather and, in turn, past 
climate, the unfiltered voices of women and the poor are far harder to discern. This dissertation 
can serve as a necessary stepping stone towards a more inclusive climate history of the Dutch 
Republic and, indeed, early modern Europe.
90
 
 In the seventeenth century, the coastal province of Holland was home to nearly half of the 
Republic’s population and supplied most of its annual budget. Consequently, it is the focus of the 
following chapters. While no single province was representative of a country where not even the 
date was standardized, Holland was as central to economic, cultural, and political life within the 
Republic in the seventeenth century as England was within the United Kingdom two centuries 
later.
91
 Urbanization in Holland reached 61% by 1675, and its crowded centres of population 
formed the core of the Republic’s unique experience with the climatic fluctuations of the Little 
Ice Age. Holland’s demographic, financial, and cultural hegemony among the United Provinces 
ensured that its times of crisis and prosperity shaped the history of the Republic as a whole. 
Moreover, the wealth of surviving documentation in the archives of Holland enables the kind of 
quantitative source analysis that is central to historical climatology.
92
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The first part of this dissertation employs a series of case studies to explore how climatic 
fluctuations during the Little Ice Age influenced mobility through the Dutch trading empire. 
Changing patterns of prevailing weather during the Little Ice Age affected Dutch commerce, and 
in turn the acquisition of wealth in the Republic, by altering the ability of mariners and 
merchants to move through their world. The first chapter employs new reconstructions of the 
early modern Arctic environment to investigate the Dutch quest for a Northeast Passage between 
1594 and 1597. For Dutch merchants, cartographers, and politicians, the passage promised a 
quicker sea route to Asia that was safe from Spanish harassment. Dutch voyages in search of the 
passage were conducted during the nadir of the Grindelwald Fluctuation, and all failed in the 
Arctic ice near Novaya Zemlya. However, the journeys were shaped not by unrelenting cold, but 
rather by a complex suite of occasionally counterbalancing, sometimes mutually reinforcing 
interactions between the regional atmosphere, hydrosphere, cryosphere,
93
 and biosphere that 
usually, but not invariably, reflected the influence of the Grindelwald Fluctuation. These 
environmental relationships may have contributed to the failure of the Dutch expeditions to chart 
a passage, but they also encouraged discoveries that would later contribute to the Dutch Golden 
Age.  
The second chapter remains at the periphery of the Dutch world, yet its focus is much 
further south. Journey data and meteorological information in day registers, ship logbooks, and 
correspondence is standardized and quantified to explore the Republic’s oceanic “rich trades” 
from the height of the Grindelwald Fluctuation through the conclusion of the Maunder 
Minimum. Extensive statistical analysis is synthesized with qualitative reflections to reveal that 
an increase in easterly winds in the Northeastern Atlantic during the minima of the Little Ice Age 
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significantly quickened outbound VOC ship journeys to Asia. Because returning VOC voyages 
usually followed a different course than outbound journeys, the influence of shifting wind 
patterns usually did not correspondingly slow inbound ships. More frequent gales in the North 
Sea region during the coldest phases of the Little Ice Age did not often sink the sturdy VOC 
ships, which often sailed far from the threatening coasts. In fact, storms could accelerate the 
progress of VOC vessels if they blew in a favourable direction. Ultimately, the weather that grew 
more common during the minima of the Little Ice Age generally facilitated the transmission of 
goods, people, and information between the opposite poles of the Republic’s commercial empire.  
The third chapter that unravels entanglements between climate, weather, and mobility 
through the Dutch trading empire turns from the periphery to the metropole and its immediate 
vicinity. The chapter begins by examining how climatic fluctuations influenced what the Dutch 
called the “mother of all trades:” the acquisition of Baltic commodities for low-volume, high-
value goods from the south. The influence of weather that grew more frequent during the coldest 
phases of the Little Ice Age was less ambiguous for those who serviced this critical commerce 
than it was for northern explorers or the VOC. Lengthier winter freezing prohibited travel 
through the Baltic and could imperil ships in icy harbours. More common storms could be 
deadly, because ships travelling to and from the Baltic often lingered near the coast. Not only 
trade but also the supply of armies, the flow of information, and the progress of diplomacy was 
routinely hampered during the minima of the Little Ice Age. Still, the Republic’s merchants 
responded creatively to the risks imposed by storms, and rising grain prices in cold years could 
benefit the Dutch economy.   
The third chapter continues by investigating mobility within the Republic’s borders. 
During the Dutch Golden Age, boats were the most efficient conduits of people, goods, and 
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information through the watery landscape of the Low Countries. During the nadir of the Little 
Ice Age, sailboats that relied on favourable wind direction and velocity were gradually 
supplemented by horse-drawn barges that were far less susceptible to the whims of weather. On 
the other hand, boats of all kinds remained vulnerable to storms, and none could be operated 
when water turned to ice. Ice could also impede travel along the Republic’s meandering network 
of unhardened roads, and in cold winters many Dutch citizens therefore employed skates and 
sleds to travel in ice-covered waterways. Roads were also rendered unnavigable by heavy rainfall 
or snowfall, and most destinations were accordingly serviced by more than one road. Overall, the 
Republic’s diverse networks of transportation allowed Dutch citizens to maintain their mobility 
during the minima of the Little Ice Age, although some weather events could jeopardize all 
forms of regional travel. 
 The second part of the dissertation uncovers how climatic shifts strengthened or 
weakened attempts to defend the Republic’s economic hegemony. Consequently, the fourth 
chapter contributes to the recent historiographical synthesis of military and environmental 
histories by introducing the Anglo-Dutch Wars as a case study into the relationship between a 
shifting climate, weather events, and early modern military operations. The chapter considers 
how differences between Dutch and English military systems yielded distinct patterns of 
vulnerability and resilience in the face of the warmer weather and more common westerlies that 
prevailed during the First Anglo-Dutch War. The war was contested in the narrow waters of the 
North Sea, where the calm, westerly winds typical of the seventeenth-century interval between 
Little Ice Age minima allowed crews aboard larger English warships to field all their guns and 
granted them the initiative in most engagements.  
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The following two chapters analyse the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars, which 
were fought on land and at sea in the colder, wetter, stormier climate of the Maunder Minimum. 
Evolving Anglo-Dutch military systems produced new weaknesses and strengths in the face of a 
new climatic regime, with more frequent easterlies now granting critical advantages to Dutch 
fleets that had adopted elements of English tactics and technology. High winds typical of the 
Maunder Minimum undermined English attempts to open their more numerous gun tiers and, 
when sufficiently severe, thwarted attempts to blockade the Dutch coast. During the French and 
German invasion that commenced the third war, the Republic’s desperate defences were 
undercut and, later, supported by a complex constellation of meteorological phenomena that 
partially reflected the influence of the Maunder Minimum. Indeed, the weather experienced 
during military engagements on land during the third war reveals both the possibilities and the 
limitations of examining climatic fluctuation as a historical influence. Ultimately, the fourth, 
fifth, and sixth chapters argue that the changing climate of the mid-seventeenth century must be 
considered alongside human agency and the political, economic, or cultural influences typically 
considered by military historians to explain the course of the Anglo-Dutch Wars.  
The third and final part of this dissertation explores how the Little Ice Age was 
understood in the Dutch Republic, and how it can be conceptualized by historical climatologists 
today. The seventh chapter reaches beyond the material ramifications of climate change in the 
Dutch Republic to investigate the mentalities that shaped, and were shaped by, the influence of 
the Little Ice Age. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, understandings of weather 
evolved in different ways among different social groups. While Dutch scholars developed a more 
secular natural philosophy, supernatural explanations for weather persisted among other literate 
observers, and particularly practical attitudes dominated among the less educated. As Dutch 
 58 
observers sought to identify the spiritual significance, natural origin, and practical consequences 
of weather, they compared meteorological conditions in their present with events in the past. 
These remarkably accurate comparisons may have reflected an emerging awareness of long-term 
shifts in prevailing weather that plausibly contributed to the development of new military and 
economic strategies in the Dutch Republic. Moreover, both artistic responses to weather and the 
development of new technologies and practices during the nadir of the Little Ice Age reflect the 
belief that the consequences of adverse weather could be endured and overcome. 
 The conclusion summarizes the ways in which the influence of the Little Ice Age in the 
Dutch Republic was ambiguous. It conceptualizes the distinct influence of early modern climatic 
fluctuations in the Republic by exploring how the Dutch economy was sustained by different 
sources of energy than those that were harnessed in Europe’s more agricultural societies. The 
conclusion then employs the case studies pursued in previous chapters to unravel how the 
climatic fluctuations of the Little Ice Age helped shape the broader history of the Dutch Republic 
from revolt to decline. It continues by evaluating the value of different interdisciplinary models 
in conceptualizing the influence of the Little Ice Age in the Republic. Finally, the dissertation 
concludes with a reflection on the ways in which an understanding of climate change in the 
Dutch Republic can improve projections of life in a warmer future.  
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PART I: COMMERCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Acquiring Wealth in the Little Ice Age: Case Studies on Exploration, Trade, 
and Travel in the Dutch Trading Empire, 1565-1750 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
While conceptualizing the Mediterranean world, Fernand Braudel concluded that, in the 
sixteenth century, distance was “the first enemy.”1 Braudel’s much-quoted phrase was not 
concerned with space so much as its cousin, time; the “tyranny of distance” lay less in, for 
example, the many miles between Spain and the Philippines than in the years required by a ship 
to traverse those miles. After spending so long in transit, it was rare that goods, messages, and 
people arrived at their destinations precisely when needed. Often information was received when 
obsolete, goods when demand had ebbed, people when their presence was no longer required. 
Both time and space were, to an extent, social constructs, increasingly relevant for European 
societies sustained and enriched by commerce or plunder.
2
  Nevertheless, time spent in transit 
was time exposed to the very real hazards of travel, which could manifest on land as at sea in 
heightened exposure to disease, crime, deprivation, and environmental catastrophe. In early 
modern Europe, travel was therefore dangerous, expensive, irregularly planned, and, above all, 
time-consuming.
3
  
Speed of travel across much of the early modern world was primarily – if not exclusively 
– hampered by two variables: the weakness of government authority, and the limitations of 
contemporary technology. Most local, regional or, in particular, national governments could not 
collect the resources necessary to build and maintain major improvements to the dirt paths and 
winding rivers used for transportation in much of early modern Europe. The limitations of early 
modern infrastructure generally exacerbated the constraints of contemporary technology, which, 
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on roads and modest waterways, primarily harnessed only the minimal energy derived from 
human or animal muscles.  Ultimately, travel was accelerated or delayed by the efficiency with 
which energy was siphoned from, and then applied to, environments that co-evolved with 
decidedly limited human activity.
4
  
From bureaucrats and wealthy merchants to millers and farmers, Dutch citizens fuelled 
the Republic’s rise to global commercial primacy by engaging in and improving forms of early 
modern travel that either required less energy, or accessed greater sources of energy, than modes 
of transportation predominant elsewhere in Europe. Many of the vessels that plied Dutch trades 
by the thousands through inland waterways and across distant oceans harnessed the power of 
wind, not muscle, and together constituted a greater share of total energy use in the Republic 
than elsewhere in early modern Europe. Although horses pulled wagons over dirt roads in the 
Republic as in the rest of Europe, during the Golden Age the transportation of people, goods, and 
information across significant distances within the coastal provinces was overwhelmingly 
accomplished by boat, barge, or ship. Vessels that did not use sails employed the limited energy 
provided by human or animal muscles to drag heavy cargo across the relatively frictionless 
surface of water.
 5
  
By the Republic’s seventeenth-century Golden Age, complex natural, human, and hybrid 
structures had yielded a unique transportation network that was vast in scope and central to the 
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relatively modern economy of the coastal provinces.
6
 In the 1630s more than 100 vessels, some 
exceeding 1,000 tons, carried high-value goods from Africa and the Americas in the service of 
the West East India Company (WIC). By 1657 the Dutch East India Company (or VOC), the 
WIC’s much larger and more successful counterpart, maintained over 160 ships for service 
between Asian ports alone. In 1636 perhaps 1,750 merchant vessels, on average far smaller than 
the typical East Indiaman, supported Dutch trade in European waters. While the most important 
routes serviced Iberia, France, and especially the Baltic, Dutch merchants dominated seaborne 
trade in ports from Archangel in the far north to Constantinople in the south.
7
 An additional 450 
ships of no more than 80 tons plied the sea trades near the Republic’s home waters, carrying 
goods between ports like Hamburg and London.
8
 
Altogether, by the middle of the seventeenth century Dutch ocean-going vessels likely 
possessed a total carrying capacity of over 400,000 tons. The raw materials and resources carried 
by this immense merchant fleet were consumed, refined, and worked into finished goods across 
the Republic. Consequently, the quantity of light vessels that ferried goods, people and 
information through the lakes, rivers, channels and creeks of the Republic itself was 
correspondingly vast. Comprehensive figures dating from the Golden Age are not available, yet 
statistics compiled in 1808 reveal that 18,421 inland commercial vessels, from small boats to 60-
ton barges, possessed a carrying capacity of more than 250,000 tons. Given the lengthy 
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economic stagnation of the Low Countries in the eighteenth century, it is likely that comparable 
numbers represented inland commerce in the century before.
9
  
Travel over the Republic’s dirt roads was relatively insignificant in the coastal provinces. 
However, it assumed greater importance in the poorer and topographically higher provinces and 
territories that surrounded the watery, low-lying Netherlands. Even in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the intricate system of roads and waterways (Map 1.1) that supported 
movement within the Republic hardly facilitated more rapid travel than what was experienced in 
the rest of Europe. Moreover, the Republic’s uniquely federated government helped generate 
relentless municipal competition, with a subsequently bewildering variety of tolls, myriad 
redundancies and chronic underinvestment in the infrastructure of the inland provinces and 
territories.
10
 Despite these very real problems, the economic significance of the Dutch 
transportation network lay in its relative regularity, its low cost, its substantial carrying capacity, 
and its flexibility. That combination of advantages, distinct within contemporary Europe, in turn 
flowed from its comparatively efficient use of energy.  
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Map 1.1. Transportation networks by land and water in the late (mid-eighteenth century) Republic, originally drawn 
by Jan de Vries. De Vries, Barges and Capitalism, 58.  
 
Technological, cultural, economic, and political developments co-evolved with 
environmental structures in the Republic’s relatively successful struggle against distance and 
time. For trade at sea the Low Countries were ideally situated between the wealthy 
Mediterranean and the burgeoning early modern economies of northern Europe.
11
 Commerce 
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across land and water from England to the European interior and back again also flowed 
naturally through the region. While geographical advantages encouraged industry, trade, and 
urbanization within the provinces that would become the Republic, they were of limited use 
without infrastructure designed to accommodate the large-scale movement of goods, people, and 
information. The landscape of the medieval coastal Netherlands hardly yielded a readymade 
network of communications, yet the presence of so much water provided the means for far-
ranging travel by boat if improvements could be constructed and maintained. Medieval 
Netherlanders consequently built the region’s first channels and sluices, creating inland water 
routes and beginning a process that would yield the Republic’s extensive system of waterborne 
transport.
12
 The Republic’s economic growth encouraged, and was encouraged by, the 
transformation of its uniquely unstable environmental structures, yet reclamation, like 
infrastructural development, stimulated silting in the harbours of port cities that were 
increasingly central to the dawning Golden Age.
13
 Ultimately, the natural frameworks of land 
and water initially motivated but increasingly hampered Dutch attempts to exploit the most 
efficient forms of energy useful for transportation through the most advanced – or pertinent – 
technology, in the most effective manner possible.  
 Grafted upon, and working through, these relationships was the influence of prevailing 
weather affected by a fluctuating climate. The following chapters explore the most important 
expressions of Dutch mobility for the Republic’s economic, demographic, and cultural heartland 
in Holland. In doing so, they develop a representative, if not entirely comprehensive, analysis of 
interactions between climatic variability, prevailing weather, and movement through the 
Republic’s expanding commercial world. The chapters initially examine renowned and usually 
                                                 
12
 De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 13.  
13
 Ibid, 44. Lambert, The Making of the Dutch Landscape, 202.  
66 
 
lucrative voyages at the periphery of the Dutch trading empire, but ultimately turn to consider far 
humbler trips across muddy paths, over frozen lakes, or through winding creeks in the Republic’s 
coastal provinces.  
In warmer and cooler decades, distinct manifestations of Little Ice Age climatic shifts 
offered different advantages and disadvantages for the various expressions of the Dutch 
transportation system. Explorers seeking passage to Asia through the frigid waters of the Arctic 
braved unusually frequent storms, and sea ice that had expanded in the colder temperatures of the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation. While extensive sea ice and storminess helped thwart efforts to 
uncover a Northeast Passage, they also encouraged changes in journeys of exploration that 
transformed European perceptions of the Arctic. It was not ice but rather shifts in prevailing 
wind across the Northeastern Atlantic, associated with Little Ice Age minima, that most 
influenced Dutch East India Company ship journeys. During the Maunder Minimum, outbound 
VOC vessels travelled more quickly as regional winds blew more frequently from the East, 
shortening total time spent in transit. More ambiguous was the influence of altered wind patterns 
on inbound East Indiamen, and unusually abundant storms likely quickened some journeys even 
as other voyages were hampered or prevented.  
 Closer to home, the passage of Dutch vessels to and from the Baltic was likely shaped, in 
part, by shifts in prevailing wind direction. More important, however, were changes in the 
frequency of storms and, in particular, the extent of sea ice, which more directly influenced when 
and how bulk goods could be transported. Also affected were the transfer of information, 
regional Dutch diplomacy, relevant legal disputes, and, possibly, the price of key commodities. 
Within the borders of the Republic, many kinds of movement pursued through different forms of 
infrastructure by ship, boat, barge, horse, and foot all responded differently to different weather 
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conditions. That, in turn, bestowed great flexibility and resilience to the Republic’s inland 
transportation network in the face of climatic oscillation. Nevertheless, particularly cold and 
stormy weather did hamper most forms of travel, especially those associated with the large-scale 
movement of goods, people, and information. Indeed, some meteorological conditions linked to 
Little Ice Age minima could interact with local environments to impede all forms of mobility.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Exploring the Periphery in a Colder Climate: 
The Quest for a Northeast Passage 
 
In August 2009, two German freighters embarked from South Korea for a long voyage to 
the Netherlands. Rather than bearing south as their route normally demanded, the two vessels 
steamed north, stopping briefly in the port of Vladivostok before departing for Arctic waters on 
the 21
st
. From Vladivostok they were escorted by Russian icebreakers, quickly rendered 
redundant in open seas that continued far beyond the Bering Strait. On 12 September the ships 
arrived in the Siberian port of Yamburg, just east of the Kara Sea, having encountered little more 
than a spell of harmless drift ice. After stopping briefly in the more westerly harbour of 
Archangel, the vessels rounded the northern coast of Norway before arriving at the sprawling 
havens of Rotterdam. The freighters had crossed nearly 15,000 kilometres, but their northern 
course had cut the duration of the journey to Europe by nearly 25%, and it was void of pirates.
14
 
The German vessels were the first non-Russian ships to complete the “Northeast Passage,” the 
seaborne route north of Eurasia opened by rapid Arctic melting in the summer of 2008.
15
 
Although anthropogenic global warming is a recent phenomenon, the relationship between 
climatic shifts, polar ice, and the quest to link East and West through Arctic waters has a long 
history. As the climate cooled across sixteenth-century Europe, improvements in ship design 
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coevolved with reformation, revolt, and the expansion of seaborne trade to encourage the first 
serious attempts at charting a northeast passage to Asia.   
The most significant early modern expeditions in pursuit of a passage to Asia through the 
waters north of Europe were launched in 1594, 1595, and 1596 under the aegis of merchants 
from major ports in the emerging Dutch Republic. The Dutch expeditions set sail during the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation, which lasted in Europe from approximately 1565 until 1629. Cooling 
in Europe was mirrored in the Arctic, where temperatures were more than 0.5 ° C lower than the 
twentieth-century average. Consequently the environmental circumstances for Arctic exploration 
during the Grindelwald Fluctuation were hardly auspicious, and the Dutch expeditions each 
succumbed either to sea ice or the threat of sea ice before they had pressed far beyond the 
Barents Sea.
16
   
Nevertheless, detailed climatic reconstructions can now refresh traditional narratives of 
the voyages, which abound with descriptions of heroic failure in the Arctic cold. In fact, the 
journeys were shaped by a complex suite of occasionally counterbalancing, sometimes mutually 
reinforcing interactions between the regional atmosphere, hydrosphere, cryosphere, and 
biosphere. The influence of these environmental relationships was mediated by cultural and 
economic structures that were, in turn, complicated by the personal agency of the explorers and 
their financiers. The first expedition, in 1594, penetrated deeply into the Arctic owing in part to 
unusual summer warmth, and this success was particularly encouraging for Dutch merchants 
who were just beginning to compete with their Iberian counterparts for access to Asian markets. 
In 1595 and 1596 the Dutch financed two more expeditions, which were hampered by sea ice 
and frigid temperatures more typical of the coldest decades of the Little Ice Age. These 
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conditions blocked access to a Northeast Passage but encouraged the exploration of new islands, 
which revolutionized European conceptions of the Arctic and stimulated the development of 
important, if ecologically destructive, new industries.  
For centuries, most histories of the Dutch expeditions to the Arctic between 1594 and 
1597 have included a description of the region’s frigid weather.17 Many recent narratives 
mention both the polar cold and its accompanying ice, without which the outcome of the Dutch 
voyages is difficult to comprehend.
 18
 On the other hand, the Arctic environment is hardly a 
central concern for many modern historians of the expeditions, who instead investigate the 
explorers as particularly bold representatives of a distinct society. Recent histories have 
examined the artifacts left behind by the explorers in the Russian arctic, the culture that informed 
their journeys, and their contribution to the Republic as a nexus of cartographical knowledge.
19
 
Overall, very few historians have connected the characteristics of Arctic weather in the years of 
the voyages to the influence of the Little Ice Age. An exception is Jaap Jan Zeeberg, who in 2007 
briefly summarized some scientific reconstructions of the polar environment in the late sixteenth 
century. Still, Zeeberg’s cursory analysis did not itself contribute to the analysis of specific 
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connections between the expeditions, daily weather conditions, and the complex regional 
manifestations of the Grindelwald Fluctuation.
20
  
This chapter opens by examining the cultural and economic contexts within the Republic, 
and the changing environmental structures in the Arctic, that would shape the Dutch quest for a 
Northeast Passage during the last decade of the sixteenth century. It introduces the cartographers, 
merchants, and mariners whose beliefs influenced the successes and failures of the polar 
expeditions. Using journals later published by the Arctic explorers, it then provides a detailed 
narrative that reconstructs each of the three voyages undertaken between 1594 and 1597. In 
every narrative, the precise characteristics of local environmental conditions, reconstructed using 
interdisciplinary sources, are linked both to the course of an expedition, and the broader climatic 
trends of the Grindelwald Fluctuation. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the 
ways in which the voyages, which pushed back the borders of the world known to the Dutch, 
ultimately contributed to the Republic’s Golden Age. The quest for the Northeast Passage, 
shaped by the complex manifestations of the Little Ice Age in the Arctic, was more than an 
interesting footnote in the history of the Dutch Republic. 
 
Planning the Expeditions during the Grindelwald Fluctuation 
 
The Dutch search for a Northeast Passage was initially motivated by developments in 
Iberia. Since the fifteenth century, the Portuguese Estado had dominated the commerce in low 
volume, high value commodities from Asia, and in 1580 its crown had been united with that of 
Spain. In the last decade of the sixteenth century, many Dutch merchants, their access to the 
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Iberian market increasingly uncertain, wished to control the lucrative commerce in spices, 
textiles, and other Asian goods directly from its source. It was a testament to the intellectual 
vigour of Dutch culture in the emerging Golden Age that Dutch merchants, explorers, and 
cartographers sought not only to retrace but also to dramatically improve Iberian sea routes to 
Asia. In the early 1590s a group devoted to the exploration and exploitation of a Northeast 
Passage to Asia formed in Enkhuizen, a town on the Zuider Zee (Introduction, Map I.1), around 
the merchant Jan Huyghen van Linschoten and the publisher-cartographer Lucas Waghenaer. 
Another circle committed to the passage emerged in Amsterdam through the ideas and ambitions 
of publisher Cornelis Claeszoon, cartographer-clergyman Petrus Plancius, and cartographer-
navigator Willem Barentszoon.
21
  
The occupations of these men were hardly coincidental. Accurate maps, financed by 
merchants, drawn by exploring cartographers, and disseminated by publishers, were invaluable 
for early modern trade. Any attempt to reveal a Northeast Passage would necessarily be informed 
by the most reliable maps available, and would, in turn, produce a map – in effect, a key – for 
Dutch trade through the far north.
 
Thereafter, the entrepreneurs hoped to secure exclusive rights 
to northern trade routes that they estimated would shorten the distance of a voyage to Asia by 
two-thirds.
22
  Balthasar de Moucheron, a wealthy merchant from the city of Middelburg in 
Zeeland, helped finance the first polar expeditions of the 1590s and provided the latest 
cartographical information. A close friend of celebrated cartographer Gerard Mercator, De 
Moucheron likely supplied the entrepreneurs with a map similar to what was published by 
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Mercator in 1595, a year after the first expedition (Map 1.2). Although his earlier maps depicted 
a polar continent joined to the European mainland, by the late sixteenth century Mercator had 
himself become a proponent of a Northeast Passage, writing in 1580 that “the voyage to Cathaio 
by the East is doutlesse verie easie and short.”23 
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Map 1.2. The most current European perception of the Arctic on the eve of the Barents voyages. The North Pole lay 
at the centre of many world maps created by Mercator. Gerard Mercator, Septentrionalium Terrarum descriptio 
1595. Amsterdam, 1595.  
  
Despite Mercator's confidence, the level of detail on his map, as on its early modern 
counterparts, varied according to the depth of cartographical knowledge that informed its 
depiction of different regions. Journeys of exploration would necessarily sail towards relatively 
unknown and, in turn, poorly detailed areas portrayed on existing maps, yet some real or 
75 
 
apparent geographical precision was necessary to analyze the initial feasibility of a voyage. 
Unfortunately for the collaborators in Amsterdam and Enkhuizen, the Arctic was poorly 
understood. The ancient notion of an Arctic continent was amended by some cartographers in the 
middle of the sixteenth century in favour of four continents surrounding a towering magnetic 
rock. That concept was, in turn, grounded on recently popularized observations made by 
Nicholas of Lynn in 1360, which had outlived the more reliable records of the earlier Viking 
explorers. Meanwhile, fanciful descriptions of bizarre Arctic civilizations, monsters, and 
treasures endured long into the sixteenth century. On the other hand, from the middle of the 
sixteenth century forays into the waters north of Europe had charted parts of the Scandinavian 
and Russian coast with increasing accuracy. That allowed the entrepreneurs to focus on the 
newly discovered land of Novaya Zemlya or, in Dutch, Nova Zembla, which seemed to lie in the 
path of a possible Northeast Passage.
24
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Map 1.3. Satellite view of the northern environment in which the Republic's quest for a Northeast Passage took 
place. Inset: detail of the island Vaygatsch and surrounding straits, with locations relevant to the Barents Voyages as 
they were named by the explorers (translated into English). These maps do not depict sea ice. The subarctic and 
arctic north of Europe. (20 December 2012). Google Earth 6. Google.  Zeeberg, Terugkeer naar Nova Zembla, 35. 
 
 
Long known to Russian hunters, Novaya Zemlya was discovered for the Dutch by the 
merchant Olivier Brunel in the cold 1570s. The fragmentary records that survive to document his 
voyages reveal that further progress east had been blocked by extensive sea ice.
25
 In 1580/81 a 
subsequent attempt by Arthur Pet and Charles Jackman, funded by the English Muscovy 
Company, was the first Western European expedition to enter the Kara Sea. Pet entered the sea 
through the Yugor Strait, a narrow passage between the island of Vaygatsch south of Novaya 
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Zemlya (Map 1.3), and the Russian mainland, but stayed only briefly before being forced back 
by ice and fog. Years later De Moucheron strongly supported further exploration of the passage 
around Vaygatsch, and wrote to the States-General that the Republic was playing a “dangerous 
game” without a firm foothold in the Yugor Strait.26  
On the other hand, Plancius and his associates in Amsterdam deduced from the failure of 
the English expedition that the straits around Vaygatsch were too shallow to afford passage into 
the seas beyond.
27
 Like many of his contemporaries, Plancius believed that deep water in rough, 
open seas could not freeze, and consequently thought that there would actually be less ice north 
of Novaya Zemlya, despite the high latitude. It was this conviction that encouraged many 
cartographers and mariners to infer the existence of vast islands and continents north of the 
European mainland. Consequently, earlier explorers may have extrapolated the existence of land 
from the distribution of Arctic sea ice, and indeed the polar continents recorded in maps like 
those published by Mercator overlapped the typical extent of Arctic sea ice during the Little Ice 
Age  (Map 1.2).
28
  
In fact, ice cover above northern Eurasia manifested as a complex pattern of vast ice 
massifs, which generally do not fully melt in the summer; icebergs calved from massifs in the 
summer melt; “fast ice” attached to the seabed that expands for thousands of kilometres in winter 
but vanishes in summer; drift ice that, unlike fast ice, is a kind of sea ice that moves with the 
current and wind; and typically ice-free corridors called “polynyas.” The extent, movement, and 
consistency of the ice on a scale relevant for the Dutch Arctic expeditions was directly affected 
by the rotation of the earth, internal ice stress, and sea surface tilt influenced by minute 
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gravitational variations across Earth’s surface. Far more important yet far more unstable than 
Earth’s rotation or gravitational consistency were ocean currents and, most significantly, 
variations in regional wind and temperature.
29
    
Ice cores and other scientifically analyzed proxy sources that respond to climatic 
fluctuation, taken from the natural world, have been employed alongside model simulations to 
yield records of average annual and seasonal temperatures across the Arctic. Admittedly, even 
sophisticated models are grounded on modern techniques and assumptions, yet they are also 
firmly rooted to past realities because their projections are impossible without both natural and 
documentary proxies. The best reconstructions of past climates are informed by a wide variety of 
sources that, like proxies, either record the past or, like models, retrace the past by computing the 
workings of climate as a physical system. As more sources are unearthed, models are refined and 
techniques are improved, inconsistencies, often but not always minor, continually emerge 
between different model simulations or proxy records. Accordingly, details in the overall picture 
of the climatic past are never entirely stable, even as many areas of consensus gradually 
strengthen.
30
  
Nevertheless, despite lingering incongruity between different simulations, the most 
current model projections and proxy records provide sufficient consensus to indicate that Arctic 
temperatures in the past millennium did not always fluctuate in step with European temperatures 
(Figure 1.1). Arctic cooling, for example, preceded European cooling before the onset of the 
global Little Ice Age, while the fifteenth century appears to have been comparatively warm in the 
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Arctic even as it was variable but generally cool across Western Europe. On the other hand, the 
minima of the Grindelwald Fluctuation and, to a lesser extent, the Maunder Minimum are 
dramatically recorded. Models and proxy data agree that average temperatures in the Arctic may 
have declined by 0.5 °C below the average in 1900 CE, significantly more than 1 °C below 
today’s average temperatures. Regional sea temperatures near the surface, but below a shallow 
layer affected by the direct consequences of ice expansion or retreat, likely declined alongside 
atmospheric cooling.
31
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Fig. 1.1. Model simulation of changes in seasonal temperature (top, middle) and sea ice (bottom) in the Arctic. In 
the top and bottom graphs, the annual mean is in black, while the winter (January, February, March) is in blue. 
Spring (April, May, June) is in green, summer (July, August, September) in yellow, and autumn (October, 
November, December) in red. The reference period for both graphs is 1850-1980.  The middle graph compares the 
proxy record (red) with the LOVECLIM1.1 model (black). There the reference period is 1600-1950.  There is a 
strong correlation between reconstructions of annual temperature in Novaya Zemlya and the entire Arctic. E Crespin 
et al., “Arctic climate over the past millennium: Annual and seasonal responses to external forcings.” The Holocene 
23 (2013): 327. E. Crespin et al., “The 15th century Arctic warming in coupled model simulations with data 
assimilation.” Climate of the Past (2009): 394.  Jaap Jan Zeeberg, Climate and Glacial History of the Novaya 
Zemlya Archipelago, Russian Arctic: With Notes on the Region’s History of Exploration. (Amsterdam: Rozenberg 
Publishers, 2002), 99. 
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The extent of Arctic sea ice directly and consistently responded to changes in regional 
average temperature. Indeed, sea ice and glaciation in and around Novaya Zemlya expanded 
aggressively during the Grindelwald Fluctuation, although variability in sea ice extent between 
warm and cold years was somewhat limited by the proximity of land.
32
 Arctic temperatures in 
autumn, winter, and spring responded most dramatically to the climatic oscillations of the Little 
Ice Age, and these months were crucial to the expansion of local ice.
33
 Logbooks kept by 
explorers and whalers in the far north also record a sharp increase in sea ice in more southerly 
latitudes across the Barents Sea during the Grindelwald Fluctuation. While such logbooks did not 
continuously record wind direction, they abound with reliable and highly detailed descriptions of 
ice cover, which powerfully influenced the success or failure of northern expeditions.
34
 
Of course, in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya, average temperature did not shift in an 
environmental vacuum during the first great minimum of the Little Ice Age. In the Arctic, as in 
Europe, fluctuations in seasonal temperature influenced and were influenced by shifts in Arctic 
wind velocity and oceanic circulation. Moreover, regional atmospheric and oceanic temperatures 
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were likely affected by a 10% reduction in the volume of water transported by the Gulfstream 
and its relatively warm North Atlantic tributary, which, in turn, also increased sea ice in the 
Barents Sea and along the western coast of Novaya Zemlya. Meanwhile, increased glaciation 
probably enhanced cyclonic activity in the Novaya Zemlya area. Ultimately, then, both increased 
ice cover and more common storms accompanied the reduced average temperatures and altered 
oceanic currents that reflected Little Ice Age minima around Novaya Zemlya.
35
 
 
The First Expedition: Frustration and Promise, 1594  
 
Ignorant of contemporary shifts in the Arctic climate, the first expedition for a Northeast 
Passage organized by the Enkhuizen/Amsterdam groups passed the island of Texel as it departed 
the Zuider Zee on 5 June, 1594. While mariners had sought a Northeast Passage near Novaya 
Zemlya in decades past, the Dutch expedition of 1594 was uniquely prepared, plentifully 
provisioned, and heralded a new phase in the European exploration of the Arctic. Carrying Jan 
Huyghen van Linschoten, whose journal provides the most detailed account of its voyage,
36
 the 
fleet sailed under the command of Admiral Cornelis Nay aboard the Zwaan and his subordinate, 
Vice-Admiral Cornelis Rijp of the Mercurius. Barents captained a third vessel, the smaller yacht 
Het Boot (“The Boat”), and in representing the interests of Amsterdam argued incessantly with 
the expedition’s other leading figures. The merchant De Moucheron financed the voyage, and 
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Barents’ frustration consequently stemmed from orders to avoid the waters north of Novaya 
Zemlya. Instead, the fleet’s mandate was to seek open sea and, in turn, a passage to Asia near the 
island Vaygatsch (Map 1.3). After braving storms on 11 and 12 June, the vessels overcame calm 
winds to reach Kildin Island on 21 June (Map 1.3).
37
   
After convincing Nay to divide the fleet, on 29 June Barents ordered his crew to set sail 
for the north coast of Novaya Zemlya. The larger vessels Zwaan and Mercurius, representing the 
interests of De Moucheron and the Enkhuizen circle, departed Kildin on 2 July. At 71° N three 
days later they were surrounded for the first time by sea ice that, according to Van Linschoten, 
“resembled land” as far as the eye could see. The explorers escaped the ice by evening, but on 8 
July they encountered massive icebergs near the town of Svyatoi Nos on the eastern coast of 
Murmansk Oblast (Map 1.4), and they were again enveloped by thick sea ice later in the day. On 
9 July they arrived at Svyatoi Nos, and soon anchored in a nearby harbour to await the retreat of 
the sea ice. Nay commanded the crews to weigh anchor on 16 July, and from Kolokolkovaya 
Bay the vessels, aided by high, favourable winds, made rapid progress towards Novaya Zemlya. 
On 21 July the explorers approached Vaygatsch, where their discovery of shipwrecks and trees 
far inland convinced them that severe storms must have recently raked the island.
38
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Map 1.4. A map of the course taken by the Zwaan and Mercurius in the expedition of 1594.  Svyatoi Nos (left) and 
Kolokolkovaya Bay (right) are highlighted in black. In the top right corner of the map the Kara Sea is marked as 
Nieuwe Noort Zee, or “New North Sea.” Van Linschoten, “Voyagie, of Schipvaart, van Ian Huyghen van 
Linschoten,” 136. 
 
Van Linschoten reported no sea ice from 19 July until 24 July, when the Zwaan and 
Mercurius were the first Dutch vessels to approach Yugor Strait in over two decades. As the 
explorers entered the strait on 25 July, however, they encountered more ice than ever drifting 
with the wind and current through the strait from east to west. To the leaders of the expedition, 
the parallel course of the current and the wind suggested a passage to the sea and, in turn, to 
85 
 
Asia, but that possibility was soon overshadowed by the peril of icebergs streaming through the 
strait. In stormy weather the Vice Admiral’s smaller vessel narrowly escaped the strait with only 
minor damage. Icebergs continued to drift west from the Kara Sea, driven by remarkably 
consistent winds from the east, and on 29 July a half-mile long iceberg forced even the 
Admiral’s ship to abandon the Yugor Strait. Many among the crew now feared that the icebergs 
had been dislodged by recent storms and easterly winds from a shallow or, worse, an inland sea 
beyond the Yugor Strait.
39
  
In fact, in the following week most of the icebergs and sea ice melted. As the explorers 
sailed east on 9 August the weather cleared, and while ice was again visible on all sides it was 
not especially solid. Before long they passed into the Kara Sea, encountering high waves and a 
sea so open that Van Linschoten, convinced that open water could not freeze, now believed 
beyond doubt that a passage to China must be ice-free and accessible.
40
 On 11 August, the 
explorers, now approximately 300 kilometres east of Vaygatsch, encountered the rivers 
Morzhovka, Saltintayu, and Nyodati. From there they believed the coast curved south to allow 
passage to China, although before long the wind encouraged them to abandon the coast and head 
further to sea. There, massive icebergs, some home to aggressive walruses, combined with heavy 
fog to imperil the vessels and convince their crews to turn back while it was still possible.  
On 15 August the vessels returned through the Yugor Strait and encountered their 
colleagues on Het Boot. Barents had sailed north of Novaya Zemlya, but his quest for a passage 
had been thwarted by impassable sea ice at 78 ° N, and he had been far less successful than his 
fellow explorers. By 10 September the fleet entered the North Sea, and six days later it returned 
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to Texel after a journey of more than three months. The expedition of 1594 was among the most 
successful polar voyages undertaken in the age of sail. Still, the subsequent enthusiasm of De 
Moucheron and the Enkhuizen circle was hardly shared by Barents and Plancius, who still 
believed that a more northerly route was navigable.
41
   
In 1594, the penetration of Dutch vessels into the seas above and beyond Novaya Zemlya 
was a product of co-evolution between the Republic’s economic expansion, cultural values, 
social structures, and technological improvements, which were activated through individual 
agency and informed by environmental frameworks that, in polar seas, most importantly 
included the extent of ice at sea. These Arctic environmental structures were broadly influenced 
by the colder climate of the Grindelwald Fluctuation, but yearly variability in seasonal 
temperature and Atlantic inflow had important ramifications for regional ice cover. Years in 
which the Atlantic current was especially weak grew more common during the Grindelwald 
Fluctuation, and this shift in the average quantity of warm water flowing into the Barents Sea 
affected related currents around the islands of Vaygatsch and Novaya Zemlya.  
In years of minimal Atlantic inflow the current through the Yugor Strait changed course 
to run from east to west, a phenomenon reported by the Dutch explorers in 1594 when they 
described how current and wind alike drove ice west into the Barents Sea. During the first 
expedition sea surface temperatures were likely quite low in the vicinity of Vaygatsch, and the 
adventurers should correspondingly have encountered unusually abundant sea ice. Instead, the 
mariners benefitted from relatively modest sea ice, particularly in the usually frigid Kara Sea, 
which is not affected by warmer currents even in years of maximum Atlantic inflow. 
Accordingly, the summer of 1594 in the vicinity of the Yugor Strait was likely quite warm in the 
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context of the Grindelwald Fluctuation. Summer warmth in the Arctic probably mirrored 
conditions in Northwestern Europe, where the summer of 1594 was only slightly cooler than the 
twentieth-century average.
42
 
 The environment that prevailed around the Yugor Strait in 1594 represented a complex 
relationship between hydrological conditions rendered more frequent and atmospheric conditions 
rendered less common during the climate of the Grindelwald Fluctuation. Plentiful sea ice 
initially imperiled the Zwaan and Mercurius in the strait while impeding the progress of Het 
Boot up the coast of Novaya Zemlya. Nevertheless, in 1594 the state of the atmosphere was 
likely more influential to the progress of the explorers than the related but not always parallel 
condition of the ocean. Regional sea ice was consequently less plentiful than what was 
encountered in subsequent expeditions during the Grindelwald Fluctuation, and indeed Barents 
might have found a way forwards were he not obliged to reunite with his colleagues.
43
 
Ultimately, relatively sparse sea ice enabled the explorers to leverage the cultural, economic, and 
environmental structures of the Republic in an unprecedented incursion into the Kara Sea.  
 
The Second Expedition: Failure and Discouragement, 1595 
 
After the voyages of 1594 confirmed the promise of a passage to Asia through the Yugor 
Strait, De Moucheron financed a second, larger expedition in the summer of the following year. 
On 2 July 1595, seven vessels from Amsterdam, Enkhuizen, and Zeeland departed Texel under 
Nay’s command. Barents served as lead pilot of the Amsterdam ships, while Van Linschoten was 
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head merchant on account of his travels in Asia. With Barents was the young Jacob van 
Heemskerk, later among the most famous explorers and admirals of the Golden Age. In the face 
of a Northwest wind, the fleet struggled up the North Sea and appeared off the coast of Norway 
on 15 July. After braving hard winds, the Dutch vessels were at 71° N on 26 July, and 
approached the North Cape – the northernmost tip of Norway – on 5 August (Map 1.3). Five 
days later the North Cape was nine miles southwest, as the explorers embarked across the 
Barents Sea. On 17 August, Gerrit de Veer, an explorer aboard the Dutch vessels, wrote that they 
were now off the coast of Novaya Zemlya, which was lined with a “great mass of ice.”44  
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Map 1.5. A map of the approach to Yugor Strait, published in the journal of Gerrit de Veer during the expedition of 
1595. On the left, “Idol Point” is highlighted in white; “Twist Point” is highlighted in black; the States Island is 
highlighted in white on the right. Refer to Map 1.3 for the actual geography of the region.  De Veer, Reizen van 
Willem Barents, 33. 
 
The quantity of sea ice persuaded the mariners to reconsider their options, but after a 
discussion they resolved to pursue their mission by attempting to enter the Strait of Yugor. 
Broken sea ice forced the crews to alter course, yet the squadron arrived off the strait on 18 
August. Despite abundant ice the explorers entered the strait on 19 August, but found the water 
near the so-called Afgodenhoek, or “Idol Point,” closed because of ice (Map 1.5). Varnek Bay, 
however, was relatively open, and provided shelter from windblown icebergs of the Strait (Map 
1.3). For nearly a week the vessels anchored in Varnek Bay as groups hiked across Idol Point, 
seeking some prospect from which they might glimpse open water. A small boat sent to scout the 
Kara Sea could not get past the Strait of Yugor on account of the ice, but on 23 August the 
90 
 
Dutchmen encountered a party of Russians preparing to set sail for the Kara Sea. The Russians 
claimed that before long much of the Kara Sea would be frozen, even onto its southern coast. 
Perhaps prompted by the Russian warning, on 25 August the explorers made a renewed attempt 
to enter the sea, but were turned back at Twist Point by an overwhelming abundance of ice (Map 
1.5).
45
  
In the next week, Barents and the other mariners spent several days among the inhabitants 
of the southern coast of Vaygatsch. On 2 September the vessels completed a treacherous journey 
through the ice to reach Cross Point, a gently protruding stretch of the coast between Idol Point 
and Twist Point (Maps 1.3 and 1.5). On 3 September the explorers were six kilometres north of 
Twist Point and entering the Kara Sea, but dense sea ice soon forced them to retreat. De Veer 
described “the great quantitie of Ice, and the mist that then fell, at which time the Winde blew so 
uncertaine, that we hold no course, but were forced continually to winde and turne about, by 
reason of the Ice, and the unconstantnesse of the wind.” After hours of such desperate 
maneuvering in variable wind the mariners correctly guessed that they had sailed back towards 
the southern coast of Vaygatsh in the Yugor Strait. With the season growing late, on 4 September 
the vessels were tied to the so-called States Island, which afforded some protection from the ice. 
The island was actually southeast of the Yugor Strait and in the Kara Sea, but the ice prohibited 
progress beyond this forward position (Maps 1.3 and 1.5).
46
  
 With their way blocked, the explorers foraged on the island for game and crystals, hoping 
that the ice would soon shift to open a passage to Asia. The island was inhabited by polar bears, 
but the peril posed by the bears was as yet unfamiliar to the Dutch. On 6 September, two men 
walking far inland were ambushed by a thin and, apparently, famished bear. According to the 
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English translation of De Veer’s account, the first man, pinned by the neck, cried, “who is that 
that pulles me so by the necke[?]” whereupon the second man responded with, “oh mate, it is a 
Beare.” The second man hurried back to his ship, where a party of some twenty sailors was 
assembled and equipped with firearms that had been brought along to deal with Iberian soldiers. 
The men approached the bear and opened fire, yet the bear ran into the barrage, killing one 
mariner, and scattering the rest (Figure 1.2). The bear was eventually slain, but the bloody 
encounter demonstrated that the peril of the Arctic environment extended beyond windblown ice, 
frigid temperatures, and severe storms. Moreover, for the explorers, the threats posed by 
different expressions of the environment around Novaya Zemlya were entwined. Not only did ice 
floes directly threaten the ships, but even when the vessels themselves were secure in relatively 
open harbours, delays caused by ice cover exposed crews to an alien and unforgiving 
wilderness.
47
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Fig. 1.2.  A sketch accompanying De Veer’s Dutch account, depicting the tragedies of 6 September, 1595. In the 
foreground several men are attacked by a polar bear; in the background a party of twenty men is routed by the same 
bear. Ice floes are visible around the ships. De Veer, Reizen van Willem Barents, 36. 
 
 
 With the polar bear dead, some among the frightened and frustrated crews staged a short-
lived mutiny, which was only quelled after five of the instigators were hanged. Between 9 and 12 
September the explorers launched three desperate attempts to break through the ice drifting east 
of States Island. The ice was too thick, however, and afforded no passage, forcing the expedition 
to return to the Yugor Strait. As if to confirm that it was now too late to linger in the vicinity of 
Novaya Zemlya, a severe storm struck the fleet on 13 and 14 September. On the morning of the 
15
th
, an easterly wind pushed thick sea ice into the Yugor Strait, driving the explorers west and 
into the Barents Sea. With any passage to Asia now clearly blocked by ice, Nay, Barents, and 
their subordinates agreed to return to the Republic. After weathering another gale on 17 
September, the expedition crossed the Barents Sea and arrived off Kildin ten days later. On 26 
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October the explorers returned to Amsterdam having never left the immediate vicinity of Novaya 
Zemlya, with only whale bones to show for their journey.
48
  
Compared to the voyages of 1594, the disastrous expedition of 1595 was likely 
influenced by a relationship between hydrological and atmospheric conditions that was more 
typical of the first minimum of the Little Ice Age. In northern Europe the winter of 1595 was 
particularly cold, in a year when temperatures across all seasons were dropping towards their 
nadir during the Grindelwald Fluctuation. In the vicinity of Vaygatsch, the force of sea ice 
through the strait recorded by the explorers likely reflected another year of minimal inflow of 
relatively warm Atlantic water into the Barents Sea. Indeed both the first and second expeditions 
were initially hampered by sea ice pressing through the Yugor Strait from the east, but whereas 
the ice had melted and opened a passage to the Kara Sea in 1594, it persisted in the summer of 
1595. Accordingly, average temperatures in the Russian Arctic likely mirrored the sharp decline 
of average European temperatures in 1595, compounding the impact of a weaker Atlantic 
current. These colder conditions were more common during the climatic regime of the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation than the relatively mild conditions of 1594, which had more than 
counteracted the influence of low Atlantic inflow. High winds and storms may, in turn, have 
funneled more sea ice into the Yugor Strait, where winds typically blew east from the frigid Kara 
Sea.
49
  
The influence of a shifting climate and, in turn, increased regional sea ice was mediated 
not only by cultural and economic trends that encouraged polar exploration, but also by the 
specific decisions made in spring of 1595. The second voyage for the Northeast Passage left later 
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in the year than the other expeditions, arriving at the Yugor Strait halfway through August, when 
the first fleet had already sailed deep into the Kara Sea a year earlier. In leaving later the 
commanders of the second expedition failed to take advantage of a likely quirk in the seasonal 
fluctuation of Arctic temperature during the Grindelwald Fluctuation. Model simulations suggest 
that average Arctic summer temperatures declined significantly less than they did in other 
seasons, while average autumn temperatures likely declined more. Consequently, by exploring 
later in the year, the adventurers in 1595 probably subjected their efforts to a much sharper shift 
in temperature and, in turn, sea ice than would be experienced today between August and 
October (Figure 1.1).  
Thick sea ice forced the explorers to wait in pockets of open water around the Yugor 
Strait, which, in turn, increased the likelihood of deadly encounters with local predators. The 
resulting mortality, coupled with the frustration caused by impenetrable sea ice, stimulated 
dissension and, indirectly, executions which poisoned already frayed relations between the 
Enkuizen and Amsterdam groups. In the final months of 1595, the passage through the Yugor 
Strait appeared far less promising than it had a year earlier, and it seemed as though the 
misgivings of the Amsterdam cabal had been realized. Now thoroughly discouraged, De 
Moucheron declined to finance continued Arctic exploration, while both Zeeland and Enkhuizen 
refused to contribute further ships.
50
  
 
The Third Expedition: Discovery, Disaster, and Survival, 1596-1597  
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In 1595, abundant sea ice rendered more common in the climate of the Grindelwald 
Fluctuation did not demoralize all advocates of a Northeast Passage. Van Linschoten remained 
convinced that “we will learn by additional investigation of the Vaygach [sic] area the right time 
to avoid the ice and conquer the obstacles that now, for lack of experience, appear 
insurmountable.” Meanwhile, Plancius and Barents, never sold on the earlier promise of the 
Yugor Strait, were eager to pursue the course they had long proposed. The voyages of 1594 had 
suggested that the Kara Sea was not merely a bay or inland sea, while the disastrous expedition 
of 1595 could not, of course, refute that the coast of the Kara Sea curved south towards China. In 
fact, Russian hunters had assured the Dutch that open seas continued well past Novaya Zemlya, 
possibly stretching across the entire polar region. The Amsterdamers reasoned that if ice had 
understandably hampered attempts to sail through the shallow Yugor Strait, the deeper waters 
north of Novaya Zemlya should afford a passage, just as the northerly sea off the North Cape 
permitted entry to the Barents Sea. On 25 March 1596, Plancius obtained a grant from townships 
in Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht to launch an expedition that would, at last, lie under the 
unquestioned authority of the Amsterdam “merchant-adventurers.”51  
 On 16 May 1596, two vessels destined for the far north attempted to leave the Zuider 
Zee. Barents was firmly ensconced as the intellectual leader of the expedition, but the captain of 
his vessel was Heemskerck, and Jan Cornelisz Rijp commanded the second ship. Once again, De 
Veer accompanied the voyage, and his journals provide a remarkably continuous account of the 
ensuing months. The endeavour was quickly off to an inauspicious start, as north-easterly winds 
conspired with a spent tide to temporarily ground a ship and, eventually, force the fleet's return.
52
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Despite continued north-easterly winds, the expedition finally left port two days later, and 
struggled up the North Sea against continued north-easterlies until at least 29 May. Barents 
actually intended to sail far to the north before bearing east to avoid the supposed polar 
continent, a logical extension of the belief among the Amsterdam explorers that sufficiently deep 
water could not freeze. That conviction was apparently confirmed by their first days in Arctic 
waters; no ice was visible even after De Veer described how the vessels were so far north that 
“wee had no night.” On 4 June, at just under 71° N, De Veer reported “a strange sight in the 
Element; for on each side of the Sunne there was another Sunne, and two Raine-bowes that past 
cleane through the three Sunnes, and then two Raine-bowes more, the one compassing round 
about the Sunnes, and the other crosse through the great rundle.” De Veer was among the first in 
European history to give a clear description of a parhelion, an illusion either stimulated or 
enhanced by the low position of the sun and the iciness of the atmosphere.
53
 
At the same time, Rijp’s pilot insisted that they had sailed too far to the east, and would 
in fact soon encounter the Yugor Strait. As the pilot could not be convinced otherwise, Barents 
and Heemskerck consented to steer even further to the north. On the following day, De Veer 
reported a troubling sign: sea ice on the horizon, “which from afar looked like an oncoming flock 
of swans.” The vessels could maneuver through on 5 June, but by 4:00 PM on the sixth the ice 
had become so solid that passage was impossible. The explorers consequently steered south-west 
before resuming their north north-east course along the great mass of ice. At more than 74° N, 
they were now as far north as they had ever journeyed. On 7 July the ice towered around them 
like land, and by the eighth it was so thick that they were again forced to bear south. Before long 
they spotted an island, for which they sailed to avoid the ice. For four days the mariners lingered 
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on the island, which they named “Bear Island” to commemorate a bear that they slew there with 
great difficulty (Map 1.3). After Rijp and Barents argued about their position a second time, the 
expedition departed the island on 13 June, and four days later the explorers again encountered 
thick sea ice.
54
 
 Once more, ice forced the mariners to alter course. At just under 80° N on 19 June the 
explorers spotted land, although the wind, blowing from the Northeast, hindered their attempts to 
approach. Barents was convinced that this was the long-lost coast of Greenland, although Rijp 
designated it “The New Land,” while the mariners called it Spitsbergen or “Sharp Mountains,” 
because its peaks scraped the clouds. For the first time Rijp was correct in a navigational dispute 
with Barents: now halfway between Norway and the North Pole, the explorers had, in fact, 
discovered the largest island of the sprawling Svalbard archipelago. On 21 June the men reached 
the shore, where they discovered a remarkable abundance of virgin fauna and flora. Two days 
later they hoisted anchor, and for the following week they explored up and down the coast of the 
island, their course routinely blocked by sea ice. Ultimately, all attempts to sail around 
Spitsbergen’s northern coast were thwarted by the ice, but because the ships were near land the 
thick ice did not disprove the notion that deep water could not freeze. On 1 July the explorers 
returned to Bear Island, no closer to a Northeast Passage for all their discoveries.
55
  
 Rijp now insisted on sailing north beyond 80° N to find an opening in the ice, but Barents 
believed that no passage was possible through the great landmass of Greenland. After a heated 
argument the two agreed to separate and attempt different passages: Rijp in the ice north of 
Spitsbergen, and Barents around the northern coast of Novaya Zemlya. In later testimony before 
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the Republic’s governing States-General, Rijp described how he had returned to the waters off 
Spitsbergen, where his ship had penetrated the ice pack to 79° N. A journal kept by crew 
member Thenis Claeszoon revealed that further progress was again blocked by impenetrable ice, 
and indeed the vessel was soon grazed by an iceberg. The ice tore a hole in the hull, but as water 
poured into the vessel the crew raised the leak above the sea by shifting all cargo towards the 
untouched side of the ship. Working from boats, the mariners repaired the hull, and after leaving 
messages nearby they sailed to Novaya Zemlya in pursuit of Barents.
56
  
 The expedition of 1596 departed nearly a month earlier than even the first fleet had in 
1594, and its initial discoveries were likely facilitated by average summer temperatures that, in 
the Arctic, cooled far less than average temperatures in other seasons during the Grindelwald 
Fluctuation. On the other hand, the summer was not so balmy that the mariners could avoid sea 
ice altogether to sail wherever they liked, and indeed model simulations suggest that, in the 
context of preceding centuries, water temperatures around Spitsbergen were colder than average 
during the 1590s.
57
 Consequently, it was not a lack of sea ice but rather its particular distribution 
that, in the summer of 1596, encouraged the discovery of Bear Island and, more significantly, 
Svalbard. On 6, 8, and 17 June the expedition encountered sea ice so thick that it forced a change 
in course, guiding the explorers closer to discoveries that they neither intended nor desired. 
Encountering Spitsbergen did not lead the Dutch closer to a Northeast Passage, but it was 
influenced by weather symptomatic of the very moderate nature of summer cooling in the Arctic 
of the late sixteenth century.
58
 The discovery may also have been influenced by persistent north-
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easterly winds in the North Sea, which delayed the expedition until it could encounter the 
distribution of sea that, in turn, encouraged its fateful changes in course. Such easterlies probably 
grew more common in the cooling of the late seventeenth-century climate, but they cannot, as 
yet, be linked to the similarly cold climate of the Grindelwald Fluctuation.  
 After Rijp and his crew departed on 1 July, Heemskerck and Barents commanded their 
men to bear east, towards Novaya Zemlya. Evidently they were less certain now regarding the 
impossibility of ice in deep water; De Veer recorded that given their high latitude they “much 
wondered” about the short-lived lack of sea ice on 4 July. Twelve days later they arrived off 
Novaya Zemlya, where they began to sail up the island's western coast (Map 1.6). On 19 July the 
explorers reached “Cross Island” (Cape Dyakanova) at roughly 76° N, yet they found their way 
blocked by ice. Opting to wait for an opening in the ice, on the following day the crew foraged 
ashore before being chased back to the ship by two polar bears. After surviving further 
encounters with bears in subsequent days the mariners finally maneuvered around the ice on 4 
August, and after two days they passed the Hoeck van Nassouwen or “Point of Nassau.” Rijp 
reached Cape Dyakanova only days after Barents and his crew slipped through, but the way 
forward was now entirely sealed by ice.
59
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Map 1.6. Significant locations for the expedition of 1596, in a Satellite image of Novaya Zemlya and, inset, as 
mapped in De Veer’s journal. The “Saved House” is visible on the top right of the De Veer map. Zeeberg, Into the 
Ice Sea, 17. Unwin, A Winter Away From Home, 68. De Veer, Reizen van Willem Barents, 138. 
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 On 7 August the ice took a more sinister form, with vast icebergs constraining the ship’s 
movement and drifting perilously close in the easterly wind. The crew attached their vessel to an 
iceberg to avoid colliding with other ice masses, yet on 10 August that iceberg splintered on the 
seabed. It was only by sailing over and through the shards of broken ice that the explorers 
narrowly escaped. After attempts to tie the ship to additional icebergs failed when these were 
also shattered, Barents and Heemskerk guided the ship nearer the shore, because the largest 
icebergs could not enter the shallow water.
60
  Despite this tactic, the explorers were entirely 
surrounded by ice on 15 August, but with great difficulty eventually found a passage. Before 
long they reached the island of Orange, and survived a polar bear encounter of a kind that was 
becoming increasingly common. On the following day there was cause for relief when a scouting 
party climbed a hill atop Novaya Zemlya and discovered open water to the southeast and east-
southeast. While Barents had worried that Novaya Zemlya was connected to a polar continent 
these fears now appeared groundless, and De Veer described how “we were much comforted, 
thinking we had won our voyage.”61  
 Having rounded the tip of Novaya Zemlya, on 20 August the explorers braved icebergs 
and thick sea ice to reach “Ice Haven” on the north-western coast of the island (Map 1.6). On the 
following day they left the haven, but a ferocious storm forced them to attach their vessel to an 
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iceberg until 23 August. On 24 August, the ice began to surround their vessel, but a change in 
wind drew it away again, and having narrowly escaped catastrophe they resolved to sail south 
towards Vaygatsch. Thickening ice soon forced them to reconsider that ambition, however, and 
on 26 August Barents decided that the expedition should retrace its steps around the west coast 
of Novaya Zemlya, abandoning the quest for a passage. However, as the ship passed by Ice 
Haven later that day it was entirely surrounded by ice, which pressed in from the sea with a 
southeast wind and, on the following day, lifted the vessel four feet above the water. After the 
ship was briefly lowered back into the sea by retreating ice on 29 August, the ice returned with 
even greater force than before, so that, according to De Veer, “the whole ship was borne up and 
inclosed, whereby all that was about it and in it, began to crack, so that it seemed to burst in a 
100 pieces, which was most fearfull both to see and heare and made all the haire of our heads to 
rise upright with feare.” For more than a week the ice retreated and returned, but all the while the 
vessel was firmly enclosed. With winter approaching and the ship again lifted high upon the ice, 
by 11 September it was obvious that there would be no imminent escape from the forbidding 
environment of Novaya Zemlya.
62
   
 Faced with this grim reality, Barents, Heemskerck, and their crew decided to build a 
house on the shore, in which they could endure the winter without facing the possibility of being 
crushed by sea ice. Fortunately, on 11 September a scouting party found entire trees on the coast, 
likely uprooted and washed ashore in a storm. With wood laboriously harvested from these trees 
the men began the long and desperate struggle to erect a shelter before the onset of the polar 
winter, when frigid temperatures and incessant storms, worsened in the climate of the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation, would combine with perpetual darkness to prohibit construction 
altogether. On 23 September the expedition’s carpenter died, likely from overwork, but despite 
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frequent bear attacks and worsening blizzards much of the shelter, which the crew called the 
Behouden Huys or “Saved House,” was built by 12 October (Map 1.6 and Figure 1.3). By 23 
October the construction of individual cabins, a chimney, and a door completed the house, which 
had finally been supplied with most of the ship’s victuals. The rest of the crew abandoned the 
vessel on 24 October, including one man who had fallen so sick that he was borne on a sled.
63
   
 
 
Fig. 1.3. An idealized depiction of the “Saved House” during the overwintering of 1596/97.  With no insulation, the 
walls were typically coated with ice. On the left, the hourglass; on the right, the clock which soon froze. Below the 
clock was a wine barrel turned makeshift bath, which offered little comfort against the extraordinary cold. Destined 
to die, a sick man rests left of the fire. Zeeberg, Into the Ice Sea, 104. See also: Gerrit De Veer, Warhafftige Relation 
der dreyen newen, unerhörten seltzamen Schiffart. Neurenberg: L. Hulsius, 1598. 
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 On 3 November the sun vanished beneath the horizon and was not seen again for months. 
The shimmering light of stars, moon, and aurora borealis, reflecting off the snow, allowed the 
explorers to forage when it was not too cold or stormy, while the sporadic thundering of the ice 
on the coast broke the silence. Nevertheless, when the clock froze and stood still four days later, 
the crew could no longer discern whether it was day or night.
64
 The bears that had routinely 
attacked the house disappeared with the sun, but temperatures continued to decline as blizzards 
grew more common. The crew manufactured pelts from foxes that had emerged with the retreat 
of the bears, but neither fur nor boiling water could long defend against the cold. By the third day 
of a lengthy blizzard on 3 December the walls were coated with ice as thick as two fingers, wisps 
of snow had blown through the walls, and the fire could scarcely be lit because its smoke, blown 
by the wind, no longer funneled through the chimney.
 65
  
In yet another blizzard three days later, De Veer wrote that the cold was “almost not to be 
indured, whereupon we lookt pittifully one upon the other, being in greate feare, that if the 
extremity of the cold grew to be more and more, we should all die there with cold.” These fears 
were well founded, and they deepened when shoes froze solid on 11 December, and again when 
the cabins were frozen in the morning of 26 December. Meanwhile, severe blizzards 
accompanied by unbearable cold and heavy snowfall that completely buried the Saved House 
had grown routine, blowing on forty-nine days from the beginning of December to the end of 
March.
66
 On 24 January the crew’s spirits were raised when the sun appeared to rise after nearly 
three months of darkness. The sunrise came two weeks earlier than Barents expected, and in fact 
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De Veer in his journal recorded the first observation of what was thereafter known as the 
“Novaya Zemlya effect,” a polar mirage stimulated by the atmospheric refraction of sunlight.67  
 Despite the illusion, before long the sun returned in truth, and, although the weather 
remained cold and stormy for months to come, by May open water was visible from the coast. 
The ship, however, could not be dislodged, and open water remained fleeting, as storms or even 
mere shifts in the wind repeatedly drove thick sea ice back into the harbour. Consequently, on 15 
May Heemskerck and Barents ordered the crew to prepare small boats, with which they would 
attempt a desperate journey back to the Republic.
68
 Weeks of frantic construction ensued, 
hampered by the curiosity of bears that had long since awakened from hibernation.
69
 Finally, on 
14 June two boats departed Novaya Zemlya, but they had not travelled far before they were 
again entrapped by ice. It was a sign of things to come, as rapidly shifting ice, bears, walruses, 
storms, and navigational blunders all conspired to threaten the return voyage in the months to 
come. Shortly following their departure Barents, long sick with scurvy, died alongside Claes 
Adrians as they huddled on windswept ice, while Jan Franszoon perished four days after the 
boats capsized in frigid water on 1 July. Nevertheless, despite enduring nearly unimaginable 
adversity, most of the explorers arrived at Kildin on 25 August, where to their astonishment they 
encountered Jan Cornelisz Rijp and his crew (Map 1.3). Reunited at last, the survivors arrived in 
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Amsterdam on 1 November, and the fur coats they had fashioned in Ice Haven created a 
sensation.
70
  
 Although adventurers seeking a Northeast Passage could have been entrapped by ice even 
in the warmer twentieth-century climate, the pattern of moderate summer cooling and frigid 
temperatures in fall, winter, and spring, typical of the Grindelwald Fluctuation in the Arctic, 
increased the likelihood of an overwintering during the Dutch expeditions. A relative lack of ice 
during summer might have encouraged the Dutch explorers to penetrate deep into Arctic waters, 
and indeed Barents and his crew might not have slipped past Cape Dyakanova had the summer 
of 1596 been any colder, while Rijp might have found a way through were the summer warmer. 
In that case the expedition would have been reunited far sooner, and Rijp might have convinced 
Barents to attempt an earlier return to the Republic.  On the other hand, before the expedition of 
1595 ended in disappointment, Barents had unsuccessfully argued for an overwintering near the 
island of Vaygatsch, and indeed in 1596 the explorers were again well provisioned for that 
possibility.
71
  
Surviving winter on the northern tip of Novaya Zemlya was an entirely different 
prospect, however, and indeed before 1597 few western Europeans had ever survived an Arctic 
winter. The unusually sharp shift in temperature between summer and autumn, influenced by the 
climate of the Grindelwald Fluctuation, likely increased the difficulty of avoiding, and decreased 
the possibility of escaping, a sudden thickening of sea ice off Novaya Zemlya (Figure 1.1). 
Thereafter, a frigid winter punctuated by relentless storms, rendered more common in the climate 
of the late sixteenth century, conspired with a relatively cold spring to deepen and lengthen the 
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hardships endured by the explorers of the “Saved House.” It may be that the reduced flow of the 
Atlantic current in the Barents Sea increased the sea ice encountered by the beleaguered mariners 
as they struggled to return to the Republic during the summer of 1597. Because their vessels 
never entered the Yugor Strait, however, there are no indications of the regional current in the 
logbook kept by De Veer to record the expedition.
72
  
 
Conclusion: the Enduring Significance of the Barents Voyages in a Colder Climate  
 
 The meteorological and hydrological conditions of the Arctic north of Europe were 
influenced by the climatic cooling of the Grindelwald Fluctuation in ways that shaped the quest 
for a Northeast Passage at the dawn of the Dutch Golden Age. Nevertheless, a climatic trend 
masks the annual variability of weather, and indeed it was actually seasonal warmth, rendered 
less common during the colder climate of the late sixteenth century, that helped enable the 
success of the expedition of 1594. The promise of that expedition inspired a second endeavour in 
1595, but the relationship between weather and hydrology was now more typical of the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation. The explorers left late in the season, exposing their voyage to the sharp 
drop between average summer and autumn temperatures reconstructed using model simulations. 
Heavy sea ice subsequently thwarted all attempts to investigate the Kara Sea, but this failure only 
encouraged entrepreneurs in Amsterdam to attempt the more northerly passage for which they 
had long advocated.  
Departing early in the summer of 1596, the third expedition of Willem Barents initially 
benefitted from weather that likely reflected how average summer temperatures in the Arctic had 
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not declined as much as average temperatures in other seasons. After discovering Bear Island 
and Spitsbergen, however, Barents and his crew were trapped off the northeastern coast of 
Novaya Zemlya as temperatures and, in turn, ice cover manifested the sharp transition to autumn 
in a cooler climate. Although the misery of their overwintering was exacerbated by weather 
typical of the Grindelwald Fluctuation, it was not the homogeneity but rather the heterogeneity 
of relationships between climate, weather, and ocean currents that influenced the history of 
contemporary Arctic exploration. The outcome of the quest for a Northeast Passage in the last 
decade of the sixteenth century can only be fully understood by matching the centuries-old 
logbooks with new climatic reconstructions to uncover differences in the rate of cooling between 
seasons and the complex, sometimes paradoxical interactions between hydrological and 
atmospheric manifestations of the prevailing climate.  
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Map 1.7. Map of the north drawn by Willem Barents shortly before his death, and published in 1599. Svalbard is 
marked as Het nieuwe land (“the new land”). Best compared with Map 1.2. Willem Barents, Deliniatio cartæ trium 
navigationum etc. The Hague: Cornelis Claeszoon, 1599. 
 
In 2005, historian Maarten Prak wrote that the third polar expedition of 1596/97 “yielded 
only the spectacular tale of the long, harsh winter months spent on Nova Zembla.”73 In fact, 
although the third voyage and its predecessors did not chart a lucrative Northeast Passage, the 
three expeditions revolutionized European understanding of the north, with consequences that 
would ultimately prove very profitable for the Dutch Republic. Exploration and, with it, the 
realization that deep water could freeze had undermined notions of polar kingdoms inhabited by 
fantastical beings. By suggesting that the Arctic ice sighted by adventurers in previous centuries 
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was no indication of nearby land, the Dutch expeditions between 1594 and 1597 challenged the 
notion of an Arctic continent, even if they never actually approached the North Pole. 
Accordingly, fictional monsters and continents vanished from maps developed using data 
gleaned from the expeditions (Map 1.7). New lands appeared to the European imagination as 
Dutch maps depicted Arctic geography and fauna with increasing accuracy.  
None of the discoveries was more significant to Dutch prosperity and Arctic ecology than 
the Svalbard archipelago.
74
 Inspired by De Veer’s vivid descriptions of Spitsbergen’s natural 
abundance, the first whaling expeditions in 1600 encountered countless bowhead whales 
congregated in some of the richest feeding grounds of the entire Arctic. Mirroring the process of 
consolidation that simultaneously strengthened Dutch imperialism in Asia and the New World, 
in 1614 the Noordsche Compagnie was granted a monopoly over the slaughter of whales and 
walruses from Novaya Zemlya to the Davis Strait. The Company quickly established factories at 
nearly every accessible site along the western coast of Spitsbergen, including the infamous 
slaughterhouse of Smerenburg. Increased activity in polar seas was accompanied by further 
attempts at a Northeast Passage, although none were as committed as the Barents expeditions, 
and none ended successfully.
75
  
 Beyond encouraging the development of a large and destructive new industry, the 
expeditions provided important new discoveries relevant to the behaviour of sea ice, the patterns 
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of Arctic fauna or flora, and the physics of light through the polar atmosphere. Moreover, the 
complete journals kept by De Veer and Van Linschoten were published in many different 
languages, and were widely disseminated in the print culture of the Dutch coastal cities. 
Consequently, the voyages of the 1590s, shaped by the climate of the Grindelwald Fluctuation, 
emerged as enduring symbols of the ambition and resilience of the Dutch Republic in its Golden 
Age, influencing popular culture in the northern Low Countries while inspiring later explorers in 
more distant seas.
76
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Chapter 2 
 
Exploiting the Periphery in a Fluctuating Climate:  
United East India Company Ship Journeys 
 
 In the 1590s, the expeditions that sought a Northeast Passage to Asia were encouraged, 
thwarted, and ultimately redirected by influences that included the interplay between climate, 
weather, and the Arctic environment during the Grindelwald Fluctuation. For Dutch merchants, 
the voyages strongly suggested that any attempts to exploit a Northeast Passage, even if it did 
exist and had somehow eluded Barents, would be prohibitively expensive. Merchants like De 
Moucheron therefore invested heavily in early expeditions around the Cape of Good Hope, 
which eventually yielded spectacular profits.
1
 Such voyages were also at the periphery of the 
world known to the Dutch, but they occupied a periphery that was already commercialized, and 
would soon be normalized, for many within the Republic. Ultimately, the journeys to Asia, and 
the trading empire they would sustain, would be shaped by relationships between weather and 
climate change that were very different from those that affected exploration in the Arctic. 
The first Dutch expeditions to Asia hinted not only at the potential of direct trade with the 
Far East, but also at the ways in which weather would affect future voyages. In August of 1597, 
Cornelis de Houtman salvaged the otherwise disastrous first Dutch expedition to Asia by 
returning to Amsterdam with word that it was possible for Dutch traders to purchase spices in the 
Far East.
2
  One year later, wealthy merchants united two smaller companies to form the Oude 
Oost-Indische Compagnie (“Old East India Company”), which now possessed resources 
sufficient to furnish a second expedition with eight large, heavily-armed vessels. Heemskerck, 
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fresh from his ordeal in Novaya Zemlya, served as chief merchant under the command of 
Admiral Jacob van Neck. The fleet departed on 1 May 1598, and was immediately hampered by 
calm winds, which impeded all forward progress in the age of sail. Thereafter still conditions 
alternated with storms that repeatedly scattered the ships. When Van Neck, Heemskerck, and 
their crew arrived at the Cape of Good Hope on the southern tip of Africa, they were left with 
only three ships. After much sickness and suffering, the surviving vessels reached Bantam on the 
island of Java, where the crew purchased spices that were loaded into their holds as their 
previously lost companions sailed over the horizon. The return journey of the united fleet was 
again hampered by tropical illness, while repeated storms finally succeeded in toppling the mast 
of Van Neck’s flagship. At last four of the vessels arrived at Texel on 19 July 1599, and their 
cargo of spices was sold at great profit by the Oude Oost-Indische Compagnie (Figure 2.1).
3
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Fig 2.1. The return of the second expedition to Asia in 1599. Two Dutch East Indiamen are visible in the centre and 
far left. The size and shape of the East Indiamen compared to other contemporary vessels is clearly depicted. 
Andries van Eeertveld, “The Return to Amsterdam of the Second Expedition to the East Indies on 19 July 1599,” 
painting, c. 1610-1620, National Maritime Museum, http://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/12240.html.  
 
 In these first Dutch voyages to Asia, delays caused by calm winds lengthened how long 
crews were forced to endure cramped, unsanitary conditions and meagre, often spoiled rations. 
Waiting for the right wind in such circumstances may have increased the threat of disease, which 
afflicted both journeys. Moreover, storms damaged the Dutch vessels and scattered fleets, 
exacerbating the risks posed by enemy action in hostile waters, while impeding navigation and, 
in turn, lengthening time spent in insalubrious circumstances. The eight small companies initially 
established to pursue Dutch commerce with Asia may have been particularly vulnerable to such 
environmental conditions. They lacked the means to compensate for a particularly disastrous 
voyage, and their competition had destabilized spice prices. The States General issued a charter 
on 20 March 1602 that merged these relatively small “precursor” companies into the Vereenigde 
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Oost-Indische Compagnie (“United East India Company”). The world’s first firm founded on 
permanent share capital, the new consortium was placed under the authority of a board known as 
the Heren XVII (“Seventeen Lords”), and granted a monopoly over Dutch trade from the Red Sea 
to Japan. The States-General bestowed great power upon the VOC, granting its representatives 
the right to conduct diplomacy, field troops, construct warships, and impose governors on 
indigenous populations.
4
  
 The merchants who founded the precursor corporations were motivated primarily by the 
potential profits of direct participation in the high-value, low-volume “rich trade” with Asia, but 
the States-General had established the VOC not only to enrich the Republic but also to 
undermine the Iberian economy.
5
 The expedition under Van Neck had already recorded 
indigenous discontent with Iberian merchants and governors, which the VOC was well 
positioned to exploit. Consequently the VOC’s initial successes in 1605 were both military and 
commercial, as its fleet seized the Indonesian islands of Amboina, Ternate, and Tidore from the 
Portuguese. Because these conquests had been unplanned and relatively unorganized, in 1609 the 
Heren XVII dispatched a governor general and council to Asia, to better administer and expand 
its new acquisitions. A decade later, the company’s fourth governor general, Jan Pieterszoon 
Coen, seized Batavia, at the site of modern-day Jakarta, transforming the settlement into the 
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locus of European power in Asia (Map 2.1).
6
 In subsequent decades the VOC expanded rapidly 
across Asia, establishing factories and fortresses at the expense of the Portuguese.
7
   
 
 
Map. 2.1. The “cart track,” (outbound from the Republic in green, inbound from Batavia in red) the “back way,” 
(yellow) and the major ports of the VOC. Routes diverged in the Indian Ocean, but for much of the Company’s 
history most Dutch vessels entering or leaving Asia called at Batavia.  
 
 The structure of the VOC under the authority of the Heren XVII superficially mirrored 
the federated organization of the Dutch state. Each equipped with its own shipyard, the 
Company’s six chambers reflected the geographic origins of the precursor companies. Still, 
Amsterdam was dominant in practice, as it was in the wider Republic. The chambers of the VOC 
manufactured and equipped 1,581 vessels between their establishment and their final collapse in 
1803. These ranged from small boats to hulking East Indiamen capable of carrying more than 
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1,000 tons in spices, textiles, precious metals, and other “rich” commodities.8 With the regular 
and spectacular profits gleaned from trade in such goods, the VOC, although initially a minor 
material contributor to Dutch prosperity, ultimately emerged as a primary engine of the 
Republic’s economy. Employing over 30,000 men at the height of its power, the Company 
dominated not only commerce between Asia and Europe, but also the equally lucrative trade 
between Asian ports. With silver shipped from Amsterdam, in the first decades of the 
seventeenth century VOC agents used the Company’s vast reach to gain a prolonged competitive 
advantage over local maritime powers. The Company’s control over intra-Asian trade and, in 
turn, its profitability peaked around 1670, although its size and gross revenues continued to 
expand in the following century.
9
 
 For the VOC to exploit price fluctuations in different ports while defending its control of 
Asian waters, the traffic in goods and information carried aboard the Company’s East Indiamen 
needed to be reliable, inexpensive, and swift. These necessities were linked: the price of 
commerce rose if vessels were lost, for example, while the possibilities for disaster increased the 
longer a ship was at sea.
10
 VOC correspondence, ship logbooks, and day registers reveal that the 
dependability, expense, and duration of voyages were connected to evolving relationships 
between climatic fluctuations, patterns of prevailing wind, and daily weather in the nadir of the 
Little Ice Age. During the Maunder Minimum, a rise in the frequency of easterly winds in the 
North Sea region likely increased the sailing speed of vessels departing the Republic relative to 
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the velocity of outbound ships in preceding, warmer decades. For outbound ships, more common 
easterlies generally blew from the point of departure, and contributed to a statistically significant 
shortening of their journeys to Asia. By comparison, for ships returning to the Republic from 
Asian ports the effect of more common easterlies was ambiguous, and the overall influence of 
changing in prevailing wind during the Maunder Minimum was likely to decrease the duration of 
VOC voyages.  
 Company sources also reflect a rise in the frequency of storms encountered by VOC 
crews during the Maunder Minimum, an increase that was likely concentrated in the North Sea 
region and was consequently reflected in regional documentary evidence. Most storms do not 
appear to have directly imperilled large, seaworthy East Indiamen, which generally sailed far 
from potentially threatening lee shores. Nevertheless, the influence of storms was significant, if 
complex. Gales routinely scattered fleets and damaged individual ships, but when high winds 
blew in a favourable direction, storms could propel vessels at speeds sufficient to substantially 
shorten their journeys.   
 The rise and decline of the VOC is one of the most studied aspects of the Dutch Golden 
Age. However, few Dutch historians, and no climate historians, have fully appreciated the 
importance of weather for the efficient operation of the Company. Recent scholarship on the 
VOC has primarily considered its networks for exchanging commodities, people, cultural 
attitudes, and information.
11
 Increasingly, historians have also explored the Company’s 
operations within Asia, including its lucrative expansion into the intra-Asian trades, which 
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required large-scale employment of local seamen.
12
 Some of these studies have adopted a micro 
historical approach, exploring the Company’s history in one of its Asian outposts.13 Accordingly, 
the environmental history of the Company’s activities in Atlantic waters has received little 
attention since the advent of climate history.
14
 In this, scholarship of the VOC echoes that of its 
English competitor. For example, Philip Lawson’s recent account of the rise and fall of the 
English East India Company contains not a single reference to “wind,” and the only storms he 
describes are metaphorical.
15
  
 Nevertheless, some historians of the VOC have examined how weather patterns 
influenced the establishment and later operation of the Company. In the 1970s and 1980s, Jaap 
Bruijn pioneered the quantitative analysis of VOC documentary records, and the resulting 
statistics reflected the influence of storms on Company shipwrecks. In 2003, Femme Gaastra, 
who had been part of this earlier initiative, outlined how VOC fleet schedules were set, in part, 
by the threat of winter storms in the North Sea, and the annual reality of the Indian monsoon. 
Gaastra echoed Bruijn in writing that prevailing winds in the Atlantic and Indian oceans shaped 
the development of standardized trade routes between Asia and the Dutch Republic. In 2010, 
Robert Parthesius repeated Gaastra’s conclusions, and again described relationships between 
VOC shipwrecks and storms. However, despite the research pursued by Bruijn, Gaastra, 
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Parthesius, and others, no study has yet connected the activities of the VOC to the climatic 
fluctuations of the Little Ice Age.
16
  
This chapter begins by reconstructing how early modern climatic fluctuations, which 
influenced the frequency of storms in the North Sea region, ultimately affected VOC shipwrecks 
and mortality rates in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Correspondence written in 
Asia and Europe sheds new light on these relationships, but the most important sources are day 
registers that are here examined in unprecedented detail. Day registers, which survive in large 
quantities, provide abundant data regarding the major characteristics of Company journeys, but 
do not record the precise geographic location of vessels at sea, or the weather their crews 
experienced. However, such information is given by the hour in VOC ship logbooks. The chapter 
therefore continues by quantifying seventeenth- and eighteenth-century VOC logbook 
measurements of wind direction and daily distance travelled. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
a comprehensive re-examination of day register data in light of ship logbook observations that 
suggest a link between changing North Sea weather patterns and average VOC journey duration. 
 
Climatic Shifts and Storms in VOC Correspondence and Day Registers  
 
In 1610, VOC commander Hendrik Brouwer instructed his crew to avoid the then-typical 
course that passed by Madagascar and Mauritius to reach the spice islands of Indonesia. Instead, 
the mariners charted a route that crossed the breadth of the Indian Ocean from the Cape of Good 
Hope in southern Africa to the west coast of Australia, before curving north towards Indonesia. 
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While superficially longer than the usual course to the Indies, this route avoided the contrary 
winds and storms of higher latitudes and instead harnessed the “roaring forties,” a persistent 
band of high-velocity westerlies at 40° S in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Consequently, 
Brouwer and his crew spent less time at sea, and in 1616 the Heren XVII approved his newly 
charted course as mandatory for all VOC vessels.
17
 After some experimentation, the course of 
ships from Europe to Asia was formally laid down in the Company’s “sailing orders.” VOC 
vessels were to sail through the English Channel or, in time of war, along “the back way” around 
Scotland and Ireland. From there, ships were instructed to bear south, passing west of the Bay of 
Biscay. After crossing the equator, captains followed a precisely marked wagenspoor (“cart 
track”) to avoid being drawn into the Gulf of Guinea to the east, or, to the west, into a collision 
course with ships travelling north. Subsequently, vessels were required to anchor at the Cape of 
Good Hope to resupply, and from there they would follow Brouwer’s route to Indonesia (Map 
2.1).
18
  
 In the decades that immediately followed the establishment of the VOC, vessels 
departing for Asia were organized into two “fleets:” the Christmas Fleet, which ostensibly set 
sail in December, and the Easter Fleet, which generally departed around April. When the English 
Channel was at peace, these “fleets” were not convoys but, instead, isolated vessels that were 
part of a biannual exodus from many Dutch ports. If harbour ice permitted departure, outbound 
vessels in the Christmas Fleet were forced to brave conditions in the North Sea region that were 
stormy in both warmer and cooler climates, but provisioning and staffing the ships in early 
winter was easier than it would be in the spring. Moreover, vessels in the Christmas Fleet could 
arrive in the Indian Ocean just before the end of the summer monsoon, which was accompanied 
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by winds that, in turn, facilitated travel from Batavia to the Company’s other factories in Asia. 
After 1636, additional vessels were organized into a third, “Fairs,” fleet, which departed in 
September and October and could more consistently harness the winds of the monsoon. By the 
eighteenth century, so many ships departed the Republic for Asia that the idea of separate fleets 
was obsolete.
19
  
Logistics in Asia forced most vessels departing from Batavia to leave between November 
and January, and none of these ships ever arrived in Dutch ports later than November of the 
following winter. That was still too late for the Heren XVII, who organized the Company’s 
autumn auction when all expected inbound vessels had arrived. Arrivals later than October 
required a second auction, which drove down prices, but despite repeated instructions from the 
Heren XVII to dispatch ships earlier in the year, changes to the rhythm of the Company’s intra-
Asian operations were never deemed feasible by the governors general of Batavia. Even in times 
of peace, the richly-laden VOC ships returning to the Republic were typically organized into 
convoys and, despite their substantial armament, awaited by escorting warships in the North Sea 
region.
20
  
 For most outbound and inbound VOC vessels, the passage through the Northeastern 
Atlantic was the part of their journey that was most influential to its success or failure. As the 
VOC’s power waxed in Asia, it was in the waters off Europe that VOC ships were most 
vulnerable to enemy action. Meanwhile, ice likely delayed outbound vessels in the harbours of 
England, Scandinavia, and the Dutch Republic, while storms were especially common in the 
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seasons during which Company vessels typically arrived and departed. The North Sea lies in a 
zone between the Icelandic Low and Azores High where depressions normally move east and 
winds consequently blow overwhelmingly from the west, particularly during moderate or warm 
climatic regimes. However, ship logbooks, diary entries and correspondence have revealed that, 
in the North Sea region, the colder temperatures and more frequent storms of the Maunder 
Minimum were probably accompanied by a rise in the prevalence of easterly winds 
(Introduction, Chapter 4). Like storms, these easterlies were particularly frequent in the months 
when most Company vessels returned to or sailed from the Republic.
21
  
 Jaap Bruijn has employed VOC day register information to calculate that fewer than 3% 
of outbound and 5% of inbound VOC ships were lost due to storms or enemy action. However, 
that still amounted to 144 vessels, and the financial, material, and human toll of even a single 
shipwreck could be immense.
22
 In order to shed new light on these statistics, and the ways in 
which Company voyages may have been influenced by changes in prevailing weather, this 
chapter introduces ship journey reconstructions compiled from a more comprehensive analysis of 
6,000 VOC day registers. Historians have developed databases that standardize register 
information, most notably through an initiative supported by the Huygens Institute for the 
History of the Netherlands. However, the interpreted data has not yet been analyzed to yield 
precise measurements of VOC journey duration or rate of completion. Indeed, the standardized 
results have not been interpreted using a rigorous methodology for removing insufficiently 
continuous or inadequately precise data. Accordingly, it has not been possible to reliably identify 
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connections between VOC journey characteristics and the climatic trends that have been 
reconstructed with great detail for the northeastern Atlantic.
 23
   
 In this chapter, VOC day register information has been carefully filtered to yield 
information that is of value for historical climatologists. For example, statistics of total journey 
times presented in this chapter do not include data recorded for the rare vessels that did not 
journey along the approximate geography of the cart track, or for ships on voyages that were not 
described to the day. The statistics also exclude journeys of ships that remained in a particular 
location for longer than a few months, for reasons that were definitely or, in rare occasions, 
probably for purposes beyond resupply.
24
  
Far more problematic was the need to compensate for secondary ports visited by VOC 
ships sailing to or from Asia, which multiplied as the Company’s reach lengthened in the course 
of the seventeenth century. Because of delays that accumulated when a ship lingered in or 
approached a port, secondary destinations could distort statistics measuring both journey times 
and rates of mortality. More importantly, the locations of secondary destinations did not always 
conform precisely to the geography of the cart track, undermining attempts to compare ship 
speeds and rates of journey completion along the same route. Consequently, statistics here 
compiled from day registers do not include journeys in which secondary destinations were 
visited, unless one of two conditions was met. First, the balance of evidence must suggest that 
meteorological conditions necessitated resupply or contributed to a delay at a secondary port, 
although this does not include cases where a vessel was forced to return to its port of origin 
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before departing a second time.
25
 Alternatively, the secondary destination must have been clearly 
positioned along the cart track, it must have been described with geographic precision, and, of 
course, the time spent at the secondary point must have been recorded to the day.
26
 Ultimately, 
nearly 2,000 VOC outbound and inbound entries, dating from 1598 to 1709, remained after 
irrelevant or imprecise day register information was screened from this statistical analysis.  
Only after 1625 did day registers record the number of shipwrecks and deaths on 
journeys from the Republic to the Cape, and along the whole length of the passage from the 
Republic to Asia. Despite the resulting omission of most of the Grindelwald Fluctuation, register 
data reveals that the average mortality rate was typically high aboard Dutch East Indiamen 
(Figure 2.2). This substantial death rate undermines Bruijn’s claim that employment in the VOC 
was relatively safe, owing to the rarity of Company shipwrecks. In fact, for journeys departing 
Asia or the Republic, most registers describe several deaths in each week, and, often, each day of 
the passage. Many of these deaths were attributed either to disease or sailors falling overboard, 
and both of these conditions could be worsened by the trauma of a storm at sea. Not surprisingly, 
the destruction of a ship could lead to a surge in deaths, particularly when all hands were lost 
upon a lee shore. The rate of mortality recorded in day registers generally peaked sharply during 
years of abundant shipwrecks, and a significant portion of deaths occurred in the Atlantic Ocean, 
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during voyages from the Republic to the Cape. Day registers, which did not mention daily 
weather, nonetheless explicitly described how storms stimulated many of the disasters that 
contributed heavily to increases in average mortality.
27
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Mortality recorded in day registers for vessels travelling from the Republic to the Cape (blue), and from the 
Republic to Asia (orange), 1625-1709.  
 
Register data confirm that failed journeys accounted for only a small percentage of total 
voyages from the Republic to the Indian Ocean, although such catastrophes could be 
tremendously costly. However, the registers also reveal that failed journeys, usually owing to 
shipwreck, were significantly more common during the minima of the Little Ice Age than they 
were during the period’s relative maxima (Figure 2.3). More than half of these wrecks occurred 
in the North Sea region. Disasters at sea peaked during the last years of the Grindelwald 
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Fluctuation in the late 1620s, the first decades of the Maunder Minimum in the 1660s and 70s, 
and in particular during the early 1690s. The sharp decline in shipwrecks during the rapid growth 
of the VOC in the 1630s and especially the 40s demonstrates that the rise in wrecks later in the 
decade was not merely a product of the Company’s expansion.28 
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Fig. 2.3. Uncompleted VOC voyages, usually owing to shipwreck, in day registers describing traffic from the 
Republic to Asia, 1620-1709.  
 
 Letters sent to the Heren XVII from the Company’s leadership in Batavia abound with 
reports of storms, which often necessitated costly repairs. The Huygens Institute has compiled 
the abundant letters from Batavia into thirteen published volumes, each containing material 
written in approximately one or two decades. The correspondence of the Company’s leading 
merchants and politicians is often continuous, reliable, and consequently relevant for historical 
climatology. In letters written from 1610 to 1638 and published within the first volume, storms 
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were discussed, on average, once every 2.3 pages (Figure 2.4). Spanning nearly thirty years, the 
period incorporates the late Grindelwald Fluctuation together with the warmer and, in some 
regions, more tranquil decade that followed. Average annual references to storms increased 
slightly in subsequent decades before rising sharply in the decade between 1675 and 1685. 
However, average yearly storm references fell significantly in the final decade of the seventeenth 
century, before increasing to their highest recorded level during the late Maunder Minimum. 
Storms were mentioned in 46 letters written between 1713 and 1724, but thereafter storms were 
mentioned in only four letters written from 1725 to 1737.
29
    
 
 
Fig. 2.4. Page numbers per year in which storms were mentioned within VOC correspondence sent from Batavia to 
Amsterdam. Page numbers were taken from nine volumes published by the Huygens Institute for the History of the 
Netherlands. Each volume covers between four and 18 years.  
 
 A quantitative analysis of storm references in letters sent from Batavia inevitably reduces 
a qualitative diversity of meteorological information to produce simplified statistics. Not all of 
                                                 
29
 Generale missiven van gouverneurs-generaal en raden aan heren XVII, Volumes 1-9, ed. Coolhaas.  
129 
 
the storms described by the governors general and councils in Batavia affected vessels in the 
Atlantic Ocean, nor did all beset East Indiamen sailing to or from the Republic. Storms that 
caused minor damage generally escaped mention, especially when that damage could be repaired 
at a port along the cart track. Still, references to storms in letters from Batavia do seem to have 
increased during the Maunder Minimum, despite a puzzling decline in the last years of the 
seventeenth century, when shipwrecks and mortality both increased sharply. That reduction in 
storm references may have been caused by a decline in descriptions of violent weather in Asia, 
which was naturally affected differently by contemporary climatic fluctuation than the 
northeastern Atlantic. However, because so many VOC shipwrecks occurred in the North Sea 
and northeastern Atlantic, storm references in letters were probably strongly influenced by the 
frequency and severity of gales in that region. Consequently, they were generally more abundant 
during the Maunder Minimum.
30
  
At the other pole of the VOC’s trading empire, many East Indiamen were too large to 
enter Amsterdam’s shallow harbour without the assistance of tugboats and external floatation 
tanks called “camels.” Accordingly, most East Indiamen loaded and unloaded at Texel. 
Correspondence and diaries written within the Dutch Republic reveal that shipwrecks off Texel 
were more common during the Maunder Minimum than they were before or after, despite the 
presence of significant statistical outliers (Figure 2.5). Most of these shipwrecks were stimulated 
by storms, yet very few were attributed to Company East Indiamen. In 1625 the VOC vessel 
Alkmaar was destroyed in a gale near Texel, and in 1639 two VOC ships sunk off the same 
island, of which one was an East Indiaman. Another Company vessel was lost in the following 
year, while the Lelie, an East Indiaman, foundered in 1654. Other wrecks in subsequent decades 
were part of convoys and some were bound to Asia, but in surviving sources none of these lost 
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vessels was explicitly assigned to the VOC. Of course, company ships did sink along the cart 
track, and many foundered in the northeastern Atlantic. Both shipwrecks and average journey 
mortality accordingly increased during the Maunder Minimum and decreased thereafter. The loss 
of an East Indiaman, rare even during the nadir of the Maunder Minimum, was far more costly in 
lives and wealth than the calamities that befell flutes and other smaller ships. Nevertheless, a 
statistical analysis of day registers, diaries, and correspondence suggests that the seaworthy East 
Indiamen could usually survive all but the most severe gales.
31
   
 
Fig. 2.5. Total shipwrecks (blue) and shipwrecks during storms (red) recorded off Texel between 1595 and 1756.  
 
Of course, correspondence sent during the Maunder Minimum can also offer qualitative 
insights into relationships between VOC voyages and the intermingled influences of increased 
easterly winds and more frequent storms during the Maunder Minimum in the Northeastern 
Atlantic. On 20 April 1671, Adriaen van der Goes informed his brother that four French East 
Indiamen were ruined in a storm shortly after leaving port. Eight years earlier, Van der Goes had 
described how four ships, these belonging to the VOC, were sunk in a storm off the coast of 
Madagascar. Both disasters likely occurred near a lee shore. For much of their voyages, however, 
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East Indiamen sailed in deep water, far from the coast, and when provided with space to 
maneuver the large, seaworthy vessels were rarely sunk by gales.
32
 
In January and February 1707, grand pensionary Anthonie Heinsius received a series of 
letters from another Van der Goes aboard the vessel De Beschermer (“The Protector”). Between 
1702 and 1720, Heinsius received thousands of letters from Dutch officials across Europe, and 
Van der Goes was one of these men.
33
 On 6 January, Van der Goes reported that his vessel had 
been delayed for two weeks off the port of Goeree in southern Holland, owing to westerly 
winds.
34
 Given the Republic’s participation in the War of the Spanish Succession, when Van der 
Goes finally set sail his vessel quickly joined other ships passing through the English Channel. 
On 27 January De Beschermer was off Portsmouth, a port in southern England that was on an 
arm of the Channel. However, its voyage was again postponed when westerly winds in the 
Downs, a roadstead on the east coast of England, slowed the arrival of the rest of its convoy from 
Texel. Shortly thereafter Van der Goes and his crew were anchored near St. Helens, off the south 
coast of England, to await the long-expected convoy, yet hard, southwesterly winds soon forced 
De Beschermer back to Portland. Despite the disruptive westerlies, Van der Goes actually 
recorded an unusual abundance of easterlies in January, and he insisted that he could have 
harnessed these to be at Lisbon on 27 January, had he not been detained by convoy duty. 
35
 Van 
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der Goes wrote that he hoped for a resumption of easterly winds, as the convoying ships from the 
Admiralty of West Friesland were not provisioned for more than six months.
36
 
 In fact, the ships from Texel arrived off St. Helens on the day after Van der Goes sent his 
letter, and with them returned the easterlies of previous weeks. In a letter sent on 10 February, 
Van der Goes reported that the convoy made good progress for two days following its long-
awaited union. Thereafter, however, three days of still conditions slowed the fleet until a 
ferocious gale brought with it rain, snow, and a driving wind from the south. Most of the convoy 
had been scattered, and with a resumption of hard, westerly winds many ships were blown back 
to Portland and Portsmouth. Much of the fleet was slowly reassembled, despite lingering rain, 
hail, and hard winds, but several ships suffered severe damage to masts and rigging. In the 
immediate aftermath of the storm, only the warships and East Indiamen escaped dispersion, and 
their likely participation in the subsequent reconstitution of the fleet suggests that they suffered 
only minimal damage.
37
  
 The letters sent by Van der Goes demonstrate the complexity of the relationship between 
outbound VOC ship voyages and weather typical of the Maunder Minimum in the North Sea 
region. Van der Goes explicitly explained that easterly winds quickened southbound voyages in 
the Northeastern Atlantic, but his reports of problematic westerlies underscore yet again that the 
seemingly random variability of weather must be considered in any analysis of climate as a 
structure capable of affecting human activity over both the short and longue durée. Moreover, the 
potential benefits of persistent easterlies were squandered because military necessities, 
stimulated by political imperatives and shaped by the agency of individual mariners, merchants, 
and politicians, forced Van der Goes to await a fleet from Texel. A spate of westerlies further 
                                                 
36
 Van der Goes, “Van VAN DER GOES, 27 januari 1707.” De Briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius, 46.  
37
 Van der Goes, “Van VAN DER GOES, 10 februari 1707.” De Briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius, 71. 
133 
 
delayed the second half of the convoy until the advantageous weather had long since passed. The 
influence of the storm was similarly complex. As the convoy sailed far from a lee shore, few 
ships were lost, and indeed the seaworthy East Indiamen were apparently more resilient to hard 
winds than the smaller merchantmen that accompanied them. Nonetheless, the gale compounded 
delays caused by convoy requirements and westerly winds, not only because it scattered the fleet, 
but because its southerly winds blew many smaller flutes north, towards ports they had departed 
days earlier. An intercepting enemy armada would have likely suffered similar damage and 
dispersal, yet, given the limited supplies carried aboard the convoying warships, the gale not 
only slowed but imperiled the progress of the VOC vessels. Ultimately, complex human and 
environmental influences mediated the destructiveness of storms for crews aboard East 
Indiamen. Overall, the course and seaworthiness of these large vessels meant that they were 
rarely wrecked by storms. Nevertheless, in the North Sea region such disasters, and 
accompanying rates of mortality, were more common during the frequent and severe gales that 
accompanied the Maunder Minimum.  
 
Changes in Prevailing Wind and Storm Frequency Reflected in VOC Ship Logbooks  
 
Ship logbooks can provide further insight into relationships between VOC voyages and 
the meteorological expressions of Little Ice Age climatic oscillations in the Northeastern 
Atlantic. Logs compiled aboard VOC ships described weather events at sea on most days of a 
vessel’s voyage. By contrast, letters were rarely sent directly from Company ships at sea. The 
few that were written at sea typically supplement correspondence from warships during naval 
operations, and are hardly representative of conditions experienced in typical VOC journeys. The 
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value of logbooks for reconstructing past weather is a reflection of both the strengths and 
limitations of nautical technology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The invention of 
the octant and the sextant meant that after the mid-seventeenth century latitude could be judged 
with reasonable accuracy, yet longitude was another matter. Until 1767, longitude was calculated 
by “dead reckoning,” a technique that incorporated the ship’s speed, measured by log-line, and 
its course, determined by compass. Corrections were made upon encountering landmarks of 
known longitude. In a vacuum these variables would have been sufficient to determine a vessel’s 
position, but a further correction was necessary to account for leeway in the ship’s course, in 
which the most important influence was wind. Estimating the effect exerted by wind intensity 
and direction was a mathematically sophisticated but inexact science; nevertheless, the safety of 
the ship depended on it. Consequently, the relatively continuous, detailed observations in 
logbooks usually recorded more, and more precise, meteorological data than was provided within 
day registers or correspondence (Figure 2.6).
38
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Fig. 2.6. An example of a Dutch ship logbook kept, featuring a particularly clear script. Jan Liefting, “Journaal 
Gehouden op 's Lands schip Matenes, onder bevel van den kapitein J. Liefting, gedurende zijn reis naar de 
Middelandsche zee en de kust van Marokko. 1730 Maart 14 - 1730 October 27.” Admiraliteitscolleges, 1586-1795. 
Reference code: 1.02.46, Inventory number: 1134, Nationaal Archief (The Hague, Netherlands). 
 
The earliest logbook that chronicled a voyage to Asia while recording weather in the 
Atlantic provides an account of a journey undertaken in 1601, by three vessels under the 
command of Joris van Spilberghen. Financed by De Moucheron, the expedition just predated the 
establishment of the VOC, and its mariners were first among the sailors of the Republic to arrive 
at the wealthy island of Ceylon, modern-day Sri Lanka and later a major Dutch possession. On 5 
May, the vessels under Spilberghen departed Zeeland with a favourable north-easterly wind, yet 
four days later a southerly storm forced the expedition into the haven of Dartmouth. According 
to the ship logbook, one of the ships had sprung a leak in the storm, and salt water flooded its 
reserves of bread. New provisions were brought aboard as the fleet waited for the wind to 
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subside, but it was not until 15 May that the vessels could leave port. The expedition passed 
Plymouth that evening, and as no further setbacks hampered its voyage in the Northeastern 
Atlantic the logbook omits any account of the succeeding weeks, until the fleet’s arrival at Cape 
Verde off the western coast of Africa on 10 June.
39
 
 The report of the expedition to Ceylon confirms that easterly winds were beneficial to 
ships sailing south from the Republic, and suggests, like the letters sent to Heinsius, that storms 
could delay, if not necessarily imperil, the largest merchantmen bound for Asia. Still, although 
the logbook provides examples of the potential consequences of weather rendered more likely 
during Little Ice Age minima, its fragmentary account is not as continuous as surviving logbooks 
that document later voyages to Asia. For example, the logs kept aboard the Wapen van Hoorn 
(“Coat of Arms of Hoorn”) in 1627 recorded daily distance travelled and morning wind direction 
on virtually every day from the ship’s departure from the Republic on 19 March until its arrival 
at Cape Verde on 12 April.
40
 Written in one of the final years of the Grindelwald Fluctuation, 
fully 82% of the logbook’s morning measurements described some variation of easterly winds, 
while winds that blew from the west were described in just 9% of observations. By contrast, 
westerlies in the Channel prevail today in all months, and would be expected in 60% of entries. 
Nevertheless, although conditions similar to those that influenced a surge in easterlies in the late-
seventeenth century likely prevailed during the first minimum of the Little Ice Age, increased 
easterly winds cannot yet be linked to Grindelwald Fluctuation. Moreover, beyond the English 
Channel the southward extent of the shift in the frequency of easterlies that accompanied the 
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later Maunder Minimum remains uncertain. Still, although the logbook of the Wapen van Hoorn 
did not record wind velocity, its observations nevertheless suggest that easterlies, and 
particularly north-easterly winds, could accelerate the speed of a vessel travelling south from the 
Republic (Figure 2.7). On days accompanied by some deviation of easterly wind, the Wapen van 
Hoorn travelled, on average, 29.4 German Miles (roughly 220 kilometres) per day, while in the 
few days marked by westerlies the ship covered just 22.5 German Miles (approximately 169 
kilometres).
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Fig. 2.7. Daily distance covered, in German miles, and morning observations of wind direction in the first 24 days of 
the voyage of the Wapen van Hoorn. In the X Axis, an E refers to an easterly, a W to a westerly, an N to a northerly, 
and an S to a southerly. “NNE” therefore refers to a wind issuing from the north-northeast. An early modern 
measurement, a German mile was equivalent to 7532.5 metres in the modern metric scale. Omitted values 
correspond to gaps in ship logbook measurement.  
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Few sufficiently continuous ship logbooks survive to document meteorological 
conditions in the Northeastern Atlantic in the slightly warmer decades that interrupted the nadir 
of the Little Ice Age. In the first year of the Maunder Minimum, however, a particularly large 
East Indiaman left Rotterdam for Batavia, and its opperstuurman or navigator, Gerritszoon Boos, 
kept a meticulous log of its voyage.
42
 Although the hulking Maarseveen departed Rotterdam on 
9 October 1662, the first entry in its logbook was written six days later, after the southbound ship 
had already cleared the English Channel. The first day of the vessel’s voyage was fairly typical 
of conditions experienced during the following two weeks. The prevailing winds were not only 
calm, but also, by blowing from the south, were generally contrary to the course desired by the 
ship’s navigator and captain. By 23 October the wind had shifted to the Southwest – directly 
contrary to the ship’s intended course – and on 24 October the breeze nearly ceased altogether. 
That day the ship moved a mere 0.25 German miles – a remarkably low number – and when the 
wind returned on 25 October it again blew from the southwest. For the 14 days from the start of 
the voyage until 29 October the Maarseveen travelled just 162 German Miles, or 11.6 for the 
average day. This signifies a lengthy delay considering that the average distance travelled by the 
Maarseveen in its first 1.5 months (two weeks in October and the whole of November) was 18.3 
German miles. Nor did the vessel travel in a straight (if slower) line during its first two weeks. 
Instead, the Maarseveen dithered near the Celtic Sea, a delay likely caused by contrary winds 
that not only slowed forward progress but were too calm to tack against (Map 2.2). 
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Map 2.2. Journey of the Maarseveen. Blue triangles reflect where each entry in the logbook of the Maarseveen was 
written during the ship’s journey to Batavia in 1662. Delays in the vessel’s passage through the Northeastern 
Atlantic are highlighted. “Cliwoc Data Position Plots: Maarseveen (CLIWOC Meta Data).” Accessed 24 June 2013, 
http://www.knmi.nl/cliwoc/cliwocmeta_maarseveen.htm.  
 
On 29 October the southwesterly winds stiffened, and over the course of the day the 
Maarseveen tacked against them to travel 19 German miles. On the following day the 
Maarseveen travelled 21 German miles, now bearing east towards the Canary Islands, and the 
course outlined in the VOC’s Sailing Orders. On 2 November the ship passed west of Lisbon, 
and now, for the first time, the wind blew from the North. The Maarseveen accelerated, covering 
27 German miles on 3 November and 33 for the next two days as winds continued to originate 
from the North-east. By 6 November, the vessel had travelled 226.5 German miles since its delay 
ended on October 29, averaging some 25.2 German miles for every day. In just seven days of 
140 
 
favourable weather, the ship had covered 33% more miles than it had in its first two weeks, and 
these were all in the right direction.
43
  
 As it closed on the Canary Islands on 7 November 1662, the Maarseveen entered another 
stretch of troublesome weather. On the 7
th
 and 8
th
 winds remained favourable from the North, but 
now also blew from the west, while their velocity declined dramatically. In calm conditions on 8 
November and most of 9 November, the ship travelled only 5 German miles, although the light 
breeze gradually shifted to issue from the southwest. On 10 November the Maarseveen 
journeyed only 9 German miles, and winds originated from the west-southwest. On 11 
November the winds turned again, now blowing favourably from the Northeast, but all 
indications are that, with the notable exception of 13 November, the wind’s strength remained 
weak. By 15 November the vessel was in the middle of the Canary Islands, but in the eight days 
since 7 November it had travelled a mere 112.5 German miles, averaging just 12.5 German miles 
a day. Once again calm, contrary winds had taken their toll.
44
  
 One month after the Maarseveen’s first recorded log the ship’s pace quickened once 
more, as strong winds from the Northeast propelled the vessel down through the cart track and 
towards the equator. The journey slowed again beginning on November 26; in fact, on 2 
December the wind was “doodstil” – dead calm – while the ship remained virtually stationary. 
Overall, from 15 October to 30 November the Maarseveen travelled over 840 German miles, 
approximately 6,300 kilometres, from the mouth of the English Channel to a position just west of 
Guinea. The ship’s progress confirms that changes in the direction and velocity of wind were the 
most important influences on the course and speed of a seventeenth-century vessel. When the 
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wind was high and blew from the north, east, or especially the northeast, the Maarseveen could 
travel over thirty times faster than it did in weak and contrary winds from the southwest (Figure 
2.8). Easterly winds were likely more common in the North Sea region during the Maunder 
Minimum, and indeed Gerritszoon Boos observed especially plentiful easterlies in the first weeks 
of his journey. The frequency of easterlies may have also increased south of the North Sea 
region, although the logbook of the Maarseveen recorded relatively few easterlies after the vessel 
sailed beyond 46°N, a latitude parallel to the southern coast of France. Overall, Boos described 
easterlies in 57% of his morning logbook entries, while descriptions of westerly winds 
accompanied the other 43% of morning meteorological observations.
45
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Fig. 2.8. Daily distance covered, in German miles, and daily observations of wind direction in the first 36 days of 
the voyage of the Maarseveen.  
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  Fifteen years after the Maarseveen left port, a vessel of similar size departed Texel for 
Batavia. The Maarseveen was lost in battle shortly after returning from Asia, but in 1662 it had 
set sail while the Republic was at peace. The Afrika, however, embarked on its journey on 12 
April 1677, in the final year of a long conflict between the Republic and France. Consequently it 
travelled in convoy along the “back way” north of Scotland and Ireland, which lengthened its 
voyage to Batavia by approximately 2,000 kilometres. Like logbooks kept by other officers, the 
log of opperstuurman Adriaen Jongekoe did not record estimated longitude in the vicinity of 
familiar landmarks, but his observations of latitude nevertheless reflect the Afrika’s progress 
through the North Sea in the first ten days of its journey. Moreover, Jongekoe faithfully 
described meteorological conditions during this period, and his measurements reveal that the 
convoy experienced winds from the east or southeast on 70% of days before a longitude was 
recorded.
46
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Map 2.3. Journey of the Afrika. Blue triangles reflect where each entry in the logbook of the Afrika was written 
during the ship’s journey to Batavia in 1677. The rapid progress made during the storm of April 25-26 is 
highlighted. The first ten days of the Afrika’s journey are omitted from this map, owing to the absence of longitude 
measurements given in the ship’s logbook. “Cliwoc Data Position Plots: Afrika (CLIWOC Meta Data).” Accessed 
24 June 2013, http://www.knmi.nl/cliwoc/cliwocmeta_africa.htm.   
 
On 21 April, Jongekoe’s first measurement of longitude placed his vessel off the northern 
coast of Scotland, where it sailed in a north-easterly wind (Map 2.3). In the course of the 
following day, the Afrika crossed an impressive 28 German miles, powered by strong winds from 
the north-northeast. However, on 23 April the Afrika covered just 11 German miles in a contrary 
if variable wind from the west-southwest. The wind shifted again to blow from the southeast for 
much of 24 April, and by evening it had stiffened while veering to issue from the east-northeast. 
The Afrika crossed 20 German miles in the favourable wind, but strong gusts soon strengthened 
into a ferocious gale. The storm raged throughout the next day, but the logbook of the Afrika, 
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rather than describing damage and mortality, instead recorded that favourable winds from the 
northeast propelled the vessel a remarkable 46 German miles, or nearly 350 kilometres, to the 
west. On 25 April the Afrika traversed over four degrees of longitude, and covered more distance 
in a day than any East Indiaman examined in this chapter. On 26 April strong winds continued to 
blow from the north, and although the storm had mostly subsided the Afrika nevertheless 
travelled 34 German miles on the day. Overall, for the sixteen days in April during which the 
distance travelled was either recorded or decipherable the Afrika crossed a total of 375 German 
miles, averaging a swift 23.4 miles every day. In just over two weeks the ship had avoided the 
peril of French interception and covered nearly 3,000 kilometres to reach 46.3 °N 18.3 °W, west 
of Porto, Portugal, on 30 April.
47
   
Jongekoe described easterly winds in 68% of his morning logbook entries, yet the first 
leg of the Afrika’s journey was perhaps most significantly influenced by a storm that 
strengthened favourable winds from the northeast for at least three days. Gales and easterly 
winds were more common in the North Sea region during the Maunder Minimum than they were 
before or after. Moreover, Hubert Lamb has also suggested that a regional rise in the frequency 
of severe storms with winds from the north may have accompanied the late Little Ice Age. 
According to Lamb, of ten catastrophic North Sea storms between 1703 and 1860, nearly half 
blew from the north. By contrast, Lamb’s analysis indicated that, from 1860 to 1989, northerly 
winds accompanied just 23% of severe storms. Lamb’s sample size was small, and his 
methodology was, at times, hampered by an uncritical consideration of documentary evidence. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the meteorological conditions experienced by the mariners 
aboard the Afrika in the first leg of its journey were precisely those rendered more frequent in the 
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colder decades of the Maunder Minimum. The easterly wind and north-easterly storm, in turn, 
greatly accelerated the vessel’s voyage. Despite its 2,000-kilometre detour, the Afrika reached 
the relatively southerly latitude of 46°N in precisely half the time of the Maarseveen, which was 
itself engaged in a relatively quick journey (Figure 2.9). Moreover, despite its ferocity the gale of 
25 April did not seem to have severely damaged or, indeed, imperilled the Afrika. The ship was 
far from shore, and although the wind direction of the storm was fortuitous, it was unlikely that 
any gale could expose the vessel to a lee shore. Several men fell overboard and drowned during 
the first weeks of the ship’s voyage, but such tragedies were hardly unusual during a voyage to 
Asia.
48
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Fig 2.9. Daily distance covered, in German miles, and daily observations of wind direction in the first 18 days of the 
voyage of the Afrika. The influence of the storm of 25 April is clearly demonstrated.  
 
 The influence of more common easterlies was reflected with particular clarity in 
logbooks kept aboard two East Indiamen that sailed through the northeastern Atlantic during the 
nadir of the Maunder Minimum. The Vosmaar left Wielingen in convoy on 26 April 1696, and 
although it was a large East Indiaman, at 800 tons burden it could carry 400 tons less than the 
Maarseveen. Meanwhile, with a comparatively light carrying capacity of 200 tons, the Boor left 
Texel on 17 July 1699. The Vosmaar departed in a season that in the warmer twentieth-century 
climate is marked by relatively abundant easterlies, and its logbook records easterly winds on 
34% of morning entries written in the Atlantic north of 40° N. Consequently, easterlies were 
slightly more common during the voyage of the Vosmaar than their annual average in the 
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twentieth-century climate.
 49
 However, during the first eighteen days of the journey of the Boor 
in the summer three years later, easterlies were measured in 44% of logbook morning 
observations, despite the vessel’s departure in a season then, as now, characterized by abundant 
westerlies. These results roughly complement Wheeler’s analysis of British naval ship logbooks, 
which reveals a sharp reduction in easterly winds in 1696, and a more moderate decline in 
1699.
50
  
Other VOC ship logbooks written during the climax of the Maunder Minimum reflect 
this unusual abundance of easterly winds in the North Sea region. The log kept aboard the Unie 
from its departure on 25 December 1699 until 4 January 1700 describes easterlies in 44% of 
morning and 67% of evening observations. Thereafter, between 16 January and 8 February 1701 
the log of the Berkel recorded easterlies on 49% of morning entries.
51
 The logbooks of the Unie 
and Berkel contain references to daily distance covered that are too fragmentary for statistical 
analysis. Even in the more complete logs kept aboard the Vosmaar and Boor, records of daily 
distance travelled were not as continuous as those provided in the logs of the Wapen van Hoorn, 
Maarseveen and Afrika. The relatively irregular measurements nonetheless reveal that daily 
distance traversed peaked in easterly winds, especially when these winds issued from the north-
east (Figure 2.10a and 2.10b). Overall, the Vosmaar travelled a daily average of 14 German 
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miles, while the Boor, weathering more easterly winds, covered an average of 17.3 German 
miles per day.
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Fig. 2.10a. Daily distance covered, in German miles, and morning observations of wind direction in the first 18 days 
of the voyage of the Vosmaar. 
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Fig. 2.10b. Daily distance covered, in German miles, and morning observations of wind direction in the first 18 days 
of the voyage of the Boor. At the end of both Figure 2.10a and 2.10b the Vosmaar and Boor had reached 
approximately 40° S. Daily distance travelled was far more irregularly recorded than in the previous ship logbooks.  
 
 Wind speed was not recorded in the logbook of the Wapen van Hoorn, yet the logs of the 
Maarseveen, Afrika, Vosmaar, and Boor provide sufficient meteorological data to suggest that 
wind direction was a more important influence than wind velocity on daily distance travelled by 
an East Indiaman. Most qualitative wind speed descriptions by mariners in the age of sail can be 
reliably converted to quantitative measurements in the modern Beaufort wind force and weather 
scale. These conversions reveal that the translatable wind velocities recorded on board the 
Maarseveen from its departure until its arrival at 40° N averaged Beaufort (BF) 3.1, 
approximately 13 kilometres/hour. Meanwhile, wind speed measured aboard the Afrika before 
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the ship passed 46° N averaged BF 3.4, nearly 16 km/h.
53
 The Afrika did travel faster than the 
Maarseveen as it crossed the northeastern Atlantic, yet its greater speed was influenced not only 
by higher average winds, but also by those winds blowing from a favourable, easterly direction. 
Moreover, the logbook of the Vosmaar reveals that its crew experienced winds that averaged BF 
3.1 (13 km/h) before the ship reached 40° N, yet the Boor apparently weathered average winds of 
just BF 1.9 (5.5 km/h). Nonetheless, in the northeastern Atlantic the pace of the Boor was 
significantly quicker than that of the Vosmaar. Without regular and extensive cleaning, the 
accumulation of barnacles on ship hulls could slow those ships over time, yet both vessels were 
attempting only their second journey to Asia. Furthermore, although the Boor was significantly 
smaller than the Vosmaar, lighter ships did not always travel faster than heavier vessels. 
Consequently, compared to the journey of the Vosmaar, the faster passage of the Boor through 
the northeastern Atlantic was likely primarily stimulated by the substantially higher volume of 
easterly winds recorded by its crew.
54
  
 Reflections of the climatic minima of the Little Ice Age, the shifting variables of wind 
direction and velocity as an influence on VOC ship voyages can be isolated with even greater 
clarity through an analysis of Company voyages during a warmer climatic regime. Documentary 
proxies compiled by Lamb, Wheeler, and Jean Grove suggest that the frequency of westerly 
winds in the North Sea region rebounded in the wake of the Maunder Minimum, with a peak in 
late 1730s yielding to a sharp decline in the colder 1740s. Thereafter, Lamb’s data indicates that 
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the frequency of westerlies rose in the years directly following 1750 before falling sharply after 
1755, a precursor of the Dalton Minimum (1760-1850) in northern Europe. Lamb’s evidence was 
derived from documentary sources that were compiled on land, across contemporary Britain. 
However, his claim that a rise in easterly winds accompanied the climatic cooling of the mid- to 
late-eighteenth century is supported by meteorological observations written at sea, in logbooks 
from the VOC vessels Africaensche Galey, Admiraal de Ruyter, Akerendam, Bos en Hoven, 
Landskroon, Oud Haarlem, Schagen, Scholtenburg, Spaarzaamheid, and Westerveld.
55
   
These ten ships all sailed through the North Sea region between 1750 and 1775. The first 
fourteen days of their logbooks record their time in the vicinity of England and the English 
Channel, which approximately overlaps with the geography considered by Lamb, Wheeler, and 
Grove. For these first two weeks of their journeys, officers aboard the Company ships observed 
an average of 58% easterly winds, 39% westerly winds, and 3% calm winds, variable winds, or 
purely northerly or southerly winds. However, the three ship logbooks describing voyages in the 
early 1750s recorded averages of 69% westerly winds and 31% easterly winds, while the seven 
logbooks written in or after 1755 measured 64% easterly winds, 32% westerly winds, and 4% 
other (Figure 2.11). The meteorological information contained within these VOC logbooks 
consequently confirm earlier studies by suggesting that westerlies grew less frequent, and 
easterlies more frequent, across the North Sea region in the 1750s.
56
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Fig. 2.11. Simplified derivations of westerly and easterly winds recorded in three ship logbooks compiled from 1750 
to 1754, and seven logs written from 1755 to 1775, for outbound VOC vessels sailing along the cart track through 
the northeastern Atlantic.  
 
Nevertheless, in the North Sea region, the relationship between more and less common 
wind directions is influenced by seasonal changes in ways that fluctuate within and between 
climatic regimes. That reality complicates attempts to compare VOC ship voyages between 
warmer and colder years. Aside from the Boor, the seventeenth-century vessels considered in 
this chapter departed in the spring or fall, seasons when easterlies are more common in the 
warmer climate of the twentieth century, if not as frequent as recorded in the VOC logbooks. In 
the 1760s the crews of the Admiraal de Ruyter and Bos en Hoven, departing the Republic in the 
spring, both experienced easterlies on the majority of days during their passage through the 
northeastern Atlantic. The measurements in their logs echoed those kept aboard the Wapen van 
Hoorn and Afrika, but no such parallels existed between autumn voyages in different climatic 
regimes. The Spaarzaamheid in 1751 and the Westerveld in 1764 both departed in the fall, and 
both vessels sailed against significantly more westerlies than were encountered by the crew of 
                                                                                                                                                             
November. Entered by Frank Boekhorst. Lieve van Rentergem, Westerveld logs, records 132726 – 132740, 25 
November – 9 December. Entered by Frank Boekhorst. CLIWOC Database. Accessed 24 June 2013, 
http://www.knmi.nl/cliwoc.   
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the Maarseveen. Meanwhile, among the eighteenth-century logs, those of the Africaensche 
Galey, Akerendam, Landskroon, Oud Haarlem, Scholtenburg, and Vlietlust were written during 
voyages that began in December or January. Westerlies dominated during the first weeks of the 
voyage of the Africaensche Galey in 1750, but, on average, the vessels that sailed during or after 
1755 weathered a particularly striking abundance of easterly winds.
57
 In the absence of 
additional wind data at seasonal resolution, these conclusions can shed little light on seasonal 
shifts in wind direction during the Dalton Minimum. Nevertheless, restricting the eighteenth-
century comparison to only those ships that departed in the spring or fall again suggests that the 
abundance of easterlies recorded in VOC logbooks compiled in the northeastern Atlantic during 
the Maunder Minimum was both significant and unusual.
58
  
The logbooks of the Africaensche Galey, Admiraal de Ruyter, Akerendam, Bos en Hoven, 
Landskroon, Oud Haarlem, Schagen, Scholtenburg, Spaarzaamheid, and Westerveld also reveal 
that more abundant easterlies could quicken the voyages of VOC vessels taking the cart track 
south through the English Channel. The average daily distance traversed by all ten ships during 
the first two weeks of their voyages was 21.8 German miles. However, for the three ships sailing 
in the early 1750s, when westerly winds were more common, that average declined to 19.3, 
while for the six vessels sailing after 1755 the average increased to 22.2. The 14% shift in 
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average distance covered reflects the over 30% leap in the number of easterlies VOC ships 
experienced after 1755. The influence of wind direction is especially apparent when the journeys 
of these ten ships are categorized according to the prevailing winds experienced, rather than the 
year of their travels. The three ship logbooks recording westerly winds for at least half of all days 
during the first two weeks of their voyages listed an average speed of just 17 German miles in a 
day. Meanwhile, ships enjoying easterly winds for more than half of their first two weeks 
travelled a daily average of 24.5 German miles. Moreover, aggregate statistics can obscure how 
gradual shifts in prevailing wind could occasionally be expressed through extremes. For 
example, 93% of the winds encountered by the Africaensche Galey in the first two weeks of its 
journey in 1750 issued from the west, and the ship travelled a daily average of just 12.1 German 
miles. By contrast, during the first 14 days of its travels in 1766, the Scholtenburg experienced 
easterly winds 93% of the time, and averaged a remarkable 29 German miles per day.
59
 
The eighteenth-century ship logbooks that help contextualize the meteorological 
conditions experienced by seventeenth-century crews sailing south through the English Channel 
cannot do the same for the journey of the Afrika, which travelled along a very different route. 
Moreover, comparing the Afrika’s voyage to a selection of VOC ship journeys from a warmer 
climatic regime is complicated by circumstances that surrounded the use of the back way. After 
the conclusion of the war of Austrian Succession in 1748, the back way was rarely employed by 
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Company ships until the end of the eighteenth century, when the last wars of the Dutch Republic 
coincided with the third and final minimum of the Little Ice Age. Nevertheless, four VOC 
vessels did take the back way between 1750 and 1760: the Hercules in 1756, the Jerusalem in 
the same year, the Sloterdijk in 1759, and the Noordbeveland in 1760. The climate of the 
northeastern Atlantic was shifting quickly between 1750 and 1760, and the logbooks of the four 
vessels suggest that the high volume of easterlies recorded in the logs kept after 1755 by VOC 
ships travelling directly south from the Republic may have affected the northeastern Atlantic far 
beyond the North Sea. Still, the decade between 1750 and 1760 was, on average, warmer than 
the late-seventeenth century had been. Consequently, journeys taken by VOC ships in these 
years can suggest whether meteorological conditions during the voyage of the Afrika were 
unusual and, perhaps, influenced by a cooler climate.
60
  
Beyond recording an abundance of easterlies, meteorological descriptions in the 
eighteenth-century logbooks differ sharply from those provided in the account of the Afrika. In 
the log kept aboard the Afrika, 80% of entries taken north and northwest of the British Isles 
reported northerly winds. In 1756, however, the logbook of the Hercules recorded winds from 
the south in 100% of entries taken while the ship travelled north of Ireland and Scotland, while 
the Jerusalem experienced winds from the south on 67% of the days it spent in the same area.
61
 
Travelling in 1759, the log of the Sloterdijk described winds from the south in just 40% of 
measurements taken north of the British Isles, but in the same region a year later the 
Noordbeveland weathered winds from the south on 60% of its days there. The Hercules and 
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 The area examined for these ship logs lies between roughly 60 °N 15 °W and 60 °N 5 °E, or as far to the east as 
the ship logs recorded, given that into the North Sea longitude was generally discarded. 
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Sloterdijk, which experienced a particular abundance of southerly winds, both sailed through the 
region in the summer, while the other vessels, like the Afrika, traversed the same waters in the 
spring. Nevertheless, the contrast between the many northerlies recorded during the voyage of 
the Afrika and the numerous southerlies described in the later logs is striking, although quite 
possibly a function of a relatively small sample size.
62
  
None of the four ship logbooks written in the 1750s recorded a single storm, let alone a 
storm with winds from the north. However, in 1769 the logbook kept aboard Agatha, a whaling 
vessel travelling to Svalbard, recorded three days of uninterrupted gustiness from the north as it 
sailed just east of the back way. Meanwhile, in the late eighteenth century, crews aboard the 
frigates Dregterlandt, Braave, and Bellone survived gales and squalls issuing from the north, as 
their vessels passed through the waters north of Scotland and Ireland. It is possible that a rise in 
the frequency of storms accompanied the coming of the Dalton Minimum in the waters north of 
the British Isles during the late-eighteenth century, although this shift may have been delayed 
relative to a regional increase in the abundance of easterly winds. Regardless, eighteenth-century 
ship logbooks confirm that the storm encountered by the crew of the Afrika was more likely 
during the Maunder or Dalton Minima than it was during the warmer, decade-scale climatic 
regimes that interrupted the nadir of the Little Ice Age.
63
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The logbooks of the Hercules, Jerusalem, Sloterdijk, and Noordbeveland were written in 
ships inbound from Asia to the Republic. Consequently they can provide a comparison for the 
weather experienced on board the Afrika, but not for the influence of those meteorological 
conditions on daily distance travelled by outbound ships along the back way during the Maunder 
Minimum. Nevertheless, few logbooks kept aboard VOC ships returning from Asia survive from 
the seventeenth century, and eighteenth-century logbooks therefore provide the best glimpses 
into how inbound vessels were affected by changes in wind direction and intensity. During their 
journey around the British Isles, the Hercules, Jerusalem, Sloterdijk, and Noordbeveland 
travelled a relatively sluggish daily average distance of 14.2 German miles, perhaps slowed by 
the paucity of high, squally winds. Regardless, for vessels inbound along the back way, as for 
outbound ships travelling down the Channel, the most significant meteorological condition 
affecting travel through the northeastern Atlantic appears to have been wind direction.  
Northerlies and southerlies, however, were far more influential than easterlies or 
westerlies in contributing to daily distance travelled aboard the Hercules, Jerusalem, Sloterdijk, 
and Noordbeveland. In particular, southerly winds appear to have accelerated ships returning to 
the Republic, perhaps because the time inbound ships sailed north while traversing the back way 
around the British Isles far exceeded the duration of their southerly course through the North 
Sea. The Sloterdijk, for example, experienced mostly northerly winds, and travelled a daily 
average of 11.2 German miles, while the Hercules journeyed 17.5 miles a day with winds 
entirely from the south. By contrast, there was minimal correlation between daily distance 
covered and the frequency of northerlies or southerlies during the voyages of the ten outbound 
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ships used as a comparison for the voyages of the Wapen van Hoorn, Maarseveen, Vosmaar, and 
Boor.
 64
  
For most inbound East Indiamen in times of peace, the cart track off Europe swung far to 
the west of its location for outbound voyages (Map 2.1). The wind directions that accelerated 
outbound vessels therefore did not influence returning ships in a directly opposite fashion. In the 
last weeks of their journeys, some inbound ships actually sailed southeast before swinging north 
at the entrance to the English Channel, while other vessels bore further to the northeast. 
Nevertheless, all ships sailed far to the west before turning to the east, a turn taken to harness 
persistent trade winds from the west in the heart of the northern Atlantic. The climatic shifts that 
probably stimulated an increase in the frequency of easterlies in the North Sea region and, 
perhaps, parts of the northeastern Atlantic accordingly did not affect the prevailing winds of the 
broader northern Atlantic, and indeed there is no scientific evidence for such a widespread 
transition in early modern Atlantic wind patterns.
65
   
Unfortunately, only two ship logbooks written before 1780 survive to document the 
journeys of VOC ships returning from Asia, and the low sample size prohibits definitive 
conclusions. Still, although the logbook of the Akerendam in 1754 recorded far more westerlies 
than easterlies, the more fragmentary log kept aboard the Alkemade in 1775 nevertheless reveals 
that easterlies could be numerous across the Atlantic. Perhaps because inbound VOC ships 
nearing the Republic could sail in many directions and still travel closer to their home ports, the 
logbooks suggest that wind velocity was more important than wind direction for returning 
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vessels. For example, on 31 April the Akerendam covered 25.5 German miles in brisk 
southwesterly winds, but on 1 May the ship traversed 28.5 German miles in a stiff breeze from 
the north-northeast. The ship covered 16.5 German miles as northerly winds moderated on the 
following day, and just 12.5 German miles on 3 May, in calm conditions.
66
  
During the Maunder Minimum, and perhaps during the other minima of the Little Ice 
Age, a rise in easterly winds in the North Sea region likely increased the velocity of VOC ships 
travelling to Asia, whether along the back way or south through the English Channel. More 
frequent storms during these minima, while occasionally damaging to East Indiamen and their 
convoys, probably accelerated outbound VOC vessels in the North Sea region, particularly 
because an unusual percentage appear to have blown from the north and, possibly, the east. Some 
of the meteorological transitions associated with early modern climatic trends likely affected ship 
journeys beyond the North Sea and English Channel, although the geographical extent of the 
changes remains uncertain, and across much of the northern Atlantic the westerly trade winds 
appear to have prevailed throughout the Little Ice Age. These trade winds benefitted VOC ships 
returning from Asia, although inbound journeys in the northern Atlantic were likely less affected 
by shifts in prevailing wind direction than changes in its average velocity. No study has yet 
measured early modern shifts in average wind velocity across the northern Atlantic, or even in 
the North Sea, yet it is possible that inbound voyages were, in general, accelerated by the same 
storms that frequently hastened ships departing the Republic. Overall, an analysis of individual 
ship logbooks suggests that outbound ship voyages were significantly influenced by the weather 
that accompanied the Maunder Minimum, while inbound journeys were more ambiguously 
affected. 
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Beyond the Northeastern Atlantic: Climate, Weather, and Dutch Trade with Asia  
 
 Additional ship logbooks and, most importantly, day registers can help reveal how VOC 
journeys beyond the northeastern Atlantic were influenced by its weather and climate. After all, 
meteorological shifts in the northeastern Atlantic may have been balanced by changes elsewhere 
along the cart track. Moreover, the acceleration of a ship voyage owing to a gale in the North Sea 
region might have been undermined by a necessarily lengthy stay at, for example, the Cape of 
Good Hope to repair storm damage. Aside from gales, daily weather was not explicitly 
mentioned in Company day registers, yet meteorological influences, recorded in ship logbooks, 
were reflected in day registers through reports of shipwrecks or, more commonly, dates of arrival 
into ports along the cart track.
67
   
 The 6,000 VOC day registers examined to reconstruct relationships between storms, 
shipwrecks, and mortality were also investigated to yield comprehensive statistics that chart 
shifts in VOC journey times from the Company’s establishment until the final years of the 
Maunder Minimum. Reconstructions of storms and mortality compiled using day registers could 
incorporate journeys from all havens in the Republic to all ports in Asia. However, because the 
settlements owned by the VOC were so far apart, statistics measuring journey times concentrated 
on inbound and outbound voyages between Texel and Batavia, the Company’s most common 
sites of arrival and departure.
68
 Day registers describing journeys between these ports reveal that 
the average total journey duration of 794 precisely documented Dutch voyages from Texel to 
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 Several sites very near Batavia substituted for Batavia in these reconstructions, especially for early voyages of the 
VOC and its precursor companies. Bantam, Bali and Jacatra were included as substitutes for Batavia, yet the more 
distant sites of Aceh and Johore were not.  
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Batavia fluctuated significantly from the first expeditions of the precursor companies until the 
last years of the Maunder Minimum (Figure 2.12). The total length of an individual voyage could 
be many times longer than the preceding voyage, even within the same decade. The most 
significant long-term trend was a decline in average total journey times from the first decades of 
Dutch trade with Asia until the 1630s, followed by a gradual if fitful increase from the last 
decade of the seventeenth century that continued into the eighteenth century. The lengthy 
average duration of voyages during the Grindelwald Fluctuation was probably a reflection of 
both the pioneering nature of those journeys, and the lack of standardization that accompanied 
the first decades of Dutch trade in Asia.  
 
Fig. 2.12. Total journey times, in days, for ships sailing from Texel to Batavia between 1598 and 1708. Gaps in the 
graph reflect years in which day registers and ship logbooks were not recorded with sufficient precision. A mean 
value line has been inserted. 
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After the conclusion of the Grindelwald Fluctuation in 1629, variation in the day register 
statistics was most strikingly expressed in extreme voyages like the 415 and 490-day passages of 
the Haan and Heemstede in 1642, or the remarkable 131-day journey of the Zwarte Beer just two 
years later. Following the first decades of Dutch trade in Asia, the number of exceptionally long 
voyages peaked in the 1630s and early 1640s, the early 1650s, and from the late 1690s until 
1708. These extreme voyages were not isolated from the broader trends reflected in the day 
register statistics, but rather symptomatic of shifts in median journey times. Minima in median 
journey times appear to have occurred in the early 1630s, the mid to late 1640s, the middle of the 
1650s until the early 1660s, and the 1680s. In particular, both median and average journey times 
were relatively stable and comparatively low from the early 1650s until the early 1690s, a period 
that was better documented than early, less constant minima.
69
  
 Long after VOC voyages were standardized, total journey times were subject to cultural, 
economic, political, and environmental influences that interacted with human agency and 
extended far beyond meteorological and, in turn, climatic stimuli. Of course, historical data 
invariably reflect a constellation of influences, but some of these influences can be extracted 
from an analysis of Company voyages to Asia. Among the most important were days spent at the 
Cape of Good Hope and secondary ports along the cart track, which naturally extended total 
journey times. Day register statistics demonstrate that for ships travelling between Texel and 
Batavia, the average number of days occupied at secondary destinations increased dramatically 
after approximately 1650 (Figure 2.13a). Moreover, both average age and average tonnage of 
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VOC ships rose gradually between 1598 and 1708, and larger ships encrusted with barnacles 
sailed more slowly than smaller, cleaner vessels (Figures 2.13b and 2.13c).
70
    
 
 
Fig. 2.13a. Time, in days, that VOC vessels travelling from Texel to Batavia spent at the Cape of Good Hope (blue) 
and applicable secondary destinations (orange) between 1598 and 1708. Ships that stopped at no secondary ports en 
route to Batavia are not listed.  
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Fig. 2.13b. Age, in years, of VOC vessels departing Texel for Batavia, 1598-1708. Gaps correspond to years in 
which day registers did not record the date of ship construction.  
 
 
Fig. 2.13c. Tonnage of VOC vessels sailing from Texel to Batavia between 1598 and 1708. Gaps correspond to 
years in which day registers did not record tonnage.   
 
The increase in ship size and age was likely not sufficient to effect a significant rise in 
average journey time. Indeed, the lack of apparent connections between ship age and journey 
duration also suggests that technological developments did not significantly quicken the speed of 
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VOC voyages. Far more significant was the rise in average time occupied at the Cape and 
additional secondary ports along the cart track in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. It is possible that delays in secondary destinations were, at times, stimulated by repairs 
necessitated by storms, although, again, gales were less likely to severely damage East Indiamen 
than smaller flutes and yachts. Ultimately, at least some of the rise in the average total journey 
duration from Texel to Batavia in the latter decades of the examined period reflected decisions 
taken by VOC personnel, rather than the unavoidable influence of changing meteorological 
conditions.  
 By subtracting the number of days in which Dutch vessels sailing to Asia remained in 
secondary ports along the cart track from the total duration of each voyage, it is possible to 
uncover the approximate time each VOC vessel remained at sea (Figure 2.14). Once at sea, 
Company crews naturally endeavoured to minimize the duration of the passage to their next port 
of call, and the resulting statistics consequently highlight the influence of variables outside the 
control of VOC personnel. The sea time reconstruction reveals a decline in the number of 
extremely lengthy voyages after the early 1660s, despite the exceptionally long journeys of the 
Drie Kronen in 1703 and the Beverwaart in 1708. Moreover, after the first decades of Dutch 
trade to Asia, relatively long average journey times now appear to have been common in the 
middle of the 1630s, the early 1640s, the middle of the 1670s, the early 1690s, and the first years 
of the eighteenth century.
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Fig. 2.14. Time spent at sea from Texel to the Cape of Good Hope (blue), and Texel to Batavia (orange), for Dutch 
ships sailing from Texel to Batavia between 1598 and 1708.   
 
Graphing the time spent at sea from Texel to the Cape alongside the total time at sea for 
the entire passage from Texel to Batavia demonstrates that variations in the duration of the 
journey to Asia were closely correlated to fluctuations in the length of voyages in the Atlantic. In 
other words, the part of most voyages to Batavia for which interdisciplinary researchers have 
most reliably compiled climate reconstructions, and in which prevailing winds may have been 
particularly subject to change, was also especially influential to total VOC journey times. On the 
other hand, the day register statistics of total days spent at sea for Dutch vessels sailing from 
Texel to Batavia also confirm that some of the rise in total journey times towards the end of the 
period was stimulated by greater time spent at secondary ports along the cart track. Still, 
significant variability in journey times is reflected in the sea time graph, with even minor 
fluctuations in average voyage duration reflecting additional weeks or even months at sea that 
were costly in both human and material terms.  
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The Republic was at war for much of the period between 1598 and 1708, and in some 
years, during most wars, VOC vessels were required to take the lengthy back way around the 
British Isles. Most East Indiamen were also forced to travel in large convoys, which travelled 
only as fast as their slowest vessels, and suffered delays if scattered by storms. In fact, it is 
surprising that delays in days spent at sea by VOC ships were not more severe during the three 
Anglo-Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century, the war with France that lingered from 1672 to 
1678, the War of the Grand Alliance from 1688 to 1697, and the War of the Spanish Succession 
from 1701 to 1714. Fortunately, the sea time reconstruction can be refined by eliminating years 
in which the Republic was embroiled in naval wars that affected the seas directly west of the 
European mainland, although the Dutch were so frequently at war that the results are reduced to 
six relatively isolated periods (Figure 2.15). Nevertheless, the results reveal a gradual decline in 
the time VOC vessels remained at sea, both in their journey from Texel to the Cape, and in their 
overall voyages to Batavia.
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Fig. 2.15. Time spent at sea for Dutch vessels sailing from Texel to the Cape of Good Hope (blue), and Texel to 
Batavia (orange), in years of peace between 1598 and 1708. To emphasize the general trend, a linear regression 
analysis has been applied to both results. Average time at sea decreased by more than a third during the period. 
 
 
The 355 day registers incorporated within a reconstruction of inbound VOC journeys 
from Batavia to Texel reflect a very different trend (Figure 2.16). More – and more precise – 
registers recorded voyages from Texel to Batavia, in part because many ships constructed in the 
shipyards of the Republic were used in the thriving intra-Asian trade. Ships leaving for Batavia 
consequently outnumbered those returning to Texel, and statistics of inbound journeys are less 
continuous than those that document outbound voyages. Still, the inbound register reconstruction 
contains sufficient data for a comparison with outbound register statistics. A quantitative analysis 
of the registers reveals that the average voyage from Batavia to Texel did not take as long as the 
passage from Texel to Batavia. Moreover, extremely short or lengthy voyages were less common 
for inbound than for outbound ships, although for vessels on both journeys they declined in 
frequency after the late 1650s. Despite that trend, however, the length of average voyages from 
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Batavia to Texel increased by approximately 10% from the expeditions of the precursor 
companies until the final decades of the Maunder Minimum.
73
 
 
 
Fig. 2.16. Total journey times for vessels sailing from Batavia to Texel, 1597-1708. Gaps reflect years for which 
sufficiently precise or continuous registers were not available. A mean value line has been inserted.  
 
The same shifts in average ship size and age that did not significantly influence outbound 
voyages also did not greatly affect gradual changes in inbound journey duration. On the other 
hand, changes in time spent at secondary destinations along the cart track did affect voyages to 
Texel as significantly as they influenced journeys from Texel. For inbound voyages, however, 
the trend in average duration spent at secondary ports and the Cape of Good Hope differed 
sharply from that reflected in outbound journey statistics (Figure 2.17). Ships travelling to Texel 
frequently called at secondary ports in the early seventeenth century, before the Cape was 
routinely employed, and the duration of their stays in these ports occasionally occupied a 
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sizeable portion of their total journey time. Secondary ports aside from the Cape sharply declined 
in popularity after the 1640s, and they were rarely used for the rest of the period. Meanwhile, the 
Cape of Good Hope emerged as the primary port of resupply. Despite significant decadal 
fluctuations in the average duration of delays there, the time spent by inbound ships at the Cape 
generally increased in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Overall, shifts in the 
time spent by returning ships at secondary destinations, including the Cape, are easily visible in a 
reconstruction of total inbound journey time (Figures 2.16 and 2.17).
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Fig. 2.17. Time, in days, that VOC vessels travelling from Batavia to Texel spent at the Cape of Good Hope (blue) 
and applicable secondary destinations (orange) from 1597 to 1708. Ships that stopped at no secondary ports en route 
to Texel are not listed.  
 
                                                 
74
 Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 Centuries, Volume III, ed. Bruijn et al., 1-343. “Database VOC 
Schepen.” De VOC Site, accessed 24 June 2013, http://www.vocsite.nl/schepen/lijst.html.   
171 
 
 The typical journey from Batavia to Texel was longer in the late-seventeenth and early-
eighteenth centuries than it had been in the first decades of the seventeenth century. After time 
spent at secondary destinations is subtracted from total journey duration, day register statistics 
appear to reveal that the average time spent at sea for VOC ships travelling from Batavia to 
Texel declined slightly over the course of the seventeenth century, but that decline was really 
stimulated by several voyages of exceptional length during the 1640s and early 1650s (Figure 
2.18). For most ships travelling to Batavia, significantly more time was spent in the Atlantic than 
was passed in the Indian Ocean. For vessels bound for Texel, however, far more time was 
employed in the Indian Ocean. In fact, during many journeys the time spent at sea for the entire 
passage was three times longer than the duration of the voyage across the Atlantic alone. 
Relatively swift homebound journeys through the Atlantic were likely stimulated by the trade 
winds of the Atlantic, which blew from the southeast in southerly latitudes, and from the 
southwest north of the equator, excepting the North Sea region and, possibly, the southeastern 
Atlantic during the Maunder Minimum. Longer journeys in the Indian Ocean, in turn, were likely 
influenced by the prevailing westerlies of the roaring forties. Consequently, during the Maunder 
Minimum it is unlikely that changes in the direction and intensity of prevailing winds in the 
North Sea region were balanced by shifts in wind direction across other regions along the cart 
track.
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Fig. 2.18. Time spent at sea from Batavia to the Cape of Good Hope (blue), and Batavia to Texel (orange), for 
Dutch ships sailing from Batavia to Texel between 1597 and 1708.   
 
 
Of course, returning East Indiamen, like outbound vessels, were required to take the 
longer back way during the Republic’s frequent wars. Unfortunately, the sample size of inbound 
day registers kept during times of peace was significantly smaller than the outbound registers. 
Still, eliminating day registers written during years of war from the reconstruction of inbound 
times at sea reveals that total journey duration peaked in the 1680s before declining slightly in 
the final years of the seventeenth century. Time spent in the Atlantic slowly rose during the 
entire period, reaching a corresponding climax in the 1680s. Both trends, however, were slight, 
with the shift in average journey times accounting for approximately 5% of average voyage 
duration between 1597 and 1708 (Figure 2.19).
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Fig. 2.19. Time spent at sea for Dutch vessels sailing from Batavia to the Cape of Good Hope (blue), and Batavia to 
Texel (orange), in years of peace between 1597 and 1708. To emphasize the general trend, a linear regression 
analysis has been applied to both results.  
 
For crews aboard VOC vessels, journey duration was a matter of life, death, and profit. 
Time spent at sea was time exposed to storms and enemy combatants in unsanitary and typically 
disease-ridden conditions. Annual mortality peaked during storms and wars, both of which were 
particularly frequent during the Maunder Minimum. On the other hand, annual mortality also 
increased in years that coincided with unusually long voyages to or from Batavia. If the risk of 
death was not motivation enough for a speedy passage to Batavia, the Heren XVII offered 
substantial bounties for outbound journeys completed within six months. These bounties were a 
testament to the uneven importance of outbound and inbound journey duration for the 
functioning of the Company’s commercial networks.77 
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The VOC occupied a larger share of the Dutch economy as the Republic declined relative 
to other European powers in the final decades of the seventeenth century. However, even as the 
Company’s revenues rose its profits declined, and its bloated infrastructure in Asia struggled to 
remain competitive against English and Scandinavian East India companies that increasingly 
traded coffee, tea, and other commodities more lucrative than spices. As the VOC entered the 
terminal decades of its lengthy decline, its Governor General in Batavia, Gustaaf Willem van 
Imhoff, submitted a lengthy recipe for reform to the Heren XVII. Written in 1741, his 
“considerations” recommended increased bounties for rapid passage to Batavia, and subsequent 
proposals written in the following year also suggested new ship designs and improved training 
for Company mariners. These urgent suggestions were doubtless inspired in part by the success 
of competing East India Companies. They also responded to a series of disastrous shipwrecks off 
the Cape of Good Hope, stimulated by the poor training of mariners in ferocious storms that 
cannot, at present, be linked to early modern climatic fluctuation.
78
  
The peril posed by competition and disastrous storms may have overwhelmed the less 
spectacular influence of gradual changes in average weather, and indeed such shifts might not 
have been readily discernible to VOC personnel. Still, the Heren and their subordinates could 
access an unprecedented wealth of meticulously quantified material that charted meteorological 
conditions. Moreover, they could consult long-serving veterans of the passage to Asia, whose 
experience could span decades of climatic transition. Consequently, by slowing the passage of 
outbound ships through the northeastern Atlantic, unusually common westerly winds in the 
North Sea region during the warmer interval between the Maunder and Dalton minima may have 
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contributed to Imhoff’s considerations, even if the contribution was not consciously recognized. 
Ultimately, Imhoff’s recommendations were only the most detailed entry in a long, fraught 
history of VOC governors general debating the duration of VOC voyages with their hypothetical 
masters in the Republic. Often weather and certainly climate remained implicit in the arguments 
that repeated themselves across the long history of the early modern world’s most valuable 
company. Negotiations concerned dates of departure and the speed of transit, although the 
Company’s leaders were aware that such structures were heavily influenced by meteorological 
conditions. When juxtaposed with surviving ship logbooks and day registers, their 
correspondence suggests that the weather accompanying climatic fluctuation during the Little Ice 
Age prompted urgent discussion and response at all levels of the Company’s vast 
infrastructure.
79
 
 
Conclusions: Trends, Consequences, and Reactions  
 
Weather patterns that grew more common during Little Ice Age minima and maxima 
influenced VOC ship journeys, but this relationship was not straightforward. The exceptional 
length of outbound voyages during the final decades of the Grindelwald Fluctuation was 
probably stimulated primarily by economic, political, and cultural influences that encouraged 
exploration and discouraged comparatively short, standardized voyages at the dawn of Dutch 
commerce with Asia. However, contemporary expeditions to the Cape were also lengthier than 
they would be later in the seventeenth century, and passage through the Atlantic was far less 
subject to the demands of discovery and conquest. The cause of the relative length of these 
Atlantic voyages is uncertain. Changes in the Company’s techniques and technologies from its 
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first years until the early eighteenth century were likely insufficient to significantly affect 
journey time. Moreover, voyages returning to Texel were comparatively short during the early 
seventeenth century, suggesting that the stimulus that lengthened outbound journeys through the 
Atlantic also shortened inbound passages across the same waters.  
Despite the meteorological conditions reported in the logbook of the Wapen van Hoorn, 
the pattern of prevailing wind in the northeastern Atlantic might have been different during the 
late Grindelwald Fluctuation than it was in the Maunder Minimum. More common westerlies 
may have slowed departing vessels while accelerating returning ships, but such a trend would be 
at odds with Lamb’s analysis of prevailing winds across seventeenth-century England. 
Unfortunately, efforts to develop firm conclusions regarding changes in patterns of prevailing 
wind across the northeastern Atlantic in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries are 
undermined by the dearth of sufficiently numerous and continuous high-resolution sources that 
record contemporary wind direction.
80
  
More of these sources survive from the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They 
reveal that the onset of the Maunder Minimum was most importantly expressed for VOC 
mariners through a rise in the frequency of easterly winds and, perhaps, high-velocity northerly 
winds. These winds influenced outbound and inbound voyages on a scale dramatically reflected 
in ship logbooks and, somewhat less vividly, day register statistics. Despite relatively small 
sample sizes, logbooks kept aboard ships sailing in the northeastern Atlantic strongly support 
previous studies by indicating that easterly winds were indeed unusually common during the 
Maunder Minimum. They also suggest that outbound vessels harnessing these winds usually 
travelled far more quickly through the Atlantic than ships struggling against westerlies.  
                                                 
80
 Lamb, Historic Storms of the North Sea, British Isles, and Northwest Europe, 31. 
177 
 
Far fewer logbooks of sufficient precision survive to record characteristics of inbound 
ship journeys, but relevant eighteenth-century logs suggest that returning ships travelling along 
the back way were affected by different winds than those that influenced vessels sailing south of 
the British Isles. For inbound vessels taking the back way, the balance between southerly and 
northerly winds was probably the most important contributor to daily distance travelled, while 
returning vessels travelling along the peacetime route through the English Channel were likely 
particularly subject to wind velocity. Neither changes in the frequency of northerly and southerly 
winds, nor shifts in average wind velocity, can currently be attributed to the influence of Little 
Ice Age minima or maxima in the northeastern Atlantic. Still, in the North Sea region high winds 
blowing at or above 34 knots were more frequent during the Maunder Minimum, and inbound 
vessels might have harnessed these to their benefit.
81
 
As comparatively low-resolution sources that provide largely indirect meteorological 
data, day registers contain evidence that is mediated by more variables than complicate the 
relatively straightforward relationships between weather, observer, and ship recorded in 
logbooks. Nevertheless, when filtered for known socioeconomic influences, day registers reveal 
that the average time spent at sea for ships sailing from Texel to Batavia decreased substantially 
during the Maunder Minimum. The registers also demonstrate that this gradual shift was at times 
masked by random variation, but nevertheless primarily reflected changes in the time ships took 
to cross the Atlantic. Moreover, the register reconstructions indicate that outlier voyages of 
extreme length, which generally signalled dramatically increased time at sea, were much less 
common during the heart of the Maunder Minimum than they were before or after. Day registers 
consequently suggest that relationships between changes in prevailing weather in the 
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northeastern Atlantic and daily distance covered by outbound ships, recorded in logbooks, 
affected the duration of the entire passage to Batavia.  
 Day registers recording voyages from Batavia to Texel reveal that interactions between 
climate, weather, and inbound journeys were more ambiguous than they were for outbound 
passages. For vessels returning to Texel, extremely long or short “outlier” voyages were less 
common than they were for outbound ships, but in both reconstructions extreme journeys were 
less common after the onset of the Maunder Minimum. Screening for socioeconomic influences 
reveals that average time passed at sea may have increased for inbound ships during the Maunder 
Minimum, but this did not reflect a significant shift in the time ships spent in Atlantic waters. 
Moreover, the general trend in 110 years of inbound VOC journeys was relatively stable. A 
slight overall decrease in total journey time contrasted with an equally marginal increase in the 
average passage through the Atlantic. It may be that more frequent easterly winds and, perhaps, 
more common northerly winds slowed returning vessels, even if high velocity winds that could 
be harnessed were also more abundant. Still, the relatively low resolution data provided within 
day registers undermine any attempt to develop firm conclusions from such a slight trend, 
particularly given the absence of abundant and continuous ship logbook information.  
 Ultimately, in the northeastern Atlantic changes to prevailing wind direction and velocity 
accompanied the climatic minima and maxima of the Little Ice Age in the seventeenth century. 
These changes influenced both the speed and the bearing of VOC ships at sea, affecting their 
passage through the Atlantic in ways that influenced long-term shifts in average total journey 
duration. For outbound ships the transition to the colder climate of the Maunder Minimum was 
particularly significant. In the final decades of the seventeenth century an unusual abundance of 
high, easterly and, possibly, northerly winds reduced average journey times for vessels departing 
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Texel, and although more ships succumbed to storms such calamities remained rare. On the other 
hand, during the Little Ice Age cold decades in the north Atlantic likely influenced the strength 
of the Asian summer monsoon, lessening regional precipitation and, in particular, the average 
force of prevailing southwest winds. These southwest winds were critical for the redistribution of 
goods brought to Batavia by ships travelling in the Christmas and Fairs fleets.
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 Different elements of the VOC’s vast trading empire were differently affected by the 
weather that accompanied the climatic oscillations of the Little Ice Age. However, changes to 
distinct aspects of the Company’s commercial network did not counteract one another to nullify 
the influence of climatic fluctuation. Departing and returning vessels carried different goods, and 
sailed to different ports for different purposes. Outbound ships typically carried silver, 
information and instructions, essential prerequisites for sustaining the Company’s trade in Asia 
and defending its monopoly from other European powers. Inbound ships, on the other hand, 
transported the profits of the commerce enabled by their outbound counterparts. Consequently, 
changes to outbound travel times were more influential to the success of the VOC’s commercial 
operations than shifts in inbound journey duration. Information about regional prices or newly 
hostile entities was most effective if it arrived quickly, and could be entirely irrelevant if 
delayed. Precious metals could be employed most effectively if used with the most current 
market information to maximize profit. Moreover, rapid passage along the cart track allowed 
outbound vessels belonging to the Christmas Fleet to arrive in Batavia before the conclusion of 
the summer monsoon. Prevailing southwest winds might have been weaker during the minima of 
the Little Ice Age, yet they could still be employed to stimulate the Company’s intra-Asian trade 
if vessels from Batavia arrived on time. Accordingly, the weather that accompanied the Maunder 
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Minimum in the North Sea region, and perhaps the broader North-eastern Atlantic, could have 
provided important commercial and military advantages to the VOC. Because the Dutch long 
dominated the commerce with and within Asia, this could have benefitted the Republic’s 
economy in the context of late seventeenth-century Europe.
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 Ultimately, shifts in prevailing weather were one influence among the many that shaped 
early modern waterborne traffic between Europe to Asia. For example, during the life of the 
VOC, changes in prescribed routes, and the increased availability of way stations along the cart 
track, reflected economic and political imperatives that affected ship voyages at least as much as 
contemporary climatic shifts. The effect of these developments is readily visible in a 
reconstruction of both outbound and inbound VOC journey times, even though changes in ship 
size, and especially ship age, do not appear to have greatly impacted voyages from Texel to 
Batavia. As it was in the Arctic, in the Atlantic the climatic shifts of the Little Ice Age affected 
mobility across the world known to the Dutch, but their influence was mediated by cultural, 
social, and economic structures that were, in turn, shaped by personal agency.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Supplying the Metropole in the Little Ice Age:  
Mobility Within, and Near, the Dutch Republic 
 
 For the merchants and mariners of the Dutch Republic, neither journeys of exploration 
nor the exploitation of discovered realms would have been possible without the wealth and 
expertise gleaned from commerce in European waters. For much of the Republic’s history, the 
most important intra-European trade was with the cities that bordered the Baltic, which emerged 
as the vital link in a single-season triangle trade that included ports in the Low Countries, France 
and Iberia. Dutch merchants ultimately wrested the mastery of this lucrative trade from the 
Hanseatic League or Hanse, a mercantile confederation of German towns that had gradually 
solidified around Lübeck in the first decades of the thirteenth century. For nearly two centuries 
the Hanse competed with Baltic powers and, eventually, Dutch towns for control of Baltic 
commerce, as economic disputes frequently erupted into open warfare.
1
  
At last representatives of Holland, Zeeland, and Friesland obtained major regional trading 
privileges in 1443, after Dutch raids and blockades in the Baltic supported the new king of 
Denmark in a war against the Hanse. Despite the relentless political machinations of the 
Hanseatic League and the enduring threat of piracy, by 1497 Dutch ships already accounted for 
the vast majority of merchant vessels entering the Baltic. Unlike their Hanseatic competitors, 
Dutch merchants could deploy the shipping capacity of off-season herring busses. Many seamen 
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from the towns of Holland sought employment in colder months, and the large busses could 
therefore be easily crewed with low-cost labour. Moreover, the already large and flexible Dutch 
merchant fleet benefitted from easy access to herring, salt, textiles, and other goods highly 
valued in Baltic ports, which in turn supplied timber, metals, and especially grain.
2
   
 Events surrounding the rise of an independent Republic in the Low Countries perpetuated 
the advantages that had already allowed Dutch traders to dominate Baltic commerce in the first 
years of the sixteenth century. The influx of wealthy merchants from the southern Low Countries 
contributed to Amsterdam’s emergence as the preeminent European entrepôt, and financed the 
expansion of Dutch industry. The subsequent surge in high-value, low-volume commodities and 
finished goods produced within the Republic flowed into Baltic ports, which supplied 
increasingly diverse bulk goods in return. In 1595, a series of technological improvements 
executed by shipwrights culminated in the development of the flute, a specialized merchant 
vessel that further reduced labour costs by requiring minimal crews. By now, Baltic commerce 
was referred to as the moeder negocie, or “mother of all trades,” not only owing to its scale, but 
because its profits and commodities were crucial to the broader health of the Dutch economy.
3
 
Indeed, at the Republic’s zenith in 1650 some 4,000 Dutch flutes sailed into the Baltic, 
accounting for 95% of all ships hauling goods between the region and the rest of Europe. Grain 
remained the most significant commodity returned to a Republic where commercialized 
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agricultural production was attuned to external markets and insufficient for the local 
requirements of a highly urbanized population.
4
 
Unlike their colleagues plying more glamorous yet less essential trades to distant ports, 
the mariners and merchants who sustained the Baltic trades found little benefit in the weather 
that accompanied the coldest decades of the Little Ice Age. For the many employees of the VOC, 
more common storms and shifting patterns of prevailing wind during the Maunder Minimum 
provided more advantages than disadvantages. For explorers seeking a Northeast Passage, the 
influence of meteorological conditions typical of Little Ice Age minima hampered efforts to 
reach Asia, but encouraged new and eventually very profitable discoveries in the Arctic. The 
environmental manifestations of climatic fluctuation that most influenced Baltic commerce were 
the same as those that mattered most for explorers in the Arctic. Ice and storms could guide 
voyages of exploration to lucrative new discoveries, even if such discoveries were unanticipated. 
Sailors plying Baltic trades, on the other hand, knew that the successful completion of their 
journeys depended on their arrival at a particular destination.  
During the minima of the Little Ice Age, sea ice that expanded rapidly in frigid winters 
and melted slowly in cool springs prohibited the progress of Baltic merchant vessels, while more 
common storms threatened lives and livelihoods. Unlike East Indiamen, flutes bound for Baltic 
cities frequently restocked in northern ports where sudden freezing could prohibit departure, and 
sailed across waters that could be entirely sealed by sea ice. Gales, moreover, were often deadly 
to crews aboard vessels that sailed near lee shores but were far less seaworthy than larger VOC 
ships. The consequences of storms and ice were rarely straightforward, and affected more than 
those directly involved in each Baltic voyage or, more broadly, the flow of commodities between 
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European ports. Delays influenced by the telltale weather of Little Ice Age minima could 
encourage legal wrangling, complicate diplomatic relations, and interfere with the success of 
armies in the field. 
Historians of the Dutch Republic continue to debate the relative modernity of the Dutch 
economy and the importance of its different commercial enterprises between the sixteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.
5
 Recently, they have explored the complex economic, cultural, and political 
processes behind the changing spatial dynamics of Baltic commerce. New studies have also 
considered interactions between the Republic’s rich knowledge culture and the sophisticated 
commercial practice of its merchants, in the Baltic and elsewhere.
6
 Overall, many historians of 
renaissance and early modern Baltic “bulk” trade have referred to the influence of weather, but 
very few have mentioned the Little Ice Age. For example, in his comprehensive survey of the 
commercial and military history of the Low Countries before the establishment of the Republic, 
Louis Sicking in 2004 briefly described how favourable winds affected voyages to and from the 
Republic, but he did not link such winds to broader climatic trends. In his 2006 study of 
Amsterdam’s entrepôt economy, Clé Lesger mentioned weather only while listing alternative 
meeting sites for early modern merchants. In these short passages he also ignored the influence 
of the Little Ice Age. Jan Luiten van Zanden did not refer to weather at all in his earlier survey of 
the Dutch economy between 1350 and 1850, or indeed in his subsequent studies of economic 
developments before, during, and after the Republic's Golden Age.
7
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Still, early modern climatic fluctuations have not escaped the notice of all Dutch 
historians of the Baltic economy. Ad van der Woude and Jan de Vries briefly acknowledged that 
"climatic shocks" coincided with the early modern expansion of Dutch commercial networks. 
Moreover, in her detailed analysis of the Baltic grain trade, published in 2003, Milja van Tielhof 
included a case study of Dutch merchant Willem de Clercq in the early nineteenth century. As 
part of this case study, Van Tielhof explained how annual fluctuations in weather, associated 
with the last great minimum of the Little Ice Age, influenced grain prices and, in turn, the 
profitability of De Clercq’s business in the Baltic. Nevertheless, historians of the Dutch Republic 
at its height have generally ignored relationships between climatic fluctuations and Dutch 
commerce in the Baltic, particularly as they were expressed in the voyages conducted by the 
Republic’s seamen.8 
This chapter begins with a statistical reconstruction of Dutch shipping through the Baltic 
during the Little Ice Age. It then explores correspondence written by Dutch citizens in the Baltic 
during the final years of the Maunder Minimum, which reflect the full complexity of 
relationships between weather and human activity in the region. It continues by examining how 
changes in average wind direction and velocity that accompanied Little Ice Age minima may 
have influenced Dutch voyages to and from the Baltic. It also investigates the possible 
relationship between climatic fluctuations, cold winters, the price of grain, and the profitability 
of the Baltic grain trade. Next, it introduces the Dutch transportation system in the metropole 
itself, within the borders of a Republic that was divided between a low-lying, watery west and a 
hillier, drier east. Using correspondence, diary entries, and toll accounts, it describes how 
different kinds of standardized travel through the canals of the coastal provinces were differently 
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affected by weather that accompanied Little Ice Age minima and maxima. Finally, it concludes 
with an analysis of travel on roads and by boat, humbler modes of mobility that were affected by 
contemporary climatic fluctuations in distinct ways.  
 
Climatic Fluctuation and Sea Ice Extent in the Sound Toll Registers 
 
 Shortly after 1420, the fortress that would later be expanded to become Kronborg castle 
was constructed near Copenhagen in the Sound, a narrow passage that affords easiest access to 
the Baltic from the sea area of the Kattegat, which in turn connects to Skagerrak and the North 
Sea (Map 3.1).
9
 Dues for passing ships were under consideration as early as 1423, and by the 
command of King Erik they were first implemented six years later, much to the consternation of 
the Hanseatic towns. The Sound’s development as a vital strategic corridor for Baltic commerce 
coincided with the failure of regional herring fisheries that had contributed greatly to Danish 
prosperity. Subsequently the Sound tolls emerged as a principal source of income for the Danish 
crown, and the state’s professed control of its vital shipping corridor was central to Denmark’s 
influence within Europe.
10
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Map 3.1. The tollhouse of Elsinore (highlighted), and nearby Kronborg castle, in 1588. Inset: general location of the 
Sound (highlighted) in a map of Western Europe published in 1630. Bottom left: Kronborg castle. Originally 
compiled by Jan Jansson, the map was coloured sometime after its publication. Jan Jansson, “Nova Europae 
Descriptio,” in Atlantis maioris appendix. Amsterdam: Ioannis Ianzonii, 1630. Georg Braun and Franz Hogenberg, 
Civitates Orbis Terrarum Vol. IV. Cologne, 1588. 
 
 
 Dues exacted on vessels passing through the Sound were meticulously recorded by 
officials in the tollhouse of Elsinore, in registers that provide critical information about the 
characteristics of voyages, ships, and crews. Remarkably, registers recording 1.8 million 
passages have survived for approximately three hundred years between 1497 and 1857, and they 
have emerged as an invaluable primary source collection for economic historians of early 
modern Europe. In a recent initiative supported by the University of Groningen and Tresoar, the 
Frisian Historical and Literary Centre at Leeuwarden, the Sound toll registers stored at the 
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Danish National Archives are being digitalized and made freely available online alongside 
powerful interpretive tools. Because the resulting data is quantified, standardized, continuous, 
and readily comparable to climatic reconstructions, the Sound toll registers can shed new light on 
the relationship between Baltic commerce and weather typical of Little Ice Age minima.
11
  
Admittedly, the information compiled within the registers also has limitations that are 
compounded by a lack of surviving ship logbooks relevant to the Baltic trades. The relatively 
small flutes that serviced the Baltic were not equipped by a centralized organization, nor were 
they individually crucial to the Republic’s economic prosperity. Consequently, in the Baltic 
trades ship logbooks were either not kept or not preserved. Entries in the Sound toll registers 
recorded ports of departure alongside intended destinations, but dates of departure were not 
provided, and journey times to the Sound are therefore impossible to plot using the registers. 
Moreover, the toll accounts provide no information of damage sustained in the voyage to the 
Sound, and there is no mention of failed journeys. The many ships and crews that foundered in 
storms or succumbed to piracy are not listed in any sufficiently continuous source, so mortality 
in Baltic commerce cannot be measured. Worse, the Sound toll registers compiled prior to 1634 
have not yet been quantified in ways that readily enable statistical analysis. Nevertheless, the 
stability of Dutch maritime culture and technology during the Golden Age enables broad 
conclusions regarding the relationship between weather, climate, and shipping in earlier 
decades.
12
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On the other hand, the Sound Toll registers do allow the reliable reconstruction of shifts 
in the flow of seaborne traffic into and out of the Baltic.
13
 Other routes granted access to the 
Baltic through the labyrinth of Danish islands, but these were hardly navigable and very rarely 
attempted. Roads could be used, yet travel by land was not practical for the large-scale transport 
of commodities. Some captains attempted to avoid the dues altogether, but the odds were slim 
that any could escape the notice of Kronborg castle and the patrolling guard ship nearby (Map 
3.1). Ultimately, because most Baltic trade during the Golden Age of the Republic was carried 
aboard Dutch ships that were not based in the Baltic, the tolls faithfully record the annual 
heartbeat of regional commerce.
14
 
The Sound toll registers reveal that changes in the monthly quantity of dues paid by 
passing captains accompanied particularly warm and cold winters during the Maunder Minimum 
(1662-1718) and the warmer decades that preceded the Dalton Minimum (1760-1850). Of 
course, the variability of weather and the recurrence of El Niño, La Niña, and other forcing 
agents beyond those that contributed to gradual climatic shifts, ensured that balmy winters and 
warm summers could occur during the coldest phases of the Little Ice Age. By far the warmest 
winter of the Maunder Minimum affected the Dutch Republic and the Baltic in 1685/86, and the 
following summer was also hotter than the twentieth-century average. The winter temperature in 
1686/87 matched the twentieth-century average, rendering 1686 a remarkably warm year in the 
context of the Maunder Minimum. Not surprisingly, shipping through the Sound followed its 
usual pattern of high volume during the summer and low volume in the winter. Even weather in 
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unusually warm winters could imperil ships plying the Baltic trades. However, the curve 
generated in a line graph by the quantity of passing ships during a regular distribution of traffic 
through the Sound was relatively shallow, because after its brief winter hiatus shipping already 
resumed at substantial rates in late February, and continued at high volume until the last week of 
December (Figure 3.1).
15
  
 
 
Fig. 3.1. Daily passages through the Sound in 1686. These and other graphs were compiled using statistical tools 
available through the Sound Toll Registers Online database.  
 
 Nine years later, the Baltic region suffered through one of the coldest winters of the 
Maunder Minimum, and the subsequent summer was the coolest since the “year without 
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summer” in 1628. However, temperatures during the following winter paralleled the twentieth-
century average. The Sound toll registers reflect a complete cessation of shipping during the 
frigid winter of 1694/95, with an aborted resumption in late March and sustained traffic 
beginning only in April. Unusually extensive sea ice, stimulated by sustained freezing, was 
almost certainly the primary culprit for the interruption in Baltic shipping. In January and 
February, rivers across Europe from the Thames to the Elbe were frozen, and in Holland the 
most significant stretch of sub-zero temperatures persisted for three straight weeks between 20 
January and 10 February. In major harbours during cold winters, sailors in icebreakers and 
labourers on foot struggled to prevent the accumulation of ice, and taxes were subsequently 
levied on ship owners. In extreme conditions typical of Little Ice Age minima, thick sea ice 
along the coast of the Republic could extend beyond the Zuider Zee and accumulated along the 
North Sea shore, while the Baltic was largely closed due to sea ice. Large-scale Baltic commerce 
was impossible while the ice lingered (Figure 3.2).
16
  
Overall, in 1695 the volume of tolls recorded in the Sound toll registers was significantly 
higher than it had been in 1686, and on two summer days more than 130 captains paid their dues 
at the tollhouse of Elsinore. Economic, cultural, and political stimuli influenced the yearly 
volume of Baltic trade, but the complete interruption of regional commerce during the previous 
winter might have contributed to the unusually high volume of summer shipping. Voyages that 
were delayed in the winter were likely not aborted but rather postponed, because timber, grain, 
metals, and other Baltic goods were necessary commodities in a Republic that, without them, 
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could neither feed its own population nor support its industries and networks of trade. 
Ultimately, the Sound toll registers reveal that substantial traffic continued through the Sound in 
the milder winter of late 1695, and dues did not cease until midway through December.
17
  
 
 
Fig. 3.2. Daily passages through the Sound in 1695.  
 
Abnormally low winter traffic through the Sound and unusually late resumption of Baltic 
commerce accompanied all particularly cold regional winters during the Maunder Minimum 
(Figure 3.3). The winters of 1697/98 and 1708/09 were just as icy as the winter of 1694/95, and 
in these years traffic ceased entirely during the season. Even colder was the winter of 1683/84, 
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perhaps the chilliest of the Little Ice Age, and the flow of vessels through the Sound was 
similarly halted. While frigid, the winter of 1673/74 was not quite as cold. However, it lingered 
long into the spring, and shipping was even slower to resume than it was in 1683/84. In all four 
winters, traffic through the Sound was entirely halted for at least two months.
18
    
 
 
Fig. 3.3. Traffic through the Sound during particularly cold years in the Maunder Minimum (1662-1720).  
 
 By contrast, Baltic commerce persisted in warm and comparatively ice-free winters 
before and after the Maunder Minimum, albeit at substantially lower volume than in spring, 
summer and fall (Figure 3.4). For example, in the mild winter of 1723/24 a steady trickle of ships 
passed through the Sound in February, and in similar conditions thirteen years later 12 ships paid 
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their dues in January. Indeed, passages through the Sound did not cease for more than a few 
weeks during the moderate winters of 1636/37, 1660/61, 1723/24, and 1736/37, whereas in the 
frigid winter of 1708/9, for example, shipping had been halted for nearly four months. More 
importantly, shipping resumed to peak volume much earlier in the year during mild winters than 
it did in cold winters. If traffic did not reach high volumes until April or even May during cold 
winters, it approached peak volume as soon as early March in mild winters.
19
  
 
 
Fig. 3.4. Traffic through the Sound during comparatively warm years before and after the Maunder Minimum. 
 
Severe winters and moderate winters influenced Baltic passages through the Sound in 
distinctive patterns, and the characteristics of cold or warm winters could differ in ways that had 
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important ramifications for Baltic commerce. For example, the winter of 1708/9 was both 
particularly cold and uncommonly long, with below-average temperatures persisting long into 
spring. Shipping ceased entirely for consecutive months, with the collection of dues at Elsinore 
only resuming midway through April. On the other hand, the generally frigid winter of 1697/98 
was interrupted by weeks of thawing, and the last stretch of below-freezing conditions relented 
on 9 March. Consequently, traffic through the Sound resumed halfway through March, although 
its volume was relatively low until April. Ultimately, the Sound Tolls reveal that travel through 
the Sound was strongly affected by the changes in sea ice extent that accompanied the climatic 
fluctuations of the Little Ice Age.
20
 
 
Correspondence, Baltic Trade, and the Consequences of Sea Ice during the Little Ice Age  
 
 Quantitative reconstructions can highlight shared historical patterns and suggest 
correlation, but only qualitative sources can establish how different trends influenced one 
another. In the absence of ship logbooks, correspondence sent between the Republic and the 
Baltic provides the best evidence for the existence of a relationship between Baltic trade and 
prolonged or unusually extensive sea ice during the minima of the Little Ice Age. The letters sent 
to grand pensionary Heinsius by Dutch diplomats in the Baltic during the last years of the 
Maunder Minimum include especially detailed accounts of the complex ramifications of 
extensive regional ice cover in cold winters.
21
  
On 11 January during the frigid winter of 1708/09, a letter to Heinsius from “Van 
Vrijbergen” described freezing across the Baltic so severe that ink froze in the pen, 
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correspondence ceased, and people refused to leave their homes. A day later, “Goes”22 reported 
that the post from Hamburg was much delayed by the cold. He also revealed that 67 Dutch 
merchant vessels bound for the Republic were entrapped by ice in the Sound. On 14 January, 
correspondence from “Hulft” mentioned that “severe and violent frost” in the Baltic was 
preventing supplies from reaching allied troops fighting the ongoing War of the Spanish 
Succession. Stimulated by abnormally cold winter weather in the final decades of the Maunder 
Minimum, unusually extensive sea ice in 1708/09 undermined the Republic’s essential northern 
European networks of information, trade, and military supply. Not only was Baltic commerce 
halted through the Sound, but the allied position in the Baltic was temporarily paralyzed.
23
 
 Nevertheless, on 15 January Goes wrote again to inform Heinsius that the grinding cold 
had diminished enough to allow most of the Republic’s merchantmen to retreat into 
Copenhagen’s harbour for overwintering. However, on 18 January the Sound had been sealed by 
ice that reached 73 centimetres thick, and an enormous ice field occupied the Kattegat. Indeed on 
26 January Goes reported that inijzen, the process of extricating vessels from the ice and 
returning them to the relative safety of a harbour, was proceeding more slowly than expected. 
According to Goes, difficulties in the work were compounded by the disunity and 
insubordination of the Dutch captains, who were apparently not used to following orders. Goes 
did not mention whether some civilian captains refused Danish help, insisted on attempting a 
passage through the ice, or in other ways hampered inijzen. Regardless, undertones of class 
tension surfaced in the correspondence between Heinsius and Goes, who operated at the top of 
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the Republic’s social strata, as sailors ostensibly under the direction of the States-General 
confronted the peril imposed by the ice. However, such undertones did not surface regularly. On 
2 February, Goes wrote only that inijzen continued, and a week later he reported that the last of 
the Dutch flutes had been safely escorted into Copenhagen’s harbour.24 
 On 10 March, “Hop” wrote from Ghent to report that traffic between the city and Zeeland 
had resumed, although with north-easterly winds the Leie remained frozen, and no ships had yet 
arrived from Holland. In fact, the ports of Amsterdam and the Republic’s other northern 
commercial centres in its dominant province remained closed owing to ice. Indeed, on 30 March 
Heinsius received a letter from the Admiralty of Amsterdam, the wealthiest of the five 
admiralties that together outfitted the Dutch navy and supported its operations by collecting 
harbour tolls. The Admiralty grimly informed Heinsius that the collection of harbour duties 
ceased completely for four months in the severe winter Europe had just experienced. That was 
devastating, for without this income the Admiralties lacked both immediate cash reserves and 
ready credit to equip and supply the ships necessary for winning the ongoing war against France. 
“We can assure you,” the letter concluded, “that this [Admiralty] was never in such dire need of 
coin as it is now.”25 
Meanwhile, correspondence from Goes hinted that some merchant captains may have 
been correct to resist inijzen. On 12 March, Goes mentioned that Danish officials had dismissed 
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an earlier contract signed with Dutch captains, and now sought a higher payment for bringing the 
merchant fleet into Copenhagen’s harbour. On 24 March, Goes wrote that negotiations were 
continuing between the parties, but in a detailed letter written on 13 April Goes reported that the 
dispute had moved no closer to resolution. Goes now revealed that in January the Copenhagen 
sailors’ guild had either been incapable or unwilling to close a contract with the Dutch captains 
in the face of the extreme cold and ice. Consequently, the Dutch mariners agreed to a contract 
with a Danish naval officer, which bound them to pay 26 rijksdaalders for every ship brought 
into harbour by Danish sailors.
26
 The total amount payable was supposed to be 1,742 
rijksdaalders, yet the Danish officer now demanded 6,317 rijksdaalders because the ice was so 
thick and the cold so severe that the inijzen was much more expensive than anticipated. The 
Dutch captains refused to amend their original contract, Dutch proposals for mediation were 
dismissed, and Danish ministers had little taste for the involvement of the States-General.
27
   
Only on 23 April did Goes declare that the sea around Copenhagen was again open for 
shipping, although Dutch crews still awaited the resolution of the contractual dispute before they 
could depart for the Republic. Four days later an exasperated Goes wrote that he had offered to 
pay the difference between the original and revised fees, yet apparently distrustful Danish 
ministers had declined his proposal. On 30 April Goes reported that there was still no movement 
on the inijzen negotiations, and again blamed the intransigence of Dutch captains who were 
unwilling to listen to his counsel until it was too late. Nearly five months after the Dutch 
merchant fleet was first rescued from the ice on the Sound, Goes wrote on 11 May that both 
parties remained deadlocked, with the Danish officer insisting that no contract had ever been 
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drafted. On the other hand, Dutch captains were now raising funds through merchants to cover 
the outstanding payment, and on 18 May a large convoy that included seven warships arrived 
from the Republic. Under the protection of the warships, on 25 May the approximately 70 ships 
that constituted the long-delayed merchant fleet finally departed for their home ports. 
Unfortunately, there is no indication in the Heinsius correspondence of how the dispute was 
ultimately resolved.
28
 
 Sea ice was a regular occurrence even when Baltic winter temperatures matched the 
twentieth-century average. For example, in December during the moderate winter of 1709/10, 
Hamburg merchant vessels bound for the Republic and laden with grain were seized by Danish 
troops. Sea ice had trapped the ships in Altona, a Danish harbour near Hamburg, and accordingly 
their crews were unable to escape. Representatives of the States-General protested to Danish 
authorities, who unconvincingly insisted that the Republic would be compensated for its lost 
imports.
29
 Still, in the correspondence between Heinsius and his Baltic agents, reports of sea ice 
and its consequences were greatly diminished during the winter of 1709/10, compared to the year 
before. Moreover, the letters Heinsius received in the frigid winter of 1708/09 reveal the 
cascading ramifications for Baltic commerce of particularly severe winter freezing along the 
shores of northern European waters. Not only did unusually expansive ice contribute to the 
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complete cessation of Baltic commerce, which clearly would have persisted otherwise, but it was 
devastating for a Dutch navy that was supported, in part, by harbour tolls.  
 
 
Fig. 3.5. The frozen harbour of Hoorn, a wealthy city on the Zuider Zee, possibly painted during the Maunder 
Minimum (1662-1720). Jan Abrahamsz Beersraten, “IJsvermaak bij de Hoofdtoren te Hoorn,” painting, c. 1651-
1666, http://www.colf-kolf.nl/1450-1700/3/details/Jan_Beerstraten_na_1651.htm.  
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Indeed, during the coldest winters of the Little Ice Age, Admiralty revenues provided by 
harbour dues dropped dramatically in the Republic’s northern ports, while fees collected in 
southern ports were hardly affected. For example, during the cool winter of 1626/27 Amsterdam 
received £20,494 in toll revenue in January compared to £40,643 in March. The slightly more 
northerly towns of Hoorn and Alkmaar collected £66 and £0 in harbour dues during January, 
respectively (Figure 3.5). In March, tolls earned in both towns totalled £404 and £2,794, which 
in turn supported the operations of the Admiralty of Westfriesland and the Noorderkwartier 
(“North quarter”). By contrast, in January the more southerly city of Middelburg collected 
£9,427 in harbour revenue for the Admiralty of Zeeland, but just £5,696 in March and £9,648 in 
April. Rotterdam, meanwhile, contributed to the powerful Admiralty of the Maas with £8,635 in 
harbour duties in January, compared to only £7,682 in March and £10,012 in April. Ultimately, 
in the cold winters common during the minima of the Little Ice Age, freezing and sea ice 
disproportionately affected trade and, in turn, the collection of Admiralty revenues in the 
northerly cities that formed the commercial heartland of the Dutch Republic.
30
   
 Letters that were eventually received by Heinsius or his agents also reveal that 
communications by Dutch officials in Baltic cities, often carried by ship, could suffer lengthy 
delays in frigid winters as vessels were trapped in harbours and couriers were forced to employ 
paths on land that were treacherous in the cold weather. Although written during the relatively 
moderate winter of 1718/19, correspondence sent by “De Bie” nevertheless reflected the full 
diversity of relationships between seasonal meteorological conditions, environmental structures 
and Baltic transportation. On 21 February De Bie wrote to Heinsius from Hamburg, and 
explained the cause of delays in the traumatic first leg of a secret diplomatic voyage to secure 
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restitution for Dutch ships and goods seized by the new Swedish regime of Queen Regent Ulrika 
Eleonora. De Bie’s journey over land had been hindered by flooding, and he could not cross the 
high water by boat because of sudden freezing. At Winsen sea ice had, in fact, blown in from the 
Baltic with southwesterly winds, necessitating long detours. Thereafter constantly shifting 
meteorological conditions, expressed through bouts of heavy rain, freezing, blizzards, and fog, 
each contributed something different to delays in the slow voyage to Hamburg. De Bie promised 
that he would consult with others for guidance on the remainder of his journey, but for the 
moment he was stuck in Hamburg.
31
  
 Fortunately, De Bie’s plight in Hamburg was a matter of logistics rather than sea ice, 
although he did reveal in a letter sent on 23 February that the Sound had recently frozen over. In 
a moderate winter during the transition from the Maunder Minimum to a somewhat warmer 
climatic regime, sea ice in the Sound had rendered the passage unnavigable some two months 
later than in 1708/09. Still, the ice was enough to dissuade De Bie from travelling near 
Copenhagen. Instead, he resolved to take an inland boat to Lübeck with the first favourable wind, 
from where he hoped to travel north through the Danish islands to the town of Ystad, located east 
of Copenhagen and just beyond the Sound. From there he would continue to Stockholm. On 2 
March, De Bie wrote again to announce that he had departed Hamburg on the 24
th
 and arrived at 
Lübeck on the 25
th
. He had arranged transport to Ystad with the captain of a galjoot, a Dutch 
merchant vessel, but variable winds and a combination of rain and snow had kept the ship in port 
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until the 28
th
. On 1 March, the oscillating conditions yielded to steady freezing with a 
northwesterly wind, and departure was impossible under such circumstances.
32
  
As De Bie wrote, however, the wind turned to blow from the southwest, a direction 
favourable for vessels departing the port of Lübeck. After sending his letter, De Bie resolved to 
discover if the ship could set sail, and he insisted that he would ask his captain to attempt a 
passage either through the Sound or the more southerly and more treacherous Great Belt, should 
the ice allow it.
33
 However, in a missive sent on 6 March De Bie revealed that he was still in 
Lübeck. Four days earlier the wind had evidently shifted before the ship could depart, but the 
wind had turned to again issue from the southwest. The skipper now intended to take to the river 
on the following day, and sail from there to Travemünde, a nearby port that bordered the Baltic. 
That news was hopeful, but De Bie had received letters from Hamburg that reported that sea ice 
in the Sound had delayed correspondence.
34
  
 For more than three weeks De Bie did not write again. Finally, on 30 March a detailed 
account of hardship and failure was sent to Heinsius from Stockholm. De Bie explained how he 
had departed for Travemünde on 7 March, yet a Danish captain had intercepted his ship in the 
harbour and would not let him continue without a passport. The captain insisted on waiting for 
new instructions until 10 March, and because the wind had turned to blow from the north and 
hindered further progress, De Bie agreed. The necessary passports soon arrived and the captain 
gave his consent, but although the wind had shifted again to issue from the south, the ship could 
not get to sea until early the next morning. On the evening of 8 March, De Bie and the crew of 
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the galjoot encountered drift ice, and upon arrival at Landskrona on the morning of the 12
th
 they 
found the entire coast beset with ice. They sailed beside the ice and happened across another 
vessel attempting to reach Ystadt. Both ships pressed through the sea ice and, with great 
difficulty, reached the vicinity of the town, only to find the haven choked with an even greater 
quantity of ice.
35
 
 De Bie reached the coast despite a contrary north-easterly breeze, but further travel north 
by sea was clearly impossible. Unfortunately, De Bie had been obliged to leave his carriage in 
Lübeck owing to the small size of the galjoot, which forced him to buy passage through the 
Swedish countryside on a series of post wagons and farmers’ wagons. De Bie reported that the 
land was hard to travel through, and that the farmers were unhelpful, so that, after a “long and 
miserable journey,” he arrived in Stockholm no earlier than 27 March. In his letter De Bie 
beseeched Heinsius to understand why it had taken so long to reach the city, and with reason, 
because the delays were ruinous. After a series of wars with its neighbours, Sweden had fallen 
from the ranks of Europe’s great powers, Russia dominated the Baltic, and the Rijksdag had 
reduced the Crown to a constitutional monarchy. By 27 March, captured vessels that might have 
been returned to the Republic, had De Bie arrived earlier, had already been sold to repair the 
Crown’s beleaguered finances. In a short message sent on 1 April De Bie concluded that the 
Republic would likely not retrieve its ships and their goods.
36
 
The letters sent by De Bie during his ill-fated journey demonstrate the full complexity of 
interactions between climatic trends, weather conditions, environmental frameworks, and travel 
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through the Baltic. As in other years, in the winter of 1718/18 sea ice was the most important 
impediment to Baltic transportation, although the extent of regional ice was far less than it had 
been a decade earlier. Indeed, De Bie’s voyage might have been impossible or, at least, even 
more difficult during the winter of 1708/09, although his correspondence reveals that sea ice was 
an impediment to regional transportation even during comparatively moderate winters. 
Moreover, the relentless meteorological variability that accompanied a winter of average severity 
undermined De Bie’s attempts to travel by land. Flooding might have been more easily 
surmountable were it not accompanied by subsequent freezing, and snow might not have been as 
bothersome if rain and fog did not immediately follow. The same likely did not apply for Baltic 
commerce, as thawing of any sort was indisputably better than continued freezing. Consequently, 
for much of the winter of 1718/19 a trickle of vessels continued to pass through the Sound, 
which was, of course, entirely closed in colder years. Still, the nature of De Bie’s diplomatic 
mission reveals how the Republic’s Baltic trade intersected with the many other reasons its 
citizens travelled through the region. Success for De Bie would have returned substantial capital 
to Dutch merchants in a time of economic stagnation, and success was thwarted not only by ice 
but also by conditions more common under a warmer climatic regime.  
For Baltic commerce, the vulnerabilities of Dutch shipping technology and practice in the 
face of climatic fluctuation changed little from the beginning of the Grindelwald Fluctuation 
until the conclusion of the Maunder Minimum. Consequently, descriptions of sea ice and its 
consequences provided in the Heinsius correspondence echo through letters, diaries, and 
chronicles compiled during the height of the Golden Age, although few of these sources were as 
detailed or continuous as those collected by the grand pensionary of the Republic in the first 
decades of the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, on 12 February during the cold winter of 
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1585/86 Velius, the famed chronicler of Hoorn, described how a sudden transition from 
moderate conditions to high winds and freezing temperatures trapped eighteen ships in ice that 
rapidly accumulated near the harbour. However, some citizens of Hoorn used axes to break 
through the ice and free most of the beleaguered vessels, which were subsequently brought into 
port. Frigid weather during the following winter was also typical of the Grindelwald Fluctuation. 
For example, as freezing temperatures lingered in March 1586, farmer Abel Eppens described 
how the harbour of Delfzijl was blocked by sea ice that pressed forward in persistent easterly 
winds, trapping the ships within.
37
 
During the lengthy and remarkably cold winter of 1620/21, the Zuider Zee froze over 
entirely in persistent easterly winds, and sea ice extended beyond into the North Sea. In 
February, a ship heavily laden with commodities was trapped in ice between the northwestern 
coast of Friesland and the island of Terschelling. The vessel’s cargo was carried in wagons 
across the frozen Zuider Zee to Amsterdam, Hoorn, and Enkhuizen. Pieter van Winsem, a lawyer 
at the Court of Friesland, reported that another merchant vessel was frozen in the ice at the same 
location, and would have to be unloaded. Meanwhile, Jan Hanszoon, a citizen of Harlingen, was 
trapped with his crew amid the sea ice as his ship approached Vlieland, one of the islands that 
divided the North Sea from the Zuider Zee. With staff in hand, Hanszoon, and presumably his 
crew, travelled by foot to the town of Harlingen. According to the scholar Pier Winsemius, “no 
one had ever heard of” such a deed. Even in the southerly city of Middelburg citizens struggled 
to break the ice that had sealed their harbour.
38
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Letters written within the Republic during the relatively moderate winter of 1636/37 
described ice in regional harbours, correspondence delayed due to sea ice and contrary winds, 
and heavy sea ice in the Baltic, where the winter was cooler than average. Written by the well-
connected scholars Hugo de Groot in Paris and Nicolaes van Reigersberch in The Hague, the 
letters were based on reports from the Baltic. They suggest that conditions common during the 
minima of the Little Ice Age could also accompany winters during the generally warmer decades 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nevertheless, in the Republic and even the Baltic 
freezing and corresponding disruptions in transportation were not as severe as they were during 
the coldest years of the Grindelwald Fluctuation or Maunder Minimum. Overall, letters compiled 
during the Republic’s Golden Age reveal that the complex environmental manifestations of 
contemporary climatic fluctuations could influence, and generally undermine, many expressions 
of the Dutch relationship with the Baltic.
39
 
 
Wind Velocity, Wind Direction, and Baltic Commerce in a Shifting Climate  
 
While storms were rarely mentioned in the Heinsius correspondence, other documents 
suggest that a rise in the frequency of regional gales shipwrecked more vessels supporting Baltic 
commerce during the minima of the Little Ice Age than were sunk in warmer, more tranquil 
decades. When quantified, references to shipwrecks in letters and diary entries reveal that, for 
flutes sailing to or from the Baltic, disasters on the coasts of Texel were substantially more 
common during the nadir of the Maunder Minimum than they were before or after (Figure 3.6). 
Unlike East Indiamen, however, there was usually no particular reason for flutes to linger near 
Texel, for they were light enough to enter the Republic’s silted harbours even when filled to 
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capacity. Consequently, although reconstructions of shipwrecks off Texel can suggest broader 
trends, they do not reflect the scale of the calamities that could befall flutes and their crews in the 
severe storms of Little Ice Age minima, because most would not have foundered near Texel.
40
 
 
 
Fig. 3.6. Shipwrecks off Texel for vessels plying the Baltic trades, recorded in contemporary documents. 
 
 On 12 December 1659, in a cold winter just over two years before the beginning of the 
Maunder Minimum in the Low Countries, Adriaen van der Goes reported that, in the vicinity of 
The Hague, storms were unceasing and many merchant ships had stranded along the coast. On 
18 August eleven years later, Van der Goes recounted that a merchant vessel had recently 
departed Rotterdam before being struck by lightning. The blast ruined much of the vessel’s 
lucrative cargo and may have killed some of its crew, although Van der Goes omitted mention of 
the sailors on board. More severe storms affected the English Channel and the North Sea at the 
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nadir of the Maunder Minimum between 1695 and 1697, and the consequences were not limited 
to Dutch flutes. On 9 September 1695, as many as 1,000 mariners perished in shipwrecks across 
the North Sea as a series of storms imperiled regional commerce. On the evening of 21 
September, a fierce gale tore ships from their anchors in English harbours and drove them into 
the Channel. Vessels were stranded along the coasts of France and the Low Countries, yet the 
night’s greatest disaster was the loss of 70 English coal freighters along the shore of Norfolk.41 
Intermittent frost in October of the following year succumbed repeatedly to thaws and 
accompanying gales that wrecked countless Dutch and English merchant vessels along the shores 
of the North Sea. In December, John Evelyn marvelled in his diary that “so wonderfull & 
perpetual Rainy season without frost, but exceeding greate storms wrecking many at sea, has not 
ben knowne in any mans [sic] memory.”42 Nevertheless, the mild but tempestuous autumn 
yielded to a bitterly cold winter that was accompanied by the rapid expansion of sea ice in the 
Baltic. In January and February, the icy conditions were joined by frequent storms that 
threatened shipping in the vicinity of the North Sea. In January, a Dutch warship under the 
command of Captain Jacob Schoon rescued the beleaguered survivors of a merchant vessel that 
had shipwrecked on the Norwegian coast nine days earlier. Most of the passengers and crew had 
already perished, but those who lived may have succumbed to cannibalism to sustain themselves. 
Recurrent and severe storminess likely persisted into the summer. In a diary entry written on 30 
August 1697, Claas Ariszoon Caescoper reported that four days of unremitting storminess had 
contributed to numerous shipwrecks near Texel. For sailors near the Republic, the most 
threatening storms blew from the west, and such storms may have been less common during 
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Little Ice Age minima. On the other hand, that favourable change may have been offset by the 
greater frequency and severity of storms in colder decades, and indeed easterly winds created lee 
shores in other parts of a Baltic journey.
43
 
 
 
Fig. 3.7. A merchant vessel in a storm. During the Maunder Minimum, Dutch artists Willem van de Velde the Elder 
and his son, Willem van de Velde the Younger, painted many scenes of ships struggling through storms. Men of war 
often featured in these depictions, but this painting is an exception. Willem van de Velde the Younger, “A Dutch 
Ship Scudding Before a Storm,” painting, c. 1690, National Maritime Museum, 
http://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/12397.html.  
 
Beyond destroying vessels already at sea, storms could also delay voyages by prohibiting 
or discouraging departure from port. For example, on 20 November 1670 Van der Goes informed 
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his brother that fourteen days of unrelenting gales had flooded nearby polders and prevented 
many ships from leaving port. Still, during lengthy gales the consequences of delays in the 
voyages of vessels travelling to or from the Baltic paled in comparison to the significance of 
shipwrecks, especially when extreme storms afflicted large convoys in times of war. Attempts to 
reunite scattered fleets could take weeks, compounding delays caused by vessels that remained in 
port to avoid stormy conditions, and exposing dispersed ships to enemy action. Worse, the loss 
of crews, commodities, and vessels was often complete, whether ships were dashed along the 
coast or sunk at sea during storms in the North Sea region (Figure 3.7).
44
  
To minimize financial risk, many merchants active in the Baltic trades distributed their 
goods in different ships. In the Republic, this “parcelling” appears to have accompanied the onset 
of the Grindelwald Fluctuation, and the corresponding rise in the frequency of storms in the 
North Sea region. After the first decades of the seventeenth century, parcelling separated those 
responsible for shipping from those who handled commercial activity. Most merchants now 
chartered vessels from shipmasters, and hired “factors” in Baltic ports to manage their business. 
As storms again grew more common and more severe in the late seventeenth century, merchants 
and shipmasters increasingly acquired marine insurance. Indeed the volume of insurance cases 
handled by the Republic’s Chamber of Insurance and Average appears to have risen in the wake 
of particularly severe winters.
45
 Surviving documents do not mention if merchants and 
shipmasters were aware of long-term changes in prevailing weather. Regardless, those involved 
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in the Baltic trades responded creatively to environmental risks that grew more common during 
the minima of the Little Ice Age.
46
  
Of course, not only in the coldest years of the Little Ice Age did severe gales affect 
merchant shipping. For instance, over 20 merchant vessels, most returning from the Baltic, 
foundered on 6 January 1654 when a catastrophic storm struck an anchored Dutch convoy near 
Texel. Unusually frequent storminess may have affected shipping in the North Sea during the 
early 1650s (Chapter 4), yet such violent weather was even more common during the minima of 
the Little Ice Age. Indeed, the Sound toll accounts suggest that traffic through the Sound likely 
diminished during particularly stormy years in the Maunder Minimum. For example, the winter 
of 1694/95 was among the coldest of the Little Ice Age, but shipping through the Sound reached 
peak volume only long after the last ice had melted in the Baltic. Severe and persistent storms in 
the spring of 1695 may have encouraged some sailors to remain in port while contributing to the 
ruin of those who might otherwise have paid dues at the tollhouse of Elsinore (Figure 3.2). Four 
years later, temperatures matched their twentieth-century average, yet the winter of 1698/99 was 
distinguished by repeated storms that kindled fires in cities, beached whales, and ruined ships 
along the Republic’s coast. In the Sound, winter shipping persisted but was abnormally low for 
such a moderate winter, possibly because gales interfered with voyages from the Republic 
(Figure 3.3).
47
 
In the absence of a systematic series of ship logbooks kept aboard vessels plying Baltic 
trades, no records survive to allow the reconstruction of relationships between shifts in prevailing 
wind and the duration of northern commercial journeys. Doubtless wind direction was important, 
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and indeed in 1673 a contract written by a captain off Stockholm promised the delivery of his 
cargo in Amsterdam “when God provides a favourable wind.”48 Two years earlier Adriaen van 
der Goes wrote that persistent easterly winds prohibited travel northeast from the Republic, 
hampering Dutch trade with Archangel. More frequent easterly winds during the minima of the 
Little Ice Age may have facilitated departure from Dutch ports, arrival in Amsterdam’s harbour 
from the Zuider Zee, and travel through the Baltic by returning ships.
49
  
Surviving correspondence supports that notion. On 2 April 1709 a letter written to grand 
pensionary Heinsius from “Vrijbergen” in Copenhagen complained that no letters had been 
received from Holland, although the wind had persisted from the east. Winds from that direction 
likely delayed ships as they approached Copenhagen, but they also facilitated departure from 
most Dutch harbours, and perhaps this was more important. On 29 June another letter written in 
the same city by Goes described how a small French merchant fleet laden with grain was 
hindered by contrary winds as it struggled to depart the Baltic five days earlier. France, Britain 
and the Republic were among the European powers embroiled in the War of the Spanish 
Succession, but a pursuing British convoy was likewise thwarted by the wind, which probably 
blew from the west. Three French ships returned to port but set sail on 26 June, again evading the 
British squadron with favourable winds that now likely blew from the east. The letters from 
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Denmark reveal not only the importance of wind direction for ships plying the Baltic trades, but 
also that winds could affect different ships differently.
50
  
One month later, Goes relayed Danish displeasure over the presence of a large Anglo-
Dutch fleet amassed in the city’s harbour. Goes explained that, to depart, the British warships did 
not require a wind as favourable as that needed by the 160 merchant vessels belonging to the 
Dutch convoy. Consequently, the British ships set sail on 25 July, while the Dutch fleet was 
forced to wait for weeks, much to the consternation of Danish officials eager to maintain their 
state’s neutrality. Despite such tantalizing references in correspondence, it is impossible to 
explore comprehensively how shifts in prevailing wind affected Baltic commerce without ship 
logbooks that provide detailed daily meteorological observations. Moreover, other surviving 
documentary evidence suggests that shifts in the abundance of storms and, in particular, winter 
ice cover were even more significant for Baltic journeys. Changes in prevailing wind direction 
during Little Ice Age minima may have affected voyage times for vessels sailing to and from the 
Baltic. However, more frequent storms and more extensive sea ice regularly contributed to 
shipwrecks or, in the case of ice, the complete cessation of trade for more than three months. 
While the influence of sea ice was difficult to mitigate, Dutch merchants responded creatively to 
the challenges imposed by more common storms during the minima of the Little Ice Age.
51
  
 
Climatic Fluctuation and Baltic Commerce: Conclusions and Consequences  
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Disruptions in Baltic commerce, influenced by weather that grew more common during 
Little Ice Age minima, may have had broader economic consequences. In a letter sent during the 
first years of the Maunder Minimum, Adriaen van der Goes on 26 December 1662 described the 
bitter cold of a particularly severe winter. Van der Goes reported that grain ships inbound from 
the Baltic had been trapped for two weeks in thick sea ice near Vlieland. Their goods had not 
been unloaded across the sea ice, perhaps because the ice was too unstable or uneven for 
transportation. Van der Goes hoped that the vessels had not been damaged and that thawing 
would soon bring open water, because he, like many others in The Hague, trusted that high grain 
prices would sink once the vessels were unloaded in port. Unfortunately, on 9 February 1663 
Van der Goes wrote that the grain ships had now been stuck in the ice for two months, as 
persistent freezing prevented the thawing of the ice. However, on 12 December during the 
warmer year of 1669 Van der Goes described relatively warm weather and low grain prices.
52
 
The prices of wheat and even rye rose sharply in the Dutch Republic during the coldest, 
rainiest, and stormiest decades of the Little Ice Age.
53
 Still, chronological correlation is not the 
same as causation. Relationships between the weather rendered more frequent in Little Ice Age 
minima, Baltic shipping, and grain prices within the Republic were mediated by powerful 
socioeconomic and demographic influences. In particular, the demographic expansion of Europe 
contributed to a lengthy inflation in grain prices and decline in the value of labour until the 
middle of the seventeenth century, when grain prices declined as labour’s real wage increased 
until the 1740s. These Malthusian trends were occasionally punctuated by the influence of war, 
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which affected commodity prices, labour wages, and the flow of shipping through the waters off 
Northern Europe. In this context, the force of climatic trends and accompanying weather events 
is difficult to quantify. Contemporary serial sources recorded shifts in prices and harvest yields, 
but even documents that abound with meteorological references cannot reveal how weather 
influenced the daily growth of plants. Extreme weather events were described at length, and 
historians of both the early modern climate and the European economy have traced how severe 
droughts or lengthy winters, for example, affected grain prices. However, the more profound 
influence of relatively subtle decade-scale changes in average weather was less commonly 
documented, yielding a low geographic and temporal density of surviving documents.
54
  
Analyzing the extensively recorded movement of vessels through the Sound consequently 
provides new insights into the relationship between commodity prices and the climatic 
fluctuations of the Little Ice Age, provided these quantitative accounts are contextualized and 
interpreted using qualitative documents. Using relatively continuous statistics of daily dues paid 
by captains passing through the Sound between 1634 and 1800, total annual passages can be 
compiled into a long-term reconstruction of fluctuations in Baltic shipping. Gaps in the 
reconstruction reflect years for which no data has survived, yet the final statistics nevertheless 
reveal that dues paid at the tollhouse of Elsinore generally declined during the Maunder 
Minimum and rarely reached decadal peaks during abnormally frigid winters (Figure 3.8). 
Overall, passages through the Sound rose steadily during the eighteenth century, mirroring the 
economic and demographic expansion of contemporary Western Europe. Stagnation in dues paid 
also sharply corresponded to wars that economically or directly involved the Baltic region, 
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including the Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652-54, 1664-67, 1672-74), the Second Northern War (1655-
60), the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), and the Great Northern War (1700-21).
55
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.8. Changes in the total volume of traffic through the Sound, 1686-1804. The Maunder Minimum is 
highlighted.  
 
Still, correspondence and accounts recording daily dues paid at Elsinore both suggest that 
the stagnation in Baltic traffic recorded in the Sound toll reconstruction was also influenced by 
the frigid, stormy weather that accompanied the minima of the Little Ice Age. In years of 
particularly severe cold or precipitation, delays and disruptions in Baltic commerce, in turn, were 
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likely related to fluctuations in the price of necessary commodities like wheat. These delays 
coincided with failed harvests that were also stimulated, in part, by the colder, stormier, wetter 
conditions during exceptional years of the Grindelwald Fluctuation and Maunder Minimum in 
northwestern Europe.
56
 Jan de Vries has argued that climatic fluctuation was not a direct causal 
variable for Dutch grain prices, because shortages in the domestic supply could be supplemented 
by Baltic imports. In fact, precisely because grain prices in Amsterdam were attuned to 
international market prices, poor harvests and disruptions in Baltic commerce may have acted in 
concert to increase grain prices in the Republic and elsewhere.
57
     
Disruptions in the supply of cereals and corresponding price increases contributed to 
famine and unrest in much of Western Europe, yet in the Republic the picture could be far more 
complex. Meat, fish, cheese, and other sources of protein accounted for an unusually high share 
of the Dutch diet, and the storehouses of Amsterdam could compensate for disruptions in Baltic 
trade. The nutrition available to Dutch citizens was accordingly less affected by disruptions in 
the supply of grains than it was elsewhere in Europe. Moreover, because Dutch vessels carried 
the bulk of Europe’s seaborne trade during the Republic’s Golden Age, Dutch merchants profited 
by exploiting high grain prices in different regions. For the mariners engaged in Baltic 
commerce, the extensive sea ice and frequent storminess of Little Ice Age minima were 
frustrating and often deadly. Despite occasional interruptions in diplomatic negotiations and 
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military supply chains, however, delays in the Sound may actually have indirectly benefitted the 
economy of the Dutch Republic.
58
 
 
Climatic Fluctuation and Transportation within the Borders of the Republic 
 
 For the Republic’s economy to retain its entrepôt function in global trade, commodities, 
information, and people from across an expanding commercial empire had to be transported from 
major harbours to specialized industrial, cultural, and political centres. They were inhaled 
through roads, creeks, canals, rivers, lakes, and coastal stretches of the sea, to towns like Leiden 
or nearby Haarlem. There goods were refined or transformed into finished products, information 
was interpreted and acted upon, and people assumed new socioeconomic roles or prepared for 
their return to the periphery. Before long, the internal transportation system of the Republic 
would gradually accommodate the steady exhalation of products, correspondence, and people 
returning to the sea. This breathing of the Republic’s economy through intersecting 
transportation networks on land and water was an essential component of its dynamic capitalist 
economy. In a process that, in some respects, mirrored the first development of defences against 
the sea in the northern Netherlands, the growth of regional networks of transportation was slow, 
organic, and largely bereft of centralized planning.
59
  
 By the sixteenth century, the gradual economic expansion of Dutch towns encouraged the 
further improvement of infrastructure that could reliably deliver buyers and goods to the 
burgeoning markets of the northern Netherlands. In 1529, Amsterdam and Hoorn established a 
service in which licensed skippers left at regular intervals to ferry passengers, goods, and 
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correspondence between standardized destinations according to tariffs previously negotiated by 
the towns.  The skippers aboard beurt, or “in turn,” ships were ordered to depart whether empty 
or full, and they possessed monopolies over the waterborne transport of goods and people 
between agreed-upon locations in the passage from Amsterdam to Hoorn. The beurtveer system 
expanded in step with the general rise of the Dutch economy in the final decades of the sixteenth 
century, as services to Rotterdam and, somewhat later, the Zaan villages were added to what was 
already an extensive network. Beurt ships typically harnessed the wind to move (Figure 3.9), and 
only when sailing was impossible did skippers employ animal or human labour. Even this was 
impractical on the rivers and lakes that frequently covered at least some of an established route.
60
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Fig. 3.9. A typical beurt ship of the seventeenth century sails with a light breeze. A thriving market existed in the 
Republic for art that depicted characteristically Dutch landscapes. Aelbert Cuyp, “River Scene with a Ferry Boat,” 
painting, c. 1652, Auckland Art Gallery Toiotāmaki, http://www.aucklandartgallery.com/the-collection/browse-
artwork/121/river-scene-with-a-ferry-boat. Mariët Westermann, A Worldly Art: The Dutch Republic, 1585-1718. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 67. 
 
 In the first decades of the seventeenth century, most of the population centres that were 
accessible by water were connected by the beurtveer network, and some were serviced many 
times in a day. Indeed, by the eighteenth century some 800 beurt ships departed each week from 
Amsterdam alone, bound for 121 destinations across the Republic. However, the capitalist 
economy of the Republic in its Golden Age required networks of transportation that were less 
subject to weather and tide.  Accordingly cities and merchants financed the construction of 
222 
 
straight canals that, when bordered by tow paths, could accommodate horse-drawn barges that 
did not require sails. In 1632, the first of these trek, or “pull,” ferries opened between Amsterdam 
and Haarlem. The new trekvaart could offer hourly departures, a steady speed of approximately 
seven kilometres/hour, and standardized journeys of just over two hours. By the middle of the 
seventeenth century the service between Haarlem and Amsterdam accommodated over 300,000 
annual travelers, and it had served as a template for the remarkable expansion of the network 
across the full breadth of the coastal provinces (Map 3.2). Barges travelling along the trekvaart 
network frequently carried goods or correspondence in small volumes, but the movement of 
people was the primary function of the horse-drawn system.
61
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Map 3.2. The trekvaart network in 1665, originally drawn by Jan de Vries. Inset: a trekschuit or “pull boat” strung 
to a horse. Buisman and Van Engelen, (ed.), Duizend jaar weer, wind en water in de Lage Landen, Vol. IV, 557.  De 
Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 3.  
 
By the middle of the seventeenth century, even minor centres in the Republic’s maritime 
provinces were woven into the overlapping networks of the trekvaart and beurtvaart. In the 
context of contemporary Europe, the networks yielded a uniquely flexible, reliable, inexpensive, 
and safe system for the transportation of commodities, correspondence, and people. However, 
intersecting and extending beyond the more celebrated infrastructure used by larger ferries were 
the relatively informal passages plied by boats individually or collectively owned by farmers and 
petty industrialists. Some of these routes worked their way through creeks and ditches, but others 
braved the same waterways navigated by much larger craft to transport goods between rural 
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communities or, more frequently, from rural to urban areas. Buttermilk, hay, fish, freshwater, 
and other commodities were transported in schuiten, watercraft up to 10 metres long that 
displaced two tons. Smaller boats in particular were often rowed, yet most melkschuiten or “milk 
boats” were sailed as they operated their essential trade.62  
 Given the quality and diversity of the Republic’s waterborne transportation networks, it 
is no surprise that the vast majority of traffic in the early modern Netherlands travelled by water.  
Roads did exist, including larger herenwegen or “gentlemen’s roads” that connected major 
centres, but in the coastal provinces it was unusual to find wagons laden with goods. 
Nevertheless, even in wealthy, urbanized, waterlogged Holland, many travellers rode or simply 
walked to reach nearby destinations. The northern Netherlands was connected by more roads in 
1600 than it was in 1848, but these roads were not paved streets but rather scarcely maintained 
and meandering paths of rutted dirt or sand. While the state of the Republic’s roads was hardly 
exceptional in the context of early modern Europe, it is not surprising that the trekvaart and 
beurtvaart dominated traffic through the coastal provinces. At least 95% of all travellers between 
Amsterdam and Haarlem took the trekvaart after it was constructed, and in the remaining 
decades of the seventeenth century its share of travellers between the cities never dipped far 
below 80%. However, in parts of the Republic’s relatively poor and sparsely populated eastern 
hinterland canals could not be constructed, and roads enabling travel by wagon, horse, or foot 
were consequently all that connected regional communities. Even there roads were not paved, 
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most were unhardened, and all were quickly compromised in a diverse selection of common 
meteorological conditions.
63
  
The diversity of these intricately connected transportation networks on land and in water 
yielded second and third options for travel between many destinations within the northern 
Netherlands. In the context of early modern Europe, these additional options, while superficially 
redundant, nevertheless bestowed a unique resiliency to movement through the Dutch Republic 
in the coldest, wettest, stormiest years of Little Ice Age minima. Resilience was hardly absolute, 
as travel within the Dutch transportation system ground to a halt during major storms that 
coincided either with severe freezing or flooding. Although such events were typically short-
lived, they were more frequent during the Grindelwald Fluctuation and Maunder Minimum than 
they were in warmer decades. Moreover, resiliency in the face of more common meteorological 
conditions during Little Ice Age minima and maxima was expressed not through stability but 
rather through shifts in the character of transportation in the northern Netherlands.  
Meteorological conditions typical of the warm or cold decades of the Little Ice Age 
consistently enabled or facilitated some forms of transportation while hampering others, 
influencing the efficiency and culture of movement through the Dutch Republic. With the 
notable exception of trekvaart passages, individual journeys through the transportation system of 
the northern Netherlands generally escaped continuous, quantitative documentation of the kind 
that can serve both as a proxy for climatic reconstruction and a window into the social influence 
of climate change. Nevertheless, because inexpensive and reliable transportation was central to 
the prosperity of the Republic’s relatively modern economy, numerous letters and diary entries 
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survive to describe relationships between travel disruptions and contemporary weather.  
 The various forms of transport available to travellers within the Republic were essential 
to the Dutch economy, and routinely depicted in contemporary art. That reality, as well as the 
enduring ubiquity of canals and toll stations in the modern Netherlands, has encouraged the 
growth of a vast but unbalanced historiography. Dutch inland shipping and travel by road has 
generated little systematic study, owing in part to a lack of historical sources.
64
 Far more 
attention has been devoted to standardized travel by water, and multiple studies have, for 
example, reconstructed the history of individual trekvaart routes.
65
 Owing in part to the 
pioneering work of Karel Davids, the history of Dutch transportation networks has increasingly 
been incorporated into the history of science. Building on earlier work by Jan de Vries, new 
studies argue that rapid technological innovations in the young Republic, expressed in part 
through the development of new transportation networks, were enabled by, and in turn 
accelerated, the economic expansion of the Dutch Golden Age.
66
  
Recently, this historiographical trend has readily incorporated the methodology of 
network theory. For example, in 2004 Erik van der Vleuten and Cornelis Disco explained how 
successive generations of Dutch engineers “networked” the “wet nature” of the northern Low 
Countries.
67
 Because the manipulation of natural structures to achieve human ends is the focus of 
such work, it does not consider the concurrent influence of climatic trends on human 
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developments. In fact, the best analysis of these relationships was published in 1978, when Jan 
de Vries carefully reconstructed how winter weather affected the operation of the trekvaart 
network. Still, no study has explored the influence of weather rendered more likely in Little Ice 
Age maxima and minima across the full spectrum of transportation networks intersecting the 
Republic’s coastal provinces.68  
 
The Beurtvaart and Trekvaart in Little Ice Age Minima and Maxima  
 
During the climatic fluctuations of the Little Ice Age beurtveer skippers, like the mariners 
who plied the Baltic trades, were most affected by shifts in the extent and particularly the 
duration of ice cover along their prescribed routes. Just as the relationship between changes in 
sea ice cover and variations in Baltic traffic influenced more than those directly involved in 
commerce, the consequences of beurtvaart disruptions rippled through the socioeconomic fabric 
of the Republic. In a letter sent on 13 January 1637, Nicolaes van Reigersbech informed Hugo de 
Groot that the States-General could not assemble owing to sustained freezing and, in turn, the 
cessation of beurtveer traffic. Although temperatures during the winter of 1636/37 matched the 
twentieth-century norm, and were consequently typical of the interval between the Grindelwald 
Fluctuation and Maunder Minimum, the season was also marked by a long stretch of highly 
variable weather. Conditions in January were as cold as they were during many of the chilliest 
winters in the minima of the Little Ice Age, and the correspondence to De Groot reveals that 
large-scale arrangements to travel by land could be impractical during sustained freezing in the 
Republic. Moreover, as the beurtveer ground to a halt the payment of river tolls dropped 
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considerably in that frigid January, damaging the finances of the towns that typically 
administered their so-called local privileges.
69
   
If the waterways that supported the beurtvaart could freeze even during relatively 
moderate winters, sub-zero temperatures generally lingered far longer during the coldest years of 
the Little Ice Age. In the frigid winter of 1662/63, for example, the letters of Adriaen van der 
Goes described how sustained ice cover halted beurtveer traffic for nearly three months. During 
the equally severe winter of 1683/84, Claas Caescoper marvelled at six weeks of unrelenting 
freezing, and wrote that the beurtveer from Zaandam to Amsterdam could not sail for more than 
nine weeks. Even longer disruptions in beurtveer traffic afflicted the Republic during the 
similarly cold winters of 1694/95 and 1708/09. Moreover, when temperatures rose above 
freezing, thawing ice could accumulate in narrow or already obstructed parts of waterways, 
blocking them and often stimulating floods. Toll accounts written in the moderate winter of 
1635/36 suggest that the inundations that frequently accompanied these “ice dams” could disrupt 
travel through the beurtveer network. Although floods increased the surface area of the watery 
networks that spanned the Republic’s coastal provinces, their occasionally rapid currents and 
invariably opaque water rendered them unsafe for beurt ships. Such floods were more common 
and more severe during the Grindelwald Fluctuation and Maunder Minimum. However, because 
ice dams typically accompanied rapid thawing, floods stimulated by accumulated ice do not 
appear to have halted beurtveer traffic for longer than a week at a time.
70
 
                                                 
69
 Buisman and Van Engelen, (ed.), Duizend jaar weer, wind en water in de Lage Landen, Vol. IV, 439.  
70
 Claas Arisz. Caescoper, “5 Maart 1684.” Nootijsye Boeck, anno 1669-1678, ofte Joernael. Gemeente Archief 
Zaanstad.  Van der Goes, “Soude syn van 6 Maert 1670.” Briefwisseling tusschen de gebroeders van der Goes 
(1659-1673) Vol II., 117. Buisman and Van Engelen, (ed.), Duizend jaar weer, wind en water in de Lage Landen, 
Vol. IV, 220. Buisman and Van Engelen, Duizend jaar weer, wind en water in de Lage Landen, Vol. V, 328. Egbert 
Alting, Diarium van Egbert Alting, 1553-1594, ed. W.J. Formsma and R. van Roijen. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), 
254. Gottschalk, Stormvloeden en rivieroverstromingen in Nederland, Vol II, 818. Gottschalk, Stormvloeden en 
rivieroverstromingen in Nederland, Vol III, 417.  
229 
 
Although the vessels that navigated the beurtveer employed sails, beurt skippers did not 
keep logbooks, hindering any attempt to trace how more common easterlies and high winds 
influenced traffic through the beurtvaart networks. Some routes might have been quicker during 
the Grindelwald Fluctuation and Maunder Minimum than they were in warmer decades, while 
others may have been slower. Many routes linking communities were likely faster for ships 
travelling in one direction than they were when the same vessels travelled back along the same 
course. Of course, departing and returning traffic did not necessarily have equal socioeconomic 
importance. Consequently, even along routes where accelerated voyages in a particular direction 
were balanced by slower journeys travelling back along the same course, shifts in average wind 
direction may have had significant consequences for local prosperity.  
Moreover, in persistent contrary winds, outbound or inbound travel along some 
beurtvaart networks was probably impractical, especially when those winds blew at high 
velocity. On 17 December 1665, for example, Adriaen van der Goes described how a ship likely 
working the beurtvaart would reach Delft with the first easterly wind. Easterlies soon resumed in 
1665, but in the first week of July 1686 Claas Caescoper in the Zaan near Amsterdam wrote that 
his beurt ship was delayed by high winds as it prepared to embark for Zeeland. Letters 
chronicling the passage of Oldenbarnevelt and accompanying officials through the Republic in 
1589 reveal that lengthy delays in stormy weather also hampered the beurtveer during the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation. For travellers on the beurtvaart, gales were frustrating when they kept 
ships at their docks, but the same storms were far more serious when vessels were already on 
their way, particularly when routes crossed large bodies of water. In the frigid winter of 1586, a 
beurt ship sailing between Amsterdam and Leiden and carrying many passengers was wrecked 
during a severe storm. In autumn of 1671, a beurt ship travelling between Rotterdam and 
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Middelburg was stranded in what Adriaen van der Goes referred to as a “hurricane,” although it 
was eventually floated again with favourable winds. While such qualitative references cannot be 
supported by quantitative evidence, they hint that, for traffic through the beurtveer network, the 
influence of relatively frequent high winds and easterlies during the minima of the Little Ice Age 
may have equalled the more spectacular effect of winter freezing.
71
 
Indeed it was the ability of wind to foil schedules of arrival or departure that encouraged 
the development of a kind of beurtveer that was less subject to meteorological conditions. 
Nevertheless, the trekvaart network, while remarkably reliable in the context of early modern 
Europe, was not immune to the social and environmental changes that affected the Republic. 
Although the service was hardly influenced by the First Anglo-Dutch War, traffic through the 
trekvaart declined during the second war and plummeted as large swaths of the Republic were 
occupied during the “year of disaster” in 1672. However, when the imminent threat to the 
Republic faded in 1673 passengers returned in large numbers. Because no further wars would be 
fought on Dutch soil until the Republic’s fall, the direct influence of war had only fleeting 
consequences for the subsequent popularity of trekvaart travel. On the other hand, economic 
trends reflecting both the rise of English commerce and the agricultural crisis of the late 1670s 
probably contributed to the first sharp fall in trekvaart passengers between 1674 and 1679. From 
1686/87 to 1691, the second steep decline likely reflected the indirect economic influence of the 
outbreak of the Nine Years’ War. Although the recovery of the late 1690s was significant, these 
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severe reversals punctuated a general slump in trekvaart passages that deepened into the 
eighteenth century and mirrored the overall stagnation of the Dutch economy.
72
  
The history of traffic through the trekvaart network was shaped by warfare, economic 
trends, and personal agency, but these variables were inextricable from the influence of 
meteorological conditions and climatic trends. For example, floods in the relatively cool year of 
1675 were, in fact, stimulated by storm surges that accompanied two severe gales in November 
and December and inundated huge swaths of land across the coastal Low Countries from 
Antwerp to Emden. Blowing from the north, the gales contributed to one of six catastrophic 
storm surge events in the history of the seventeenth-century Republic, all of which occurred 
during the minima of the Little Ice Age. The heartland of the Republic between Hoorn, Haarlem, 
Leiden, Utrecht, and Amsterdam was almost entirely flooded, causing spectacularly expensive 
damage to the Republic’s defences against the sea. Because urgent repairs were needed, the 
States-General approved onerous land taxes that contributed to subsequent agricultural crisis and, 
in turn, the reduction in trekvaart passengers. The financial toll of the great floods of 1675, 
which followed costly artificial inundations during the desperate defense of Holland three years 
earlier, was compounded by calamitous river flooding only two years later. In the Republic, the 
great majority of river floods during the Maunder Minimum followed severe winters, when 
floating ice was prone to accumulate in ice dams.
73
  
Relationships between flood events, damage to infrastructure, economic performance, 
and lower trekvaart traffic were not confined to the 1670s. In 1652, a depression in annual 
trekvaart passengers followed concurrent storm and river flood events in the previous year, while 
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a subsequent trough in 1655 coincided with similarly widespread storm and river inundations. 
Following the onset of the Maunder Minimum, particularly severe storm flooding in 1664 
preceded a lengthy decline in trekvaart passengers that overlapped with the Second Anglo-Dutch 
War. Inundations stimulated by gales in 1682 and 1683 similarly preceded a decline in trekvaart 
traffic in 1684. Troughs in trekvaart passengers routinely, if not invariably, followed major storm 
flooding by one year, perhaps because the costs of natural disasters took time to reach many of 
the trekvaart’s regular travellers. On the other hand, the relationship between trekvaart popularity 
and river inundations was not as reliable. Indeed storm surges inundated land across the wealthy 
coastal provinces and typically damaged defences against the sea, while many river floods 
stimulated less costly destruction in the Republic’s hinterland.74  
On the other hand, a year of higher than normal trekvaart popularity coincided with a 
significant river flood event in 1661, and in both 1671 and 1682 highs in trekvaart usage 
accompanied major storm surges. Clearly relationships between fluctuations in trekvaart 
passengers and storm and river flooding were mediated by political or socio-economic 
influences, and accordingly were hardly straightforward. Still, the damaging storm of 1671 also 
afflicted the coast only in November, when most of the year’s passengers had already passed 
through the trekvaart. The consequences of most storm flood events also followed inundation by 
at least a year, and it is therefore unsurprising that the gale of 1682 did not reduce trekvaart 
traffic through the entire Republic in the same year. Neither correspondence, diary entries, nor 
newspaper articles mention a direct connection between flooding and disruptions in the trekvaart 
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service, although the same sources contain regular reports of inundation interrupting other modes 
of travel through the Republic.
75
  
The combination of river flooding and high trekvaart traffic in 1661 is hardly surprising, 
because the trekvaart was simultaneously influenced by a meteorological condition that was even 
more significant than inundation for waterborne travel through the Republic. Financial accounts 
reveal that ice perpetuated by winter freezing closed the trekvaart canals for an average of 28 
days in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The winters of 1660/61 and 1661/62 just 
preceded the regional onset of the Maunder Minimum, and they were milder than the twentieth-
century average. Consequently, ice cover never rendered unnavigable the canals of the trekvaart, 
and the service continued year-round, substantially increasing annual passenger volume. On the 
other hand, the winter of 1662/63 was among the most severe of the colder climatic regime, and 
travel through the trekvaart network was halted for more than 80 days. In letters to his brother, 
Van der Goes described the short-lived joy that followed the resumption of the service in the first 
week of February. However, freezing resumed after only three days of thawing, and the trekvaart 
was again suspended.
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Fig. 3.10. Trekvaart peak years (red) and trough years (blue) compared to winter intensity. Winters in trough years 
were, on average, 10% more severe than the average twentieth-century value (5), while winters in peak years were, 
on average, 10% less severe. For winters, a nine equates to an average temperature in December, January, and 
December of -2.4 degrees Celsius, while a one denotes an average winter temperature of 6.2 degrees Celsius. For 
summers in the same graph, a nine reflects average temperatures in June, July, and August of 18.3 degrees Celsius, 
and a one records average temperatures of 14 degrees Celsius. Van Engelen, Buisman and Ijnsen, “A Millennium of 
Weather, Winds and Water in the Low Countries,” 112. 
 
Jan de Vries has demonstrated that suspensions of 70 or more days during especially 
frigid, long-lasting winters reduced annual passenger volume by an average of nearly 7%, 
relative to typical winters during the Little Ice Age. After 1663, such freezing recurred five times 
before the end of the century. Lows in trekvaart traffic usually coincided with winters that were 
over 10% more severe than the twentieth-century average, while highs occurred in winters that 
were nearly 10% less severe (Figure 3.10). Still, changes in the volume of trekvaart and indeed 
beurtvaart traffic may actually have been less significant than even more drastic shifts in the 
availability of both the trekvaart and beurtvaart in cool winters. In this sense, the consequences 
of increased ice cover for travel through the Republic’s internal transportation networks were not 
dissimilar to those that followed from the simultaneous cessation of Baltic commerce. 
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Ultimately, the reduction in collected tolls and disruption in political assembly that accompanied 
the interruption of travel through the beurtvaart also resulted from the cessation of the trekvaart, 
as indeed both services were part of the same waterborne network.
77
  
 
Climatic Fluctuations and Travel through the Republic by Boat, Road, and Ice  
 
 Many within the Republic did not use the trekvaart or beurtvaart, and instead moved 
through the coastal provinces in their own small vessels. Owned by farmers, the boats that plied 
informal routes woven through the standardized connections of the beurtvaart were propelled by 
sail or, in less favourable winds, by oar. While their crews preferred to harness the wind, the 
possibility of rowing gave them greater resilience to meteorological changes than beurt ships. 
Boats carrying agricultural goods were also more flexible than the barges of the trekvaart, 
capable of navigating with equal proficiency both the rough seas off the Zuider Zee and the 
narrow spaces of Amsterdam’s labyrinthine canals. The long, shallow rudder of a typical schuit 
allowed it to sail through very shallow water, while a leeboard
78
 could be deployed amidships to 
mitigate the lateral force of a wind. Weighed down by agricultural goods, ballast, or in rare 
occasions even passengers, most farmer-owned boats were stable in rough seas.
79
  
 However, records of voyages taken by melkschuiten or “milk boats” from agricultural 
Waterland to heavily urbanized Amsterdam reveal the peril posed by storms during the minima 
of the Little Ice Age. Waterland bordered the northern shore of the IJ, which in the seventeenth 
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and eighteenth centuries was still a wide bay off the Zuider Zee, its salty water subject to tides as 
it snaked above Amsterdam and Haarlem. Consequently, to reach Amsterdam milk boats from 
Waterland were required to cross a waterway that had all the characteristics of an inland sea. 
Amsterdam’s need for perishable dairy products was insatiable, and milk boats departed for the 
city even in less than ideal weather. Once in the IJ, however, there could be little recourse when 
a storm churned across waters already notorious for their roughness. In February 1661, for 
example, a boat carrying an unusually high number of passengers foundered in a severe storm, 
drowning twenty people. On 9 November 1697 a boat transporting milk to Amsterdam capsized 
in a storm as it struggled cross the IJ, and two years later another vessel succumbed in similar 
circumstances.
80
  
Additional milk boats sunk in 1763, 1764, and 1788, as colder, stormier weather grew 
more common in the Republic with the coming of the Dalton Minimum. In fact, wrecks were 
exclusively recorded during the minima of the Little Ice Age. Nevertheless, of the thousands of 
voyages conducted by farmers, very few appear to have ended in catastrophe. Of course, the low 
documentation of wrecked milk boats does not necessarily reflect a paucity of lost vessels and 
crews. Because individual milk boats and other schuiten were generally owned and operated by a 
small number of farmers, their loss only entered surviving elite correspondence and newspaper 
accounts in extreme circumstances: for example, when far too many passengers were on board. 
Nevertheless, more common than wrecks were likely delays in the departure of milk boats, such 
as those Caescoper observed during a particularly ferocious storm in January 1693. Because 
voyages from Waterland to Amsterdam lasted no more than three hours, they could be readily 
postponed if conditions were too severe. Still, lengthy delays during the long gales that grew 
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more common in Little Ice Age minima likely spoiled dairy products, although sufficiently 
detailed records kept by farmers have not survived.
81
 
 In frigid winters during the minima of the Little Ice Age, farmers who operated milk 
boats and other schuiten were affected by the same severe freezing that halted travel through the 
beurtvaart and trekvaart networks (Figure 3.11). For example, during the cold winter of 1586/87 
Commander Van Vervou reported that extensive ice cover on the Eem River had prohibited 
boats from supplying pure water to brewers during a time of plague, when local water was 
contaminated. Correspondence and diary entries described how sustained freezing in the frigid 
winter of 1620/21 and 1621/22 prohibited travel by boat as the Republic’s waterways solidified. 
The onset of the Maunder Minimum in 1660 was accompanied by the cool winter of 1659/60, 
during which letters sent by Adriaen van der Goes recorded the lengthy interruption of voyages 
by boat.
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Fig. 3.11. A rural winter scene painted during the Grindelwald Fluctuation. Small boats are frozen amid the ice. A 
larger schuit is visible in the background. Hendrick Avercamp, “Winter Scene on a Canal,” painting, c. 1605, Toledo 
Museum of Art, http://goo.gl/HndX5w.  
 
During the even cooler winter of 1662/63, Van der Goes observed that schuiten had only 
sailed for a few days in early February. Already on 19 November during the frigid winter of 
1671, Van der Goes marvelled that “the boats lie still before Leiden, Utrecht and Amsterdam.” 
Caescoper suggested that travel by boat was impossible for more than three months during the 
landmark winters of 1683/84 and 1694/95. According to Caescoper, on 10 March 1695 major 
waterways could be traversed by boat, although ice remained in creeks, and in fact freezing 
continued to affect voyages by boat into August! Boats were forced from the water for several 
weeks even in relatively moderate winters, like those of 1661/62, 1670/71, 1685/86, and 
1698/99, although the cessation of travel by boat was broken by sustained thawing and generally 
did not endure long past February.
83
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 Nevertheless, the dairy supply of Amsterdam and other Dutch cities was too important to 
be entirely disrupted by ice, and indeed the small scale of individual boats and crews enabled 
alternatives to waterborne transportation. Although few records kept by farmers survive from the 
seventeenth century, later testaments suggest that most farmers in Waterland owned at least one 
sled. Farmers sailed as long as possible, and some illustrations suggest that milk boats were 
dragged across icy harbours if open water persisted in the IJ. When the ice had expanded too far, 
however, farmers loaded their goods into sleds and continued their trade. Because the kinetic 
friction of ice is higher than that of water, and early modern movement across a solid surface 
usually demanded human or animal muscle, travel by farmers in cold winters was less efficient 
and more arduous than it was in warmer winters. Nevertheless, with minimal capital and access 
to only the most rudimentary of early modern transportation technologies, farmers persisted in 
their commerce during periods of extensive ice cover, while the Republic’s other waterborne 
networks ceased to function.
84
  
 Amsterdam’s inhabitants also depended on regular shipments of fresh water. By 1550, 
changes in the balance between land and the North Sea had rendered the water in Amsterdam’s 
canals too salty for consumption. Entrepreneurs established a service that transported freshwater 
to Amsterdam by boat from nearby lakes and rivers. It expanded in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and by 1781 more than 43 brewer ships and 114 private water-company 
ships delivered freshwater to Amsterdam’s citizens. Like the supply of dairy products, this 
service was also disrupted by winter freezing, yet the city’s brewers could collectively access 
greater capital than Holland’s farmers. In 1651, the brewers founded a company to deploy an 
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icebreaker in Amsterdam’s harbour. The icebreaker could not open the harbour for shipping, but 
it could preserve a watery corridor to the river Weesp. It was usually pulled by eight horses, but 
in cold winters it required 12, and in severe winters, such as those between 1687 and 1690, it 
could not be operated at all. In those winters the water route from Amsterdam to the Weesp was 
opened by hand. The price of fresh water in Amsterdam therefore fluctuated according to winter 
severity, yet its supply was maintained. In the cities of the Republic, brewers and farmers alike 
adapted to the severe winters of Little Ice Age minima, because some forms of mobility could 
not be abandoned.
85
 
The kind of weather that grew more frequent during the minima of the Little Ice Age not 
only altered how existing transportation networks were used, but also contributed to new modes 
of travel that facilitated new cultures and social spaces. Quintessentially Dutch winter scenes, 
most famously painted during the Grindelwald Fluctuation by Pieter Bruegel the Elder, reflect 
the popularity of skates and sleds when temperatures lingered below zero (Figure 3.12). 
However, they cannot do full justice to the scale of the icy thoroughfares that could emerge when 
freezing lingered for as many as three months. For example, in the frigid winter of 1620/21, 
chronicles and diaries described an ice fair near Harlingen that was visited by 1,300 sleds on just 
one day, some of which had been pulled across the full breadth of the Zuider Zee. Shortly 
thereafter, new patents for wind-driven wagons and even wind-driven sleds were submitted for 
the approval of the States-General (Chapter 7).
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Fig. 3.12. Ice skating and winter activities in the Republic during the first year of the Grindelwald Fluctuation. 
Pieter Bruegel the Elder, “Winter Landscape with a Bird Trap,” painting, 1565, Musées Royaux des Beaux-Arts, 
http://www.wga.hu/frames-e.html?/html/b/bruegel/pieter_e/01/13winter.html.  
 
Diary entries kept by Caescoper during the Maunder Minimum demonstrate that skating 
was common both out of necessity and for leisure as soon as freezing conditions endured for 
more than a few nights, and indeed when the ice thickened sufficiently skaters were joined by 
travellers on horseback or in carriages. Extensive exploitation of ice for transportation could 
occur in moderate winters, but it endured much longer in frigid winters that were more common 
during the minima of the Little Ice Age. Still, not all ice was alike. On 7 March during the cold 
winter of 1683/84, Caescoper described how ice on regional waterways remained very strong, 
before reflecting that “we have had no ice that can be crossed by skates.” Curiously, a week 
earlier Caescoper had reported people skating beside the Zaan, yet skating was evidently more 
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difficult and, perhaps, less widespread than it might have been given the duration of sub-zero 
conditions.
87
  
Indeed, although freezing stimulates smooth ice in calm water, higher winds and, in turn, 
waves during sufficiently cold temperatures distort the resulting ice into uneven surfaces. 
Caescoper also described several storms in diary entries kept during the winter of 1683/84, and it 
is possible that the stormier conditions of the Maunder Minimum contributed to rougher ice 
cover in the Republic. Consequently skating may have been hampered by the nature of freezing 
during Little Ice Age minima even as lengthier ice cover encouraged the greater exploitation of 
ice for transportation. On the other hand, ice can also become uneven when snow that has melted 
on the ice is refrozen. These conditions require warmer temperatures, and so might have grown 
less common in the minima of the Little Ice Age, which therefore could have actually facilitated 
skating.  In any case, carriages, horses, and sleds were scarcely affected by changes in the kinetic 
friction presented by different forms of ice, except presumably in the Zuider Zee. There, thick 
shards of sea ice could converge in thawing and then refreeze in new formations as temperatures 
returned below zero. However, such impediments for movement across ice during the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation or Maunder Minimum were not recorded in surviving correspondence, 
diary entries, and newspaper accounts.
88
 
Obstructions to travel by ice were, of course, not the only concern for those who 
attempted to use the Republic’s icy thoroughfares. It could be difficult to judge the thickness of 
ice, particularly at the beginning and end of winters, or when conditions had alternated between 
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freezing and thawing. For example, in March 1670 Adriaen van der Goes wrote that a horse, a 
coach driver and four women perished when they plunged through the ice at the Schie near 
Rotterdam. The chronicle kept by the Franciscan St. Elizabeth’s covenant near the eastern border 
of the Republic at Huissen described how many monks fell through the ice on 10 March 1709, 
“so that it was a wonder that they did not break their legs.” For travellers in the Republic, 
sustained temperatures, whether cool or warm, were likely easier to adapt to and consequently 
less dangerous than variability, so long as prolonged temperatures did not reach the 
meteorological extremes of the coldest winters of the Little Ice Age.
89
 
It is telling that so many journeying through the coastal provinces of the Dutch Republic 
by foot, horse, and carriage opted to use frozen water rather than roads during the winters of the 
Little Ice Age. Many of the Republic’s roads were as vulnerable to shifts in temperature as the 
waterways that intersected them, as freezing rendered many rutted paths impassable, either 
through slipperiness or because mud and sand froze in uneven formations (Figure 3.13). Across 
Europe ice cover on city streets imperiled those who ventured outside, and many of those 
severely injured could expect chronic pain, or even lifelong hampered mobility. For example, on 
19 January during the cold winter of 1664/65, Samuel Pepys in London recollected that he “saw 
a woman that broke her thigh, in her heels slipping up upon the frosty streete.” Indeed diaries 
written on both shores of the North Sea in the winter of 1694/95 reveal that extreme cold could 
simply discourage travel altogether. In fact, on 23 January John Evelyn in London wrote that “so 
very fierce was the frost, as kept us still from church.” Lyrics of popular songs performed during 
the frigid winter of 1708/09, although perhaps apocryphal, nevertheless described a postman 
frozen on his horse, and a family frozen on the street. Corpses belonging to unfortunate families 
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were, in fact, discovered on roads and even in houses when the weather shifted from 
unseasonable warmth to nearly unprecedented cold on 5 January. Song lyrics consequently 
reflected exaggerated popular responses to the very real consequences of one of the last great 
winters during the Maunder Minimum.
90
  
 
 
Fig. 3.13. Two winter scenes, painted by father (inset) and son at the beginning and just after the end of the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation, depict travel by land through a wintry Republic. The wagons in the painting by Pieter 
Brueghel the Elder (inset) are still covered by snow, suggesting that they have not been used following a snowfall. 
While possibly an example of artistic license, perhaps Brueghel the Elder suggested that the wagons could not 
traverse their snow-covered roads.  Pieter Brueghel the Younger, “Winter Scene with Ice Skaters and Birds,” 
painting, 1638, http://goo.gl/8rbqLX. Inset: Pieter Brueghel the Elder, “The Census at Bethlehem,” painting, 1566, 
Musées royaux des Beaux-Arts de Belgique, http://www.wikipaintings.org/en/pieter-bruegel-the-elder/census-at-
bethlehem-1566.  
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Moreover, in the minima of the Little Ice Age the development of new infrastructure was 
evidently as vulnerable to prolonged wintry weather as the use of existing roads and city streets. 
A letter sent by Adriaen van der Goes on 23 February 1663 reported that icy conditions had 
inhibited the construction of new paths for post wagons, which functioned as a sort of miniature 
land-based trekvaart connecting major towns. The maintenance of roads that had already been 
built was also hindered by freezing, particularly during the severe winters of Little Ice Age 
minima. For instance, in the frigid winter of 1666/67, an ordinance drafted by Amsterdam city 
officials reveals that maintenance of the Overtoomseweg (“Overtoom road”) was forcibly 
postponed by wintry weather. Because the labour of road maintenance may have taken longer 
during the minima of the Little Ice Age, its cost likely increased as well.
91
 
Roads and the travellers who used them were also vulnerable to precipitation, particularly 
when rainfall or snowfall was expressed in the storms that grew more common during the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation and Maunder Minimum. On 29 February 1684, Caescoper reported that 
a torrential downpour during an otherwise frigid winter had left the road he was walking on wet 
and very dangerous. If the temporarily mild temperatures were hardly typical of a severe winter 
during the Maunder Minimum, the ferocious gale and its accompanying precipitation certainly 
were. On 5 August 1695, Christiaan Huygens described how a bout of rain had left one road so 
slippery that he had fallen on his way to lunch, albeit without serious injury. Flooding stimulated 
by storms, ice dams, and precipitation was a substantially more serious danger for those 
travelling on the Republic’s roads. On 8 December 1665, Van der Goes wrote that flooding 
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stimulated by a catastrophic storm prohibited all travel through roads between Haarlem and The 
Hague.
92
  
Snowfall during severe winters could be an equally severe impediment to travel along the 
Republic’s roads. In a blizzard during the winter of 1662/63, many post wagons were repeatedly 
delayed between Rotterdam and The Hague, and others vanished altogether. Although surviving 
correspondence does not record casualties, many letters never reached their destinations, 
hampering the flow of information through the Republic.  For months during the bitterly cold 
winter of 1708/09, heavy snowfall accompanied bitterly cold conditions, impeding travel both on 
roads and in waterways. In the northern Netherlands, travel on land was likely hindered by 
conditions that were, on average, wetter during Little Ice Age minima, which slowed the trickle 
of people and correspondence along the roads of the Republic, and compounded the influence of 
delays in waterborne transportation.
93
 
Nevertheless, despite the limitations of roads in the context of early modern climatic 
fluctuation, shifts in both average annual precipitation and average winter freezing altered the 
usually lopsided balance between waterborne and land-based travel through the coastal Republic. 
Indeed, once water froze during the winter some travellers did take to the roads, as long as 
freezing was moderate and not accompanied by heavy snow. When Delfzijl’s harbour was frozen 
shut in March 1587, for example, it proved possible to load fifty wagons with goods that would 
otherwise have travelled by ship. More significant, however, were shifts in annual precipitation 
and, in turn, water levels. Prolonged drought in December 1669 encouraged many to walk or ride 
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across riverbeds, while similarly dry conditions in the spring of 1672 allowed invading French 
and German armies to easily ford the rivers that normally screened the Republic’s southeastern 
borders. In the summer of 1707 Caescoper described lower water levels than anyone could 
remember, which evidently prompted many to ride their mules through former creeks and 
ditches. These years of lower than average water levels coincided with relatively mild winters, 
and because the minima of the Little Ice Age were accompanied by higher than average 
precipitation it may be that travel on land was more common during early modern climatic 
maxima than it was during colder decades. Of course, in parts of the Republic’s eastern 
periphery during both warm and cold climatic regimes, there was little option for travellers but to 
either use the region’s meandering latticework of roads or, in unfavourable weather, postpone 
their journeys.
94
   
Ultimately, in the Dutch trading empire the greatest resilience to the weather that 
accompanied the climatic fluctuations of the Little Ice Age might have been expressed in small-
scale travel by water, ice, and road. The farmers who operated milk boats were rarely threatened 
by storms, and employed sleds to supply the Republic’s cities when water froze in cold winters. 
Brewers invested in ice breakers and even manual labour to maintain the waterways essential to 
Amsterdam’s supply of fresh water. Many travellers took to the ice using skates, especially 
during very cold or lengthy winters. Skating and sledding could be perilous, but still provided a 
means for speedy movement between population centres. Weather that accompanied Little Ice 
Age minima could hamper both the maintenance and use of the Republic's unhardened roads, yet 
travel by land continued and even increased during very cold or very dry conditions. The flow of 
people, goods, and information through the Republic never ceased entirely.  
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Conclusions: Travel through the Dutch Republic during the Little Ice Age 
 
 Beyond the vicinity of major urban centres, travel across most of early modern Europe 
was possible only by using sparse, dangerous, often dilapidated roads. However, movement was 
central to the mercantile economies of the Dutch maritime provinces. The Republic’s watery 
environment, already a product of centuries-long co-evolution with human activity, was 
accordingly manipulated to yield a complex network woven from diverse, flexible, and often 
overlapping lines of transportation. The result was a system that, while skewed heavily toward 
waterborne traffic, nevertheless accommodated many modes of movement that responded 
differently to weather rendered more or less common during the climatic fluctuations of the 
Little Ice Age.  
 The diversity and flexibility of the Republic’s transportation network was particularly 
apparent in the way it responded to shifts in prevailing wind direction and velocity. During the 
minima of the Little Ice Age, most beurtvaart connections could not operate in more common 
high winds, and parts of the beurtvaart benefitted while others suffered from more frequent 
easterlies. On the other hand, travel through the trekvaart continued unabated irrespective of 
shifts in wind direction and, within limits, wind velocity. Indeed the correlation between the 
development and first implementation of the trekvaart and the final years of the Grindelwald 
Fluctuation might not have been coincidental. Changes in wind velocity and direction forced 
farmers in boats to employ oars, a tedious task that slowed the movement of agricultural goods to 
urban centres and between rural communities. Travel along roads, on the other hand, was 
scarcely affected.  
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Still, generalizations about relationships between climate, weather, and movement are 
particularly problematic when they concern unhardened roads in distinct environments, 
fashioned from different materials and subject to maintenance of varying consistency. Indeed, 
the diversity of different roads contributed to the seemingly bizarre practice in the Republic of 
constructing and preserving multiple roads that meandered to the same destination. Most roads 
were, however, compromised by excessive rain or snow, not only for travellers but also for 
labourers assigned to maintenance. Naturally, waterborne travel typically continued unabated 
during rain, and ceased with snowfall only if substantial ice had accumulated in waterways. It 
may be that precipitation undermined the paths bordering canals and travelled by the horses of 
the trekvaart, but relevant correspondence, diary entries, and newspaper accounts do not mention 
a correlation.    
 Diversity in the face of weather and climate also had its limits. Most forms of travel 
across water were halted during prolonged freezing, although even the consequences of freezing 
were subject to variation. Sub-zero temperatures generally endured longer in the northern 
Republic, and unlike travel through the beurtvaart and trekvaart, the transport of commodities in 
boats apparently continued when ice had already formed in harbours, so long as it did not extend 
too far from the coast. Ice cover could slow or even discourage travel across roads, but freezing 
did not affect travel by land as severely as it influenced movement by water. Overall, large-scale 
transportation in the northern Netherlands was generally impeded by freezing, because the 
volume of goods or people that regularly passed through the watery arteries of the Dutch 
Republic could not be fully displaced onto wagons, or even skates. Meanwhile, extreme cold 
discouraged all kinds of travel, and such conditions were far more common during the minima of 
the Little Ice Age. Moreover, storms rendered more likely in the same minima impeded the use 
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of conduits both on land and across water. Indeed, gales accompanied by heavy precipitation or 
flooding could prevent all movement through a particular region, overwhelming even the 
Republic’s uniquely resilient transportation network.   
 Nevertheless, the history of relationships between transportation within the Republic’s 
borders and meteorological conditions typical of Little Ice Age minima is not a declensionist 
narrative. Even in severe winters, Dutch labourers worked to maintain watery corridors through 
the ice near Amsterdam. Moreover, moderate freezing actually stimulated new forms of small-
scale transportation across the ice that preserved some movement of goods, people, and 
information through the Dutch provinces. In fact, winters that were only slightly cooler than the 
twentieth-century average, and were accordingly accompanied by prolonged but tolerable 
freezing, were significantly more common than the landmark winters of, for example, 1627/28, 
1683/84, or 1708/09. Unfortunately, records of severe weather abound in surviving sources, 
while relatively moderate shifts in meteorological conditions often went unreported in sources 
other than ship logbooks or weather diaries. In spite of that reality, paintings, diaries, and 
correspondence reflect the remarkable popularity of skating and ice fairs in the Republic during 
the Grindelwald Fluctuation and Maunder Minimum.  
The popularity of skating in cold winters was but one expression of the impressive 
physical and intellectual energy with which Dutch citizens of different social strata confronted 
weather more frequent during the minima of the Little Ice Age. The infrastructure of the 
trekvaart was constructed to free waterborne transportation from its dependence on shifts in wind 
direction and, to some extent, velocity. Less structured networks established by farmers 
functioned organically and efficiently irrespective of wind or even ice cover. As cold winters 
grew more common and more severe, Dutch inventors developed patents that, while impractical, 
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nevertheless reflected a confident attitude affirming that environmental problems could be 
circumvented by human ingenuity. While the environmental crises that contributed to the 
Republic’s decline would later expose the limitations of that notion (Introduction), it 
nevertheless typified the resilience of a dynamic society and a relatively modern economy during 
the minima of the Little Ice Age.   
Ultimately, relationships between climatic oscillations, short-term weather, and changes 
in travel through the Republic were as complex as the socioeconomic consequences of those 
changes. Changes in, for example, travel through the trekvaart network or along roads in the 
eastern provinces were influenced not only by weather that directly affected infrastructure, but 
also by meteorological events and trends that contributed to or detracted from regional 
economies. For instance, rye prices increased in the year following a particularly cold winter 
during the Little Ice Age. Curiously, travel through the trekvaart network rose in tandem, even 
though a significant portion of household income was spent on bread in the early modern 
Republic, and demand for cereals like rye was consequently inelastic in a way that demand for 
travel was not for most families.
95
  
Of course, the number of passengers through the trekvaart declined in years accompanied 
by lengthy winter freezing, and it is not surprising that trekvaart popularity should rise alongside 
rye prices in the Republic. Still, the case highlights the difficulty of establishing connections 
between broad socio-economic trends and climatic fluctuation in early modern Europe. 
Consequently it is prudent to conclude simply that transportation through the Republic was more 
resilient to some expressions of Little Ice Age minima than it likely was in the less tightly 
connected agricultural economies that dominated early modern Europe. Because transportation 
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was central to a Republic competing with these relatively agrarian entities for commerce and 
territory, that was not an insignificant advantage.
96
   
Ultimately, travel within the borders of the Republic, and in the European waters around 
it, was similarly hampered by lengthy and widespread freezing during the frigid winters of Little 
Ice Age minima. Moreover, storms could imperil voyages both for sailors plying the Baltic 
trades, and for travellers journeying between Dutch towns. Other weather patterns that 
accompanied Little Ice Age minima influenced travel near, and within, the northern Low 
Countries in different ways. For example, shifts in wind direction were more influential for 
mariners in the Baltic and the North Sea than they were for those moving through the Republic. 
On the other hand, major precipitation events were more significant for travellers on land than 
they were for those at sea. Overall, the meteorological expressions of Little Ice Age minima 
ambiguously influenced travel through the Republic’s economic heartland in the Low Countries 
and the Baltic. Many Dutch citizens responded to the weather that accompanied the Little Ice 
Age in ways that often mitigated the disadvantages, and exploited the advantages, of an 
environment in flux.  
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PART II: CONFLICT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Defending Wealth in the Little Ice Age: Case Studies of the Anglo-Dutch 
Wars, 1652-1674 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 254 
 In Europe, 190 years between 1500 and 1700 were engulfed by war. In that context, 
military power was inextricably linked to the survival and expansion of the Dutch commercial 
empire. While the Republic’s economic interests were global, the North Sea region and, to a 
lesser extent, the Baltic Sea remained the military focus of the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth 
century. The thousands of ships that serviced the Republic’s many trade routes, fished for 
herring, and hunted whales all passed through these waters on their journeys to and from the 
Dutch coastal cities. Moreover, invasion from the sea and from land was a continual threat for a 
small but prosperous state ringed by larger rivals. Ultimately, the prosperity of the Dutch 
economy in its Golden Age would have been impossible without a powerful military capable of 
both aggression and defence.
1
 In this sense the Republic was hardly unique within contemporary 
Europe, although the character of its defences on land, and its conduct of war at sea, were 
certainly unusual.
2
   
Despite the importance of warfare in early modern Europe, until recently military history 
as a sub-discipline appeared on course to join political history in its irrelevance to the cutting 
edge of historical research.
3
 Nevertheless, enduring public interest in warfare, and the wealth of 
documentation generated by centuries of armed conflict, gradually encouraged social and 
eventually cultural historians to reinvigorate military history by exploring, for example, the 
memory of military campaigns, or their complex expressions of contemporary class distinctions.
4
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Military historians, meanwhile, increasingly embrace gender, class, and other social or cultural 
concepts to write ground-breaking new studies of early modern military operations.
5
 In the last 
decade, environmental historians have begun to explore how military, scientific, industrial, and 
political interests in the modern era exploited and perceived foreign, domestic, or occupied 
ecologies in times of conflict. More recently still, environmental historians have started to 
unravel interactions between pre-industrial warfare and environment, as part of a growing 
understanding within environmental history that pre-industrial societies anticipated many of the 
ecological relationships previously thought peculiar to modernity.
6
 While studies considering 
pre-industrial warfare and environment remain rare, those that move beyond declensionist 
accounts of environmental destruction in times of war by devoting primary attention to the ways 
in which natural stimuli influenced armed conflict truly represent the vanguard of the new 
discipline.  
Surviving documents chronicling pre-industrial wars frequently reveal that among natural 
influences weather events stimulated by past climatic fluctuation loomed large in the perceptions 
of combatants.
7
 Historians can unravel connections between past climates, weather conditions 
and military operations by deploying climate reconstructions and interdisciplinary methodologies 
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developed by historical climatologists. However, although historical climatologists have moved 
well beyond their long-standing agrarian focus to consider a diverse spectrum of relationships 
between humans, weather, and climate, no comprehensive study has yet considered how climatic 
fluctuation influenced armed conflict. Until very recently two of the most dynamic avenues in 
environmental history have essentially failed to interact.
8
  
The following chapters bridge that gap by exploring relationships between climatic 
fluctuations, weather events, and the conduct of the three Anglo-Dutch Wars in the seventeenth 
century. Fought between 1652 and 1674, the wars coincided with a period of transition between 
climatic regimes. Slightly warmer conditions that generally prevailed after the conclusion of the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation in 1629 yielded in 1662 to the renewed cold of the Maunder Minimum. 
Newly considered Dutch and English ship logbooks, missives, weather journals, intelligence 
reports, and other sources demonstrate the halting but dramatic nature of this transition. They 
also suggest that oscillations in temperature were intimately connected to long-term shifts in 
wind direction over the North Sea and English Channel. Finally, they reveal that changes in 
prevalent weather conditions influenced the course of the Anglo-Dutch Wars in a way that was 
perceived and, to varying degrees, either consciously or unconsciously exploited by, the 
combatants.  
In the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-54), relationships between Anglo-Dutch culture, 
economy, technology, and environment, mediated through many layers of human agency, 
enabled the English to benefit from weather that accompanied a relative interruption in 
conditions typical of Little Ice Age minima. Persistent westerly winds probably born of a warmer 
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climate frequently helped crews aboard larger English warships set the terms of most naval 
engagements, increasing the tactical advantage provided by revolutionary “line of battle” 
tactics.
9
 By contrast, in the latter wars abundant storms and more frequent easterlies, likely 
stimulated by a cooling climate, granted critical advantages to Dutch fleets that had adopted 
elements of English tactics and technology. The second (1664-67) and third (1672-74) wars were 
also fought on land, where tactically relevant weather occasionally defied climatic trends and 
ultimately exerted an ambiguous influence on the defence of the Dutch Republic.  
Climatic shifts alter regional patterns of prevailing weather on a decadal scale, yet 
military operations, like the voyages of Arctic explorers, Dutch East Indiamen, or trekvaart 
passengers, usually play out over a far shorter period. These chapters therefore demand the same 
methodology that has previously been deployed in case studies that examined movement through 
the Dutch trading empire. They investigate three relationships: between long-term regional 
climatic shifts and local, short-term environmental change, between human activity and local, 
short-term environmental change, and ultimately between climate and human history. Weather 
experienced during battles, raids, and other historical events will be considered a manifestation 
of a prevailing climate if it recurred during months in which it was rare during a preceding or 
subsequent climatic regime. Particularly persistent weather over the course of a month will also 
be tied to the prevailing climate if such weather grew more common during that climatic regime, 
even if such weather occurred regularly in the same month during preceding or subsequent 
climates.   
Battles were staccato notes within the undulating melodies of the broader relationship 
between climate and early modern warfare. There were other notes, however, for in the 
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seventeenth century major engagements at sea and on land were fought against a simmering 
context of small-scale violence, often pursued by private parties. Minor naval raids, privateering 
and piracy, marine intelligence networks manned by crews in small boats, victualing fleets, and 
the actions of civilian crews aboard merchant vessels all shaped the course of the Anglo-Dutch 
Wars. However, major battles between state armies and fleets receive far more attention than 
minor skirmishes in surviving documentary evidence. Moreover, despite the lingering 
importance of small-scale violence at sea, the Anglo-Dutch Wars were largely decided by large 
fleets assembled to decisively defeat their counterparts. These chapters therefore concentrate on 
the ways in which climate change and associated environmental conditions influenced 
preparations for, and the conduct of, major battles from 1652 to 1674.
10
   
Dutch and English historians often disagree on even the most fundamental aspects of the 
largest battles fought during the Anglo-Dutch Wars. In particular, striking numerical 
discrepancies exist between Dutch and English historiographies. English historians rarely 
employ Dutch primary material that contradicts English accounts. Moreover, historians on both 
sides of the Channel have depended too much on statistics provided within propaganda that was 
written immediately after battles, which greatly exaggerated enemy losses. Reliable primary 
sources compiled by both Dutch and English sailors, and intended for internal use, provide the 
basis for most of the ship numbers introduced in these chapters. Where such documents are not 
available, a variety of English and Dutch primary and secondary sources can still provide 
relatively reliable statistics. However, they must be examined in concert, and screened for 
improbable fluctuations in ship numbers from battle to battle. 
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 Climatic fluctuation plausibly influenced the Anglo-Dutch Wars not just by shaping 
tactical conditions, but also by changing the resources available to England and the Dutch 
Republic. The tremendously expensive navies that fought the wars were primarily funded by 
credit, but it was the ability of the Commonwealth parliaments to tax at unprecedented levels that 
enabled the earlier expansion of the English fleet and allowed it to successfully challenge Dutch 
naval supremacy. The most important taxes imposed by Cromwell’s parliaments were the 
Customs, the Excise, and the Assessment, of which the Excise targeted items of common 
consumption – like food – while the Assessment taxed land. It is possible that warmer and more 
stable annual average temperatures during the relative pause in the nadir of the Little Ice Age 
increased English agricultural yields, ultimately strengthening the Commonwealth’s finances.11  
Moreover, domestic woodlands and hemp crops provided the timber, iron, and sails 
necessary for ship construction. Dendrochronological data suggests that warm temperatures and 
moderate precipitation sharply accelerated the growth of pine and oak trees across Northwestern 
Europe from 1640 into the 1650s. Oak trees commonly served as timber, and it is possible that 
two decades of relatively strong growth reduced the cost and, perhaps, increased the accessibility 
of timber for some English shipyards. High grain yields and healthy woodlands therefore may 
have contributed to the English success in the First Anglo-Dutch War. However, examining such 
broad relationships is beyond the scope of these chapters, because the most convincing and best-
documented connections between climate, weather, and the course of the Anglo-Dutch Wars 
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were visible at the tactical level. There, those engaged in battle directly described the 
environmental conditions they encountered.
12
 
The following three chapters begin with a comprehensive analysis of the environmental 
structures in which the Anglo-Dutch Wars were fought, which includes a detailed reconstruction 
of contemporary shifts in prevailing wind direction. The first chapter continues by introducing 
the cultural and socioeconomic frameworks that accounted for differences in Dutch and English 
military systems. The chapter then explores how major naval operations were affected by 
weather conditions that were, in turn, influenced by the climate of the slightly warmer and more 
tranquil interruption of the Little Ice Age in the middle of the seventeenth century. The next 
chapter begins by explaining how Dutch and English military systems changed from the end of 
the First Anglo-Dutch War to the commencement of the second. It then examines connections 
between the conduct of the war, which for the first time included fighting on land, and the cooler 
climate, and changed wind dynamics, that accompanied the Maunder Minimum. The third 
chapter describes the very different military context on the eve of the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 
which included a French and German invasion that almost overthrew the Republic. The chapter 
investigates how war on land and at sea was affected by weather that was largely, but not 
straightforwardly, shaped by the climate of the Maunder Minimum.    
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Chapter 4 
Warfare in a Warmer Climate: the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1652-54 
 
When the Peace of Westphalia ended the Eighty Years’ War in 1648, the prosperity of 
the Dutch Republic was widely resented in the courts of Europe, and many believed 
Amsterdam’s commanding position in international commerce was possible only at the expense 
of competing economic interests.
13
 Both the French and Spanish economies complemented that 
of the Republic, and accordingly the Spanish had generally permitted trade with their rebellious 
provinces. However, after 1659 the government of Louis XIV actively sought to end its reliance 
on the entrepôt to the north by imposing a series of protectionist tariffs. These policies 
increasingly damaged Dutch economic interests, and the encroachment of French influence in 
the Spanish Netherlands alarmed many Dutch politicians. Nevertheless, in the seventeenth 
century the French government by itself could neither halt the flow of Dutch trade overall nor 
aspire to replace the Republic’s unique place in the global economy.14  
However, England loomed over vulnerable shipping lanes and fishing grounds in the 
English Channel and North Sea. Moreover, London was Europe’s second-most developed urban 
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area, and ideally situated to usurp Amsterdam’s entrepôt function in world trade. The 
circumstances that encouraged English governments to leverage these advantages were complex. 
Much responsibility for the wars that resulted can be attributed to political or religious 
similarities (under Oliver Cromwell’s republic) or schisms (under the restored monarchy), 
domestic disputes between royalists and republicans and, of course, the personal agency of 
diplomats. Ultimately, the legislation most directly responsible for the First Anglo-Dutch War – 
the Navigation Act of October 1651 – was a protectionist measure born from mercantile pressure 
and aimed at eliminating Dutch entrepôt trade with English territories. Moreover, the act 
authorized English warships to take action against all vessels that did not acknowledge 
England’s “sovereignty of the seas” by lowering their flags. Because commerce, fishing, and 
whaling at sea were integral to Dutch culture and prosperity, this stipulation was intolerable to 
the States-General.
15
  
 Most members of the States-General, indeed most observers in contemporary Europe, 
considered the Republic to be the world’s preeminent naval power. However, the English 
admiralty had developed a revolutionary naval system that bestowed important advantages in the 
subsequent war. These advantages were exacerbated by weather patterns that were more 
common during the slightly warmer interval between the Grindelwald Fluctuation and the 
Maunder Minimum. Westerly winds allowed English fleets to easily leave port, and granted 
them the initiative they required to deploy their nascent line of battle tactics. They may also have 
helped English privateers claim far more prizes than their Dutch counterparts, which contributed 
                                                 
15
 Jack S. Levy, “The Rise and Decline of Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-1689.” In Great Power Rivalries, ed. William 
R. Thomspon. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 199), 173. Jack S. Levy and Salvatore Ali, “From 
Commercial Competition to Strategic Rivalry to War: The Evolution of the Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-52.” In The 
Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries, ed. Paul Francis Diehl. (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 31. 
De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 376. Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth 
Century, 111. Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires, 35. Glete, Warfare at Sea, 15. 
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to the unequal outcome of the war. Other weather conditions also affected the course of the war, 
but they cannot yet be linked to the climate of the mid-seventeenth century.   
 
Overview of Environmental Structures  
 
The Anglo-Dutch Wars have stimulated English and especially Dutch historiographies 
that generally ignore environmental relationships while constructing detailed political, economic, 
and military narratives.
16
 Environmental histories of war have hardly ventured past the shore, 
and the Anglo-Dutch Wars, so closely identified with the North Sea, have entirely escaped the 
attention of environmental historians. Beyond the rising volume and sophistication of early 
modern documents related to fishing or whaling relatively few written sources survive to enable 
the reconstruction of human interactions with the myriad environments of the sea, as, for 
example, legal documents can aid scholarly analysis of woodland exploitation. The sea also 
appears unbounded; vast and, in the pre-industrial era, superficially bereft of the shifting patterns 
of environmental resilience and vulnerability described within some of the historiography 
connecting environment and warfare. Pre-industrial warfare did not destroy marine ecologies, for 
instance, whether directly, through the actions of military forces, nor indirectly, through the 
overexploitation of a resource base. 
Nevertheless, the Anglo-Dutch Wars were influenced by the context of the geography 
and marine environment of the North Sea between the Strait of Dover and the Dogger Bank, 
                                                 
16
 Among scholars who have contributed to a recent surge in the English historiography of the wars only J.R. Jones 
explores environmental contexts, although his The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century is certainly not an 
environmental history. The Dutch admirals that led the Dutch war effort – particularly Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp 
and Michiel Adriaanszoon de Ruyter – were folk heroes in their own time, known as zeehelden (sea heroes) and 
immortalized as symbols of the Dutch golden age. Not surprisingly, this has lent a hagiographical character to much 
of the extensive Dutch historiography.  
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where the bulk of its naval engagements were fought. Regional currents push north through the 
English Channel and past the Low Countries, but additional currents drive south from the 
subarctic into the North Sea, interacting with tides to influence ship journeys. During the Anglo-
Dutch Wars, extensive shoals surrounding the English and particularly the Dutch coast 
constricted the movement of ships and affected tactical or strategic decision-making during the 
wars. The colour, texture, and composition of the seabed, regularly analysed, also provided clues 
for navigation when the shore was out of sight.
17
 Marine animals like mackerel or haddock could 
benefit military operations, supplementing much-needed victuals when successfully harvested. 
Barnacles, on the other hand, could dramatically slow warships that relied on speed; their 
inevitable accumulation on hulls necessitated regular and expensive cleaning.  
More importantly, the extreme proximity of Dutch and English ports, fortifications and 
fleets in this region (Map 4.1) mitigated some of the organizational inefficiencies of the opposing 
admiralties. Because weather systems could span the entire theatre of war, these geographical 
constraints also enhanced the influence of meteorological conditions at sea.
18
 In the age of sail, 
wind direction and velocity not only provided a vessel’s power supply but also constrained its 
ability to move according to the wishes of its crew. By the seventeenth century, ships had 
acquired the ability to tack against the wind, but this was difficult, time-consuming work and 
altogether impossible in intense winds. Storms were a constant menace, capable of throwing 
ships hundreds of miles off course, inflicting severe damage and either sinking ships at sea or 
                                                 
17
 John Narbrough, “Journal of John Narbrough, Captain of the Fairfax. September 18, 1672, to July 1, 1673. 
Pepysian MS. 2556” in Journals and Narratives of the Third Dutch War, ed. R. C. Anderson. (London: Publications 
of the Navy Records Society, 1945-1947), 213.  
18
 A week of contrary winds could thwart a naval raid in such narrow seas, for example, but would generally have a 
reduced influence on the journey time of a fleet bound for North America. Narbrough, “Journal of John Narbrough, 
Captain of the Fairfax. September 18, 1672, to July 1, 1673,” 213. Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth 
Century, 17.  
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shattering them on the coast. Heavy rain could drown supplies of food or ammunition, while fog 
impeded navigation and increased the risk of collision. 
 
 
Map 4.1. Locations of major engagements during the three Anglo-Dutch Wars. Locations of rival cities London and 
Amsterdam are also provided. Inset: seventeenth-century map of the North Sea and English Channel. Pierre 
D’Abbeville Du Val, Carte des Isles Britanniques, map, 1677. Accessed 10 April 2014, http://goo.gl/I8zlX1. Gerben 
Graddesz. Hellinga, Zeehelden van de Gouden Eeuw. (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2008), 20. True colour NASA 
satellite image, acquired 18 December, 2010. 
 
 
Although the first two Anglo-Dutch Wars were largely determined at sea, the third war 
was fought in a shifting, amphibious landscape that responded to the different ways the Dutch, 
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and their enemies, waged war.
19
 The intricate defences against the sea that emerged from 
centuries of environmental and cultural co-evolution in the Low Countries were manipulated 
during the French and German invasion of the Third Anglo-Dutch War. Dutch defenders 
engaged the Oude Hollandse Waterlinie (“Old Hollandic Waterline”), a winding expanse of 
inundated farmland that effectively rendered the province of Holland an island.
20
 The decisive 
months of the war were shaped by French, German, and English attempts to reach this new 
island. The Dutch struggled to balance the necessities of defending against naval invasion from 
the North Sea, and securing vulnerable fortresses along the waterline. Equally critical was the 
need to maintaining the required depth, and liquid state, of their protective waters.  
On land and at sea, the prevailing weather of the North Sea region was therefore among 
the most important environmental structures in which the Anglo-Dutch Wars were fought, and it 
was in flux. Average winter temperatures, which had not been far removed from the twentieth-
century norm in the first war, were sharply cooler in the second and third wars (Figure 4.1). 
Average summer temperatures declined less steadily, and were actually higher in the second war 
than they had been in the first. However, by the third war average summer temperatures were far 
colder than they had been in the earlier wars. Meanwhile, average temperatures in autumn and 
particularly spring declined between the first and third wars. Precipitation rose while the rate of 
                                                 
19
 The concept of the “amphibious landscape,” and “amphibious culture” of the Republic has been developed by 
environmental historian Petra van Dam. While Van Dam’s meaning is specific, here the concept is used more 
generally. The landscape of the Netherlands was penetrated and encircled by water: for many in the Dutch Republic, 
water and land were equally surfaces on which to work, play, and fight. Never was this more apparent than in 1672 
and 1673. Petra van Dam, “De amfibische cultuur.” For more on the amphibious landscape and culture of the 
Republic, see: G. P. van de Ven, Man-made lowlands: History of water management and land reclamation in the 
Netherlands. Utrecht: Uitgeverij Matrijs, 1993. 
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Eighty Years War, of which the relief of the siege of Leiden in 1574 was the most renowned. J.P.C.M. van Hoof, 
“Met een vijand als bondgenoot. De rol van het water bij de verdediging van het Nederlandse grondgebied tegen een 
aanval over land.” BMGN 103 (1985): 624. P.G. Vonk, De Victorieuze Zeeslag op Schoneveld: het hol van de 
Ruyter, 65. For more on the Waterlinie, see: Wim Klinkert, “Water in oorlog. De rol van het water in de militaire 
geschiedenis van Holland na 1550,” in Hollanders en het water. Twintig eeuwen strijd en profijt, Vol. II, ed. Eelco 
Beukers. (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2007), 451-504.  
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evaporation declined, and the southward movement of the circumpolar vortex encouraged greater 
storminess in many northern European regions, including the coasts of the North Sea.
21
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 Gottschalk,  Stormvloeden en rivieroverstromingen in Nederland, Vol III, 159, 414. See also: Shabalova and Van 
Engelen, “Evaluation of a reconstruction of temperature in the Low Countries AD 764-1998.” Christoph C. Raible, 
“Climate variability - observations, reconstructions, and model simulations.”  
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Fig. 4.1. Annual changes in Winter and Summer Intensity in the Low Countries, 1600-1700. This figure is compiled 
from climate reconstructions developed using diverse documentary evidence quantified by A.F.V. van Engelen, J. 
Buisman and F. Ijnsen. In both graphs, the Maunder Minimum (1662-1718, boxed area) and the Anglo-Dutch Wars 
(arrows) are highlighted. The top graph reveals winter and summer temperatures outside their relation to one 
another. Greater space between the winter and summer lines correspond to cooler yearly temperatures. The bottom 
graph records changes in the relationship between winter and summer intensity. For example, years in which both 
summer and winter intensity was a 4 receive the same “score” (5) as years in which summer and winter intensity 
was at 6. For further explanation of the relationship between these numbers and average seasonal temperatures, see 
Chapter 3, Figure 3.10. Van Engelen, Buisman and Ijnsen, “A Millennium of Weather, Winds and Water in the Low 
Countries,” 112. M.V. Shabalova and A.F.V. van Engelen, “Evaluation of a reconstruction of temperature in the 
Low Countries AD 764-1998.” Climatic Change (March 2000), 225.  
 
However, gales during the latter wars may not have become more abundant in all 
seasons. In the spring, summer, and autumn of the later Maunder Minimum, steeper temperature 
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gradients between the sub-tropical and high latitudes probably channelled the polar jet south, 
imbuing the system with greater potential for storminess. In the winter well-developed 
continental anticyclones could have created “blocking” situations that led storm fronts away 
from the British Isles and, in turn, away from the region in which the Anglo-Dutch Wars were 
predominantly fought.
 22
 Then again, according to Hubert Lamb several severe winter storms 
afflicted the North Sea region during the winters of the 1660s, and missives written by, for 
example, the brothers Van der Goes contain repeated references to calamitous winter gales. 
Consequently, although it is possible that storminess during winter months was reduced relative 
to twentieth-century averages for the whole of the Maunder Minimum, the majority of relevant 
research and primary sources currently suggest winter storms were symptomatic of the prevailing 
climate of the second and third Anglo-Dutch Wars.
 23
 
Climatic cooling also influenced prevailing wind direction in the Second and Third 
Anglo-Dutch Wars. The North Sea lies in a zone between the Icelandic Low and Azores High, 
where depressions normally move east and winds consequently blow overwhelmingly from the 
west, particularly during moderate or warm climatic regimes. For example, between 1961 and 
1970, a relatively cool decade by twentieth-century standards, westerly winds prevailed off the 
Dutch coast for every month except February, and even then easterlies were only marginally 
more common. Nevertheless, while westerlies were more common than easterlies during most 
months in the climate of the late twentieth century, and particularly in June and July, easterlies 
were at their most abundant in the spring.
24
 Lamb was among the first historical climatologists to 
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 Wheeler, “British Naval Logbooks from the Late Seventeenth Century,” 141. 
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 Hubert Lamb, Historic Storms of the North Sea, British Isles, and Northwest Europe, 48. “Hage, den 8 December 
1665.” Briefwisseling tusschen de gebroeders van der Goes (1659-1673) Vol I., 221.  
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 This is a generalization of weather patterns that are never stable; west-southwesterlies, for example, appear to 
have grown more frequent between 1988 and 1997, as mean wind velocity increased. Siegismund and Schrum, 
“Decadal changes in the wind forcing over the North Sea,” 44.   Korevaar, North Sea Climate, based on 
observations from ships and lightvessels, 65. “Northeast England: Climate,” Met Office, accessed February 2, 2013, 
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use documentary evidence listing wind direction to suggest that the frequency of westerlies in the 
North Sea region rose during the warmer decades of the Little Ice Age, and fell during its coldest 
periods (Introduction).
25
 
Recently, Dennis Wheeler has employed British naval ship logbooks compiled in the 
English Channel between 1685 and 1750 to reveal that the overall frequency of westerly winds 
declined during much of the Maunder Minimum.
26
 Ship logbooks written before the final 
decades of the seventeenth century are relatively rare; those that survive contain little detail and 
typically describe important but unrepresentative journeys.
27
 Still, some ship logbooks do 
survive to shed light on the prevailing winds experienced during the First Anglo-Dutch War. For 
example, while limited to 1653, the meteorological readings in the ship logbook of Dutch 
Admiral Witte de With appear to confirm that westerlies were more common during the 
“maxima” of the Little Ice Age. Most of De With’s weather reports were taken during spring and 
fall, when winds from the east were more common in the twentieth-century climate. 
Nevertheless 51 per cent of De With’s 131 morning measurements recorded westerly winds and 
35 per cent listed easterlies, while in the evening 55 per cent of his entries listed westerlies and 
just 34 per cent mentioned easterlies. In May, when easterlies can be more common than 
westerlies in even the warmer twentieth-century climate, De With still recorded more 
westerlies.
28
 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/ne. “Eastern England: Climate,” Met Office, accessed February 2, 2013, 
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/ee.  
25 Lamb, Climate, History and the Modern World, 198. 
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 Wheeler, “British Naval Logbooks from the Late Seventeenth Century,” 136. Wheeler et al., “Atmospheric 
circulation and storminess derived from Royal Navy logbooks,” 13. Wheeler, “Understanding Seventeenth-Century 
Ships’ Logbooks,” 16. See also: Glaser and Koslowski, “Variations in reconstructed ice winter severity in the 
western Baltic from 1501 to 1995,” 188. 
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 Buisman and Van Engelen, (ed.), Duizend jaar weer, wind en water in de Lage Landen, Vol. IV, 611, 735.  
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 De With, Witte, “Journael off dagh register gehouden bij den Hr Vice Admiral Witte Cornelisz. de With, sedert 24 
Aug. 1652 tot 5 Nov. 1658,” Aanwinsten Eerste Afdeling, Reference code: 1.11.01.01, Nationaal Archief (Den 
Haag, Netherlands).  Korevaar, North Sea Climate, 65. 
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The longer and more continuous ship logbooks written by English naval officer Thomas 
Allin between July 1664 and November 1666 reflect a dramatically changed pattern of prevailing 
wind (Figure 4.2). According to Allin’s log, easterlies outnumbered westerlies in 7 out of 25 
months, and overall easterlies accounted for 39 per cent of recorded wind directions. The final 
statistic, while representing a 10 per cent increase in the frequency of easterly winds over the 
twentieth-century norm, may actually misrepresent the shift. Allin’s first logbook of 1664, 
recorded in July, was written several months before the unofficial opening of the second Anglo-
Dutch War, and just after the months when easterlies were particularly abundant in the climates 
of both the late Maunder Minimum and the late twentieth century.  
Still, additional quantitative research is required to measure whether a spring abundance 
of easterlies was also typical of the climate of the early Maunder Minimum. More significantly, 
in June Allin sailed from England to take his new post as commander of the Mediterranean fleet, 
departing the Channel on 2 September, 1664 and returning by 24 March, 1665. Between 7 
October and 5 December Allin was well into the Mediterranean Sea, before retiring to the area 
around the Straits of Gibraltar pending his return to the Channel. It is still uncertain to what 
extent shifts in wind patterns in the North Sea and English Channel were symptomatic of larger 
changes in the Northeastern Atlantic and, potentially, the Mediterranean, but between the 
beginning of October and the end of February only 29 per cent of Allin’s entries described 
easterly winds. If Allin’s logbooks are read from the start of 1665, and his time spent in or near 
the Mediterranean Sea is excluded, fully 45 per cent of Allin’s meteorological observations 
record easterly winds!
29
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 Thomas Allin, The Journal of Sir Thomas Allin, Vol. I, 1660-1666, ed. R.C. Anderson. London: Navy Records 
Society, 1939. 
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Fig. 4.2. Easterlies and westerlies recorded by Thomas Allin in the North Sea, English Channel, Northeastern 
Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea. Only months with at least six measurements are incorporated, although Allin took 
far more measurements in most months. Months with six measurements are: August 1665, January 1666 and 
November 1666. Morning measurements were used because they were more frequently kept than evening 
measurements; in rare cases when time of day was not specified the first (and, sometimes, the only) wind description 
was used. In rare entries where several wind directions were recorded for one morning the direction that endured the 
longest was employed. Allin’s records end in 1666 because the English main fleet neither assembled nor sortied in 
1667. Thomas Allin, The Journal of Sir Thomas Allin, Vol. I, 1660-1666, ed. R.C. Anderson. London: Navy Records 
Society, 1939.  
 
 
Westerly winds were more common during the First Anglo-Dutch War, and easterly 
winds were remarkably abundant in the second war. The ship logbooks kept by captain John 
Narbrough from January 1672 to August 1673 reveal that in the third war easterlies were less 
frequent than they had been five years earlier, although they were still more common than they 
were in the warmer climate of the mid-seventeenth century (Figure 4.3). Narbrough’s logbooks, 
rarely missing a day and hence significantly more continuous than the journals kept by Allin, 
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described winds in just 32 per cent of their entries, although easterlies outnumbered westerlies in 
7 of 20 months. Once again, the final statistics may misrepresent the wartime frequency of 
easterlies in the North Sea region because Narbrough, on convoy duty, sailed out of the English 
Channel towards the Mediterranean Sea. Although Narbrough received his orders from the Duke 
of York on 6 December 1672, his vessel only passed Lisbon on 6 February. Even struggling 
against contrary winds in a convoy limited by the speed of its slowest ship, the journey would 
usually not have taken longer than a month, so it is possible that Narbrough remained in the 
Channel until the beginning of January. If wind directions recorded from the first of January 
through the end of April are omitted, 34 per cent of Narbrough’s entries describe easterly winds. 
Because Narbrough’s logbook ended just before a possible autumn rise in easterlies, his journal 
ultimately suggests that easterly winds, while not as common in the third war as in the second, 
were nevertheless significantly more frequent in both latter wars than they had been in the first.  
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Fig. 4.3. Easterlies and westerlies recorded by John Narbrough in the North Sea, English Channel and Northeastern 
Atlantic. The same methodology was employed to compile this graph as was used to reconstruct wind directions in 
fig 5. In both cases the rare measurements of variable winds were not included. John Narbrough, “Journal of John 
Narbrough, Lieutenant and Captain of the Prince. January 7, 1671/2, to September 18, 1672. Pepysian MS. 2555,” 
in Journals and Narratives of the Third Dutch War, ed. 108. John Narbrough, “Journal of John Narbrough, Captain 
of the Fairfax. September 18, 1672, to July 1, 1673. Pepysian MS. 2556,” in Journals and Narratives of the Third 
Dutch War, ed. 200. John Narbrough, “Journal of John Narbrough, Captain of the St. Michael. July 1, 1673 to 
September 21, 1673. Pepysian MS. 2556,” in Journals and Narratives of the Third Dutch War, ed. 339. 
 
Ship logbooks kept by De Ruyter, De With, Allin, Narbrough, and others can help 
reconstruct shifts in prevailing wind during the decades of the Anglo-Dutch Wars at a daily 
resolution, but the resulting statistics should still be approached with caution. Occasionally wind 
directions listed in ship logbooks measured not the general prevalence of easterlies or westerlies 
during the wars, but rather the ability of Dutch or English commanders to take advantage of 
winds that benefitted them on a given day. Fortunately, that problem is diminished by the reality 
that, once at sea, a wind that aided the English generally disadvantaged the Dutch, so that at least 
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one commander would commence hostilities. In fact, often the pressure to defeat the enemy at 
sea was such that commanders would engage their counterparts even in unfavourable weather. 
Still, other methodological issues are not so easily resolved. Minor discrepancies could exist 
between the meteorological measurements recorded in ship logbooks taken by different officers 
in different ships belonging to the same fleet.
30
 Wind information taken at different times could 
yield contradictory morning measurements, and fleets could grow so large that two ships 
belonging to the same armada might be 10 kilometres apart. Consequently, in these 
reconstructions the complexity of the 32-point compass used by most officers has been 
simplified. Easterlies refer not only to wind directions that observers listed as simply “easterly,” 
but to all recorded wind directions that described easterly winds.
31
 
Ultimately, many diaries, missives, newspaper articles, intelligence reports, and other 
documents survive to describe weather during major engagements during the Anglo-Dutch Wars, 
and can be used to verify meteorological information gleaned from ship logbooks. A quantitative 
analysis of weather descriptions in a diverse selection of textual evidence suggests that in the 
English Channel and North Sea westerly winds generally dominated during the warmer climate 
of the mid-seventeenth century before declining in frequency with the coming of the Maunder 
Minimum (Figure 4.4). In the middle latitudes air usually flows from west to east, but this 
system can break down, enabling the movement of air from other directions. During the Maunder 
Minimum such a breakdown probably occurred over the north-eastern Atlantic as a result of 
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 For example, De With listed Easterly winds on the morning of 8 June 1652, while De Ruyter recorded wind from 
the East-southeast. De Ruyter, Michiel Adriaanszoon. “Journaal gehouden op het schip De gekroonde Liefde door 
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wind that blew from the east – even the North-northeast – a vessel sailing from the east typically had the weather 
gage over one that sailed from the west, and any exceptions are described in this chapter. 
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changes in the pattern of atmospheric pressure that constitutes the North Atlantic Oscillation, 
which permitted the subsequent intrusion of frigid Arctic air from the Norwegian Sea.
32
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4. Easterlies and westerlies recorded in Anglo-Dutch ship logs, missives, intelligence reports, newspaper 
stories, and diaries during the battles of the Anglo-Dutch Wars. This graph may slightly understate the number of 
easterlies measured in major battles during the second war because it accepts the English account of the wind 
measurements on the first day of the Four Days’ Battle – which describes a Southwesterly wind – rather than the 
official Dutch narrative, which records Southeasterly winds. 
 
Indeed, Dutch and English sources written during the Anglo-Dutch Wars abound with 
references to easterlies accompanying cold temperatures, and westerlies coinciding with warmer 
conditions. For example, cold days recorded by Narbrough during the Third Anglo-Dutch War 
were always accompanied by easterly or north-easterly winds. On 18 February 1672, Narbrough 
described how south-westerly winds accompanied balmy weather, but on the next day the wind 
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 Wheeler, “Understanding Seventeenth-Century Ships’ Logbooks,” 16. See also: Glaser and Koslowski, 
“Variations in reconstructed ice winter severity in the western Baltic,” 188.  
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had swung to the east and the temperature plummeted.
33
 Civilian contemporaries not only 
described but were keenly aware that easterlies usually accompanied cold weather. In a missive 
written to his brother on 11 January 1664, Adriaen van der Goes reported the unusual warmth of 
winter weather that felt more like March, and wondered whether colder temperatures, then in the 
East, would blow over before the thaw began in earnest.
34
 Van der Goes was surprised when 
easterlies did not accompany frigid weather, writing in the previous December that “for several 
days the wind has blown consistently from the East yet it has been misty, with no freezing, and 
this morning it began to rain with the wind still from the East.”35  
During the legendary wave of winter weather in March three years later, weaver Jan 
Hubrecht from Leiden described the persistent north-easterly winds that accompanied constant 
cloudiness and freezing of shocking intensity.
36
 References to westerly warmth and easterly 
coldness were especially common during winter months, but this may be because winter freezing 
directly affected travel at sea and inland, rather than an indication that the relationship did not 
exist in other seasons. Regardless, the abundance of westerlies in the warmer mid-seventeenth 
century climate explains why English captain Nicholas Foster was astonished that the Republic 
risked war, “when (like an eagle’s winds extended over her body) our coast surrounded theirs for 
120 leagues . . . and the wind blowing above three-quarters of the year westerly on the coast of 
England, made all our cape-lands and bays very good roads for ships to anchor at.” Changes in 
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these weather patterns, and associated shifts in average seasonal storminess, temperature, and 
precipitation, would have important consequences for the conduct of the Anglo-Dutch Wars.
37
 
 
Commercial Rivalry and Competing Military Structures 
 
The First Anglo-Dutch War was predominantly contested at sea between neighbouring 
maritime powers, but in their crews, institutions, and technologies the duelling fleets were 
expressions of relationships between different cultural, economic, and ecological systems that 
yielded distinct environmental vulnerabilities.
38
 It was a sign of the commercial ethic of the 
Republic that most of the Dutch fleet was sold to foreign competitors after the Peace of 
Westphalia.
39
 Without easy access to iron, in 1652 the Dutch admiralties populated their large 
but makeshift fleet with small frigates and converted merchant vessels, most armed with light 
guns that were typically arranged in two tiers and situated high above the water. Compared to 
their foreign counterparts, Dutch hulls were wider with far shallower draughts and fewer sharp 
lines, a necessity given the shallow approaches to Dutch harbours. This limited the maximum 
size of Dutch vessels but increased their stability in rough weather, allowed them to sail better in 
conditions of near calm, and enabled them to safely navigate over shoals that grounded other 
warships. The shape of the Republic’s armada played to the strengths of its commanders, master 
mariners from port cities who had often risen from obscurity in the commercial fleets and had 
witnessed the success of superior seamanship against the Spanish. The Republic’s admirals, 
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captains, pilots, and common sailors were Europe’s preeminent seamen and collectively 
possessed unparalleled knowledge of the North Sea environment. Dutch tactics emphasized 
grappling, boarding, and firing at enemy rigging in an era when warships were powerfully built, 
easily repaired, and not easily sunk by artillery fire.
40
   
Meanwhile, with ready access to iron and deep harbours, the English under Cromwell’s 
dictatorship constructed a standing navy around a core of “floating castles:” great ships of deep 
draught and tall hulls, many armed with 80 or more guns arranged in three tiers.
41
 The lower tier 
was located between four and five feet from the waterline, which meant it could not be opened in 
rough seas lest water flood in through the gun ports on the lee side. In 1653 the English navy 
categorized warships in six “rates” which corresponded to guns carried and, in turn, overall size. 
English first and second rates carried more artillery than an entire field army, and could sink 
opposing vessels at unprecedented range.
42
 Over the course of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 
English commanders, chosen from Cromwell’s imposing army, improved the effectiveness of 
these vessels by developing line of battle tactics in which ships would sail by each other in single 
file while firing broadsides that targeted enemy hulls.
43
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Fig. 4.5. Windward and lee positions in the battle of Scheveningen.  In this depiction of the last major engagement 
of the First Anglo-Dutch War, the Dutch flagship at the centre of the painting is to windward and has the weather 
gage, while its English counterpart is leeward. See also: Figure I.6, Introduction. Jan Abrahamszoon Beerstraten, 
“Slag bij Ter Heijde,” painting, 1653-1666, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, 
https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/collection/SK-A-22.  
 
These English and Dutch “naval systems,” spun from a web of co-evolving cultural, 
economic, and environmental interactions, reacted differently to the prevailing weather 
experienced in each Anglo-Dutch War. Both systems depended on fleets attaining the “weather 
gage,” the windward position from the enemy that granted initiative in attack and, occasionally, 
retreat (Figure 4.5). The tactical strengths and vulnerabilities of the competing naval systems, 
overlaid with their shared reliance on the weather gage, ensured that wind direction and velocity 
– not temperature or precipitation – were the critical meteorological influences during the naval 
battles of the Anglo-Dutch Wars. 
However, the picture was different on land. Because an English invasion was impossible 
without control of the North Sea and English Channel, war on land scarcely featured in the First 
Wind Direction 
LeeWindward 
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and Second Anglo-Dutch Wars. On the other hand, in the third war the powerful French army 
confronted Dutch defences that had been badly neglected in the wake of the Treaty of 
Westphalia. The expansionist ambitions of the highly centralized army of the Sun King in 
Europe contrasted sharply with the emphasis on decentralized naval power in the Dutch 
Republic, which strung together its loose trading empire. These geopolitical considerations were 
buttressed by the demands of domestic politics. After a brief civil war incited by William II in 
1650, and his death later that year, the legislative power of the States-General was unchallenged 
by the executive power of the House of Orange. During this period of so-called “true freedom,” 
the Dutch army continued to supply a reservoir of Orangist sympathy. Accordingly, grand 
pensionary Jan de Witt feared that a strong army, which supported the regime of Louis XIV in 
France, would threaten the Dutch republican government with a revolution that would restore the 
power of the House of Orange. Moreover, as European states increasingly eschewed the hiring of 
unpredictable and undisciplined mercenaries, Dutch financial resources could no longer procure 
an army that could match those of its more populous neighbours. Ultimately, on the eve of the 
Third Anglo-Dutch War the States-General relied less on the strength of its army than the waters 
that encircled and interlaced their Republic. In this war, temperature and precipitation were 
therefore as important in victory or defeat as prevailing wind direction and velocity.
44
 
 
Beginning of the First Anglo-Dutch War  
 
 After Cromwell’s Commonwealth imposed the first Navigation Act in October 1651, the 
Republic’s States-General passed a resolution calling for its fleet of 76 vessels to be 
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supplemented by an additional 150 ships by 1 April 1652.
45
 The planned flotilla was intended to 
resolve Anglo-Dutch tension through intimidation, but the Dutch admiralties, long starved of 
funds, were incapable of furnishing, let alone manning, the required vessels. Meanwhile, 
although the following summer was warm enough to render 1652 a year of average temperature 
by twentieth-century standards, the winter of 1651/52 had been cooler than normal. In coming 
years the slow pace of ship construction during the frequently frigid weather of the Maunder 
Minimum demonstrated that work in shipyards could be slowed in severe winters.
46
 
Consequently, in May 1652 Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp, Lieutenant Admiral of the Dutch 
Republic, left port with a ragtag fleet of just over 40 men-of-war, many converted merchant 
ships, most small and obsolete, with orders to protect Dutch merchant convoys from inspection 
or detention by English patrols.
47
 Some English historians have claimed that Tromp’s orders 
rendered conflict inevitable given the increasingly fragile state of the peace, but Tromp was 
ordered to avoid the English coast and use his own discretion in lowering the flag in the face of 
English provocation.
48
   
Indeed it was not Tromp’s armada that instigated the first hostilities of the Anglo-Dutch 
Wars; fittingly these erupted off Start Point on 22 May 1652 when two warships and an armed 
merchantman attempted to enforce England’s sovereignty of the seas against a small Dutch 
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convoy defended by three warships.
49
 The Dutch commander, Commodore Huyrluyt, lowered 
his flag and fired a salute, but Joris van der Zaanen, captain of the second escort, refused to 
follow his lead. Van der Zaanen approached the English on the westerly, windward side, an 
aggressive course that helped instigate a brief but inconclusive skirmish.
50
 Two days later 
Tromp, oblivious, anchored his fleet off the Flemish town of Nieuwpoort when a powerful gale 
rose from the North-Northeast, threatening to destroy the Republic’s ships on what was suddenly 
a lee shore. The storm worsened, damaging the Dutch vessels until Tromp decided to lead his 
fleet across the Channel for the sheltered corner of Dover. The Dutch fleet arrived there on 28 
May 1652.  
Nine English warships under Nehemiah Bourne were stationed behind the Goodwin 
Sands to the north of the port of Dover, while a larger Commonwealth fleet commanded by 
Admiral Robert Blake lay off Rye. Tromp sent emissaries to explain his presence, but Bourne 
prepared his fleet for action, and immediately dispatched a small, quick boat – or ketch – to warn 
his admiral. The ketch reached Blake’s flagship that night, yet Blake was forced to tack against 
the strong, contrary winds still blowing from the East, and his journey up the Channel was 
laborious. Blake sent the ketch back to Bourne, but the boat struggled against the wind to such an 
extent that his order for Bourne to sail downwind and unite the fleet only arrived around 10:00 
AM the next morning. Hence, Bourne was probably still negotiating the south end of the 
Goodwin Sands when the Dutch fleet weighed anchor and made for the French coast.  
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Halfway across the Channel someone in Tromp’s armada sighted an approaching Dutch 
ship, obviously scarred by battle. Van der Zaanen had been seeking Tromp to report the skirmish 
off Start Point and acquire aid for the convoy, then sheltering from the storm off Fairlight. 
Tromp, wrongly believing that the tiny but lucrative convoy had been captured, ordered his fleet 
to turn and face the English. A heavy growth of barnacles slowed Bourne’s ships, and the 
English squadrons were still divided. However, the wind had shifted to blow from the Northwest, 
and this granted them the weather gage. At around 4:00 PM the English fired first, and their 
disunity actually helped them flank the more numerous Dutch vessels. Battles in the age of sail 
could not be fought in darkness, so the battle of Dover was brought to a close in a matter of 
hours, its outcome technically inconclusive. Still, the English almost certainly fared better in the 
encounter, capturing two vessels while losing none. One of their prizes was deemed unseaworthy 
and thus abandoned, but owing to westerly winds, the current, or both, it drifted back to the 
Dutch fleet that night to be salvaged by the Republic’s superior mariners.51  
The events that instigated the First Anglo-Dutch War reveal some of the limitations and 
possibilities of relating wind direction and velocity to the outcome of early modern naval 
operations. Certainly weather influenced the beginning of hostilities. Damage inflicted to Dutch 
ships by unusually persistent and severe northeasterly winds encouraged Tromp to disregard his 
instructions and seek the shelter of an English port, where his fleet would be safe from the perils 
of a lee shore. That decision brought the two Republican fleets within striking distance of one 
another, and the resulting tension was exacerbated by Tromp’s failure to acknowledge England’s 
sovereignty of the seas by lowering his flag. With the Dutch fleet so close it is certainly plausible 
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that Blake, Bourne, or both intended to initiate hostilities. Similarly, it is possible that Tromp 
might have realized that the Dutch merchant convoy had not been detained or, at least, that a less 
provocative course of action would have been taken had Tromp encountered Van der Zaanen at a 
different time, in a different place.  
Certainly the resulting battle was shaped by the easterly winds that hampered Blake’s 
quest to unify his armada, and the westerly winds that granted him initiative in battle but allowed 
the Dutch to salvage a prize the English had abandoned. The influence of these winds was 
mediated by personal agency, the cultural scaffolding that constituted each naval system, and the 
shape of local environments. Still, there is little doubt that weather events were an important, 
measureable factor in the outcome of the Battle of Dover. Moreover, the westerly winds that 
helped Van der Zaanen claim the weather gage at Start Point and, more importantly, granted a 
disjointed English fleet the initiative in the Battle of Dover were typical of the warmer climate in 
which the first Anglo-Dutch War was fought. However, the easterly winds that forced the Dutch 
fleet to seek shelter at Dover exerted equal influence over the nature of the subsequent 
confrontation. The presence of both easterlies and westerlies in the first week of a conflict 
dominated by the latter demonstrates that a spell of winds from any direction – or a stretch of 
daily temperature of any severity - could powerfully affect military operations and occur under 
all climatic regimes. The winds experienced by Tromp, Van der Zaanen, Blake, Bourne, and 
their men in the final week of May 1652 did not blow continuously from one direction, for an 
extended time. Accordingly, relationships between weather and climate in the English Channel 
during the last week of May 1652 are impossible to confirm. While environmental conditions 
helped stimulate the First Anglo-Dutch War, the initiation of hostilities cannot be linked to the 
prevailing climatic regime.  
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 The Battle of Dover caused great alarm among the members of the States-General. The 
war had begun in earnest, yet strategies for its execution developed on both shores of the 
Channel were confused and short-lived. The Dutch merchant marine was originally the primary 
target of the English fleet. On 10 June the Council of States ordered Blake to seize the VOC 
fleet, take convoys destined for the Baltic, and disrupt the Dutch herring fleet off the English and 
Scottish coasts. While ambitious and potentially lucrative, this scheme threatened to dilute the 
strength of the English fleet in a series of raids across the North Sea, leaving it vulnerable to a 
united Dutch fleet.
52
 On the other hand, while the States-General on 6 July ordered Tromp to 
inflict “all imaginable damage” upon the English armada, the primary purpose of the Dutch fleet 
was still to escort merchant shipping. Neither Dutch nor English commanders yet realized that 
victory in contemporary naval warfare was possible only by engaging and decisively defeating 
the opposing fleet.
53
  
 In June the Commonwealth experienced some success in disrupting Dutch shipping, with 
a fleet under Blake taking 11 Dutch merchantmen laden with salt, and an additional cruiser of 22 
guns. However, eight days after Tromp received his instructions from the States-General, Blake 
and Ayscue divided the English fleet. Ayscue remained in the Channel to harass Dutch convoys 
sailing from the South, while Blake fulfilled his orders in the North.
54
 The division of the English 
armada quickly bore fruit when Ayscue’s squadron attacked a Dutch convoy inbound from 
Portugal, seizing 6 vessels while grounding another 26. It was Tromp’s intention to sail north 
and protect the herring fleet, but persistent contrary winds, likely from the Northwest, foiled that 
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ambition. These winds, typical of both the season and the prevailing climatic regime, ruled out of 
a defence of the herring busses but facilitated a sortie against Ayscue’s fleet in the South.55  
On 15 July Tromp received orders to “attack, destroy or capture” the English ships in the 
Downs, so long as the wind continued to thwart any attempt to sail north. Although hindered by 
light winds, the Dutch armada approached the North Foreland over the next two days. Tromp 
commanded as many as 104 men-of-war and 10 fireships or branders, light vessels designed to 
burn warships. Having annihilated the Spanish fleet in the Downs in 1639, Tromp was keenly 
aware of the region’s geography, and dispatched two squadrons to seal the southern entrance 
while the main fleet entered from the North. With as few as 20 ships, Ayscue could do little but 
gather his vessels under the guns of the shore fortifications. However, on the 16
th
 and 17
th
 the 
Dutch advance was slowed by calm winds. The northerly winds resumed on the 18
th
, yet blew so 
hard over the next three days that three fireships separated from the fleet, and an equal number 
threatened to sink. On the 21
st
 the Dutch ships finally approached the North Foreland with light 
winds from the North-northwest, yet an English journalist recounted how the Dutch were soon 
forced to anchor, with “the tide of ebb being done and but little wind.” Once the wind rose later 
that day it was from the Southwest, and Tromp immediately ordered his captains to set sail for 
the North.
56
   
 Blake had struggled up the Scottish coast against the same contrary winds that dissuaded 
the Dutch pursuit, and he now used the southerly breeze to arrive off the Shetland Islands on the 
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22
nd
. He dispatched a squadron under Admiral William Penn that defeated the lighter Dutch 
escorts, but not before most of the roughly 600 herring busses had escaped. Fearing an 
unmanageable influx of prisoners, Blake suffered the rest to depart before making for Fair Isle, 
where he believed incoming Dutch convoys would gather before continuing south. With the 
Shetland Islands to the Northeast and the Orkney Islands to the Southwest, Fair Isle forms a 
string of islands stretching from Scotland into the North Sea towards Norway. Tromp assumed 
that Blake would station his fleet near Fair Isle and approached roughly a week later, with a 
numerically impressive armada that actually included ships that were, by now, barely seaworthy. 
On 4 August the opposing fleets drew together off the Shetlands, but a sudden calm thwarted an 
engagement. By the afternoon of the 5
th
 the winds rose again but blew variable, before steadying 
into a northwesterly during the night. Under cover of darkness the wind carried several inbound 
Dutch West Indiaman to the safety of Tromp’s fleet, much to the elation of their crews. 
However, in the morning that joy turned to misery as the wind swelled into a furious 
northwesterly gale. The Dutch ships, positioned nearer the rocky coast, were exposed to a lee 
shore and subject to the full force of the storm, but the English fleet, though not immune from 
damage, nevertheless found some shelter in Bressay Sound on the east coast of the Shetlands. 
A Dutch survivor described how, “the fleet being . . . buried by the sea in the most 
horrible abysses, rose out of them, only to be tossed up to the clouds; here the masts were beaten 
down into the sea, there the deck was overflowed . . . the tempest was so much the mistress . . . 
the ships could be governed no longer.” When the storm passed on 7 August Tromp was left with 
just 34 ships. Many of the Republic’s warships and merchant vessels were scattered across the 
North Sea, most of which would find their way back to safe harbour. Still, thousands of seamen 
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drowned, while 16 warships and several merchantmen were lost. The crews of the ships that 
limped home under Tromp’s command were soon subject to scurvy and malnutrition.57 
 In the first months of Anglo-Dutch hostilities the weather that prevailed during naval 
operations strongly benefitted the Commonwealth. Recurrent westerly winds probably helped 
English squadrons leave port, enabled them to surprise Dutch convoys sailing up the Channel, 
and granted them the weather gage in combat with escorts. Westerlies did allow West Indiamen 
that might otherwise have been seized by the English to join the Dutch fleet, but that triumph 
proved fleeting. Moreover, Dutch merchantmen returning from the Baltic might have been 
slowed by common westerlies, and thereby exposed to English harassment. Regardless, the high 
frequency of these westerlies during the warmer mid-seventeenth century climate suggests a 
strong climatic link.   
It was persistent northerlies that most influenced the decision of the States-General to 
dispatch the Dutch main fleet South against Ayscue, rather than North against Blake. Contrary to 
the States-General’s orders, Tromp’s subsequent letters, and the judgement of historians like 
Roger Hainsworth and Christine Churches, continual northerlies did not render a pursuit of Blake 
impossible. Blake, after all, was tacking against the same northerlies to reach the Shetland 
Islands. Rather, to Tromp and his political overlords it probably seemed easier to employ the 
prevailing winds and sail South to annihilate Ayscue’s fleet, before waiting for the southerlies 
that would quicken a journey North. Indeed, trapping and destroying the English warships in the 
Downs probably would have been successful but for the unusually consistent calms that 
hampered Tromp’s approach to the Downs, and the light North-northwesterly that blew for most 
of the 21
st
. Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether fluctuations in the frequency of northerlies, 
                                                 
57
 Hainsworth and Churches, The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars, 30. Harald Appelboom, “Harald Appelboom aan Axel 
Oxenstjerna, 27 July1652,” in Bescheiden uit Vreemde Archieven omtrent de Groote Nederlandsche Zeeoorlogen, 
Vol. 1, 7. 
 290 
southerlies and calms were part of Little Ice Age climatic shifts. Certainly the Dutch command’s 
decision to exploit the division of the English fleet by engaging Ayscue’s squadron is evidence 
of the culturally mediated influence of weather. However, apart from the westerlies that 
characterized the final day of the operation, the attempt and its failure cannot be used to link a 
warmer climate to the course of the war.  
Though a combination of northerlies, southerlies, westerlies, and calms in the first 
months of the conflict facilitated English raiding while preserving the English naval presence at 
both ends of the North Sea, it was the storm of 6 August that first jeopardized the Dutch 
Republic’s chances of winning the war. The design of Dutch ships actually rendered them less 
vulnerable to rough seas than their English counterparts, yet many of Tromp’s ships were barely 
seaworthy when the winds rose on the morning of the 6
th
. Worse, the northwesterly direction of 
the storm exposed the Dutch fleet to a lee shore, and the rocky cliffs of the Shetland Islands 
offered little chance of survival for crews of foundered vessels. The westerly winds that 
influenced the devastation of a portion of the Dutch fleet were rendered more likely within the 
warmer climate of the mid-seventeenth century. The disaster was therefore worsened by the 
westerlies that were especially frequent in that climate, but the destructive velocity of these 
winds was not necessarily symptomatic of the prevailing climatic regime.  
The First Anglo-Dutch War appears to have been nearly as tempestuous as the second, 
although it was less stormy than the third. It was not fought during the Maunder Minimum, when 
storms in spring, summer, and fall grew more common, yet climate change does not affect all 
weather events at the same time. Nevertheless, explanations for the late-seventeenth century rise 
in storminess provided by Lamb and Wheeler link more violent North Sea weather to a cooler 
climate, and the same meridionality that allowed for more easterlies during the second and third 
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wars. Still, long-term climatic trends are not the only influence on yearly variation in prevailing 
weather. The First Anglo-Dutch War was fought during warm summers and relatively cool 
winters, a condition that can lead to more frequent storminess in the North Sea region. Recent 
tree ring data also suggest that it coincided with the strongest El Niño of the century, a warming 
of the equatorial Pacific Ocean that may amplify cyclonic activity in Europe.
58
 El Niño and La 
Niña fluctuations, while varying in intensity, are quasi-regular cycles in the world’s climate that, 
at least in their origin, should be distinguished from overall climatic cooling or warming. 
Ultimately, while it is possible that European storminess between 1651 and 1653 was 
anomalous, it is equally likely that more frequent storms were stimulated by rhythmic climatic 
patterns of unusual severity or, perhaps, the first hints of the Maunder Minimum. Storms 
undoubtedly influenced the outcome and aftermath of the First Anglo-Dutch War, but because 
they cannot yet be convincingly linked to the coming of the Maunder Minimum they will receive 
no further analysis in this interpretation of the war, unless the winds that accompanied them blew 
from the west.  
 
Conclusion of the First Anglo-Dutch War 
 
 On 26 September Admiral de Ruyter ended nearly a month of successful escort duty by 
joining his ragtag fleet of ships, many damaged by battle or storm, with the partially restored 
Dutch main fleet under Witte de With. After 11 of De Ruyter’s ships were judged unseaworthy 
and returned to port, the united fleet consisted of just 62 vessels. Dutch mariners loathed De 
With, and their poor morale was compounded by poor pay, bad beer, and insufficient food. From 
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this position of weakness the States-General commanded De With to engage Blake’s armada of 
68 larger, better-provisioned ships. Accordingly, on 5 October De With ordered his fleet to 
depart Nieuwpoort on the Flemish coast. He hoped to lure the deep-draughted vessels of the 
Commonwealth fleet under Blake from the Downs into the shoals of nearby Goodwin Sands.
59
  
However, De With’s gambit failed just as the Downs appeared over his horizon, as south-
westerly winds strengthened into a ferocious gale that pushed the Dutch fleet back into the North 
Sea. The storm persisted until the 7
th
, forcing Blake to remain in port while either sinking or 
aiding in the desertion of three Dutch warships. On the morning of 8 October the southwesterly 
winds finally moderated enough for the English to leave port, but the fleet’s headlong rush to sea 
scattered its ships over many kilometres and entangled its three divisions.
60
 De With was also 
struggling to reform his fleet into three divisions, with many of his ships dragging anchors or 
scattered by the storm. De With attempted to board the Brederode, Tromp’s former flagship, but 
its crew refused his command and he was forced to move his flag to a converted Dutch East 
Indiaman with relatively sluggish sailing abilities and an inexperienced crew. Nevertheless, the 
Dutch armada was able to regroup more quickly than the Commonwealth fleet. Tacking against 
the wind, the Dutch vessels bore down upon the English from the northeast.
61
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Two English divisions under Blake and Admiral William Penn launched a counterattack 
at approximately 4:00 PM. Blake attempted to hold the weather gage by ordering his ships to sail 
along the eastern edge of the Kentish Knock shoal, but the massive James and the 100-gun 
Sovereign were soon grounded. Penn’s division was forced to surround the immobilized great 
ships while Blake’s division engaged the entire Dutch fleet. The English appeared vulnerable, 
but De With, perhaps hampered by his unwieldy flagship, had never taken the weather gage. 
Light winds allowed the English warships to use their lower tier of guns, and this advantage, 
coupled with the initiative granted by the persistent westerly, allowed Blake’s division to use the 
nascent line of battle tactics to their full effect (Figure 4.6). After its first pass through the Dutch 
ranks Blake’s division turned, and the wind helped Bourne’s division enter the fray before the 
extricated English great ships joined Penn’s division to flank the deteriorating Dutch column. 
Meanwhile, numerous Dutch captains, unwilling to risk their lives for an unpopular admiral, 
lingered well behind the other Dutch vessels, shooting ineffectually at friend and foe alike. As 
the light faded many of the Dutch ships remained afloat only through heavy pumping and the 
superior seamanship of Dutch mariners, while most English ships had suffered damage only to 
their rigging.  
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Fig. 4.6. The shape of the Battle of the Kentish Knock, with winds from the west proving decisive. Hainsworth and 
Churches, The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars, 44.  
 
After a night of frantic repairs at sunrise both fleets were nearly 10 kilometres apart, 
drifting east in a westerly that blew too soft for battle. The light winds that had aided the English 
the day before now benefitted the Dutch fleet which, numbering less than 50 vessels, could not 
hope to defeat an English fleet that had probably been reinforced to 85 ships during the night. 
When the wind shifted to blow from the Northwest, De Ruyter convinced De With to order a 
retreat, and by the next day the Dutch ships reached the safety of their home shoals. Many of the 
Dutch Republic’s vessels were heavily damaged, although ultimately only three were lost.62 
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The Battle of the Kentish Knock revealed that English great ships, deployed in line of 
battle tactics, could be highly effective against light Dutch ships arranged in loose formations. 
Westerly winds, although mediated by personal agency, the structure of each naval system and 
the shape of local environments, nevertheless enhanced these English advantages. When 
expressed in a storm, they thwarted De With’s attempt to lure Blake into the Goodwin Sands, 
while in the subsequent battle they helped English commanders claim the weather gage and, in 
turn, the tactical initiative so crucial to line of battle tactics. Still, the pattern of advantages and 
disadvantages that linked each naval system with fluctuations in weather and climate was never 
straightforward. The storm’s westerly winds scattered the Dutch fleet, but the resulting 
confusion, coupled with the chaos of the English departure from port, helped delay hostilities 
until the afternoon. The late hour ensured that only a limited number of ships could be lost on 
either side before the onset of night. The quest for the weather gage in the face of south-westerly 
winds also temporarily grounded the largest vessels in the English fleet, and a northwest wind 
aided the Dutch escape on 9 October. Consequently, although westerlies generally benefitted the 
English, they also played a role in diminishing the scale of the victory. Because these westerlies 
were likely more common during the prevailing climate in which the First Anglo-Dutch War was 
fought, that climatic regime rendered more likely, and may indeed have influenced, the outcome 
of the Battle of the Kentish Knock.  
Changes in wind velocity compounded the complex but, to the English, ultimately 
advantageous influence of wind direction during the engagement. A gale may have foiled De 
With’s trap, and during the battle it was light winds that allowed English commanders to 
maximize the effectiveness of their great ships by fielding all their guns. On the other hand, calm 
winds delayed hostilities on the morning of the 9
th
, giving De Ruyter the time necessary to 
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dissuade De With from resuming a hopeless battle. Unfortunately, reconstructions of average 
wind velocity have not been attempted for the seventeenth century. Moreover, wind intensity 
during the Anglo-Dutch Wars cannot be charted using the wealth of available sources 
documenting battles, because engagements were often avoided if winds were too high or low.
 63
 
Hence, light winds, an important weather phenomenon that affected the Battle of the Kentish 
Knock and, ultimately, the course of the First Anglo-Dutch War, cannot at this point be tied to 
contemporary climatic fluctuations.   
More damaging for the Dutch Republic than its defeat at Kentish Knock was the 
spectacular success of English privateering. Privateering was authorized by each state but 
pursued by private actors, generally for personal gain, and supported by investors, usually 
merchants whose commercial activities were thwarted by war. Privateering, and to a lesser extent 
piracy, were often the last resort for merchant crews unwilling or unable to serve in naval 
vessels, especially after the state’s fleet lost an important engagement and merchant shipping was 
forbidden. Privateering crews as small as 50 men usually employed light, fast vessels that could 
carry as few as five guns, and their operations rarely involved more than a few ships. Large 
convoys were obviously protected from privateers, yet not every merchant vessel sailed in a 
fleet, with an escort. Profits from such captured prizes were divided between crews, investors, 
and the crown, and for the English these profits were continuing to support the war effort. The 
Dutch Republic would lose over 1,200 merchant vessels over the course of the war, most at the 
hands of English privateers. By contrast, Dutch privateers from Zeeland and Holland seized no 
more than 400 English prizes. The imbalance is not as extreme as it initially appears, given the 
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far larger size of the Dutch merchant fleet, yet most of the Republic’s prizes were taken in the 
final months of the war, when the outcome was largely decided.
64
 
Most within Cromwell’s regime believed that the war was won after the Battle of the 
Kentish Knock. Certainly many Dutch ships had been severely damaged, but only three were 
actually taken or destroyed. Hence, few within the Dutch Republic’s governing circles believed 
that the battle had revealed weaknesses in Dutch ship construction or naval tactics. Instead the 
States-General blamed De With for the reversal, and replaced him with Tromp on 27 October. 
Given these prevailing attitudes on both shores of the Channel in November, it is neither 
surprising that the English fleet was again divided when the Dutch fleet returned to sea, nor that 
Tromp’s fleet consisted largely of light ships. A Dutch fleet under Admiral Van Galen had 
driven the English out of the Mediterranean in October, and English ships had been dispatched to 
both the Mediterranean and the Baltic, leaving a comparatively small force in the Channel under 
Admiral Blake. The admiral, however, took no action when warned that 400 fully freighted 
vessels were preparing to depart Dutch havens under Tromp’s escort.65  
During the naval wars of the seventeenth century most warships were laid up by October, 
enabling sailors to serve on merchant vessels that would have otherwise taken to sea in the 
summer. A winter guard of greatly reduced strength was often maintained until the spring, when 
the main fleet would be reassembled for the campaigning season. Hence, Blake may have simply 
believed that Tromp would not sortie with nearly 500 ships in a season notorious for its 
dangerous weather. For the same reason the English would not attempt a blockade that might 
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have screened all avenues of departure. Similarly, before the Glorious Revolution of 1688 James 
II, an experienced seaman, did not seriously believe that William III would attempt an invasion 
in October or November because of the frequency of gales in the season. As it happened 
William’s invading fleet was spirited to England by a favourable easterly, a “protestant wind.” 66 
Baltic freezing would have limited the Dutch convoy to a westerly course in most years 
during the seventeenth century. However, in 1652 Josselin in Essex wrote that October, 
November, and the first half of December, were remarkably mild and dry. New climatic 
reconstructions also suggest that the westerly winds more common during the First Anglo-Dutch 
War corresponded with reduced winter ice in the Baltic. Commonwealth commanders may have 
been uncertain about where to ambush the Dutch fleet because the lack of ice in the Baltic raised 
the prospect of the Dutch fleet taking a northerly or southerly course. Ultimately, warm, dry 
weather that was more likely during the First Anglo-Dutch War than it was in the latter wars may 
have encouraged the Dutch to field their main fleet in an unprecedented December convoy 
operation, while increasing uncertainly in English circles regarding the fleet’s destination.67  
In the first week of December the Dutch convoy departed and took a southwesterly 
course down the English Channel, in spite of the Baltic’s likely navigability. A northwesterly 
gale rose during the voyage and, at 4 AM on 9 December, spirited Tromp’s war fleet into the 
Dover Strait well ahead of its civilian charges, leaving the Dutch captains unencumbered by 
escort duty. Departing the Downs on 10 December Blake commanded only 52 ships to Tromp’s 
88, of which 42 were of middling size while several were captained by unreliable privateers. 
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Consequently, Blake was ordered to sail southwest to unite with hastily converted merchantmen 
coming from Portland. A south-westerly breeze rose on 11 December, as the English and Dutch 
fleets sighted one another. Both fleets tacked against the wind to sail on parallel courses, 
temporarily separated by the perilous Varne sandbank. However, the shingle ridges of 
Dungeness loomed ahead, cutting off Blake’s course. If the English divisions cleared the Varne 
sandbank before the Dutch, Blake would have the option of continuing on course to join with 
reinforcements from Portland. On the other hand, if the Dutch outraced the English they would 
gain the weather gage while blocking the route to the Portland squadron (Figure 4.7). In that 
event the most sensible option for the English would be to reverse course and retreat, leaving the 
inbound Portland crews to their own devices.
68
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.7. The race along the Varne sandbank in the hours before the Battle of Dungeness. Dungeness Point, UK. (13 
February 2014). Google Earth 6. Google.   
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As Dungeness Point approached Tromp took the weather gage. However, Blake, making 
no attempt to concentrate his forces, turned to port and took the leading edge of the English fleet 
into the waiting Dutch lines. As many as 20 English captains refused to follow. Thwarted by the 
wind, Blake did not endeavour to use line of battle tactics, and hostilities soon degenerated into 
clusters of small-scale conflict. With superior numbers, Dutch mariners were able to use the 
wind to more easily come to one another’s aid, and that proved decisive. While the English 
captured one Dutch ship, three English vessels were taken or destroyed. Of these one had been 
grounded, before it was freed by Dutch mariners who exploited the combined influence of the 
tide and persistent westerly winds.
69
  
The Battle of Dungeness was the last major conflict of the First Anglo-Dutch War that, in 
quantitative terms, could be described as a victory for the Dutch Republic. Although the battle 
was as indecisive a victory for the Dutch Republic as the Battle of the Kentish Knock had been 
for the English, the containment of the English fleet provided a vital reprieve for the Dutch 
trading economy and helped restore the Republic’s prestige in Europe. Severe tactical and 
strategic miscalculations by the English nullified the advantages bestowed by their naval system. 
Equally important, however, was the influence of persistent westerly winds born of a warmer 
climate, which did not benefit but rather imperilled an English fleet caught badly out of position. 
The superior seamanship of the Dutch mariners earned them the weather gage, allowing Tromp 
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to maximize the benefit of his greater numbers. Still, to acquire the weather gage the Dutch were 
forced to manoeuvre frantically; when the wind blew from the west it did not come easily for 
fleets sailing from eastern ports. 
As with the Battle of the Kentish Knock, the Battle of Dungeness was preceded by a 
westerly gale that affected the Dutch fleet while the English armada sheltered in port. Mariners 
have always dreaded storms, but the very different consequences of the two gales reveal that 
each storm was distinct, expressed through weather that, while always defined by severe winds, 
could nevertheless yield very different results. Storms were mediated by a host of environmental 
and cultural frameworks, which were, in turn, channelled by human agency as battles were 
planned and fought. Intense westerly winds pushed De With’s fleet away from its destination, 
but hurried Tromp’s course towards the English fleet. Without the influence of the gale, Tromp, 
burdened with escort duty, would probably have been driven into a defensive battle, had the 
English decided to engage at all. Moreover, unlike it had been off the Shetlands, the Republic’s 
fleet in December 1652 was far from a lee shore, or indeed any shore, when it encountered the 
storm that blew it into Dover Straits.  
After the Battle of the Dungeness, the battered Commonwealth fleet retreated back to the 
Downs after a night of repairs, before retiring to the greater security of the Thames. Tromp was 
eager to pursue on 12 December, but the Dutch armada, scattered by battle and stormy weather, 
could only be reassembled on 13 December. Although Tromp was aware that the vulnerability of 
the English fleet stemmed from its temporary disunity, his pilots dissuaded him from raiding the 
Thames because westerly winds, when combined with an ebbing tide, could easily strand even 
the shallow hulls of the Dutch vessels.
70
 In a 2005 article, Lisa Brady illustrated how 
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relationships between warfare and environment, expressed most obviously in material terms, 
were even more importantly revealed in the coevolution between human psychology and 
(altered) local environments. Indeed, during the First Anglo-Dutch War persistent westerly 
winds typical of a warmer climate not only shaped the course of engagements in ways that were 
perceived and acted upon by their participants, but the frequency of these westerlies encouraged 
different “mental landscapes” – different conceptions of what was tactically possible – among 
many mariners. The resulting reticence to raid up the Thames rendered the Battle of Dungeness 
far less decisive than it might have been, and for the next two months the English fleet regrouped 
in safety.
 71
  
Tromp’s aborted raid was the last offensive operation planned by the Dutch in the First 
Anglo-Dutch War, although the dream of assaulting English naval infrastructure in the Thames 
endured. Changing tactical circumstances would soon prohibit such initiatives. In the last week 
of February 1653, the Dutch fleet under Tromp escorted a 150-vessel merchant fleet up the 
Channel, hugging the English coast while struggling against rough weather. Unbeknownst to the 
Dutch commanders, a restored English armada under Blake had left port days earlier. The 
Commonwealth fleet numbered 70 ships to the 80 that constituted the Dutch fleet, but Blake’s 
vessels were primarily second or third rates, with many even larger and better armed than 
Tromp’s flagship. Wrongly assuming that Tromp would avoid battle and stay to sea, Blake 
scattered his armada to better scour the breadth of the Channel. As a result Blake’s divisions 
were miles apart when the opposing fleets encountered one another near Portland on the morning 
of 28 February, while the united Dutch fleet was well positioned between the English and the 
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merchant convoy. With the wind out of the Northwest the Dutch fleet had the weather gage, and 
Tromp immediately ordered his captains to sail for the remnants of Blake’s squadron.  
Outnumbered four to one when hostilities erupted, Blake’s division endured the Dutch 
onslaught for over an hour while Vice Admiral Penn and Rear Admiral Lawson ordered their 
squadrons to tack against the wind to gain the weather gage and join their beleaguered 
commander (Figure 4.8). Although the Dutch initially captured several English vessels by 
disabling their rigging, the battle turned decisively as the reinforcing English divisions joined the 
fray and targeted Dutch hulls with synchronized broadsides. Meanwhile, English commanders 
deployed quick fourth and fifth rates to raid the Dutch merchant fleet. Fortunately for the 
Republic’s mariners the light faded quickly, and the long winter night was consumed with frantic 
repairs. With dwindling ammunition Tromp arranged his ships into a crescent to protect the 
merchant vessels, and for two days the Dutch desperately held the English at bay. On 2 March 
the battered remnants of the Dutch convoy approached the cliffs of Cap Gris Nez on the French 
coast, with winds steady from the Northwest. Blake decided the Dutch fleet was trapped, pinned 
against the dangerous shoals and rocks by wind and ebbing tide. However, that night Tromp 
guided the surviving Dutch ships between the cliffs, through a deep-water channel unknown to 
the English. On the next day the 70 combined merchantmen and men-of-war left to Tromp 
anchored off Dunkirk, as a rising westerly gale exposed the English to a lee shore. Fearful of 
winter weather, the English admirals retreated across the Channel with minimal losses. The 
Dutch, meanwhile, had lost approximately 15 warships, 45 merchantmen, and perhaps 3,000 
seamen over three days in the first truly decisive engagement of the war.
72
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Fig. 4.8. The order of battle on the first day of the Battle of Portland/Driedaagse Zeeslag. Roger Hainsworth and 
Christine Churches, The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars, 63.  
 
 The course of the Battle of Portland, known to the Dutch as the Driedaagse Zeeslag or 
“Three Days’ Naval Battle,” illustrates how wind patterns interacted differently with the distinct 
naval systems employed by the Dutch and English in the First Anglo-Dutch War. Initially, the 
tactical advantage bestowed by the windward position of Tromp’s united fleet in the face of 
Blake’s scattered divisions was nullified both by the increasingly obsolete Dutch tactic of 
targeting rigging, and, more importantly, by the far greater capacity of the larger Commonwealth 
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ships to withstand and inflict artillery bombardment. A master of defensive warfare on land, 
Blake ensured that the 20 vessels near his flagship were tightly arranged and prepared for the 
Dutch assault. Meanwhile, the quick action of the other English admirals helped them gain the 
weather gage against the confused and stationary swarm of Dutch vessels surrounding Blake’s 
division. Although being windward granted one fleet an important advantage at the start of an 
engagement, the Battle of Portland, like the Battle of Dungeness, revealed that the weather gage 
could be lost even in steady winds if one armada managed to outmanoeuvre the other.  
The threat of a lee shore in rising winds, however, could only be escaped before the wind 
strengthened into a gale, and then only through retreat. Tromp, a seasoned mariner, employed his 
remarkable seamanship and environmental knowledge to guide his convoy from the supposed 
trap of Cap Gris Nez. Nevertheless, it was building westerly winds that ultimately thwarted the 
English pursuit and saved the remnants of the Republic’s fleet from annihilation. The unusual 
persistence of westerly winds during the convoy’s journey home, the Battle of Portland, and the 
convoy’s escape to Dunkirk, all in a month when winds typically emanated from many different 
directions even in the warm twentieth-century climate, reflects the general abundance of 
westerlies in the climate of the mid-seventeenth century.
73
   
 Amsterdam’s entrepôt economy essentially ground to a halt for over three months after 
the Battle of Portland, as Dutch warships could no longer escort convoys to and from the 
Republic. Negotiating a peace from such a weakened position was out of the question. By May 
the Republic’s carpenters and shipwrights had prepared a fleet of nearly 100 men-of-war, 
although larger vessels designed to match the English great ships were not yet ready to sail. The 
restored fleet escorted several hundred merchantmen to the Shetland Islands, before sailing south 
to encounter a more numerous English fleet near the Gabbard shoal on 12 June, 1653. English 
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vessels were still far larger than their Dutch counterparts, and most were equipped with castles to 
repel Dutch boarders. Moreover, their captains operated according to new Fighting Instructions 
that heralded the maturation of English line of battle tactics. Light, southwesterly winds allowed 
the English to claim the weather gage, which they used to bombard the Republic’s fleet at range. 
On the second day of fighting the Dutch ranks broke, and Tromp’s orderly withdrawal quickly 
became a chaotic rout. Several Dutch vessels collided with each other and, so entangled, were 
easily taken by the English. Only nightfall preserved the majority of the Republic’s fleet, which 
found shelter in the Wielings, at the entrance to the Scheldt estuary.
74
  
 Light, westerly winds during second day of the Battle off the Gabbard or Zeeslag bij 
Nieuwpoort (“Naval battle near Nieuwpoort”) created ideal conditions for the English line of 
battle tactics. In fact, Dutch propaganda blamed the defeat on the westerly wind.
75
 However, the 
ship logbooks kept by both Witte de With and Michiel de Ruyter reveal that these winds were 
not continuous. De With recorded westerly winds from the evening of the 9
th
 to the 11
th
, and 
again from the 13
th
 to the 14
th
. Still, of the 20 weather measurements he took in June, only nine 
listed winds from the West, while an equal number described winds from the East.
76
 De Ruyter’s 
logbook did not record anything from 13 June to 1 July, but his measurements for the first two 
weeks of June were nearly identical to those taken by de With.
77
 Hence, although the Battle off 
the Gabbard was fought during a swell of westerly winds, those winds were neither continuous 
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nor seasonally unusual, and can therefore not be convincingly tied to the influence of the 
prevailing climate.  
 With English mastery of the North Sea temporarily uncontested, an ailing Blake, soon to 
be replaced by Admiral George Monck, imposed the war’s first systematic blockade. The 
English admiralty hoped to suffocate a Dutch economy that depended on maritime commerce, 
but harassment of Dutch ports was stymied by the extensive shoals that protected Dutch harbours 
and the entrance to the Zuider Zee. Even Dutch crews were required carefully to navigate 
through the narrow entrances to these shoals, most of which were either unknown to English 
pilots or impassable by the deep-draughted English vessels. In the sixteenth century, an elaborate 
warning system had also been established along the coast to allow the Dutch to remove buoys at 
the mouths of rivers and the entrances to harbours when hostile vessels approached.
78
 Still, safety 
from English raids scarcely diminished the economic toll of the blockade. It could not endure for 
long in the seventeenth century, given the administrative weaknesses of contemporary naval 
systems, but it is likely that persistent westerlies stimulated by a warmer climate facilitated the 
delivery of supplies to English ships patrolling the Dutch coast.
79
 Once again the Republic’s 
leadership resolved that peace under these conditions was untenable; once again Dutch shipyards 
demonstrated their remarkable industriousness. By August, the Republic’s naval strength 
amounted to perhaps 107 men-of-war and nine fireships, but it was divided between Tromp’s 
southerly fleet in the Wielings, and De With’s smaller squadron assembling near Den Helder to 
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the North. A westerly or southerly wind would allow help Tromp guide his divisions up the 
Dutch coast to Den Helder, but De With required an easterly or northerly wind to leave port.  
Tromp took advantage of a westerly wind on 6 August and ordered his fleet to sail north, 
but Monck, aware of the Dutch predicament, had already stationed his fleet off Den Helder. 
When the English sighted Tromp’s 82 vessels to the south on 8 August, Monck promptly 
abandoned his siege of Den Helder and ordered his captains to engage the Dutch fleet. Although 
Tromp initially sailed to sea in order to gain the weather gage, in the afternoon the wind shifted 
from west to north, and the English had the advantage. The Commonwealth fleet now chased 
Tromp’s divisions, but northerly winds and Monck’s preoccupation with Tromp had finally 
given De With an opportunity to leave Den Helder. Slowed by barnacles, Tromp’s vessels were 
forced to give battle by 4:00 PM, and the Dutch fleet remained divided at nightfall. As the 
English drifted downwind in the night, Tromp ordered his fleet to execute a complicated tacking 
manoeuvre and sail north. It was a daring gambit in the darkness, but on 9 August the English 
awoke to find a united Dutch fleet sailing with the weather gage. Nevertheless, rising north-
westerly winds strengthened into a gale and prohibited battle.  
The wind moderated by the morning of the 10
th
, with the opposing armadas drifting off 
the Scheveningen, not far from Haarlem. The fleets had switched places in the storm, but with 
the breeze now from the south-southwest the Dutch had retained the weather gage. Unlike Blake, 
who at Portland had waited for the Dutch to bear down with the wind, Monck resolved to 
aggressively tack against the wind. He hoped that his fleet would sail through the Dutch lines 
and so claim the weather gage. As the English fleet passed the Dutch ranks Tromp ordered his 
vessels to follow, hoping to prevent Monck from turning before the wind. In the tacking battle 
that ensued the English crossed through Dutch lines on four occasions, with Tromp dying on the 
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first pass. The ship logbook of the Vanguard records how, by afternoon, “many of their ships’ 
masts were shot by the board, others sunk to the number of twenty. At last God gave us the 
wind.” Most Dutch ships were now retreating before the wind, bearing Northeast to the island of 
Texel, but some heavily damaged vessels under De Ruyter and Evertsen could not manoeuvre 
past the English fleet. Their crews were forced to sail west against the wind, with Monck’s fleet 
in pursuit.  By nightfall perhaps 3,000 Dutch seamen had died with 15 ships lost, to at most 900 
Englishmen and only two English vessels, one a fireship. Still, Monck was forced to lift the 
blockade and retire his fleet to Southwold for repairs, because virtually all English ships had 
sustained some damage to their masts.
80
  
While the westerlies that prevailed during the Battle of Scheveningen were seasonally 
typical, De With’s ship journal strongly suggests that the battle was fought in a period of 
unusually continuous westerly winds. Of the 31 weather observations written by De With in 
August and September, 19.5 – or 63% – recorded westerly winds.81 Accordingly the Battle of 
Scheveningen was likely influenced by the climate of the mid-seventeenth century. However, 
during the engagement the pattern of advantages and disadvantages bestowed by persistent 
westerly winds shifted from one fleet to the other, with both commanders employing innovative 
strategies to claim the weather gage. The manoeuvres ordered by Tromp, De With and Monck 
demonstrated that although the quest for the weather gage could dictate the strategies pursued in 
battle, the weather gage, when claimed, was neither a permanent nor necessarily decisive 
advantage. As ever, the influence of wind patterns was mediated not only by cultural frameworks 
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and human initiative, but also by environmental circumstances as superficially innocuous as a 
cluster of barnacles.
82
  
The division of the Dutch armada into separate retreats against and before the wind also 
demonstrates how wind patterns could influence withdrawal from battle. Although both 
retreating and pursuing fleets sailed with or against the same wind, fleeing crews usually wished 
to minimize their time away from the shelter of friendly shoals and harbours. Even when 
retreating vessels were out of range of enemy fire, ships with damaged masts were vulnerable in 
storms, those with punctured hulls could not be continually pumped free of water, injured 
seamen required medical attention on shore, and larger or less seaworthy vessels were often 
vulnerable to the harrying of faster frigates. Hence, during the Battle of Scheveningen the worst 
Dutch losses were suffered by the damaged ships that fled west, against the wind and away from 
the Republic, with Monck’s fleet in hot pursuit.  
Still, the relationship between wind patterns and retreat was differently expressed in the 
unique geographic, environmental, cultural, and tactical frameworks that coloured each battle of 
the Anglo-Dutch Wars. By similarly thwarting the progress of both retreating and chasing fleets, 
contrary winds could also aid fleeing ships, especially when those vessels were out of range, and 
particularly when they were slower than their pursuers. Wind velocity was equally important. 
For example, storms could expose retreating ships to a lee shore, depending on their wind 
direction and the state of the chase. Storms that did not blow pursuing ships towards the coast 
could also benefit fleeing vessels, especially if those storms struck in the late stages of a retreat. 
The pursuers could then find themselves in a very vulnerable position, because fleeing vessels 
were typically closer to shelter. Similarly, light winds, so beneficial to English gunnery, could 
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also benefit retreating Dutch ships that had passed out of firing range, as Dutch vessels sailed 
better on calm seas.  
The Battle of Scheveningen had ended in retreat and destruction for the Republic, but  
Monck’s blockade had been lifted. The States-General hastily coordinated the assembly of a new 
fleet, and ordered De With to escort a fleet of merchantmen towards the North. Inadequately 
provisioned, the Republic’s makeshift fleet returned to Texel in October with over 400 
merchantmen. Fearful of desertion, the States-General dismissed De With’s “ridiculous” pleas to 
return to port, resolving instead to supply the fleet at sea until more merchant vessels could be 
brought to safety. De With’s fears were realized on 7 November, when a ferocious gale rose 
from the Northwest and endured for five days, exposing the Dutch fleet to a lee shore. By the 
third day De With wrote that his ships were losing their anchors and each other, and when the 
winds moderated on 12 November as many as 11 warships were lost. Of the rest at least 24 had 
lost their masts.
83
  
In the twentieth century, North Sea westerlies were slightly more common in November 
than winds from other directions, but for in the first two weeks of November 1653 De With 
recorded westerlies in fully 83% of his weather observations. One can imagine De With penning 
his request to the States-General in the days before the storm, as a westerly wind rocked his 
cabin. Ultimately, the direction of the winds that exposed De With’s ships to the shore of Texel – 
if not their velocity – can be linked to the warmer climate in which the war was fought. That 
climate did not render the westerly storm inevitable, but it certainly made it highly probable as 
the Dutch fleet continued to linger at sea. Royalist preachers loyal to the disempowered House of 
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Orange regarded the gale as divine punishment for negotiations with Cromwell’s regime. Still, 
the losses suffered by the Dutch convinced Grand Pensionary Jan de Witt and his fellow 
republicans that peace was necessary.
 84
   
Having deposed the English monarchy, Cromwell feared that the Republic’s defeat would 
incite a royalist revolt in favour of the House of Orange. Such a revolt might install an even more 
implacable adversary across the North Sea, and this concern, as well as the state of English 
finances, led English negotiators to conclude a peace so lenient that it scarcely amounted to an 
English victory. According to the Treaty of Westminster, Dutch captains were required to 
acknowledge England’s sovereignty of the seas by saluting their English counterparts in the 
North Sea, and the Dutch would pay tribute when their herring fleets fished off the English coast. 
The Dutch also agreed to recognize the terms of the 1651 Navigation Act.
85
 Dutch ships were 
now prohibited from importing goods to England or its colonies, but Dutch merchants quickly 
circumvented the new trade restrictions. The peace therefore had little potential to damage 
Amsterdam’s primacy in world trade. Still, beyond the terms of peace the first Anglo-Dutch War 
had been costly for the Dutch Republic. Many of the ships captured by English privateers were 
flutes, and the efficiency of these vessels temporarily enabled English merchants to offer rates 
comparable to those of their Dutch colleagues. Also costly was the VOC’s need to replace East 
Indiamen that had been drafted into the Republic’s fleet and subsequently destroyed. Moreover, 
resources that would otherwise have been directed to combat colonial rebellion and Portuguese 
resistance in Brazil had been diverted to the struggle against the Commonwealth. In 1654, the 
                                                 
84
 De With, “Journal kept by vice-admiral Witte de With.” 
85
 Lacey Baldwin Smith, This Realm of England, 1399-1688, Eighth Edition. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
2001), 311.  
 313 
WIC surrendered Recife, permanently altering the possibilities for a Dutch empire in the new 
world.
86
  
 The First Anglo-Dutch War was fought between two increasingly global empires, but its 
outcome was decided in the space between Amsterdam and London, the narrow swath of the 
North Sea and English Channel through which flowed the commerce of both world systems. 
There, frequent westerly winds that accompanied a slightly warmer climate influenced naval 
operations on various scales, in a manner that, while complex, nevertheless favoured the English 
in most occasions. Persistent westerlies, mediated through a web of cultural and environmental 
relationships, granted tactical initiative to English privateers and sped supply ships destined for 
English blockades. More importantly, westerlies frequently aided English armadas in battle and, 
when expressed in storms, ravaged Dutch fleets. Prevailing westerlies also coloured Dutch 
“landscapes of the mind,” limiting Dutch attacks on English naval infrastructure. Ultimately, the 
conclusion of the First Anglo-Dutch War was more a truce than a lasting peace, but the next 
conflict would be fought in changed environmental circumstances, between very different naval 
adversaries.  
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Chapter 5 
Warfare in a Colder Climate: the Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1664-67 
 
 Unrest following Oliver Cromwell’s death in 1658 prompted George Monck to restore 
the monarchy by negotiating the return of Charles II in 1660. The Dutch state was now Europe’s 
only major Republic. Its States-General sent lavish gifts to Charles II, but although he had spent 
his exile in Breda he remained implacably hostile. In 1660 the English parliament passed a new 
Navigation Act that introduced a register of ships permitted to trade with England, stipulated that 
every ship’s crew would be 75% English, banned foreign merchants from English colonies, and 
ensured that all colonial goods would be sent to English ports before arriving at their ultimate 
destinations. Arguably the most effective protectionist policy proposed by a rival power since the 
origins of the Republic, the Act threatened to end Dutch participation in English commercial 
life.
1
  
 The Navigation Act of 1660 antagonized the States-General, but it was the actions of a 
belligerent cabal of merchants, politicians, and naval officers under James, the Duke of York, 
that ultimately instigated the Second Anglo-Dutch War. The failure of the English East India 
Company to challenge the VOC’s Asian monopoly convinced the group that only action in the 
North Sea and English Channel could force the WIC and VOC to yield to English demands. In 
the first years of the 1660s, Sir George Downing, the resolutely antagonistic envoy to the 
Republic, continually pressured the States-General to make commercial concessions. Ultimately, 
he succeeded only in convincing its grand pensionary, Jan de Witt, that appeasement would be 
futile. In that increasingly poisonous atmosphere the Royal Adventurers, a trading company 
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associated with the Duke of York’s cabal, engaged the WIC in an escalating series of hostilities 
over the West African slave trade. In 1664, James instructed a small fleet under Sir Robert 
Holmes to eliminate the WIC’s presence in West Africa. By September Holmes had captured 
several Dutch ships, seized all the primary WIC fortifications except Elmina, and negotiated new 
agreements with indigenous chiefs.
2
  
 English provocations after the restoration of Charles II were as much a response to the 
Dutch Republic’s perceived economic strength as a reaction to its assumed military weakness. 
Since James and his allies believed that the Dutch could not defeat the English fleet, they 
guessed that the States-General would ultimately quail in the face of English pressure. In fact, 
since the First Anglo-Dutch War, De Witt had spearheaded the transformation of the Dutch naval 
system, which had adopted many of the most effective elements of its English counterpart. After 
the Treaty of Westminster was signed, a belated Dutch campaign to build ships equal to English 
second or third rates had yielded 64 men-of-war of revolutionary size, which now formed the 
core of the Republic’s new standing navy. The largest of these ships, while not as massive as the 
English first-rates, nevertheless approached the maximum size contemporary Dutch harbours 
could accommodate. Meanwhile, Dutch assets would be protected from English raids by as many 
as 90 smaller, quicker warships. De Witt also simplified and centralized Dutch naval 
administration under his effective leadership, while increasing the income of the Republic’s five 
Admiralties. However, the Republic’s naval system had not improved in every respect. While 
Tromp’s remarkable seamanship had counted among the Republic’s few advantages in the First 
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Anglo-Dutch War, in the second war Jacob van Wassenaer, an officer in the army, was selected 
as Lieutenant Admiral, after De Ruyter declined De Witt’s offer. Nevertheless, on balance the 
changes appear to have improved the overall morale of Dutch sailors.
3
  
 In composition and tactics the English fleet was in most respects fundamentally 
unchanged since the Treaty of Westminster. Many of its warships were renamed after the 
restoration, yet few had been constructed in the following decade. Still, the Fighting Instructions 
had been further refined. They now specified that captains would fight in a single line during the 
entire battle, keeping the stations assigned to them before the commencement of hostilities. 
Overall, the authors of the Fighting Instructions sought to expand the tactical unit beyond the 
individual warship to encompass the entire line of battle. Consequently they prohibited the taking 
of prizes without a flag officer’s permission, instructed disabled ships to fall to the rear rather 
than seek immediate help, and dispersed heavier ships among lighter vessels. English tactics 
emphasized unity and discipline as never before, but the state’s naval leadership was divided 
between pardoned republicans and staunch monarchists. The English naval system was therefore 
characterized by tactical sophistication but also hubris, internal division, and a damaging lull in 
naval construction. It had assumed many of the worst institutional traits that had plagued the 
Dutch at the onset of the First Anglo-Dutch War. Moreover, it would now face similar 
meteorological disadvantages, stimulated by a shifting climatic regime.
4
  
 In the Second Anglo-Dutch War, meteorological conditions rendered more likely in a 
cooler climate granted important advantages to the Republic. More common easterly winds 
enabled the Dutch fleet to claim the weather gage, and in turn the tactical initiative, in most 
battles. Changed patterns of prevailing wind usually allowed the Republic’s armadas to easily 
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leave port, and may have aided Dutch privateers. Moreover, persistent easterlies fanned the Fire 
of London in 1666 and a Dutch raid up the Medway River in 1667, disasters that financially 
crippled the English war effort. In naval engagements, high winds more common in a cooler 
climate repeatedly forced English crews to close their lower tier of guns, against a Dutch fleet 
with ships and artillery that increasingly matched their own. Cold winters likely slowed both 
English and Dutch ship construction, but also contributed to the failure of a Münsterite invasion 
of the Republic. Still, the military impact of the weather that accompanied a cooler climate was 
hardly straightforward. Meteorological conditions less likely during the Maunder Minimum 
occasionally provided advantages to English fleets, while the influence of weather rendered more 
common was directed by choices taken, or not taken, by commanders and their subordinates.  
 
Beginning of the Second Anglo-Dutch War 
 
 After the near destruction of the WIC’s presence in West Africa the Duke of York 
commanded a fleet to wait in the English Channel and challenge any Dutch fleet that departed 
the Republic for Africa. Anticipating this, De Witt sent word to De Ruyter’s Mediterranean 
squadron, ordering them to sail south and avenge Dutch losses. In October De Ruyter swept 
down the coast of West Africa, seizing many ships and all English fortifications except Cape 
Coast castle. When the humiliating news returned to London in December, the English Privy 
Council permitted English vessels to seize Dutch shipping in the Channel and the North Sea. On 
29 December a squadron under Thomas Allin ambushed a Dutch convoy sailing from Smyrna in 
rough weather. With eight men-of-war the English heavily outgunned the Dutch, but in the 
stormy weather most of the English vessels ran aground, and the rest were heavily damaged. 
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Allin wrote that, “had God pleased to have sent us fair weather, we had gone great service, but it 
was a fret of wind, that we did not handle our sails to fight.” Of 33 Dutch ships only three were 
lost, of which two had been captured.
5
  
 Destructive gales were as common in the North Sea region during Second Anglo-Dutch 
War as they were in the first, although they were less numerous than they would be in the third 
war.
6
 The stimulus for increased cyclonic activity during the First Anglo-Dutch War may have 
been tied to the regular rhythms of climatic cycles, but the rise in severe storms after 1660 has 
been linked to the onset of the Maunder Minimum. On the other hand, Allin engaged the Smyrna 
fleet south of the North Sea region, and the geographical extent of changes in storm frequency is 
not yet known. Still, severe storms rendered more common in a cooling climate probably 
affected the attempted capture of the Dutch Smyrna fleet, stressing the already problematic 
interplay between English ship design, nearby shoals, and tactical blunders made by English 
commanders.   
  Changing weather patterns associated with a shifting climate could influence not only 
military operations but also the efficiency of essential infrastructure. Shipyards and 
transportation networks in particular occupied the conceptual space between the relatively 
narrow, well-documented tactical execution of naval operations and broader strategic issues of 
resource supply in different economies. Such infrastructure was strongly affected by shifts in 
winter temperature. Statistics created from a synthesis of material and documentary proxy data 
indicate that the winter of 1664/1665 was generally only slightly colder than the twentieth-
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century average, but an examination of qualitative sources demonstrates the unusual 
concentration and, consequently, the heightened effect of severe winter weather. After Allin’s 
disappointing raid temperatures plummeted for the rest of December, and until February the 
winter of 1664/1665 was, according to Josselin in Essex, “wonderfull sharpe beyond what was 
known for so long.”7 In his diary, Samuel Pepys, Chief Secretary to the English Admiralty, 
frequently described abundant snow and frigid temperatures, writing on 14 January that, “I 
walked home, it being a very hard frost, and I find myself as heretofore in cold weather to begin 
to burn within and pimples and pricks all over my body, my pores with cold being shut up.”8 On 
16 February Pepys wrote that “this was one of the coldest days, all say, they ever felt in 
England.”9 In the Dutch Republic the Maas froze through much of January, then again for parts 
of February, while the trekvaart between Haarlem and Leiden was halted by ice for six weeks, 
before westerly winds ushered in thawing towards the end of February.
10
  
 On 6 February the most important of the Dutch admiralties, the Admiralty of the Maas, 
wrote to the States-General explaining delays in the construction of 24 new great ships. These 
included De Zeven Provinciën, which would later serve as De Ruyter’s flagship in the Second 
and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars.
11
 According to the letter, construction had been slowed by 
prolonged freezing and “other inconveniences,” ensuring that the vessels would not be 
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completed on time.
12
 Unfortunately, neither the Admiralty’s letter, nor subsequent missives 
written by important members of the States-General, described how cold winter weather affected 
shipbuilding.
13
 It is possible that frozen canals prohibited or, at least, slowed the transportation of 
supplies necessary for the construction of the new great ships, although most of these materials 
would have already been on site. Most likely construction was slowed as labourers suffered from 
discomfort caused by cold and required more resources to sustain their work.
14
  
 This delay would have consequences. In April the English main fleet under the Duke of 
York sortied from the Gunfleet, Essex before the Dutch armada could assemble. While stationed 
off Texel the fleet captured eight Dutch merchantmen inbound from Bordeaux and Lisbon, but 
thereafter it it was beset by gales. With no rich prizes expected for several months James II soon 
commanded his captains to abandon the blockade and return to the Gunfleet. The Dutch fleet 
finally assembled near Texel, and at 120 mostly large vessels it was the most powerful armada 
ever assembled by the Republic, likely equal to that fielded by the English. After uniting through 
May, in the first week of June the fleet departed in haste for the Dogger Sands. Surviving 
missives reveal that the fleet’s commanders acted on the widespread belief that the English 
armada had been scattered and heavily damaged by a recent storm.
15
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Particularly illuminating are the letters of George Downing, whose well-founded 
intelligence reports are a critical source for the history of the Second Anglo-Dutch War. On 5 
June, he reported that “[the Dutch] suppose and report that [the Duke of York’s fleet was] 
scattered by the late storme, and that they are putt over to the coast of England to rendez-vous 
againe.”16 According to Downing, the Dutch believed that the storm, apart from damaging the 
English fleet, also granted the Republic more time to train its new sailors, of which there were 
many. On 12 June Downing lamented that, “the weather and wind have bin these 3 or 4 dayes as 
fit for their goeing thither and for a fight as could be wished,” before describing how the Dutch 
were “exceeding confident . . . of getting the better.”17 
 Given these widespread attitudes, Van Wassenaer’s orders at sea are especially 
perplexing. On 11 June the Dutch armada encountered the English fleet 40 miles Southeast of 
Lowestoft. However, Van Wassenaer did not command an attack, despite being windward of the 
prevailing Northeasterly. On the 12
th
 the English were just ten miles distant, but again Van 
Wassenaer did not exploit his advantage. The winds were relatively light, but during the late 
Maunder Minimum gales were almost twice as common in June as they were in the twentieth 
century. Accordingly, it is possible that Van Wassenaer was waiting for rougher weather. Higher 
winds would have forced the English to close their lowest gun ports, and would have strained 
repairs necessitated by the storm several days earlier. Still, Van Wassenaer’s hesitation puzzled 
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both Dutch and English captains, with one Dutch captain writing that “God Almighty took away 
the skill of our Commander in Chief, or never gave him any.”18  
By the evening of the 12
th
 the wind shifted to blow from the South-southwest, and by the 
morning of 13 June the English had claimed the weather gage. The Duke of York promptly 
ordered his captains to attack with the wind. The English squadrons clustered together in their 
first pass, with some ships firing into friendly vessels, but English lack of discipline paled in 
comparison to the chaotic conduct of Dutch captains, who abandoned any semblance of order in 
their haste to claim prizes. The Dutch, to leeward, were unable to use their fireships, and both 
fleets bombarded each other as thick smoke blew away from the English vessels to envelop the 
Dutch. At 3:00 PM the powder magazine in Van Wassenaer’s flagship exploded under the 
onslaught of several English three-deckers, killing the admiral and his crew. The death of Van 
Wassenaer’s direct subordinate and subsequent miscommunication among the surviving admirals 
promptly scattered the Dutch fleet.  
Over 112 kilometres from safety, the damaged remnants of the Dutch fleet might have 
been annihilated but for the actions of the Duke of York’s gentleman-in-waiting. Acting on prior 
orders from Anne Hyde, the Duchess of York, he commanded the captain of the English flagship 
to shorten sail while James was sleeping, causing the fleet to abandon its pursuit.
19
 This critical 
decision changed the character of the Dutch defeat. On the morning of the 14
th
 the bulk of the 
Republic’s fleet reached the safety of the shoals that enveloped its ports. Only one English vessel 
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had been sunk and 800 seamen had been killed, but a disproportionate toll had fallen upon the 
English command. While the Dutch had lost 17 ships and at least 5,000 men, each fleet counted 
two admirals and many captains among the dead.
20
 Moreover, in the aftermath of the battle 
English dominance in the North Sea was frustrated by several months of persistent storminess, 
during which the Dutch completed their delayed great ships.
21
 An English report to the 
Committee of Parliament presented on 1 November 1667 identified the difficulty of pressing the 
English advantage after the battle as the most important failure of the war.
22
 
The Battle of Lowestoft was contested in westerly winds. Nevertheless, weather 
conditions typical of the Maunder Minimum, filtered through the occasionally bizarre lens of 
personal agency, influenced where, when and how the engagement was fought. Prevailing 
westerly winds prompted caution among Dutch pilots in the First Anglo-Dutch War, thwarting 
Tromp’s hopes for a raid down the Thames. By contrast, in 1665 reports that a gale had struck 
the English fleet, when coupled with persistent easterly winds that enabled entry to the North Sea 
from Texel, encouraged Dutch commanders to hazard a battle far from the safety of their home 
shoals. Both the storm and the summer easterly were rendered more likely in the climate of the 
deepening Maunder Minimum. Still, Van Wassenaer had been reluctant to depart Texel, much to 
Jan de Witt’s frustration, and on 11 June he was again strangely hesitant to exploit steady 
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easterlies by attacking the English with the weather gage.
23
 Van Wassenaer’s tactical blunder and 
the machinations of the Duchess of York demonstrate that environmental structures can never be 
considered direct influences in human affairs.  
Anthropologist E. Jones has conceptualized a climatic event, “as a funnel through which 
ongoing processes are channelled, and are in some sense transformed,” and certainly weather 
typical of new climatic regime, interacting with other environmental structures, helped channel 
the course of the Battle of Lowestoft on a level beyond individual agency.
24
 That these weather 
conditions were advantageous for the Dutch fleet was understood not only by politicians and 
mariners but also large swaths of a population that was intimately connected to maritime life. 
Nevertheless, if climatic stimuli were interacting with cultural and social structures to funnel the 
impending battle to a certain outcome on 11 June, then Van Wassenaer’s decisions were 
sufficient to influence the effectiveness of his naval system, changing the pattern of advantages 
and disadvantages afforded by a shifting climate. Small wonder, then, that he was little mourned. 
In a letter to Sir Henry Bennet, Downing wrote that most Dutchmen, “hardly give [van 
Wassenaer] a good word. They attribute the loss of this Battle mainly to the English their having 
the wind of them, and they say that if ever they should come to fight againe and have the wind of 
the English, they doubt not but they should give a better account of it.”25  
The Dutch Republic may have lost the first major battle of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, 
but its naval effort was succeeding in small ways that would ultimately have major 
consequences. Unfortunately, source limitations generally constrain an exploration of 
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relationships between climatic shifts, weather events, and naval operations to an examination of 
large-scale engagements. Nevertheless, Dutch awareness of the storm that damaged the English 
fleet on the eve of the Battle of Lowestoft reflects the effectiveness of the Republic’s maritime 
intelligence network. Beacons and missives like Downing’s intelligence reports helped inform 
opposing commanders, but far-flung networks of small boats called “galjoots” provided the bulk 
of naval intelligence gathering. These boats allowed opposing fleets to encounter one another in 
a region that, while geographically constrained, is frequently stormy, foggy, and perilous even 
for modern mariners in a warmer climate. Surviving letters reveal that the Republic’s galiot 
system was likely superior to that of the English, at least in the Second Anglo-Dutch War. After 
the Battle of Lowestoft, Downing reported that Dutch galiots had been sent north of Scotland to 
instruct all returning vessels to seek shelter in northern ports while the Republic’s fleet was 
restored, adding that, “some nimble capers [privateers] or other men-of-warre would make 
worke among those galliotts.”26  
On 30 June, 1665 Downing acknowledged that the Dutch, “are here mightily to be 
comended for keeping such a number galliotts continually at sea for advice,” and on 17 July he 
warned that “Galliotts lye still about Holland to advertise all ships that are comeing this way.” 
Several months later the Earl of Sandwich, who succeeded the Duke of York as commander in 
chief after the Battle of Lowestoft, defended his decision to abandon a cruise along the east end 
of the Dogger Bank by writing that “the multitude of galliotts the Dutch keepe abroad to give 
advice” would thwart any attempt to capture prizes there.27 Unfortunately, because individual 
galjoots were inexpensive, lightly crewed by relatively unskilled mariners, and engaged in 
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ostensibly inglorious activities, no surviving sources record how the Republic’s extensive and 
apparently effective intelligence network was affected by weather events. Still, it is possible that 
more common storms proved deadly for many galiot crews, while easterly winds allowed 
elements of the network to quickly assume new positions.
28
  
Equally important for the outcome of the Second Anglo-Dutch War was the improved 
performance of Dutch privateers. In the First Anglo-Dutch War, English privateers had 
devastated the Republic’s merchant shipping, and expectations of similar success encouraged 
English provocations in the months before the second war was officially declared. Instead, Dutch 
privateers seized as many prizes as their English rivals over the course of the war, and the much 
larger size of the Dutch merchant fleet meant English losses were far more damaging. The rising 
success of Dutch privateering was a sustained trend. During the Third Anglo-Dutch War the 
wealth acquired by English privateers was again expected to help finance English naval 
operations, but the Republic’s privateers ultimately captured far more vessels than their English 
counterparts. Because the wars were fought largely to expand English trade, the success of Dutch 
privateers was an important catalyst behind English efforts to commence peace negotiations. The 
decision of the States-General to forbid merchant shipping that did not service the oceanic rich 
trades, English strategic errors, and the efficiency of the Dutch galiot network all contributed to 
the success of Dutch privateering after the First Anglo-Dutch War.
29
  
It is also plausible that the onset of the Maunder Minimum proved beneficial for Dutch 
privateers.
 Easterly winds likely enabled the Republic’s privateers to surprise their prey while 
granting them the initiative in battle. Moreover, privateers often lurked near typically sheltered 
coasts, and it is possible that more frequent, more severe storms inflicted damage to merchant 
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ships at sea that privateers avoided. These merchant vessels may have been more easily seized in 
the wake of such storms. However, the surviving sources that describe the exploits of privateers 
do not reliably record meteorological data in a manner that would enable firm conclusions about 
the broader relationship between a shifting climate, changing weather patterns, and the nature of 
Anglo-Dutch privateering.
30
  
 Moreover, the Anglo-Dutch Wars revealed that only large fleets assembled to defeat their 
counterparts could win or lose a naval war, despite the enduring importance of maritime 
intelligence networks and privateering. Some tempting targets were also too important and 
consequently too well defended to be taken by privateers. After avenging Dutch losses in West 
Africa and raiding English possessions in the New World, by July De Ruyter and the men-of-war 
still under his command were expected to enter the North Sea. As Van Wassenaer’s natural 
successor, De Ruyter was critical to the Dutch war effort. Indeed on 28 June Downing reported 
that, “every body at the court is lookeing how the wind blowes, and they expect with infinite 
impatience de Ruyter’s returne, who . . . is to come round Scotland.” De Ruyter’s anticipated 
return corresponded with the expected arrival of the VOC fleet in Norway, which carried wealth 
that, if lost to the English, threatened to decide the war.
31
 On 10 July, a large English armada 
under Sandwich was already sailing north towards Bergen, Norway, after English agents 
reported that the VOC fleet had just entered the city’s harbour. The Republic’s main fleet was 
hastily readied to escort De Ruyter and the East India fleet back to Texel in the face of English 
opposition.
32
  
                                                 
30
 Rommelse, The Second Anglo-Dutch War, 125.  
31
 The VOC fleet was taking the “back way.” See Map 2.1, Chapter 2.   
32
 “Downing aan Arlington, 28 Juni 1665,” in Bescheiden uit Vreemde Archieven omtrent de Groote Nederlandsche 
Zeeoorlogen, Vol. I, ed. Colenbrander, 253.  
 328 
 De Ruyter’s battered squadron reached Bergen with the English fast approaching. 
However, the Dutch employed a succession of southerly winds, fog, and persistent easterlies to 
slip by the English fleet and return safely to Delfzijl.
33
 Gerard Brandt, a contemporary 
biographer of De Ruyter, wrote that after an English scout spotted the Dutch the “fog . . . cloaked 
the [Dutch] ships by night, the changing winds . . . constantly deceived the English, and the same 
winds . . . delivered [De Ruyter’s fleet] from peril.”34 The fog encountered by De Ruyter was 
stimulated by warmer air from the south flowing over cold water, and the spring of 1665 had 
been cool. While the southerly breeze encountered by De Ruyter’s fleet was not rendered more 
likely during the Maunder Minimum, regional water may have been chilled by the influence of a 
cooler climatic regime, perhaps thickening the fog that helped the Dutch escape the English fleet.  
Certainly the easterlies that aided De Ruyter’s return to the Republic would have been 
particularly rare in June just ten years earlier.
35
  
 The English fleet under Sandwich had actually struggled for weeks to reach Bergen in the 
face of calms and northerly winds, and now De Ruyter’s squadron had slipped from its grasp. On 
the other hand, Gilbert Talbot, the English envoy in Copenhagen, had been in negotiations with 
King Frederick of Denmark, who ruled southern Norway and nominally supported the Republic. 
Talbot now reported that Frederick would break treaty with the Dutch by surrendering the fleet 
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into English hands, in return for half the spoils. On 9 August, Sandwich dispatched a squadron of 
15 warships and two fireships under Sir Thomas Teddiman to engage the VOC fleet in Bergen, 
while the rest of the English armada waited to ambush the Dutch main fleet when it arrived from 
the South.
36
  
However, when Teddiman reached Bergen the governor, Claus von Aslefeldt, denied all 
knowledge of the secret agreement and insisted that no more than five ships could enter the 
harbour. Meanwhile, severe southeasterly winds blew directly out of the harbour, and threatened 
to impede any attack. During the night, the Dutch repositioned their ships and fortified the 
garrison on the shore as negotiations dragged on between Teddiman’s representive and Von 
Aslefeldt. Victuals were now running low aboard the English ships, and the Danes were 
continuing to stall for time. Accordingly, at first light the next day Teddiman ordered an attack, 
although his squadron faced a persistent and intense southeasterly. Eight English vessels attacked 
the VOC fleet while the others engaged the nearby Danish castle, but their rigging quickly 
disintegrated in the face of Danish and Dutch cannon fire. Increasingly out of control, 
Teddiman’s vessels threatened to run afoul of one another. Sandwhich wrote that “if God had 
given us but few howers of a faire wind, against the opposition both of the Dane and Dutch wee 
had destroyed both the shipps and towne.”37 Instead, Teddiman’s fireships were ineffectual, and 
the English squadron was driven from Bergen with 400 seamen killed, to 29 for the Dutch.
38
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Miscommunication among Danish officials, the shortage of victuals among English 
vessels, and the threat of the Dutch fleet’s impending arrival influenced Teddiman’s disastrous 
decision to attack in a high easterly winds that, while seasonally unusual, were symptomatic of 
the Maunder Minimum in the North Sea. The Southeasterly winds that so benefitted the VOC 
convoy also drove the main English fleet towards the Northwest, away from its planned 
rendezvous with Teddiman’s squadron. Sandwich and his commanders resolved to make for the 
Shetland Islands owing to lack of supplies, particularly water, and their analysis of “the damage 
our heavy shipps must have received in hulls and masts in that climate and season.” 39 By 20 
September the English fleet was again in the North Sea when it was grazed by a severe storm 
that disabled one vessel, flooded the ammunition stores of a second, but did not separate any 
ships.
40
 However, the Dutch fleet under De Ruyter, then escorting the VOC convoy back from 
Bergen, was directly struck by the same gale and was scattered. On 22 September, Sandwich 
exploited the tactical situation created by the storm’s unequal toll by overseeing the capture of 
seven Dutch ships, including two hulking East Indiamen. During the battle, the English vessel 
Hector, fighting with its lower gun ports open, was sunk when it tilted in a sudden gust of wind. 
Still, a week later the English fleet seized two West Indiamen and four men-of-war, before 
pursuing a large squadron of 30 ships bearing for Texel under the command of Vice Admiral 
Van Nes. This time contrary, northeasterly winds hampered the English attempt to close, while a 
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rising storm threatened to expose the English to a lee shore should the wind change.
41
 Sandwich 
abandoned the hunt in the evening of 30 September, and during the night was driven back 
towards Sole Bay by high easterly winds.
42
  
Weather conditions typical of the Little Ice Age superficially benefitted the English in the 
weeks that followed the disastrous English attempt to capture the VOC fleet at Bergen. The 
dispersal of the Dutch fleet after the storm of 20 September allowed Sandwich and his 
subordinates to seize some of the spoils that had earlier escaped Teddiman’s squadron. On the 
other hand, ten days after the storm English raiding was cut short by another gale. Although it 
blew from a direction that preserved English vessels in the face of a potential lee shore, it also 
stymied any attempt to seize the largest collection of Dutch ships spotted since Bergen. In fact, 
the number of prizes taken was quantitatively quite low considering the weakness of the Dutch 
tactical situation after 20 September. Moreover, the qualitative value of the two captured VOC 
ships may have encouraged Sandwich to embezzle some of their wealth. Those rumours were 
central to his subsequent dismissal, and may have been impossible without the storm that 
scattered the Dutch fleet and exposed the East Indiamen to the English. By at least partially 
facilitating English naval operations against Dutch merchant vessels, the meteorological 
conditions typical of the Little Ice Age likely weakened the English in coming engagements by 
enabling interactions between cultural frameworks and human agency that allowed ambitious 
officials to remove Sandwich from the theatre of war.  
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In October, it was the reassembled Dutch fleet that appeared off the English coast, 
braving the season’s tempestuous weather at De Witt’s insistence. The fleet captured few prizes, 
and was eventually driven off by storms and an outbreak of plague that also ravaged London. 
Still, the inability of the English fleet to leave the Thames and confront De Ruyter’s armada 
demonstrated the weakness of English finances.
43
 Charles was, however, capable of promising 
subsidies to the Bishop of Münster, Bernhard von Galen, in return for an invasion of the Dutch 
Republic from its eastern borders. While the Dutch fleet appeared off the English coast in the 
autumn of 1665, 20,000 soldiers under Von Galen invaded the Republic’s peripheral regions of 
Achterhoek, Twente, and Drenthe. The invasion represented a shift in the way the Anglo-Dutch 
Wars were fought. It was the first land campaign attempted during the wars, and the first large-
scale offensive launched by a third party. The young Louis XIV, only recently crowned King of 
France, had resisted direct participation in the war. Still, the terms of a 1662 treaty technically 
obligated France to support the Republic in the face of English aggression. Now the invasion of 
troops under Von Galen, a Habsburg ally, raised the prospect of the Republic’s imminent 
collapse and, in turn, Habsburg encirclement. Louis was compelled to act, and thereafter the 
threat or reality of French and German intervention would influence the rest of the wars. Fighting 
would expand beyond the narrow swath of the English Channel and North Sea where most naval 
battles were decided, although military campaigns within the borders of the Republic were still 
of relatively minor importance in the second war.  
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Troops under the Bishop of Münster initially overran poorly prepared Dutch defences and 
even threatened the city of Groningen, but by October the invasion stalled in the face of 
torrential rains and severe storms. The unhardened roads that connected population centres in the 
peripheral territories of the Republic could not be used in the heavy rain. Multiple roads serviced 
every major transportation corridor, but the weather of late 1665 overwhelmed these 
redundancies. Dutch soldiers destroyed agricultural infrastructure in their retreat, and now 
starvation spread among the deluged invaders. Still, the Germans faced only ineffectual military 
opposition until the arrival of French troops in November. The French routed Münster’s 
demoralized army, ultimately forcing Von Galen to sign a disadvantageous peace. In January, 
Louis XIV finally declared war on England.
44
  
High winds during storms affected seventeenth-century military campaigns on land and 
at sea, but the meteorological conditions that most influenced the possibilities open to an army 
were temperature and precipitation. The failure of Von Galen’s offensive was a product of 
complex interactions between these meteorological conditions and the evolving military 
structures that have encouraged some historians to identify a contemporary “military 
revolution.”45 The increased importance of artillery during the Eighty Years’ War in the late 
sixteenth century stimulated the extensive expansion of defensive fortifications and the 
widespread adoption of the star-shaped Italian bastion in the Low Countries.
46
 New 
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fortifications, designed to function in tandem with inundations in the Republic’s easily flooded 
environments, encouraged costly sieges that frequently endured through the winter. Fluctuations 
in temperature during the year’s coldest months could affect the number of soldiers who died 
through exposure, the resource consumption of defenders and attackers, the morale of armies 
frequently prone to mutiny, and the effectiveness of watery defences, with potentially decisive 
consequences for the fate of besieged citadels. Sustained rain could also stymie attempts to erect 
earthen fortifications, vital for both besiegers and besieged.
47
  
Meanwhile, the rising value of firearms helped spur a dramatic increase in contemporary 
army size, while the new emphasis on the drill and other forms of military discipline 
simultaneously increased the proportion of officers to common soldiers. In general, military 
campaigns grew more expensive, increasingly relying on new instruments of taxation and credit 
that partially drew from a resource base that was probably influenced by climatic fluctuations. 
Moreover, larger armies and their vast baggage trains, heavily burdened with weighty artillery, 
were sustained by raiding local resources and transported along frequently unhardened roads 
susceptible to torrential rainfall.
48
 Ultimately, Von Galen’s failure to claim the relatively 
prosperous city of Groningen before the arrival of French forces was likely influenced more by 
the impassable state of waterlogged roads than any action taken by the beleaguered Dutch 
defenders.   
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Conclusion of the Second Anglo-Dutch War 
 
 In April 1666 the English and Dutch fleets began to assemble for another season of 
campaigning, but it was not until June that both were ready to leave port. As early as 15 February 
English agents reported that frigid weather was delaying the construction and repair of Dutch 
vessels, which they projected would hamper the union and sortie of the Republic’s fleet in the 
spring. One source in Rotterdam conveyed that “this last frost has hindered them much in the 
building; their business begins to loocke as it did last year when they said that in April they wold 
be ready to goe to sea but found themselves much disappointed . . . by all appearance they wil be 
so late a coming to sea as they wer last yeare.”49 The winter of 1665-66 was no colder than the 
twentieth-century average, but the end of January and most of March was unusually cold and 
dry. Accordingly, it is possible that frigid weather conditions interfered with the Republic’s 
extensive shipbuilding campaign, as they may have a year earlier.
50
  
The correspondence of the Van der Goes brothers suggests that severe storms may have 
also stalled the Dutch shipbuilding effort in a way that was recognized by contemporaries. In a 
letter to his brother on 8 December 1665, Adriaen van der Goes described a gale of 
unprecedented fury that blew for a day and was accompanied by a storm surge higher than had 
been seen before the town of Scheveningen for 80 years. The storm was the dramatic conclusion 
of several days of tempestuous weather throughout Northwestern Europe that devastated coastal 
towns, flooded polders, washed away dunes, destroyed dikes, stranded ships, and drowned 
animals and people across the Republic’s maritime provinces. Lightning accompanied severe 
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snow and hail, igniting fires outside Haarlem that were fanned by high winds.
51
 Van der Goes 
described the damage in a missive written on 17 December, emphasizing that the loss of the 
polders in particular was a “major disaster” and a “severe financial reversal.” Van der Goes 
continued by writing that, “meanwhile much money will be required for the urgent equipping of 
170 warships, including 60 new vessels.”52 Indeed on 4 June an English source reported how 
ships belonging to North Holland and Friesland – the provinces most affected by the December 
storm – had been delayed in joining the Republic’s fleet owing to a lack of money.53 Financial 
distress exacerbated by the cost of repairs rendered necessary by the December gale had likely 
been compounded by major storms that continued to afflict the Republic between January and 
April, 1666.
54
  
 Whether owing to severe storms, a series of unusually cold weeks, or both, the departure 
of the united Dutch fleet was probably hampered by weather typical of the Maunder Minimum. 
The storms that devastated the low-lying, coastal regions of the Republic blew from the 
Northwest, and were therefore less damaging to the English coast.
 55
 Nevertheless, stretches of 
cold weather were felt on both shores of the North Sea, and the state of English finances was 
even more precarious than that of the Dutch. If the weather of the Maunder Minimum was less 
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destructive in England during the winter of 1665/66 than it was in the Republic, it also coincided 
with the worst wave of plague to scour the island since the Black Death. Doubtless 
environmental and probably climatic influences also helped delay the departure of the united 
English fleet in the spring of 1666.
56
  
As the English armada finally prepared to sortie in May the overriding concern among its 
leadership was preventing a union of the Dutch fleet with squadrons belonging to a now openly 
hostile France. Both the English and Dutch were aware that a French fleet had departed Toulon, 
a French port on the Mediterranean coast, in late April. Prince Rupert, recently appointed with 
George Monck as co-commander of the English fleet, later claimed to have received intelligence 
that French vessels were approaching the English Channel.
57
 Much to Monck’s surprise and 
distress, on 8 June Rupert departed with 20 choice men-of-war and four fireships in an effort to 
intercept the French fleet before it could unite with its Dutch counterpart. Monck was left to 
command the bulk of the English armada. Just before Rupert left port Monck wrote a missive 
begging for more ships, and revealed that he had received reports informing him that the “the 
Holland fleet will suddainly be out.”58 His intelligence was dated, because all outgoing 
correspondence from the Republic had been halted when the Dutch fleet left port.
59
 Moreover, he 
had failed to ensure that English galjoots retained position off the Dutch coast, although it is 
possible that the boats were driven away by persistent easterly winds.
60
 The Dutch fleet had 
actually been ready to sortie since 31 May, and despite being briefly thwarted by westerly winds 
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it left port soon after, as the wind shifted to blow from the Northeast. It united with late 
squadrons from Friesland and North Holland, and then used the prevailing easterly winds to 
rapidly cross the Channel. At last alerted to the impending threat, Monck sent urgent letters to 
Rupert, who had assumed that any easterly wind that would bring the Dutch to the English coast 
would simultaneously allow him to return to the English fleet. However, he had apparently 
forgotten that he could not be notified of the incoming Dutch armada before a ketch found him in 
contrary winds.
61
  
On the morning of 11 June the English warship Bristol sighted the Dutch fleet anchored 
in the narrow sea off the coast of Flanders, riding out a strong wind that, according to most 
sources, had shifted to blow from the Southwest with such velocity that it toppled the masts of a 
great ship commanded by the Republic’s vice-admiral.62 The vessel’s subsequent return to port 
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still left the Dutch with at least 80 large warships to 54 English vessels. Facing such odds, 
Monck called a council of war to debate the merits of attack or retreat. “The Generall had the 
wind,” an English source recounted, “and it was at his choice to fight, or saile to the Swin where 
he before intended; he might compell the enemy to fight, but they could not compell him.” Most 
of the flag officers gathered at the council of war urged Monck to avoid battle, with the most 
vocal advising “that the Dutch in probability had all their fleet together and wee had newly 
parted with so considerable a Squadron of ours, and if his Grace would fight, yet it would be 
convenient to defer it a little, the wind at that time blowing so hard a gale that wee could not bear 
out our lower tire of gunns.”63  
Monck dismissed the recommendations of his officers and ordered his captains to prepare 
for an attack, evidently undaunted either by the disparity in numbers or a wind that facilitated 
aggression but also exacerbated the English disadvantage. After the ensuing battle, Monck’s 
bizarre decision unleashed a hail of criticism, and it has stimulated much historiographical 
speculation. Historians like R.C. Anderson have suggested that Monck’s inexperience at sea led 
him to underestimate how rough winds hampered English naval technology. Still, earlier in the 
day Monck himself had declared that, “I do not think we shall engage today” on account of the 
wind.
64
 Hence, the majority of scholars and contemporaries argued that Monck gravely 
underestimated the Dutch at a time when the Republic’s shipbuilding program had finally 
produced great ships that could match any fielded by the English.
65
 An English review of 
mistakes made before and during the battle concluded that, “if the General could think still so 
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contemptibly of the Dutch, that might be his reason for his hasty fighting . . . nobody can 
imagaine why he would fight them when none of his own captains thought of it a few hours 
before, and were not ready for it, and in so stiff a gale that he could not bear out with his lower 
tier of guns.”66 In fact, four days earlier Monck had insisted that he required urgent 
reinforcement to expand his fleet to “70 sayle” in order to fight the Republic’s armada, and he 
had opposed the division of the English fleet in the face of Dutch numbers.
67 
 
In a later defence of his decision to attack, Monck argued that his ships, many slowed by 
barnacles, could not have reached safety before a Dutch attack, and described how he had feared 
entrapment within the Thames.
68 
Still, Monck’s order to commence one of the bloodiest and 
longest battles of the age of sail in unfavourable weather with an outnumbered fleet echoes Van 
Wassenaer’s reluctance to engage in beneficial winds prior to the Battle of Lowestoft. Both 
decisions were opposed by subordinate officers and widely derided across a diverse spectrum of 
each society. Both exacerbated the environmental weaknesses yielded by the tactics and 
technologies incorporated within each naval system, and both were taken in conditions typical of 
the Maunder Minimum in the North Sea. Monck’s decision, like that of Van Wassenaer, also 
demonstrated that the unpredictability of personal agency - particularly elite agency in the 
extreme hierarchy of naval command structures - complicates any attempt to unravel how 
weather patterns that accompany climatic trends encourage or discourage military operations. 
Military elites need not guide their subordinates along the paths rendered most easily traversable 
by environmental structures, and any attempt to link climatic developments to decision making 
in times of war must account for the frequent irrationality of human psychology.  
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Fig. 5.1. A Dutch painting of the Four Days’ Battle, depicting high waves and high winds. The artist, Willem van de 
Velde the Elder, travelled with the fleet. Hellinga, Zeehelden van de Gouden Eeuw, 90. 
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Fig. 5.2. An English synthesis of major events during the engagement that incorporates the rough seas of the battle’s 
first day. Abraham Storck, “The ‘Royal Prince’ and other Vessels at the Four Days Battle, 1-4 June 1666,” painting, 
1667, National Maritime Museum, http://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/11778.html. 
 
Following Monck’s order to engage the English squadrons sailed towards the Republic’s 
fleet, with the speed of the English assault in such high winds (Figures 5.1 and 5.2) forcing many 
Dutch crews to cut cables and abandon their anchors. However the headlong charge allowed the 
Dutch, fighting in line formation for the first time, to concentrate fire on the leading English 
ships, and several were disabled or taken.
69
 That tactical blunder was compounded when the 
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faster vessels around Monck’s flagship were separated from their slower counterparts, 
undermining the force of the initial assault and allowing the Dutch to manoeuvre for the weather 
gage. Squadrons under De Ruyter and Cornelis Tromp, Maarten’s son, surrounded Monck’s 
division as the English struggled to avoid the coast of Flanders. Three English ships were lost to 
the Dutch before the coming of darkness.
70
  
At first light the battle resumed, with the English fielding at most 45 ships while the 
Dutch retained 80. Although the wind had shifted to blow from the east the English claimed the 
weather gage owing to the position of the fleets, and for most of the day the English and Dutch 
squadrons passed one another in line formation.
71
 Both fleets sustained minimal damage until 
Tromp broke the Dutch line and tacked to windward, pressing into the English lines and isolating 
his squadron from the other Dutch divisions. De Ruyter ordered the rest of the Dutch fleet to cut 
through the English divisions, and rescue Tromp’s squadron. With the Dutch fleet reunited the 
English were left with 28 heavily damaged vessels, to the 66 that remained for the Dutch. Monck 
now ordered his remaining ships to turn west for a final pass in line formation. Conflicting 
accounts complicate any attempt to reconstruct the English retreat, but it appears that Monck 
called a council of war as the Dutch sailed past his line towards the east. This time Monck 
listened to his subordinates, opting to retreat while the Dutch, tacking for another pass, were 
roughly five kilometres distant. The wind, a fresh breeze from the west-southwest at 15 knots, 
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likely hampered the initial Dutch pursuit, allowing Monck to assemble a rear guard of perhaps 15 
surviving great ships.
72
 These in turn thwarted attempts by captains and crews of the lighter, 
faster Dutch vessels to raid among the English fleet. In the night the wind shifted again to blow 
from the northeast, but in conditions of near calm neither the English survivors nor their Dutch 
pursuers made much progress.
73
 
 The Dutch continued the chase into the morning of 13 June, growing closer but 
remaining out of reach until Rupert’s squadron finally sailed into view at 4:00 PM. The 
attempted reunion of the English fleet took a disastrous turn when the Royal Charles, Royal 
Katherine, and Royal Prince were grounded on the Galloper Shoal. Although the other vessels 
escaped, the 94-gun Royal Prince was stuck, as the easterly wind and the force of the tide 
pressed the rest of the fleet away from the great ship, and away from the oncoming Dutch. 
Carried closer by the wind, the Republic’s fleet soon surrounded the stricken Royal Prince, 
which was burned to prevent its retrieval by the English (Figure 5.3).
 74
 De Ruyter then ordered a 
squadron of light vessels to goad Rupert into the shoal, yet Monck dispatched a swift ketch to 
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warn Rupert of the danger. As night fell the Dutch made for their coast, and the English fleet was 
united at last, if considerably diminished by the loss of the Prince.  
 
 
Fig. 5.3. The surrender of the Royal Prince. The direction of the wind is clearly illustrated in this painting by 
Willem van de Velde the Elder. An easterly blows the English – and plumes of smoke – in the direction of England 
to the right, as the marauding Dutch sail in from the left. Willem van de Velde the Younger, “The Capture of the 
Royal Prince,” painting, 1666, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, http://goo.gl/xeYBrs.  
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On the fourth day of the battle, the English pursued the Dutch with a fleet that was now 
of equal strength. Although winds blew from the south-southwest, the Republic’s fleet had the 
weather gage as the battle resumed. After five passes the Dutch line began to disintegrate, with 
most of the Dutch ships trapped between squadrons commanded by Monck and Rupert. 
However, just as Rupert’s flagship crashed through the Dutch formations its masts and rigging 
collapsed, victims of Dutch gunners who still avoided hulls to target rigging. By 5:00 PM the 
Dutch, now benefitting from a shift in wind to the South-southeast, divided and then routed the 
English fleet. The Dutch pursuit was again thwarted, this time not by wind but by a heavy fog 
and De Ruyter’s belief that his battered fleet could not sustain much more fighting.75 
Nevertheless, the Dutch armada returned victorious after the bloodiest battle of the war. 
Although English sources conceded that ten English vessels were lost, including the gigantic 
Royal Prince, Dutch and Danish sources alleged that perhaps 36 English ships had been taken or 
destroyed. The Dutch, meanwhile, lost between four and eight ships.
76
  
The Four Days’ Battle, as it came to be known in both English and Dutch, played a 
critical role in exhausting English finances in the Second Anglo-Dutch War. It was powerfully 
influenced by a complex pattern of weather events that was likely affected, in part, by the 
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deepening Maunder Minimum. Severe storms, along with a series of unusually cold weeks, 
probably helped delay English and Dutch shipbuilding and, consequently, the preparations for 
departure, until faulty intelligence convinced Rupert that the French would soon unite with their 
Dutch allies. Although storms and cold spells were more common during the Maunder Minimum 
in the North Sea region, it was a westerly wind rendered less frequent that momentarily thwarted 
the sortie of the Dutch fleet until it was impossible for the English to be alerted before Rupert’s 
departure. Westerly winds could, of course, occur under any climatic regime, and because their 
influence must be attributed to the regular variations of weather they reveal how natural 
structures like a changed climatic regime cannot fully explain all possible connections between a 
fickle atmospheric environment and human activity.  
Still, after a brief spell of westerlies a persistent easterly that would have been unusual in 
June during a warmer climate aided the Dutch fleet in crossing the Channel to intercept Monck, 
just as Monck’s remaining vessels were en route from the Thames to the Swin, where they could 
not have been trapped by the Dutch. Monck’s ketch to Rupert was forced to struggle against 
contrary winds, ensuring that Monck and his subordinates would face the Dutch alone. Monck’s 
letters and subsequent actions suggest that he genuinely believed that his fleet could not escape 
the Republic’s armada. Accordingly, he dismissed the advice of his officers by attacking with the 
element of surprise, even if his ships were hampered by high winds rendered more common 
during the Maunder Minimum. After the battle was joined an English retreat was probably 
inevitable in the face of Dutch advantages in numbers, seamanship, leadership, and 
meteorological conditions. However, the arrival of Rupert’s fresh squadron evened the odds. 
Because the fleets were now equally matched, the easterly that thwarted English attempts to aid 
the Royal Prince, a first-rate, was invaluable for the Dutch.  
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Conversely, the thick fog that frustrated De Ruyter’s pursuit on the final day of the battle 
contributed to, but did not directly cause, the survival of the English fleet. Unlike the spring of 
1665, the summer of 1666 was unusually hot, a statistical outlier in the general trend of cool 
summers that characterized the Maunder Minimum. Still, water absorbs and loses heat more 
slowly than air. Heavy fog may have been stimulated by interactions between unusually hot air 
brought north by the southwesterly wind, and water previously chilled by the cool temperatures 
that normally accompanied a colder climate. Nevertheless, climate reconstructions cannot yet 
link changes in the frequency of North Sea fog during the Little Ice Age to shifts in the 
temperature gradient between hydrosphere and atmosphere.
77
  
The many missives and ship logbooks written before, during, and after the Four Days’ 
Battle enable an unusually comprehensive reconstruction of how weather rendered more frequent 
or more severe during the Maunder Minimum generally benefitted the Dutch naval system while 
disadvantaging that of the English. Two months later, weather typical of Little Ice Age minima 
again hampered English attempts to defeat the Dutch at sea. On 30 July the English fleet, 
reassembled and reinforced at great expense, had to depart the Thames in a single group or be 
destroyed piecemeal by the blockading Dutch. For two days English crews waited for a 
sufficiently westerly wind to help them enter the Gunfleet, in a month during which westerlies 
had been ubiquitous during the First Anglo-Dutch War. On 31 July Sir Thomas Clifford 
lamented that “it is not to be expressed how impatient our Generalls are, for besides theire edge 
to be at it they consider the Dutch doe even grow, and we have all our force, and our men are in 
better heart now then probably they will be after two or three nights without theire hammocks, 
for every ship is already a cleare ship.” Finally, on 1 August a westerly allowed the English to 
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stand for sea, but easterlies returned the following day. That night a storm damaged the fleet, and 
the Jersey was disabled by a lightning strike.
78
   
On 3 August the Dutch and English fleets engaged in a tacking duel to claim the 
Northeasterly wind, with the Dutch ultimately prevailing. Several English ships had suffered 
damage in attempting to match the Dutch, while many more were scattered before a lee shore. 
The English sailors were therefore relieved when De Ruyter decided that the coast was too close 
for an attack with the weather gage.
79
 On the morning of 4 August the wind continued to blow 
from the Northeast before shifting to the Northwest. The English appear to have seized the 
weather gage and attacked while the wind held. De Ruyter ordered his squadrons into a crescent 
formation, hoping that one of its horns could regain the weather gage.
80
 Both fleets engaged in 
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the line of battle, but before long the wind yielded to a complete calm. Hans Svendsen described 
how the opposing warships, virtually immobilized, bombarded one another “as castle to castle,” 
a “murderous business” that was “tragic to behold.”81  
The still wind allowed the English to open all their gun tiers, and although the Anglo-
Dutch fleets both fielded 88 ships the English slightly outgunned their counterparts. Owing to the 
calm, the three Dutch squadrons were each isolated against the three English divisions, and when 
Dutch vice admiral Jan Evertson died in the afternoon the ships under his command gave way. 
De Ruyter fired a gun to recall them, but the low wind prohibited any attempt to turn. The same 
calm prohibited Tromp’s squadron from reinforcing De Ruyter’s vessels, which were forced to 
engage two English squadrons alone. De Ruyter’s line began to give way by 4:00 PM, even as 
Tromp’s division badly defeated its English counterpart. During their ensuing retreat, De Ruyter 
and the crew of De Zeven Provinciën exploited a rising northeasterly to save several maimed 
Dutch ships. On at least one occasion, for example, they furled their sails while dropping anchor 
as English vessels, carried by the wind, harmlessly swept past. On 5 August the wind shifted to 
blow lightly from the Southwest, gently pushing the De Ruyter’s squadron across the nearby 
shoals and back to safety while slowing the pursuing English.  
Tromp’s ships remained at sea, still engaged with the English Blue squadron. At 
midnight, Rupert and Monck, both aboard the Royal Charles, positioned the English flagship 
between the presumed location of Tromp’s division and the Dutch coast. However, their 
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accompanying men-of-war failed to weigh anchor, and the trap was foiled. The breeze turned 
again to blow from the east as Tromp’s ships loomed over the horizon, struggling against the 
wind but unaccompanied by Blue Squadron. The Royal Charles was isolated and vulnerable, yet 
the Dutch crews declined to engage and instead sailed past to safety. Ultimately the Republic lost 
just two ships and the English only one, but with over 4,000 Dutch seamen killed the battle was a 
significant reversal in fortunes after the Four Days’ Battle. For a Republic already low on 
manpower, the St. James’ Day Fight or Tweedaagse Zeeslag (“Two Days’ Sea Battle) may have 
been the bloodiest engagement of the wars.
82
  
The unstable weather that characterized the final days of July and the first week of 
August, 1666, complicates any attempt to isolate the influence of climate during the St. James’ 
Day Fight. On the one hand, the English may have won far more decisively without 
insufficiently westerly winds contributing to their delay in leaving the Thames, and the damage 
inflicted by a subsequent storm. Easterlies, unusual in July or August during a warmer climatic 
regime, further disadvantaged the English fleet when the Dutch prevailed in a tacking battle on 3 
August. As in the battle of Lowestoft, an easterly contributed to a tactical situation that strongly 
benefitted the Dutch, and De Ruyter’s decision not to attack is curious considering his 
willingness to exploit the shallower draught of his vessels in subsequent engagements. Again as 
at Lowestoft, a sudden shift in wind direction left the Dutch to leeward on the first day of battle. 
In response, De Ruyter ordered his fleet to adopt a crescent formation, which was originally 
imagined by Jan de Witt and later described in English missives. Dutch commanders were 
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prepared to adapt to rapid changes in wind direction, even if the character of those changes on 4 
August was somewhat less likely in a generally colder climatic regime.  
Still, such adaptation could only go so far, and the ploy failed when the brief westerly 
yielded to absolute calm. It is possible that extremes in wind as expressed in both gales and 
calms grew more common in the colder climate of the late seventeenth century, but such climate 
reconstructions have not yet been developed.
 83
 Hence the weather condition that most influenced 
the unique character of the St. James’ Day Fight cannot yet be linked to the climatic regime of 
the Maunder Minimum. After the engagement a westerly wind benefitted the retreat of De 
Ruyter’s squadron while, in an apparent paradox, a contrary easterly facilitated Tromp’s escape 
in the same region on the next day. In both cases the characteristics of the English pursuit 
mediated the influence of the wind. With the English in close proximity but out of firing range 
the westerly of 5 August soon pushed the Republic’s battered fleet over what were impassable 
shoals for the English, and reduced its time at sea.
84
 Meanwhile Tromp’s squadron struggled 
against contrary winds with the English regrouping in the distance. The persistent easterly and 
the growing remoteness of the Dutch fleet ensured that the English pursuit, when it finally began, 
was instantly doomed to futility. Ultimately, the St. James’ Day Fight and its aftermath were 
influenced by a complex pattern of weather events, some strongly associated with the Maunder 
Minimum, others atypical of the new climatic regime. The meteorological conditions rendered 
more frequent by the cooler climate benefitted the Dutch before and after the engagement, while 
those more common in a warmer climate granted a critical advantage to the English during the 
battle itself.  
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After the Dutch squadrons had retreated to safety, the seaworthy remnants of the English 
fleet struggled north against a contrary northeasterly. From the southerly shores of Zeeland the 
fleet sailed past the more northerly coast of Holland, the economic heart of the Republic. By the 
time the English finally reached a position off the entrance to the Zuider Zee, nearby Dutch 
merchant vessels had already escaped past the shoals that enveloped the Low Countries. It 
seemed that the wind had foiled English designs to leverage their victory and capture Dutch 
prizes. However, as the English fleet lingered offshore a Dutch traitor revealed that the northerly 
islands of Vlieland and Terschelling (Map 5.1), which contained storehouses for the Republic’s 
fleet and the VOC, were poorly guarded and relatively unshielded by shoals. On 19 August 
Monck and Rupert dispatched a squadron of light ships under Robert Holmes. Leader of the 
African raid that had helped ignite the war, Holmes was ordered to oversee a daring attack on the 
Dutch islands. The English had now sailed in easterly winds for 13 straight days.
85
  
English scouts soon uncovered a richly laden fleet of perhaps 170 recently arrived 
merchant vessels anchored between the islands, guarded by just two men-of-war. Holmes 
promptly ordered his fireships to ignite the fleet, and burned all but nine vessels. Two English 
frigates were grounded with the coming of darkness, and Holmes intended to free them before 
raiding Vlieland in the morning. However, that night a severe rainstorm soaked English 
ammunition and damaged the squadron’s artillery, while the southerly wind pushed the ships 
away from the Vlie.
86
 Consequently, when the weather moderated in the morning of 20 August 
                                                 
85
 Allin, The Journal of Sir Thomas Allin, Vol. I, 281.  
86
 The author of “A true and perfect narrative” – an English account – describe how on the night of 19 August 
Holmes’s design on Vlieland was, “prevented, for so great a Gust and Rain hapned that night, that the arms and 
ammunition in the Boats, Hoys and Ketches haveing received much damage, he thought it best to weigh, and as the 
wind stood, to attempt something upon the Island of Schelling, which the morning proveing moderate weather, he 
according prosecuted.” “A true and perfect narrative of the great and signal success of a part of his Majesties fleet 
under his Higness Prince Rupert, and his Grace the Duke of Albemarle, burning 160 Dutch ships within the Vlie, as 
also the Town of Brandaris upon the Island of Schelling, by some commanded men under the conduct of Sir Robert 
 354 
Holmes and the remnant of his squadron attacked the less defended island of Terschelling. They 
razed the town of Brandaris before rejoining the rest of the English fleet.
87
  
 
  
 
Map 5.1. The islands of Vlieland (left) and Terschelling (right) on a detail of a seventeenth-century map of the 
Dutch Republic. The shoals that defended entrance into the Zuider Zee (shaded areas) are clearly visible. Jansonius, 
1658. 
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Holmes’s Bonfire, as it was subsequently known, was a catastrophe for the Republic that, 
when added to the casualties suffered during the St. James’ Day Fight, helped extend the war 
into 1667.
88
 It would not have been possible without a relentless stretch of easterly winds, which 
hampered the English blockade and contributed to the concentration of Dutch merchant vessels 
just inside the Zuider Zee. Clearly, conditions typical of Little Ice Age minima did not always 
benefit the Republic’s war effort, even when they appeared to undermine English naval 
operations. On the other hand, the disastrous conclusion of the war’s penultimate year for the 
English was also influenced by weather that was more common during the Maunder Minimum.   
By 5 September the Dutch fleet was again at sea, amid reports that its French counterpart 
was now as close as the Bay of Biscay. As the Dutch armada sailed south the English fleet 
struggled to intercept, for its commanders still hoped to prevent a union of the allied fleets. On 
10 September the English spotted the Dutch fleet, but in a persistent easterly wind several 
English great ships, including the flagship Royal Charles, were grounded on the Galloper sands. 
The Royal Charles had been trapped on the same shoal during the Four Days’ Battle, and the 
consequences again hindered the English. As the easterly winds grew more intense on the next 
morning, De Ruyter ordered the Dutch fleet to hug the coast rather than attack, and the English 
ships were eventually freed without interference. The English commanders finally attempted to 
engage at noon, but they managed only a fleeting long-range exchange of cannon fire, and their 
fireships were scattered by the wind. That afternoon the wind climaxed into a ferocious gale that 
drove the English back into the deep water while the Dutch sheltered near the shore. Thomas 
Allin reported that “the York lost his mainmast about 5 oclock and bore away, the West Friesland 
[a prize] after him. The Plymouth's two topsails flew away together and Sir Tho Teddeman's fore 
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topsail. Two their foresail and several others their topsails, all in half an hour. I never saw the 
like. We split two fore topsails that day, part of our main topsail, our mizzen.” The scattered 
remnants of the English fleet sailed for St. Helens at first light on 12 September, and when they 
arrived at sunset Allin’s squadron missed nearly ten ships.89  
After recording a northeasterly on the morning of the following day, Allin recounted that 
he his fellow officers had “heard . . . of a great fire begun in London.” A day earlier Pepys had 
climbed atop the Tower of London to survey the inferno, which had just erupted nearby at the 
King’s baker around the eastern edge of the city. In his diary Pepys vividly described how the 
flames incinerated people, animals, and property, with “the wind mighty high and driving [the 
fire] into the city.” The blaze might have been localized but for the same intense and persistent 
easterly winds that had damaged the English fleet and thwarted its attempts to engage the Dutch 
at sea. Owing to the geography of London and the location of the bakery enabled the easterly to 
drive the fire deep into the city along the shores of the Thames (Map 5.2). That night Pepys took 
to his boat, writing that the fire was “still encreasing, and the wind great. So near the fire as we 
could for smoke; and all over the Thames, with one’s face in the wind, you were almost burned 
with a shower of firedrops.” These embers, lofted and scattered by the easterly, accelerated the 
spread of the blaze by kindling many houses at a time. John Evelyn wrote that the fire ultimately 
resembled a “hideous storm,” with the flames thundering and the sky “like the top of a burning 
Oven.”90  
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Map. 5.2. The origin of the Fire of London at a bakery in Pudding Lane, on a map printed just months before the 
inferno. A powerful easterly exposed most of the city to the flames. Wenceslaus Hollar, “Plan of London before the 
fire,” map, 1665, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto, http://goo.gl/cqvf2U.  
 
Although the rubble continued smoldering into March, The Fire of London was largely 
extinguished by 16 September, after more than 13,000 houses had been destroyed across 400 
acres. Coupled with the damage inflicted upon the English fleet, the financial toll of the fire 
crippled the English war effort. Certainly these calamities were stimulated or greatly exacerbated 
by stormy, easterly winds typical of the Maunder Minimum. However, London was also 
rendered more vulnerable to a fire by the dry conditions of the previous summer. Changes in 
temperature and precipitation were not precisely matched during the Little Ice Age. Still, the 
drought of the previous summer was probably more unusual during the relatively wet and cool 
Maunder Minimum than it would have been in a warmer climatic regime.
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The long and severe winter of early 1667 once again delayed the assembly and departure 
of the Dutch fleet. However, when on 6 June the armada sortied under De Ruyter’s command it 
had no English counterpart to challenge its supremacy of the North Sea. The Earl of Clarendon 
had often warned Charles that “the Dutch could endure being beaten longer than he could endure 
to beat them,” and with parliament unwilling to approve new funds for the war the English naval 
system was financially exhausted. Naval vessels had been cannibalized for supplies during the 
cold winter while unpaid mariners deserted in droves. English diplomats proposed a peace in 
Breda, and the great ships of the fleet were towed up the Medway River. There they were 
protected by fortifications, shore batteries, and a giant chain, as light frigates continued to raid 
Dutch merchant shipping.
92
  
Owing to the extent of the Republic’s trade with England, the approaches to the Thames 
and the Medway were more familiar to Dutch pilots than most of their English counterparts. 
Consequently, De Witt during the First Anglo-Dutch War had urged Tromp to raid up the rivers 
of Southeast England, and he had personally charted the mouth of the Thames during the Dutch 
blockade of 1665. The Republic’s armada arrived off the English coast on 17 June, but De 
Ruyter was reluctant to commit the fleet to the Medway or the Thames. He worried that his pilots 
could not navigate through the rivers, and feared that the arrival of an English fleet would trap 
his armada. Indeed a Dutch raid against English West Indiamen in the Thames was soon foiled 
by a sudden change of wind. Nevertheless, Jan de Witt’s brother Cornelis persuaded the Dutch 
admirals to harness a rising northeasterly wind to attack the partially constructed fortress of 
Sheerness on the mouth of the Medway (Map 5.3 and Figure 5.4). On 20 June the undermanned 
and demoralized garrison there was swiftly overcome. Only now, with the Dutch fleet pressing 
towards the Medway, did the English admiralty attempt to reinforce its defences. Monck 
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oversaw the strengthening of shore batteries at Gillingham near the mouth of the Medway, and 
ordered nearby great ships to be run aground. As the Dutch were carried ever closer by the wind, 
guard vessels were scrambled to defend the chain. However, attempts to buttress the chain by 
sinking ships were not completed because the Sancta Maria, a hulking Dutch prize, could not be 
scuttled in the right place owing to the force of wind and tide.  
 
 
Map 5.3. Map of the raid on Sheerness, with arrow indicating wind direction. “Uberfall im Medway, 19.-24. Juni 
1667.” Wikipedia Commons. Available from: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RaidMedwayKarte.png.  
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Fig. 5.4. A contemporary painting of the raid, with the direction of the smoke revealing wind direction. Hainsworth 
and Churches, The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars, 162. Willem Schellinks, “The Dutch in the Medway,” painting, 1667, 
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.  
 
A Dutch squadron under Admiral van Ghent arrived at Gillingham on 22 June. English 
sources reported that the favourable easterly wind and spring tide drove the Dutch ships forward 
into the chain. Monck wrote that, “one of their Fireships Struck upon the Chain, but it stopt it, 
then comes another great Fireship, and with the Weight of them the Chaine gave way.” After the 
English guard ships were captured or destroyed, the shallow-draughted Dutch vessels sailed over 
their sunken counterparts and passed through the gap that might have been filled by the Sancta 
Maria. The English great ships were vulnerable when De Ruyter arrived with the rest of the 
Dutch fleet, and the flagship Royal Charles was swiftly captured. By the evening of 23 June, the 
scale of English losses was immense, and much of the fleet’s core of “floating castles” had been 
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taken or burned. On the other hand, the Dutch missed the chance to weaken English naval power 
for decades to come by opting to spare the poorly defended dockyard at Chatham. Nevertheless, 
after the Dutch departed with their captured prizes on 24 June, Charles ordered his negotiators to 
drop the outstanding English demands at Breda. With the Dutch suffocating English trade and 
halting London’s critical supply of coal from the Tyne a peace based on the status quo was 
signed on 31 July.
93
  
 The Second Anglo-Dutch war was largely decided in the same watery corridor contested 
a decade earlier. However, the more comprehensive exploitation of the region’s geography, and 
the greater diversity of operations across different environments at sea and, for the first time, on 
land, distinguished the second conflict from the first. Within Europe, English fleets ambushed 
Dutch convoys from Bergen to the Portuguese coast, Dutch armadas raided far inland, and 
battles between the armies of Münster, France, and the Republic stimulated the further 
geopolitical expansion of the war. Marauding in Africa and the New World hardly influenced the 
course of the war, although it reflected the global aspirations of its participants. A web of 
simmering, small-scale private and state conflict probably did contribute to the Dutch victory, 
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but the outcome of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, like that of the first, still hinged on major 
battles between united fleets in the narrow seas between England and the Netherlands.  
The complex influence of the weather that accompanied a shifting climate was woven 
through, and mediated by, the various manifestations of the war. The Dutch largely benefitted 
from the weather of the deepening Maunder Minimum in their struggle with Europe’s other 
maritime power. Still, that conclusion masks the intricate, sometimes counterintuitive manner in 
which different expressions of climate, weather, and environment intersected with the war effort 
at sea and on land. Easterlies, for example, allowed Dutch admirals and privateers to set the 
terms for subsequent engagements, likely helped the Republic’s galiot intelligence network 
manoeuvre responsively into position, fanned the flames that burned London, and thwarted 
English attempts to capture merchant prizes. On the other hand, by undermining English 
attempts to seize incoming convoys after the St. James’ Day Fight, easterlies also encouraged the 
raid that culminated in Holmes’ Bonfire. Meanwhile, by slightly delaying the sortie of the 
Republic’s armada in June 1666, westerlies, generally rendered less common in the cooler 
climate of the late seventeenth century, actually ensured that the Four Days’ Battle would be 
joined only after the division of the English fleet.  
Ultimately, weather rendered common or atypical under a changing global climate was 
locally felt – in Dutch harbours that prohibited departure in westerly winds, for instance - and 
local circumstances both human and environmental nuanced its influence. In local settings 
human agency affected the immediate expressions of larger structural confluences. Rather than 
displacing the historical role of agency, an analysis of historical structures such as climate 
change in military conflict can highlight the enduring importance of decisions taken by 
individual human beings.  
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Chapter 6 
Warfare in a Colder Climate: the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-74 
  
Two months before the Dutch fleet left port in 1667, French armies invaded the Spanish 
Netherlands. In the aftermath of the Treaty of Westphalia, the provinces of the southern Low 
Countries had formed a buffer between Protestant and Catholic Europe. Now, the ebbing 
authority of Spain was replaced by that of an ascendant France, and many within the States-
General again perceived a threat to the south. After aligning with Sweden and even England, the 
Republic threatened to intervene unless the French withdrew. In 1668 Louis XIV consented, but 
never forgave the supposed treachery of his former ally.
1
 In 1670 he convinced Charles II to sign 
the secret Treaty of Dover, in which French funds would support English participation in a 
decisive war against the Dutch. Louis would have free rein in the Low Countries once the Dutch 
were humbled, while Charles, a Catholic, hoped that a successful war would grant him true 
independence from England’s Protestant parliament. Both Charles and Louis therefore had much 
to gain from the culmination of their long-standing efforts to extinguish Dutch control over 
European and Asian commerce.
2
   
The plan hatched by Louis, Charles, and their advisors imagined a massive French 
invasion from the southeast, overwhelming the Republic’s long-neglected army. Meanwhile, an 
Anglo-French fleet would defeat its outnumbered Dutch counterpart before suffocating the 
Republic’s economy by blockading the coast. To that end the English fleet was reinforced with 
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seven new great ships, while little had changed for the Dutch navy since the raid on the Medway 
five years earlier. On the other hand, by the end of the Second Anglo-Dutch War the Dutch naval 
system had fully incorporated many of the most effective English innovations. In 1672, the 
Republic’s great ships were even larger than they had been at the beginning of the second war, 
and their commanders were now accustomed to sailing in the line of battle. On the other hand, 
the Dutch naval system retained some of its distinct characteristics. Limited by the Republic’s 
shallow harbours, Dutch shipwrights continued to design wide and shallow vessels, which were 
still commanded by military officers who doubled as master mariners. Furthermore, the Dutch 
enjoyed a continuity of effective naval leadership under the authority of Jan de Witt and Michiel 
de Ruyter. By contrast, the English command structure was again divided, this time between 
bitterly opposed factions of Catholic and Protestant officers. Following Monck’s death in 1670, 
James, the Catholic Duke of York, was again in overall command, as French captains more 
readily accepted his orders than those of his brother, the Protestant Rupert. Meanwhile many of 
the English officers were selected for social standing rather than capability, and consequently 
most were inexperienced at sea. On the other hand, Pepys had transformed a previously corrupt 
system of pursery into the world’s most efficient method of victualing warships.3 
Still, the primary difference between the combatants at sea between the third and the 
second wars did not concern the English or Dutch naval systems. In the Second Anglo-Dutch 
War, Louis XIV never seriously intended to risk his nascent fleet in order to hasten the 
conclusion of a war between Europe’s paramount Protestant powers. However, by 1670 the 
French navy had matured. Dutch shipyards had completed six massive warships for their then-
allies in 1666, and Dutch shipwrights contributed to the construction of a further six men-of-war 
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just two years later. In the early 1670s a further 20 great ships joined the French navy. With 
Louis apparently committed to joining the war at sea, the Republic’s fleet of 62 large vessels 
faced an allied flotilla that contained 74 ships of fourth rate and higher.
4
  
 The First and Second Anglo-Dutch Wars were decided at sea, despite the aborted 
invasion of troops under Bishop von Galen in 1665. However, the unrivalled French army, which 
numbered 144,000 soldiers in 1672, lent a very different character to the third war. Charles 
initially hoped for a start to hostilities in 1671, but plans to achieve the seventeenth-century 
equivalent of a blitzkrieg were complicated by the futility of invading through the Spanish 
Netherlands. Any attack from the south would be slowed by the tedious necessity of seizing one 
town after another, even before the Republic’s border was reached. Thereafter the Dutch river 
defences that had foiled the Spanish for 80 years would transform any invasion into a grinding 
battle of attrition. Hence the allied plan adopted in July of 1671 imagined an invasion from the 
southeast, which would outflank the bulk of the Republic’s static defences. Efforts to secure the 
neutrality of Cologne and Münster, vital for any attempt on the Republic’s dilapidated eastern 
defences, culminated in both states pledging to join the invasion.
5
  
 The Third Anglo-Dutch War was also the beginning of the longer and less decisive 
Franco-Dutch War. However, until 1674 these wars were scarcely distinguishable from one 
another, although the French monopolized military operations on land, while the English 
controlled allied activity at sea. The influence of weather rendered more likely by the Maunder 
Minimum was different in these environments. Persistent easterly winds again allowed De 
Ruyter to claim the weather gage in most battles, providing his fleet the tactical initiative that 
was even more important for an outnumbered force. Moreover, when the Dutch armada was 
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partially dismantled to resist the French and German invasion in 1672, severe and remarkably 
continuous storms protected the Republic’s coast from naval invasion or blockade. On land, dry 
weather less common in a cooler climate initially aided the allied invasion. Heavy precipitation 
typical of the Maunder Minimum soon strengthened the Republic’s last lines of defence, yet 
winter freezing later threatened to undermine them. Ultimately, relationships between weather, 
climate, and military operations were far from straightforward during the Third Anglo-Dutch 
War. Nevertheless, the weather typical of the Maunder Minimum still provided critical 
advantages for a Republic struggling to survive the worst disaster of its seventeenth-century 
Golden Age.  
 
Beginning of the Third Anglo-Dutch War 
 
The bitter cold of November 1671 ushered in a frigid winter that featured most of the 
meteorological conditions typical during the Maunder Minimum. Six days after Adriaen van der 
Goes described the extreme cold of 19 November, 44 ships were lost in a severe storm north of 
England.
6
 Thereafter, easterlies prevailed as Dutch waterways froze for nearly three months. In 
fact, in February easterlies accounted for 70% of all wind directions recorded by English Captain 
John Narbrough. Westerlies were necessary for departure from most English ports, and in 
February easterlies combined with heavy ice cover to keep 220 richly laden Dutch ships within 
English harbours. More alarming for the Dutch were the provocations of the English. On 23 
March an English squadron under Holmes, who again acted as instigator, ambushed the Dutch 
Smyrna fleet off the Isle of Wight. The fleet’s 72 vessels had been struggling against westerly 
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winds as they sailed towards the Republic. Although the Dutch merchantmen were lightly 
escorted, Holmes bungled the operation and seized no major prizes. Holmes’ incompetence had 
more than compensated for the tactical advantages offered by westerly winds that had become 
less common in a colder climatic regime.
7
  
 Prospects for peace grew increasingly bleak in the spring of 1672, but the Dutch Republic 
was utterly unprepared for war. Easterlies, storms, and frigid temperatures may have prevailed 
during the winter of 1671-72, yet the increased moisture typical under the Maunder Minimum 
climate yielded to unusual dryness in the spring. Thawing ice hardly raised water levels, which 
in March were, according to Van der Goes, lower than anyone could remember.
8
 On 2 June the 
States-General conceded that the Republic was open to invasion, as the remarkably low water 
levels in the Rhine and its tributaries ensured that most could be forded with ease.
9
 The 
vulnerability of the Republic’s natural defences, exacerbated by weather that was actually 
rendered less common in the wetter climate of the late seventeenth century, was compounded by 
political crisis.  
During the Eighty Years’ War the head of the House of Orange had assumed the position 
of captain general of the States Army, and had wielded substantial political power even in 
peacetime. The death of William II had ushered in the period of “true freedom,” but William III 
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had come of age by 1672. Orangist publicists printed a diverse selection of propaganda 
pamphlets that were disseminated in print shops, book stores, and markets. Such pamphlets 
would become an important weapon for William’s regime, and in 1672 they encouraged Dutch 
burghers to vigorously, even violently, support his ascension.
10
 Fearing the end of the true 
freedom, Jan de Witt, his allies in the States-General, and the States of Holland fervently resisted 
William’s permanent ascension to this position, while the majority of the States-General sided 
with the Republic’s other provinces in support of the Prince of Orange.11 Further deepening 
divisions between Republicans and Orangists was De Witt’s reluctance to accept the scale of the 
Republic’s peril, which delayed the necessary reinforcement of its neglected land defences. 
Grafted onto this rift were the perpetual divisions between and within Dutch provinces and 
towns, all of which rendered the Republic a particularly appealing target in 1672.
12
  
 On 24 February the States-General finally agreed to appoint William III as captain-
general for the summer, a position that would become permanent on his 22
nd
 birthday. Then, in 
the second week of April 1672, England and France declared war within days of one another, 
plunging the Republic into its rampjaar, or “year of disaster.” Louis XIV personally led his army 
through northern France and the Spanish Netherlands. In the Ardennes, dry roads quickened the 
advance of the 25,000 horses and 1,000 cannons that would have been bogged down during a 
rainy spring. In the first months of the war, two overriding objectives guided the Dutch response: 
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at sea, the attempt to prevent the union of English and French fleets; on land, the struggle to 
reinforce defences along the IJssel, a tributary of the Rhine, so they could withstand the allied 
invasion.
13
 The Dutch failure to achieve either goal was influenced by a pattern of weather 
conditions that partially – but not entirely – reflected the climatic influence of the Maunder 
Minimum.
14
  
 De Ruyter and De Witt understood that an early sortie and a quick, victorious strike 
against either the English or the French armada was essential if the Republic was to achieve 
superiority at sea. However, incessant gales kept the bulk of the Dutch fleet in port until the end 
of April. When the weather calmed, the delay was compounded by the commanders of the 
admiralty of Zeeland, who feared an attack from the sea and therefore refused to add their 
powerful squadron to the united fleet until word arrived that De Ruyter had left Texel. By the 
time the Dutch fleet had crossed the Channel, its English counterpart had already departed for the 
Isle of Wight, and, unimpeded, it united with the French on 7 May. De Witt urged another raid 
on the Medway and the Thames while the allied fleet was delayed by easterly winds that 
persisted until the 17
th
. Yet when Admiral van Ghent and his squadron approached the fortress of 
Sheerness, they discovered that it was far better defended than it had been in 1667.
15
  
On land the States Army fared even worse. With scarcely a quarter of the soldiers fielded 
by its French counterpart, it could not defend the eastern frontier from concerted attack. Troop 
strength along the fortifications of the IJssel was utterly insufficient, while morale and stores 
were both in short supply. Efforts to create a regional inundation zone foundered on the 
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intransigence of farmers unwilling to sacrifice their land, and anyway the efficacy of inundation 
depended on local water levels. Given the weakness of its army, the borders of the Republic 
could not be defended in a spring that was remarkably dry within the climatic context of the 
Maunder Minimum. At sea, conditions far more typical of a colder climate afforded both 
advantages and disadvantages that were either compounded or nullified by human agency. 
Storms may have thwarted Dutch attempts to ambush the English fleet, but delays were 
exacerbated by the fears of the Zeeland admiralty. Easterlies might have permitted another raid 
on the Medway while slowing allied reinforcement, but the English had strengthened the river’s 
fortifications. Ultimately, a distinct pattern of meteorological conditions in the spring of 1672 
interacted with environmental and cultural structures to exacerbate the military threat faced by 
the Republic.
16
 
 In late May the allied fleet scoured the Channel for the Dutch fleet, while the French and 
their German allies completed preparations for an assault against the Republic’s IJssel defences. 
When the allies sighted the Dutch armada on 29 May, De Ruyter ordered a retreat because a light 
westerly granted the allies the weather gage and enabled them to use all their guns. One letter 
sent from the Republic reported that the Dutch fleet “hath order not to fight in calm weather but 
in the time of a fresh gale of wind, to the end that not so much blood may be shed, as also that 
the English may not be able to use their lower tire of guns, which they say here they cannot doe 
if the wind blow hard.” The Dutch fleet sailed back to the Flemish coast, but De Ruyter’s 
subsequent attempt to lure the deeper-draughted allied ships into the nearby shoals proved 
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unsuccessful. The westerly intensified during the night, and on the next day it blew too hard for 
battle. With the Dutch out of sight the allied fleet sought shelter off Sole Bay on 31 May.
17
  
 On 5 June the three allied squadrons were loosely strung out along the coast, as the 
English and French crews cleaned and provisioned their warships. In his log, captain Narbrough 
wrote that he suspected the Dutch “will be with us in a morning, if the wind hang easterly.” 
Indeed at 3:00 AM the wind turned to blow from the east, rendering Sole Bay a lee shore. 
Inexplicably, the allied crews continued their work, and many sailors remained on land. Their 
vulnerability was known to De Ruyter after it was disclosed by the crew of a captured English 
coal transport. Consequently the Dutch fleet made for Sole Bay as soon as the wind shifted. De 
Ruyter ordered each of his squadrons to form a spearhead of six warships and six fireships, 
which he hoped would sow chaos among the allies and overcome their superior numbers. 
However, when the Dutch surprised the allies on 6 June the easterly suddenly died to a light 
breeze. While still in disorder, the allies could prepare for a battle in which Dutch fireships were 
rendered ineffectual by the gentle wind, and they could use their lower tier of guns. Still, the 
Dutch harnessed the light wind to successfully surround the scattered English flagships. 
Meanwhile, miscommunication between English and French commanders helped the Zeeland 
squadron isolate and severely damage the French fleet. The Dutch lost two middling vessels yet 
sunk the 100-gun Royal James before deepening fog, a rising gale, and the coming of darkness 
ended the battle.
18
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 The Dutch fleet enjoyed substantial advantages on the morning of 6 June. A driving 
easterly, rendered more common in the Maunder Minimum, encouraged tactics that nullified the 
Anglo-French numerical advantage, exacerbated allied disarray with the prospect of a lee shore, 
heightened the influence of surprise, and allowed the Dutch to determine the order of battle. The 
easterly helped the Dutch surround English flagships and divide the allied fleet, while the 
afternoon gale dissolved the battle before allied numbers could prove decisive. Nevertheless, the 
sudden drop in wind velocity as the Dutch sailed into view removed a crucial variable from De 
Ruyter’s plan, and helped deprive the Republic of a decisive victory. In the North Sea easterlies 
are especially uncommon in June during a warmer climate, yet the weather that shaped the Battle 
of Sole Bay reveals the complexity of establishing relationships between human affairs, general 
climatic trends, and hourly, local weather. Easterly winds grew more frequent during the 
Maunder Minimum, and these winds allowed the Dutch to commence the Battle of Sole Bay. 
They also allowed De Ruyter to claim the weather gage, granting him the tactical initiative that 
was critical for an outnumbered fleet. On the other hand, the sudden drop in wind velocity on the 
morning of 6 June cannot be tied to the influence of the Maunder Minimum, and it was equally 
critical for the outcome of the battle.  
Dutch tactics before and during the Battle of Sole Bay reflected how De Ruyter and his 
subordinates perceived the relationship between the environment of the North Sea and the 
Republic’s naval system. De Ruyter understood that the allies needed to destroy the Dutch fleet 
in order to invade the Republic from the sea, because its existence rendered an invasion too risky 
to attempt. Consequently, the outnumbered Dutch fleet did not necessarily need to defeat the 
allied armada outright: it had only to survive and occasionally check the free reign of the French 
and English in the North Sea. Fortunately for the Republic, the shallow hulls of Dutch vessels 
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allowed De Ruyter to employ shoals as cover for one of the most effective guerrilla wars ever 
fought at sea. After the engagement at Sole Bay, the Dutch fleet remained near the shoals that 
protected the Republic’s coast. Before long, the shoals around Schooneveld, near the mouth of 
the Scheldt, were known to the English as De Ruyter’s “narrow hole.” Remaining behind 
underwater walls allowed De Ruyter to attack only in high, easterly winds, when the advantage 
of the weather gage compounded the inability of allied great ships to open all their gun tiers.
19
  
In the Third Anglo-Dutch War, easterlies were not quite as common as they had been in 
the second war, although they were still more frequent than they had been in the first war. 
Instead, storms and high winds were now the dominant expression of the Maunder Minimum in 
the North Sea region. It is telling that De Ruyter and the rest of the Republic’s naval leadership, 
so attuned to maritime weather, developed strategies and tactics that helped the fleet maximize 
the advantages of high, easterly winds precisely when these were more common. Admittedly, De 
Ruyter, De Witt, and their subordinates probably had no conception of climate as a product of 
interactions between the atmosphere, hydrosphere, and cryosphere that were subject to change. 
There is also no written evidence that anyone within the Dutch naval command realized that 
easterlies and high winds had become more common in a way that heightened the effectiveness 
of De Ruyter’s guerrilla war. However, their contemporaries did cite oral and sometimes written 
histories of past meteorological events to contextualize remarkable weather. Moreover, ship 
logbooks written aboard naval vessels were meticulously compiled and preserved. Consequently, 
it is possible that De Ruyter developed and fought a guerrilla war that he knew was rendered 
more effective by prevailing weather patterns. Regardless, awareness of a shifting climate need 
not accompany exploitation of the opportunities it provided.  
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The Dutch fleet returned to port after the Battle of Sole Bay, where a third of its ships 
were decommissioned, its guns were unloaded, and its marines were disembarked to resist the 
Franco-German invasion.
20
 The Republic had, at worst, fought the allies to a standstill at sea, but 
the Dutch fleet had effectively been defeated on land. The coastal provinces were now nearly as 
vulnerable from the sea as the English had been in 1667, yet no invasion was forthcoming. 
According to historian Jonathan Israel, the Dutch fleet had, in the Battle of Sole Bay, “damaged 
enough of the . . . English ‘first rates’ to prevent a full-scale descent on the Republic, from the 
sea, during the ensuing months.” However, the rugged wooden construction of early modern 
warships allowed most damage to be repaired relatively quickly, provided materials and labour 
were available. With war recently declared, both were plentiful in English shipyards. Moreover, 
the brevity of the battle of Sole Bay meant that damage inflicted to the allied fleet was far less 
severe than it had been after the Four Days’ Battle, when the repaired and reinforced English 
fleet left port just six weeks after the Dutch victory. The engagement was also fought early in the 
year, and nearly five months remained in the campaigning season. That left more than enough 
time for even the most difficult repairs. Finally, the allied naval command was aware that the 
Dutch fleet was in no state to resist Anglo-French supremacy at sea, and English first rates would 
not be needed to secure a naval invasion.
21
    
In fact, the allied fleet was ready to leave port by 4 July, although Narbrough reported 
that, “the blowing weather hinders the taking in our provisions; otherwise the fleet might have 
been out.” The wind relented on the following day, but when it resumed it blew at a stormy 37 
knots. On 8 July, Rupert penned a letter to allied commanders that contained secret instructions 
should their vessels be scattered by storms. Ironically, by thwarting travel between ships the 
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tempestuous weather prevented the letter’s dissemination until the 10th. On the 11th the wind rose 
again to blow at approximately 37 knots. It persisted until, on 14 July, a ferocious storm with 
winds at 60 knots hurled the allied ships forward while inflicting damage and casualties. At 
sunset on the 15
th, with the gale continuing, Narbrough related that, “the clouds this evening . . . 
were dark, heavy, hanging like great fleeces of wool . . . throughout the whole hemisphere.”22  
In the first weeks of July 1672, unrelenting storminess, not damage sustained in the Battle 
of Sole Bay, thwarted allied naval operations. Basic communication between contemporary 
vessels was possible through the use of flags, guns, or even shouts if ships had grown 
dangerously close. Still, at sea detailed information, like any other good or service, could only be 
exchanged in person and delivered by nimble craft that traveled between ships. These boats, 
usually propelled by oar, could make headway in contrary winds yet were vulnerable in heavy 
seas. By cutting the vital links of supply and information provided by boats, stormy weather 
could paralyze a fleet lacking victuals or clear orders. Moreover, gales routinely inflicted damage 
that ranged from severed anchor cables to collapsed masts, undermining ship control that was 
already compromised by the violence of wind and sea. As equipment failed, sailors suffered. 
Beyond the psychological toll inflicted by threatening weather, in every storm injuries were 
inevitable, illness was common and compounded by delayed victuals, and several men aboard 
each vessel were routinely swept to sea. Worse, the high density of naval fleets increased the risk 
of ships colliding and sinking. Such disasters usually claimed the lives of most, or even all, 
sailors aboard the ship, and in a strong gale any vessel, however seaworthy, could founder 
anywhere at sea. However, shoals and lee shores were particularly threatening, especially for the 
deep-draughted allied great ships. More frequent easterlies during the Maunder Minimum 
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rendered much of the British coast a lee shore for allied vessels, and the more common storms of 
the period presented nearly insurmountable obstacles for Anglo-French mariners.
23
  
The intensity of the wind, which prohibited ketches from traveling between ships on 17 
July, had moderated by the following morning to a fresh breeze of roughly 18 knots. However, 
on the next evening Narbrough reported “rainy, dirty, gusty weather all this day,” with “so base a 
sea . . . that no boat could stir.” The wind, now blowing at 37 knots, rose into another gale on the 
evening of the 21
st
 that sustained winds of between 48 and 73 knots for nearly a week. By the 
evening of the 28
th
 the wind subsided for roughly 24 hours, before intensifying into yet another 
storm in the following evening, as anchor lines snapped across the allied fleet. High winds 
finally relented on 1 August, but, remarkably, strengthened in a severe gale on the 2
nd
. Despite a 
brief interruption on the 9
th
, that storm would endure until the morning of the 12
th
.
24
  
John Narbrough’s detailed account of English efforts to seize an inbound VOC fleet 
during the gale reveals how tempestuous weather in the summer of 1672 crippled allied naval 
operations. With large swaths of the Dutch trading empire asphyxiated by allied control of the 
sea, Dutch merchant crews took to the sea as privateers. Crown revenues collapsed as Dutch 
privateers outnumbered and outclassed their English counterparts, while French subsidies, 
mostly squandered to enhance the glory of the English court, utterly failed to finance the war 
effort. James hoped to attack what remained of De Ruyter’s fleet when the weather calmed, but 
Charles commanded his brothers to seize the VOC convoy. Without wealth gleaned from 
captured East Indiaman an irate parliament would soon require consultation, undermining the 
king’s motives for war.25  
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On 4 August, Narbrough reported that “the frigate Bristol came amongst the fleet” after 
its crew, and that of the Cambridge, had spotted and unsuccessfully engaged the returning VOC 
fleet. The Bristol’s captain managed to come aboard the flagship Prince and inform Rupert, who 
resolved to dispatch the great ship York and three third-rate frigates to aid the Cambridge off the 
entrance to the Zuider Zee. In the mounting wind Narbrough, captain of the Prince and Rupert’s 
direct subordinate on board the ship, dispatched a boat to Rear Admiral Beach aboard the York. 
After coming aboard the Prince to retrieve his orders, Beach would return to the York and set sail 
immediately. However, Narbrough wrote that the “weather was so stormy no boat could row to 
windward or steer, the sea was so high.” With the wind exceeding 48 knots the Prince’s boat was 
lost as its crew struggled to return, while Beach remained aboard the York. Writing several hours 
later, Narbrough described how the English fleet had been paralyzed in the face of the gale:  
 
The weather increasing more violenter, I could not possibly send to Rear Admiral Beach 
by boat or smack, it being so much wind no vessel could get to windward, the wind at 
S.W. and rain; neither was it possible for the Flag Officers to get aboard to his Royal 
Highness. We made all preparations to heave ahead our ship, to weigh, but dared not 
unbitt the cable by no means, for fear of turning the ship adrift and losing the cables and 
anchors . . . . [Rupert], seeing it was impossible to advise with the Flag Officers, and to 
get the ships under sail without losing their cables and anchors, and when under sail it 
would be a hard matter to keep the fleet together, and to divide the fleet it would be 
dangerous, in case the enemy’s fleet should at the same time meet with either division, 
concluded to wait for the first opportunity of better weather and get the fleet under sail. 
 
That evening the wind abated slightly, and for the first time in many days the sky was 
clear. It may have seemed as though the VOC fleet could still be seized before it passed through 
the shoals that protected the Zuider Zee. However, in the night the gale resumed, and in the 
morning the fleet encountered the battered Cambridge. With no men-of-war guarding the 
entrance to the Zuider Zee, the VOC fleet was safe from capture, and its seaworthy vessels 
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survived the storm.
 26
 Their return, facilitated by a remarkable stretch of summer storminess 
rendered more likely in the climate of the Maunder Minimum, was as much a blow to the 
English crown as it was a financial stimulus for the beleaguered Dutch. For the allied fleet the 
gale continued with little respite.
27
 
When the storm finally yielded to calmer winds on the 12
th
 the damage sustained by the 
allied warships was immense. Worse, the provisions fleet was scattered, and the scouting ships 
were lost. On 13 August the English commanders decided to return to port with nothing but 
damage and casualties to show for their time at sea. High winds and two further storms beset the 
fleet on its return to England, until over a thousand sick men could be brought ashore on 23 
August. Beyond seasickness likely prompted or exacerbated by continually violent weather, the 
stricken were victims of scurvy caused by short rations. On the following evening Narbrough 
observed “a small air of wind at E.N.E.,” before concluding: “thus ended this 24 hours – fair 
weather – a miracle.”28 It was not to last. As Narbrough’s tenure aboard the Prince came to a 
close in the first weeks of September, his log recorded how a lengthy gale disrupted English 
plans to return to sea. The wind strengthened on 8 September, and Narbrough wrote that it was 
“very bad weather for this time of year,” and concluded that “we could not do any business in 
fitting our ships.” For more than a week the storm prohibited English vessels from provisioning 
despite Narbrough’s desire “to get ready with all speed.” Only on the 18th did the weather calm 
enough for victuals to be brought aboard.
29
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The remarkably severe and persistent storms that safeguarded the Republic from 
blockade and naval invasion were likely influenced by the colder climate of the Maunder 
Minimum. However, very different interactions between weather, climate, and the various 
expressions of warring military systems on land actually exacerbated the consequences of the 
Republic’s failure to achieve its initial tactical objectives. Admittedly, a frigid winter and late 
spring had delayed the beginning of the French advance through the Spanish Netherlands until 
early April, but the States of the divided Republic did not use the extra weeks to their advantage. 
As the French army approached the Republic’s southern borders in May several thousand civic 
militiamen were belatedly assembled in Holland, Utrecht, and the eastern province of Gelderland 
to reinforce the IJssel line. These frantic measures, already inadequate in the face of the 
overwhelming quantitative and qualitative superiority of allied armies, were undermined by 
historically low water levels. Stimulated by enduring dryness, shallow water levels dramatically 
reduced the effectiveness of the IJssel as a barrier to invasion.
30
  
Meanwhile, the failure to strengthen watery defences through inundation reflected a 
disastrous relationship between human agency and meteorological conditions that were rare 
during the Maunder Minimum. When the IJssel was higher in April the Dutch commander of 
Doesburg, a town in Gelderland, had opened nearby sluices to flood the region. Unfortunately 
for the Republic, he forgot to close the sluices when the inundation was complete. The water 
flowed back when the IJssel dried in May, again exposing Doesburg to the French. Ultimately, 
fluctuations in temperature and precipitation, not changes in wind direction and velocity, were 
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the expressions of the Maunder Minimum that most affected warfare on land. However, while 
the meteorological conditions of the first half of 1672 generally reflected the climate of the 
Maunder Minimum, the calamitous influence of unusually dry conditions again demonstrated the 
military significance of seemingly random variability in weather.
31
  
On 18 May the Bishop of Münster declared war on the Republic, as did the Elector of 
Cologne soon thereafter. On 22 May, the French under Louis and his general Condé used a 
bridge of ships to cross the shallow Maas at Visé, bypassing the fortifications of Maastricht. As 
the Dutch fleet checked the allies at Sole Bay in June, the French invaded the Republic. Dutch 
garrisons east of the IJssel at Rheinberg, Orsoy, Emmerich, Rees, and Wesel fell within a week, 
and would never rejoin the Republic. Meanwhile Münsterite troops seized Lingen, invaded 
Overijssel, and joined the more numerous French in the conquest of Grol on 9 June. However, a 
relatively small force of Dutch soldiers held the Rhine near Lobith, the town that straddled its 
traditional entrance into the Republic. Condé had planned to employ ship bridges in a crossing of 
the Rhine near Lobith, but French engineers and soldiers would be under constant fire while the 
bridges were assembled. Fortunately for the French, Condé soon learned from farmers that the 
dry weather had left the Rhine crossable further upstream. On the morning of 12 June, 6,000 
French cavalry crossed the Rhine with Louis watching from atop Eltenberg (Figure 6.1). The 
horses only needed to swim for a brief stretch, yet they were engaged by hastily assembled 
Friesian defenders as soon as they reached the shore. Condé was injured in the battle before the 
French prevailed. Thereafter, bridges were hastily constructed to accommodate the army’s 
artillery and innumerable infantry. Were the Rhine less shallow the French cavalry could not 
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have crossed so easily, and the Republic’s defenders might have hindered the construction of the 
bridge and, in turn, the French crossing.
32
 
 
 
Fig. 6.1. A contemporary Dutch painting depicts Louis XIV and his army crossing the unusually shallow Rhine. 
Adam Frans van der Meulen, “Louix XIV passing the Rhine,” painting, 1672, Deutsches Historisches Museum, 
http://goo.gl/JLrCXL. 
 
 Upon hearing that the French had crossed the Rhine, the States-General and the States of 
Holland decided to abandon the suddenly outflanked IJssel line and concentrate all resources on 
defending the provinces of Utrecht, Zeeland, and Holland. Meanwhile the allied conquests 
continued unabated: Arnhem surrendered to the French on 15 June, before Doesburg, Zutphen, 
and the other IJssel towns fell to the armies of Münster and Cologne. The French pursued the 
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remnant of the States Army as it retreated north under William III, and seized Amersfoort on 19 
June.
33
 Morale collapsed across the remaining Dutch provinces, and in Utrecht the citizenry 
rioted, preventing any defence of the city. William was forced to order a second retreat towards 
the “five posts,” the last bastions for the defence of Holland. On 23 June the French army seized 
Utrecht without a fight, while allied troops overwhelmed Zwolle and Kampen to the Northeast. 
On 7 July, torrential rain that was far more typical of the Maunder Minimum than the preceding 
dryness drowned French ammunition stores, but it came too late for the Republic’s central and 
eastern provinces.
34
 
 With the IJssel line crumbling on 8 June the order was given to engage the Hollandse 
Water Linie or “Hollandic Water Line” (Map 6.1). The vast crescent of sluices, fortresses, and 
inundated land that together constituted the water line would provide the Republic with its last 
and best defence. The first wing of inundated land stretched from Muiden on the Zuider Zee to 
Bodegraven, completely surrounding the great bastion of Amsterdam.
35
 From William’s 
headquarters at Bodegraven, a relatively narrow strip of flooded land connected the Rhine with 
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the IJssel, from where the inundations broadened to encompass Schoonhoven and heavily 
defended Gorinchem.
36
 From the river Waal before Gorinchem the inundations continued past 
the waters of the Biesbosch, before halting west around Geertruidenberg and east at ‘s 
Hertogenbosch. Inundation was a traumatic and expensive process that, for many Dutch citizens, 
was more destructive than invasion and defeat. Dikes were breached and sluices opened in some 
areas while new dikes were constructed in others, and great swaths of farmland were inundated 
by water that, when brackish, destroyed their productivity.
37
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Map 6.1. The Old Hollandic Water Line. Right: map of the Hollandic Water Line in 1672. Further inundations 
would broaden the northern waterline in 1672. Left: a map, likely drawn in the eighteenth century, demonstrating 
the complexity of the waterline near the fortified town of Woerden (highlighted in the map to the right). The 
immediate vicinity of Woerden was in the hands of the French and therefore dry in 1672, but it was underwater in 
1673. “De Oude Hollandse Waterlinie.” Waterlinie Werelderfgoed. Accessed 14 February 2014,  
http://www.oudehollandsewaterlinie.nl. “Kaart van het ontwerp van een waterlinie tot dekking van de provincie 
Holland van Muiden aan de Zuiderzee langs de Vecht naar Weesp, Uitermeer, Hinderdam, langs Woerden, 
Oudenwater, Schoonhoven, Everdingen, Asperen tot Gorinchem aan de Mewede." Kaartcollectie Ministerie van 
Oorlog, Situatiekaarten. Reference code: 4. Nationaal Archief (Den Haag, Netherlands). Gottschalk, Stormvloeden 
en rivieroverstromingen in Nederland, Vol. III, 240. 
 
Opening the sluices did not immediately engage the water line. Many peasants, fearful 
that their livelihoods would be destroyed in a hopeless conflict, bitterly resisted the inundations. 
Fearing peasant mobs, the magistrate of Gouda delayed opening nearby sluices until the States-
General finally threatened to use force, while the farmers of Lek repeatedly drained inundated 
land under cover of darkness. Peasant resistance ended only when the death penalty was imposed 
for sabotaging the water line. Even then, critical fortifications remained in poor repair, and low 
water levels stimulated by enduring dryness continued to hamper the inundations. Overall, the 
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Hollandic Water Line was easily crossable for two critical weeks after the opening of its first 
sluices. However, by the end of that period precipitation was finally beginning to reflect the 
influence of the wet Maunder Minimum, and favourable winds were fanning the artificial floods. 
The window of Dutch vulnerability available to the French and Germans was therefore fleeting, 
and it was not exploited. In fact, Louis XIV and his high command, ignorant of the water line’s 
purpose, believed that their war was already won. Once again, human agency interacted in 
counterintuitive ways with a network of environmental, social, and cultural structures to shape 
the course of war. When the water line was finally completed the character of the war within the 
Republic’s borders was fundamentally altered. The amphibious struggle that characterized the 
rest of the rampjaar would be fought on terms more familiar to the Dutch.
38
   
 Nevertheless, most of the Republic was gripped by social unrest. Refugees poured into 
coastal towns, farmers rioted against inundation, and city councils considered surrender. Popular 
fury at the Republic’s lack of preparation for invasion ultimately ended the period of “true 
freedom.” In June, Jan de Witt had been wounded in an attempt on his life, and could no longer 
work as grand pensionary. It was no coincidence that, in July, William III was formally 
appointed as stadthouder by the States of Holland and Zeeland. In the following month a mob 
brutally murdered the De Witt brothers, an act that was perhaps directed and certainly inspired 
by William. In late July, German troops continued their advance, and the borders of the northerly 
provinces of Friesland and Groningen remained unsafe because farmers refused to inundate their 
land with water rendered brackish by continuing dryness. However, the rainy weather 
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characteristic of the Maunder Minimum prevailed for most of August, foiling a French invasion 
of Holland from the territory of North Brabant and strengthening the water line as a defensive 
barrier. The city of Groningen was besieged by German troops, yet cold, wet, and stormy 
conditions rendered roads impassable, filled trenches dug by the invaders, and may have 
worsened the outbreak of disease. Inundations drowned as many as 2,000 Münsterite troops, and 
with enough provisions within the city on 28 August the siege ended in failure. As weather 
conditions rendered more likely during the Maunder Minimum helped provide crucial breathing 
room, the Republic’s internal divisions were violently resolved.39  
 
Conclusion of the Third Anglo-Dutch War 
 
 By September, most of the Republic beyond the Hollandic Water Line had been seized 
by allied armies. Nevertheless, the inundations had created a shallow sea around the provinces 
that together housed the vast majority of the Republic’s demographic and financial resources. At 
great cost Holland had become an artificial island, with the largely natural islands of wealthy 
Zeeland to the south and Friesland, isolated by marshland, to the North. With the front 
temporarily stabilized, the most immediate danger in this watery environment came from the sea. 
On the one hand the late season precluded invasion, and the Dutch armada had been restored to 
its former strength.  On the other, the fleet was outnumbered and would be hard-pressed to resist 
a blockade.
40
 It was provisioned only until September, as Dutch naval commanders believed that 
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the storm-ravaged campaigning season would end with the early arrival of winter. Whether 
reflecting a reaction to the summer’s stormy weather, or an awareness of new climatic 
conditions, the gamble was justified in subsequent months.
41
  
On 28 September, Narbrough, now captain of the Fairfax, left port with an English 
squadron under the command of Admiral Edward Spragge. The vessels struggled against an 
easterly wind, and two days later were beset by a powerful easterly gale that raged until the 31
st
. 
Winds, now from the west, continued with little respite at a driving 37 knots until 8 October, 
when another storm whipped the sea into such a frenzy that the Fairfax’s ketch, tied to the hull, 
strained the ship to the point of breaking. Narbrough ordered the ropes cut and the boat released, 
while Spragge’s ship vanished from sight. The Fairfax, now alone, was afflicted by yet another, 
even more ferocious gale on the 10
th
. In his log, Narbrough reported that he was “doubtful of my 
mainsail holding,” yet he refused to anchor because the bows could not endure the heavy seas. 
Still under sail, the Fairfax passed by a Dutch vessel riding at anchor, and Narbrough wrote that 
the weather was “so bad we could not meddle with him.” Scattered and paralyzed by relentless 
storms, the squadron that left port under Spragge captured just 20 small herring buses, a tiny 
portion of the Dutch fleet and not nearly enough to improve the increasingly dismal state of the 
English treasury.
42
   
 As autumn yielded to winter, weather typical of the Maunder Minimum in the North Sea 
continued to undermine allied naval operations. In October and November Narbrough recorded 
winds from the east in 42% of his morning and evening measurements, describing westerlies in 
                                                                                                                                                             
W., “Baron de W. aan Arlington, 14 Aug 1672,” in Bescheiden uit Vreemde Archieven omtrent de Groote 
Nederlandsche Zeeoorlogen, Vol. II, 177. 
41
 Ibid. Baron de. W., “Baron de W. aan Arlington, 17 Aug 1672,” in Bescheiden uit Vreemde Archieven omtrent de 
Groote Nederlandsche Zeeoorlogen, Vol. II, 180. Huneken, “Huneken aan den raad van Lubeck, 13 Aug. 1672,” in 
Bescheiden uit Vreemde Archieven omtrent de Groote Nederlandsche Zeeoorlogen, Vol. II, 173. 
42
 Narbrough, “Journal of John Narbrough, Lieutenant and Captain of the Fairfax. September 18, 1672, to July 1, 
1673. Pepysian MS. 2556,” in Journals and Narratives of the Third Dutch War, ed. 126. Hainsworth and Churches, 
The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars, 179. Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars, 192.  
 388 
an unusually low 53% of entries. Meanwhile at least 12 gales troubled the Fairfax, and their 
sustained winds of between 48 and 63 knots drove the vessel from the Dutch coast. After 1 
December the weather moderated until, on 6 December, Narbrough was ordered to join a convoy 
of 78 merchant ships bound for the Baltic. The wind was calm until the 9
th
, when a wind of 37 
knots rose and culminated in yet another severe gale on the 12
th
. Tempestuous fall weather is 
endemic to the North Sea during warm or cool climates, yet the autumn storminess of 1672 was 
exceptional even in the more violent conditions that prevailed during Little Ice Age minima.
43
   
On 16 December, the convoy experienced a powerful gale that endured until the morning 
of the 23
rd
. In a log entry written on 20 December, Narbrough described how severe easterly 
winds and repeated storms rendered convoy duty a risky enterprise. High winds and heavy seas 
increased the danger of collisions between ships or against the coast, and damaged merchant 
vessels even more than their relatively seaworthy escorts. By the 23
rd
 the English convoy 
contained only 40 merchant vessels, with the rest scattered or destroyed by the storm. When the 
gale subsided, another storm rose on the morning of the following day. Before long its winds 
moderated, but on 28 December the fleet encountered a storm that raged for perhaps 13 days. 
During the gale, Narbrough’s apparently rushed entries provided less meteorological data. Still, 
on 10 January Narbrough revealed that no work was possible owing to the heavy seas, and wrote 
that, “on board fifty five men very sick of a violent fever, some distracted with it.”44  
On 3 January work was again impossible. While passing through Denmark on the 4
th
 
Narbrough recorded “a great rolling sea in the Sound, [so] that provisions could not get off to the 
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ship.”45 The convoy left Denmark and sailed out of the Baltic, bearing south towards Portugal as 
another storm blew between the 16
th
 and the morning of the 20
th
. In a driving easterly on 2 and 3 
February the Fairfax and other ships in the convoy lost their topmasts. As the fleet approached 
Lisbon that week, fever, likely stimulated or worsened by violent weather and irregular victuals, 
spread among the crew. Four men died aboard the Fairfax on 5 February, and two more perished 
on the 8
th
, including John Mayweather, an officer. Overall the logbooks kept by English captains 
Narbrough, Richard Haddock, and George Legge reveal an extraordinary frequency of storms 
and high winds in 1672 and 1673 (Figure 6.2). Of 930 morning and evening weather 
measurements taken during sorties between 7 January 1672 and 21 September 1673, 49%, or 
452, recorded winds at or above 34 knots.
46
 Storms with winds at or above 48 knots, a ferocious 
89 km/hour, were described on 136 days, in nearly 15% of entries!
47
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Fig. 6.2. Measurements of wind velocity recorded by Narbrough, Legge, and Haddock between 7 January 1672 and 
21 September 1673, converted to the Beaufort Scale. The particular frequency of storms in 1672 after the repaired 
allied fleet left port in July is clearly demonstrated.  
 
 The Third Anglo-Dutch War at sea was contested in conditions where nearly half of all 
days were accompanied by winds so severe that they prohibited battle and constrained the 
possibilities open to naval commanders. In the warmer North Sea climate of the twentieth 
century, average days with winds at or above 34 knots range from just over 12 in December to 
approximately two in June and July. In the late Maunder Minimum, this gradient was less steep 
and storms were, in general, more common, as days accompanied by high winds ranged from 
roughly eight in March to nearly four in July. It is therefore probable that, in 1672 and 1673, 
persistent high winds in all seasons were rendered more likely by the onset of a colder climatic 
regime. During any early modern naval war the campaigning season from the late spring to early 
fall was particularly important, and storms in the warmer months were therefore especially 
influential. However, the journal kept by Captain Narbrough demonstrates that storms in colder 
months could also have substantial military consequences. Overall, the extraordinary frequency 
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of gales in 1672-73 was remarkable even for the tempestuous climate of the late seventeenth 
century.
48
  
 High winds and incessant gales paralyzed allied naval operations while the Republic’s 
fleet was generally diminished and less capable of resisting naval invasion. Indeed, on 24 August 
a Dutch traitor informed his English masters that, “this foule weather by sea and land [the Dutch] 
attribut (as they have reason) to a great providence.”49 Dutch advantages in stormy weather 
appear to have extended beyond the activities of major state fleets. In months accompanied by 
incessant gales, Dutch privateers captured far more prizes than their counterparts, crippling 
Anglo-French merchant shipping. With a third of the Dutch fleet decommissioned in the summer 
of 1672, and maritime trade ground to a halt, many of the Republic’s seamen had few options 
beyond privateering. In September, the Republic’s naval command, likely encouraged by 
unrelentingly violent weather, concluded that the Republic faced little threat from the sea and 
endorsed privateering. Thereafter mariners flocked to Dutch ports from Ostend, Dunkirk, 
Flanders, the Republic’s remaining provinces, and the Holy Roman Empire. They took to sea in 
privateering squadrons that, accompanied with a fireship, could engage allied convoys. As in the 
Second Anglo-Dutch War, Dutch privateers, who lurked near sheltered coasts while sailing in 
ships that handled better in rough weather than those of their Anglo-French counterparts, may 
have benefitted when storms damaged allied merchant vessels.
50
 
 Many of the gales that helped thwart allied operations in the North Sea were also felt 
across the Low Countries. In the last week of September 1672, William planned a combined land 
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and sea assault on the French garrison in Naarden, a fortified town bordering the water line 
where it reached the Zuider Zee. On September 28
th
, William hoped to exploit persistent storms 
and torrential rain during the Dutch attack. High winds yielded to absolute calm on the night of 
the 27
th
, forcing the Prince to cancel the operation. In the evening of 10 October 8,000 soldiers 
under William’s command attempted to retake the town of Woerden, which was defended by 
1,500 French soldiers and bordered the front near Utrecht (Map 6.1). The effort failed when 
torrential rain brought by a severe gale drowned torches, filled trenches, and hampered attempts 
to take the town walls. Prolonged stormy weather stimulated by the climate of the Maunder 
Minimum generally benefitted the Dutch war effort by strengthening the water line and impeding 
the allies at sea. However, interactions between local environments and variations in hourly 
weather stymied the Republic’s first counteroffensives in the fall of 1672.51  
Across the front, wet, stormy weather continued through much of October. On 17 
October, Adriaen van der Goes informed his brother that “the rain continues almost every day; 
tonight severely, as though it has not rained in a year.”52 Persistent rain typical of the Maunder 
Minimum deepened the water line, but Van der Goes described how wet conditions also ruined 
harvests and flooded cellars in coastal provinces that depended on imported food even before the 
allied invasion. Despite strong winds, windmills could not dry the waterlogged landscape behind 
the water line, and Van der Goes predicted a winter of extreme hardship.
53
 Indeed unusually cold 
weather in October and November encouraged soldiers on both sides of the water line to 
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dismantle houses, uproot trees, destroy fences, and undermine fortifications in the quest for 
firewood. Far more alarming for the remnant of the Dutch Republic was the threat posed by 
winter freezing. With December approaching, continually cold weather raised the prospect that 
the Hollandic Water Line would soon become crossable by the French and German armies.
54
  
 In November, the French general Luxembourg resolved to launch an offensive when 
winter freezing had sufficiently thickened the ice of the water line. Thereafter he planned to lead 
10,000 infantrymen across the narrow stretch of inundated land at the Lange Weide, south of 
Woerden and east of Gouda. From there, the allies would follow the dike that bordered the Rhine 
to reach Leiden, before marching over the coastal dunes to The Hague and forcing a Dutch 
surrender. In early December, William led a large army to the conquered territories of North 
Brabant and Limburg, but frigid temperatures threatened to freeze large swaths of the water line. 
Holland’s hydraulic engineers struggled to keep the water from freezing by setting it in motion 
across the inundated lands, while farmers were mobilized to shatter the ice that did form. Few 
farmers volunteered, however, as easterly winds ushered in sub-zero temperatures that persisted 
for weeks. By the 18
th
 the ice was crossable on the IJ before Amsterdam, and it was only with 
difficulty that warships were broken from the ice on the 22
nd
. On the 23
rd
 thawing and rain 
briefly hindered allied plans for invasion, yet on the 24
th
 the wind resumed from the east, with 
frigid temperatures in its wake. Crossing the Lange Weide remained perilous on the 26
th
 and the 
27
th
, yet over the Meijepolder the water froze more quickly than the ice could be broken. At 
10:00 PM, Luxembourg and his troops abandoned their horses and artillery to cross the 
Meijepolder, beginning their march on The Hague.
55
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Fig. 6.3. Detail of a Dutch propaganda pamphlet that depicts the French raid on Zwammerdam and Bodegraven in 
December, 1672. Left of centre, French troops march through the ice and water. Romeyn de Hooghe and Govard 
Bibloo, “Franse wreedheden in Bodegraven en Zwammerdam,” print, 1673, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, 
http://goo.gl/5XjR8k.   
 
In the early morning 12 allied soldiers drowned at Zegveld, yet the invaders pressed on. 
They constructed a bridge over the open water of the Haakwetering, then assembled another to 
cross the Slimmen Wetering. The second bridge initially collapsed, yet the French reached the 
towns of Zwammerdam and Bodegraven in the afternoon (Figure 6.3). After the towns were 
brutally sacked, cold weather yielded to rain and thawing, threatening to isolate the allied army 
behind Dutch lines. Luxembourg ordered a retreat to Utrecht, yet his army might have been 
trapped before the Rijndijk at Nieuwerburg had the Dutch garrison there kept its post. Instead, 
the main allied force successfully returned to Utrecht on the 30
th
, and stragglers were retrieved 
by boat in the face of Dutch naval superiority on the water line. On 1 January, persistent mild 
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weather melted most of the remaining ice, and the coastal provinces were again safe from 
invasion.
56
  
 While the allies prepared for invasion in the cold temperatures that endured for most of 
December, the States Army marched across frozen marshes that would have impeded attack in 
warmer weather to retake the town of Coevorden near Groningen. A larger army under William 
also reclaimed Maastricht, yet between 16 and 22 December its siege of Charleroi, a critical 
French depot, was hampered by bitter cold. Frustrated, on 30 December William abandoned the 
siege and led his forces back to Gorinchem. Three days later, Van der Goes summarized his view 
of the Republic’s plight by writing that “all earthly help is hopeless, and as soon as the freezing 
resumes we will surely be lost.”57 Soon after freezing did resume, provoking panic across the 
Republic’s remaining provinces. However, following the first week of January storms, rain, and 
winds from the Southwest endured for two weeks, thawing ice and flooding additional land. In 
late January and early February, another cold spell required further breaking of ice throughout 
the water line, yet the weather warmed before the ice thickened enough for another allied 
crossing. A wet, stormy spring finally ended the danger of an allied invasion over the Hollandic 
Water Line.
58
  
 While rainy, stormy, and accompanied by prolonged cold spells, the winter of 1672-73 
was, on the whole, of moderate intensity relative to twentieth-century averages. The trekvaart, 
was halted for just two stretches, each totalling two weeks, and westerly winds frequently 
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accompanied periods of thawing.
59
 The moderate severity of the winter, coupled with the arid 
spring of 1672, demonstrated that seasonal weather rarely featured all the meteorological 
conditions rendered more common during Little Ice Age minima. The weather of the Third 
Anglo-Dutch War was more complex than that of the second, when unusually cold temperatures, 
increased precipitation, easterly winds, and enhanced storminess had accompanied most seasons. 
In 1672-73 the weather experienced by soldiers and civilians generally reflected the climate of 
the Maunder Minimum, yet conditions rendered less common under the new climatic regime 
influenced both the collapse of the Republic’s outer defences in the spring and the resilience of 
its inner defences in the winter. That reality underscores the limits and possibilities of climatic 
fluctuations as a category of analysis in the study of military history, for within the borders of the 
Republic in 1672 it was precisely when the homogeneity of weather accompanying a climatic 
regime faltered that local environments most affected the conduct of war.   
 In the spring of 1673 the Republic had survived its rampjaar and recovered enough to 
retake some of its losses. However, the success of the war launched by the English crown 
depended on quickly destroying the Dutch fleet and reducing the Republic. Persistent gales, the 
Dutch success at Sole Bay, and the resilience of the water line in a wet and relatively warm 
winter had rendered this impossible. By 1673 the initial funds gathered by the English crown 
could no longer finance its increasingly unpopular war. Charles resorted to summoning 
parliament in February, yet its ministers refused to release further funds unless all office holders 
swore an oath against Catholicism. James declined, thrusting his brother Rupert into overall 
command of the allied fleet. Once again allied commanders aimed to defeat the Dutch fleet at 
sea, and for the first time this desire was accompanied by a concrete plan for naval invasion. In 
May, merchant shipping was hired to land 10,000 infantry and 5,000 marines on the coast of 
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Zeeland, where French cavalry would join them from the west. With the water line and its 
fortifications outflanked, the Republic’s remaining provinces would have little choice but to 
surrender.
60
  
 When the Dutch armada entered the North Sea in the second week of May, De Ruyter 
intended to sink flutes in the Swin, the narrowest point of the Thames. Thereby De Ruyter hoped 
to trap the deep-draughted English fleet and prevent its union with the French, yet remarkably his 
pilots were unaware of the existence of two other channels out of the Thames.
61
 This second 
attempt to prevent the union of the allied fleet was again hampered by the late arrival of the 
Zeeland squadron. Moreover, the first weeks of May were relatively dry after the torrential rains 
of the preceding months. As water levels declined the fleet was further delayed when the largest 
Dutch warships struggled to clear the Pampus before Amsterdam’s harbour. On 12 May, the 
Republic’s fleet arrived at the Thames in south-easterly winds, yet a spirited English defence 
foiled the Dutch operation, and the allied fleet united soon after.
62
  
 Now outnumbered 2:3, the Dutch fleet retired to Schooneveld, covering the coast on 
which the English hoped to land.
63
 The allied armada arrived off the shoals on 1 June, its 
commanders aware that the invasion was impossible while the Republic’s fleet remained intact. 
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Calm winds initially thwarted a battle, and then a lengthy gale forced both fleets to lie at anchor. 
The Dutch ships waited in relatively sheltered waters while the allied fleet, further to sea, 
suffered substantial damage.
64
 When the wind moderated on 6 June, Rupert decided that his fleet 
would brave the shoals and attack in the morning. He emulated De Ruyter’s tactics in the Battle 
of Sole Bay by organizing a vanguard of smaller ships.  
However, in the morning the Dutch employed north-easterly winds to attack before the 
allied squadrons could be properly organized. When the battle was joined, Rupert’s vanguard, 
inadequately brought to bear, lacked ships powerful enough to break the Dutch line. A squadron 
under Cornelis Tromp fought both the vanguard and the English red squadron to a standstill 
while drifting toward shallower water. The wind shifted to blow from the west-northwest, and 
Anglo-French crews were forced into frantic manoeuvres to avoid the shoals looming nearby. 
Meanwhile squadrons led by De Ruyter and Banckert sailed through the French division, cutting 
the allied fleet in two and regaining the weather gage. At nightfall the allies retreated to sea while 
the Dutch returned to Schooneveld. Despite the allied numerical advantage both sides lost only 
fireships, and both were burdened with an equal number of disabled vessels. After the battle 
George Legge concluded that allied captains feared running aground more than enemy fire, and 
when Rupert described the danger of shoals to Charles the allied fleet was forbidden from 
entering Schooneveld a second time. A tactical stalemate, the Battle of Schooneveld was a 
significant strategic victory for the Republic, thwarting invasion and damaging Anglo-French 
prestige.
65
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De Ruyter probably would have avoided battle on the morning of 7 June without a 
summer easterly rendered more common in the climate of the Maunder Minimum. The wind 
initially helped the Dutch foil Rupert’s ill-conceived attempt to emulate De Ruyter’s tactics in 
the Battle of Sole Bay, yet before long a change of wind temporarily granted the allies the 
weather gage. However, with the shoals nearby the westerly threatened to ground the deep-
draughted allied ships, and therefore presented as much a danger as an advantage for the English 
and French. Frequent course adjustments attempted by allied captains to avoid the shallows 
likely helped De Ruyter’s squadron outmanoeuvre the French division to regain the weather 
gage. Gales and an easterly, both atypical in June during a warmer North Sea climate but quite 
common during the Maunder Minimum, granted the outnumbered Dutch an initial advantage in 
the Battle of Schooneveld. Still, it was the complex and, for Dutch mariners, well-understood 
relationship between local environments and variable weather, only partially overlaid with the 
telltale signatures of a cooler climate, that helped the Republic’s fleet thwart a naval invasion. 
Following the battle, a week of renewed gales hindered allied attempts to mend their 
damaged ships, while the Dutch fleet, sailing near the sheltered coast, repaired and recruited 
more easily.
66
 De Ruyter, aware of these advantages, employed three days of persistent easterly 
winds to surprise the allies on 14 June. Spragge was on a ketch, halfway towards Rupert’s 
flagship, while the Dutch armada bore towards the Anglo-French fleet with the weather gage. 
Spragge inexplicably pressed on towards Rupert’s vessel, delaying his return to his squadron and 
throwing the allied fleet into confusion. Meanwhile, the Dutch employed the north-easterly 
winds to bombard the allies at range, eventually forcing a retreat back to Sheerness. At dawn, De 
Ruyter commanded his subordinates to give chase, writing that “[the allies] will fight with me 
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when I desire, but I will not when they please.”67 With French and English vessels still 
undergoing repairs, on 6 July the Dutch fleet appeared off the Thames, possibly to attempt a raid 
up the river. However, after five days an outbreak of plague forced its sailors to return to 
Schooneveld.
68
  
In England, public support for the war had been eroded by Dutch propaganda, losses to 
Dutch privateers, rising anti-Catholicism, mounting suspicion regarding French ambitions, and 
the obvious reality that victory was not forthcoming. Meanwhile, the army intended for naval 
invasion, crowded on requisitioned coal transports in a fleet that overflowed the harbour of 
Yarmouth, was forced to retire to Harwich to avoid storms and the risk of a Dutch attack. 
Consequently an invasion was impossible on short notice, ensuring that the war would continue 
for weeks even if the Dutch fleet could be defeated at sea. With English finances teetering on the 
brink of collapse and the war effort in disarray, Charles visited Rupert aboard the Royal 
Sovereign on 26 June. Rupert was ordered to present the allied fleet to the Dutch before 
Schooneveld, attacking only if the position of the enemy and the state of the weather provided an 
advantage. If battle could not be forced on allied terms, Rupert and his subordinates would sail 
north to Texel, where an inbound VOC fleet was expected. Plundering East Indiamen would help 
finance the war, and if the Dutch were drawn out from Schooneveld there were few shoals 
immediately off the western coast of Texel that would hinder the allies.
69
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On 31 July the allied fleet of 86 men-of-war appeared before Schooneveld, claiming the 
weather gage in calm north-westerly winds and drawing out the 60 ships in the Dutch armada. A 
sudden wind shift to the southwest helped the Dutch claim the weather gage, but De Ruyter 
opted to avoid battle and instead protect the coast from naval invasion. Accordingly the allied 
fleet sailed north for Texel, and the Republic’s admirals rightly feared a trap. However, on 2 
August William III instructed De Ruyter to engage anyway, believing that the exhausted English 
naval system would not survive another costly battle. The Dutch fleet therefore bore north for 
Texel, yet a severe gale rose on 14 August and continued for six days, preventing battle. 
Narbrough, now captain of the St. Michael, wrote on the 14
th
 that “we had much water on the 
gundeck,” which, pouring down into the hold, “wet all the sails in the Boatswain’s store-room . . 
. wet the stores in the Carpenter’s store-room . . . wet 20 pounds of paper cartridges filled with 
powder in the powder-room and some barrels - at present we cannot tell the quantity – and wet 
most of the match and several other things in those rooms.” The loss of these critical provisions 
was compounded on the following day when high winds inflicted further damage. On 17 August 
the storm precluded travel between ships, but the winds finally moderated on the 19
th
. Shortly 
thereafter, the Dutch fleet was spotted on the horizon. At daybreak on 20 August the wind blew 
from the north-east, and the direction of the wind, which did not initially favour either the allies 
or the Dutch, encouraged their sailors to engage in a race for the weather gage.
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 The ships furthest east would claim the weather gage and, in turn, dictate the terms of 
battle. Accordingly at sunset both fleets braved the confusion of darkness and continued to sail 
towards the Republic’s coast. However, with the shoals approaching, the French squadron twice 
disobeyed Rupert’s orders and shortened sail, forcing the English to hang back and, at 1:00 AM, 
allowing the Dutch to shoot ahead. With first light at 6:00 AM, the allies tacked while the Dutch 
bore down with a rising south-easterly wind. Having claimed the weather gage, De Ruyter could 
employ his tactics for engaging a superior force, which allowed the Dutch to concentrate on the 
enemy’s main body while sending smaller squadrons to occupy the remaining allied divisions. At 
8:00 AM the majority of the Dutch fleet under admirals De Ruyter and Banckert attacked 
Rupert’s red squadron and the centre of the allied line. Tromp’s division engaged Spragge’s blue 
squadron, while just seven men-of-war with three fireships from the Zeeland squadron assaulted 
the entire French armada. As the battle was joined the easterly wind blew the black cannon 
smoke west from the Dutch vessels to enshroud the allied men-of-war. Unable to see beyond 
their immediate surroundings, allied commanders were forced to fight three scattered battles, and 
the bulk of the opposing fleets therefore engaged on relatively equal terms.
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At 9:00 AM a thick layer of fog further isolated each engagement. In the resulting 
confusion, Tromp’s division and its superior gunners devastated blue squadron, while the French 
ships sailed south-west for so long before tacking that they effectively abandoned the battle. At 
noon, red squadron, the core of the English fleet, began to give way as it was bombarded on 
three sides by Dutch divisions under De Ruyter and Banckert. At 2:00 PM the wind shifted to 
blow hard from the south-southwest, lifting the veil of smoke and revealing the plight of blue 
squadron. Rupert ordered his remaining seaworthy ships to relieve Spragge’s division, but the 
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majority of the Dutch fleet followed, and again both armadas sailed east in parallel. Red 
squadron arrived before Tromp’s vessels could seize or destroy Spragge’s disabled flagship, but 
Spragge had perished while in transit to another vessel. The French, nearly ten kilometres 
distant, ignored Rupert’s signal to engage the Dutch, and by nightfall the English were forced to 
retreat west with many crippled vessels. Miraculously, neither fleet had lost a ship, although the 
allies ultimately captured four VOC vessels before and after the battle.
72
 On the other hand, a 
simultaneous Dutch raid on Anglo-French colonies in the Americas was spectacularly successful, 
and in the North Sea the badly damaged allied fleet would take months to repair. For the allies, 
retaining command of the sea – let alone attempting a naval invasion – was now impossible. As 
if to underscore the new reality, the Republic’s fleet reappeared off the Thames on 3 
September.
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Rendered more likely by the climate of the Maunder Mininmum, the gale that delayed the 
Battle of Texel or Slag bij Kijkduin likely damaged both fleets, although the allies, sailing farther 
from shelter, may have suffered more. More important for the course of the battle, and the war, 
was the easterly that persisted from the morning of the 20
th
 to the afternoon of the 21
st
. Blowing 
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in a month in which westerlies prevailed during warmer climates, and part of four-day stretch 
during which logbook entries recorded easterlies, the wind that helped shape the battle was 
probably stimulated by the colder climate of the Maunder Minimum. Its influence was, of 
course, mediated by the unique nature of both naval systems, and indeed the wind blew from a 
direction in which either fleet could theoretically have claimed the weather gage. Still, even if 
the French squadron had not twice shortened sail, the superior seamanship of the Republic’s 
mariners, and the shallow hulls of their ships, likely would have granted them the weather gage. 
For crews aboard warships, the weather gage was important before, during, and 
sometimes immediately after any naval battle in the age of sail. However, it was especially 
critical for the Dutch before the Battle of Texel, because it allowed De Ruyter to deploy his 
tactics for engaging a superior force. These tactics depended, in part, on separating each 
engagement, and the smoke that blew from windward ships to isolate the English divisions was 
therefore also of particular significance. The effect of the smoke was exacerbated by fog, which 
was probably stimulated by the south-easterly wind blowing warm air over water likely chilled in 
a cool summer typical of the Maunder Minimum. When the wind did shift to the southwest in the 
afternoon, it blew at approximately 37 knots for 24 hours, preventing the allies from opening all 
their gunports and further tilting the odds in favour of the less numerous Dutch. The relationship 
between weather associated with the Maunder Minimum, and the marine environment off Texel, 
maximized the effectiveness of De Ruyter’s tactics and helped the Republic claim another 
improbable victory.
74
  
Reports sent by Rupert and other English officers in the wake of the battle were sharply 
critical of the French. Fanned by Dutch propaganda, they helped intensify anti-Catholic and anti-
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French sentiment in England that increasingly bridged all social strata. English commerce was 
halted by the Republic’s fleet as Dutch trade finally resumed, and William organized an alliance 
against France. Brandenburg, Lorraine, the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, and later 
Denmark joined the Republic in resisting the territorial ambitions of Louis XIV. Meanwhile, the 
States Army under William III had grown into a large and effective force. On 1 October, 
Münsterite troops attempted to retake the fortress at Coevorden by damming the river Vecht, yet 
persistent torrential rains raised water levels so high that the dam was swiftly breached. As the 
broader war transformed into a conflict between Habsburg and Bourbon, the Republic’s army 
seized the critical French supply depot at Bonn on 12 November. On 23 November the core of 
the French army, its position in the Republic increasingly untenable, was forced to retreat from 
Utrecht to the IJssel line. They travelled by foot, because easterly winds and unseasonal freezing 
impeded travel by boat. The majority of the Republic was swiftly restored and Bernhard von 
Galen soon sued for peace, although the war with France would continue until 1678.
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England concluded its Third Dutch War by signing the Treaty of Westminster on 19 
February 1674. The Dutch annexed Surinam and the English reclaimed New Amsterdam, but for 
the financially exhausted English government the treaty was a humiliating confirmation of the 
status quo. The Dutch did not recognize England’s “sovereignty of the seas,” and regained the 
right to fish in the North Sea without compensating the English government. The success of the 
Dutch privateers had devastated English merchant shipping, significantly delaying the rise of 
England’s supremacy in global commerce. Worse, the terms of the secret Treaty of Dover could 
be revealed by the French at any time, destabilizing the English monarchy. By undermining the 
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credibility of Charles and the Duke of York, the war ultimately contributed to the success of 
Dutch propaganda prior to the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
76
  
 
Conclusions: Climate, Weather, and the Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century 
 
 In 1980, Jan de Vries argued that most “historians of climate” placed “excessive 
emphasis on identifying changes in meteorological magnitudes.” For De Vries, “the 
consequences of climate changes do not flow only, probably not evenly primarily, from 
differences in level; they also flow from differences in variance.”77 Certainly meteorological 
variability, often expressed in weather that was unusual during different climatic regimes, 
affected the course of military operations in every Anglo-Dutch War. In the first war, an easterly 
storm raised tensions between the Anglo-Dutch fleets by encouraging Tromp to seek shelter near 
the English coast, and in the second war westerly winds helped prevent the Dutch armada from 
leaving port before the Four Days’ Battle until after the English fleet was divided. Later, calm 
winds during the St. James’s Day Fight allowed the English to safely open all their gunports, 
while a westerly quickened the retreat of De Ruyter’s squadron after the Dutch line disintegrated. 
In the third war, unusual dryness in the first months of 1672 helped the French cross the Rhine 
and outflank the IJssel line, then initially slowed the pace of inundation so that the heart of the 
Republic lay open to invasion for two critical weeks. Finally, the moderate intensity and frequent 
thawing of the winter of 1672-73 aided Dutch efforts to maintain the Hollandic Water Line as a 
barrier to invasion.   
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 The long climatic history of the Little Ice Age in Northern Europe can be defined less as 
a prolonged period of cold, wet, and stormy weather than a turbulent stretch of meteorological 
variability following the relatively stable warmth of the Medieval Climatic Anomaly. However, 
changing relationships between climate, weather, and competing military regimes in the Anglo-
Dutch Wars reveal the limits of meteorological variability as a useful trope for the synthesis of 
environmental and military histories. While westerly winds, warm days, or droughts were hardly 
rare during the Maunder Minimum, ship logbooks, diaries, and correspondence written by both 
Dutch and English authors reflected a pronounced shift to a generally colder, wetter, stormier 
climate that stimulated more easterly winds. Between 1652 and 1674, the influence of such 
weather rippled through every level of the military systems that contested each Anglo-Dutch 
War.  
In the first war, persistent westerlies allowed English privateers to set the terms of battle, 
plausibly contributing to their remarkable successes. Westerlies also enabled supply ships to 
easily leave port and quickly provide victuals to English blockades. In battles, English ships of 
unprecedented size, guided into line of battle tactics by artillery commanders, were most 
effective when calm, westerly winds allowed bombardment at range with all gunports open. Not 
only did the English win more than twice as many major battles in the first war than in the latter 
wars combined, but prevailing westerlies also discouraged Dutch raids into the Thames Estuary 
and beyond. Storms with westerly winds also inflicted an unequal toll, and repeatedly scattered 
Dutch vessels or destroyed them on lee shores while English armadas sheltered nearby. 
Admittedly, the weather common under the slightly warmer climate that divided the Grindelwald 
Fluctuation from the Maunder Minimum did not directly cause the English to prevail during the 
First Anglo-Dutch War. For example, it was England’s deep harbours, easy access to iron, earlier 
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civil war, and distinct maritime culture that encouraged the leaders of its naval system to develop 
the revolutionary fleet that defeated the wealthier Dutch. Weather shaped by a warmer climate 
was therefore one influence among many. It stimulated changes in local environments that, in 
turn, interacted differently with the unique maritime expressions of competing Anglo-Dutch 
naval systems.  
However, by 1664 both the Dutch naval system and the regional environment had 
changed. Although they retained their wide lines and shallow draughts, many of the Republic’s 
new vessels increasingly pushed the limits of ship size imposed by shallow Dutch harbours, and 
Dutch naval commanders adopted elements of English line of battle tactics. Moreover, the 
coming of the Maunder Minimum had altered the patterns of prevailing weather that benefitted 
the English a decade earlier. In the Second Anglo-Dutch War, the Republic’s privateers were 
likely assisted to their prey by persistent easterlies, and elements of the Dutch galiot intelligence 
network could probably manoeuvre more rapidly to new positions. Frequent high winds often 
persuaded English captains to close their lower gunports, while easterlies helped the Dutch claim 
the weather gage during major battles and, most famously, the triumphant raid on the Medway.  
 Meteorological conditions differ from year-to-year during any climatic regime. The 
weather that influenced the Third Anglo-Dutch War, while generally typical of the Maunder 
Minimum, was not identical to that which had prevailed five years earlier. Gales and high winds 
were more common, thwarting allied attempts to exploit their superiority at sea when the Dutch 
fleet was partially dismantled. Easterlies were less frequent than they were in the second war, but 
still more common than they had been in the first, and it is likely that this again benefitted Dutch 
privateers preying on storm-damaged merchantmen. Despite an ill-timed dry spell in early 1672, 
precipitation, which had been abundant in the second war, was also plentiful in the third. The 
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invasion of a Münsterite army under Bernhard von Galen had been slowed by torrential rain in 
1665, and in 1672 the Bishop’s siege of Groningen was undermined by a similar deluge. On 
land, as at sea, Dutch commanders and ordinary soldiers, working within the context of their 
distinct military system, exploited unique relationships between regional environments and the 
weather rendered more common during the Maunder Minimum. Elevated land underwater, 
combined with high easterly winds, allowed De Ruyter to exploit the advantages of Dutch ship 
design by developing revolutionary tactics aimed at defeating a superior force. Meanwhile, the 
low-lying Dutch landscape encouraged the design of watery defences that, when strengthened by 
persistent precipitation, provided a formidable barrier against invasion.  
Competing military systems also reflected broader structures that were equally influenced 
by weather rendered more common in different climatic regimes. Cold winters and damaging 
storms delayed ship construction and fleet assembly in the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars, 
while persistent easterlies fanned the great fire of London in 1666. Overall, it may be that the 
flexible networks of trade that contributed so much to Dutch prosperity adapted more easily to 
climatic transition than the agricultural economies of England and, in particular, France. On the 
other hand, history is about people, and people, while influenced by structures, are not inevitably 
bound by them. At sea and on land, civilian and military leaders were pressed towards particular 
decisions by the weight of interactions between cultural and environmental structures. Still, Van 
Wassenaer did not attack in easterlies before the Battle of Lowestoft, the Duke of York’s 
gentleman-in-waiting instructed his captain to shorten sail in the battle’s aftermath, Rupert 
departed before the Four Days’ Battle while Monk engaged a superior force, and Luxembourg 
dithered as the Hollandic Water Line was filled. A structural analysis can shed new light on why 
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historical actors felt compelled to act in one way or another, but every historical narrative must 
acknowledge the enduring importance of human agency.  
In 1622, Francis Bacon ended his Historia Ventorum, or “History of the Winds,” with a 
list of desiderata stemming from his investigation. Desideratum III advised that “ways be found 
to predict the risings, fallings, and times of winds; this would be useful for navigation and 
agriculture, and most of all for choosing times for sea battles.”78 Bacon’s call for action suggests 
that military commanders sought ways of predicting weather, although long-term weather 
forecasts would not be developed until the nineteenth century. Moreover, most early modern 
soldiers believed that demonic or divine influences were behind the meteorological conditions 
that influenced military success or failure. Still, in the First Anglo-Dutch War, Commonwealth 
naval strategists developed line of battle tactics that, for the English, were especially effective in 
calm, westerly winds. After the coming of the Maunder Minimum, Dutch commanders attacked 
from shoals, raided English rivers, and inundated land to form a defensive barrier. These 
strategies were facilitated by more frequent easterlies, more common high winds, and generally 
increased precipitation.  
Many Dutch mariners had spent decades at sea, and even the most unseasoned 
commanders in the fleets that contested the Anglo-Dutch Wars respected how weather 
influenced success or failure. On land, generals and their subordinates understood, for example, 
how rain rendered roads impassable, cold winters hampered sieges, storms thwarted attack, and 
drought compromised waterways as defensive barriers. Certainly soldiers at sea and on land 
remembered exceptional weather, but when recording daily weather did officers discern long-
term changes in average daily weather and plan accordingly? Unfortunately, neither surviving 
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correspondence nor ship logbooks reveal if the tactics of the Anglo-Dutch Wars emerged from a 
growing awareness among military officers that North Sea weather patterns had changed. Still, it 
is probable that, at the very least, these tactics were unconsciously shaped by the weather that 
accompanied the transition from the warmer climate of the mid-seventeenth century to the cooler 
Maunder Minimum. 
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PART III: CONCEPTUALIZING CLIMATE CHANGE 
Dutch Culture and the Little Ice Age, 1565-1720, and Modern Understandings 
of Climate History 
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The changes in prevailing weather that accompanied the Little Ice Age in the Dutch 
Republic were perceived, understood, and exploited in the context of a culture that was distinct 
within early modern Europe. To contemporaries, the culture of the Dutch Golden Age was most 
importantly expressed through the nebulous, frequently violated, but influential concepts of 
freedom, equality, and toleration. These ideals informed a thriving intellectual life that was 
sustained by commerce, informed by scholarship, and most spectacularly reflected in visual art. 
The freedom, equality, and toleration experienced by the citizens of the Republic were 
substantial in the context of conditions elsewhere in Europe. Visitors to the Republic routinely 
expressed their horror at its relatively relaxed class distinctions and religious heterogeneity. 
However, freedom of expression was, in practice, circumscribed in a plutocracy that largely 
adhered to Calvinist norms. Moreover, the Republic’s large but rarely studied urban 
lumpenproletariat scarcely experienced the benefits of their supposedly enlightened culture, not 
to mention the victims of the Dutch slave trade.
1
  
Nevertheless, substantial freedoms did exist for many Dutch citizens relative to 
conditions elsewhere in Europe. The cultural values that informed these freedoms largely 
predated Dutch pre-eminence in trade but ultimately contributed to the efficiency of the world’s 
most dynamic commercial economy.  They also reflected the atavistic decentralization of the 
Dutch state, which, although possessed of a generally orderly and stable civic culture, 
nevertheless recognized a bewildering number of local privileges. Comparative freedom and 
toleration encouraged the Republic’s remarkable intellectual life, even if the latitude given to 
open expression was limited by modern standards. Moreover, the dynamism of Dutch 
scholarship was not divorced from broader Dutch society. In the context of seventeenth-century 
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Europe, the Republic, and particularly Holland, was exceptionally urbanized, highly literate, and 
possessed of a striking variety of technological innovations that, like the trekvaart, improved the 
lives of ordinary citizens.
2
  
The Republic’s culture, industry, commerce, and military power were mutually 
constitutive, as cultural attitudes enabled commercial expansion that, when supported by military 
force, sustained new and evolving industries that could kindle fresh cultural approaches. The 
order of these interactions could change, but entanglements between Dutch culture, industry, and 
commerce consistently shaped the history of the Republic’s Golden Age. Commercial pressure 
encouraged mapmaking, for example, which stimulated the Dutch paper industry, spurred the 
rise of cartography in Amsterdam, and informed the military and commercial expansion of Dutch 
trading interests that, in turn, had cultural ramifications.
3
 
The following chapter, and the conclusion, explore how climate change can be 
understood. The chapter investigates how different groups within the Republic’s distinct culture 
perceived weather, discerned climate change, and responded culturally. It probes to what extent 
the Dutch cultural reaction to early modern climate change reflected its material influence. The 
conclusion examines how an analysis of the Little Ice Age in the Dutch Republic can refine how 
historical climatologists today understand relationships between climate change and human 
history.  It also considers how the major findings of this dissertation can inform both the 
scholarly understanding of early modern Europe, and interdisciplinary projections of life on a 
warmer planet.  
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Chapter 7  
 
Understanding Weather and Climate Change in the Dutch Republic 
 
 
 Two major case studies have here explored how climatic fluctuations during the Little Ice 
Age influenced the production and defence of wealth during the height of the Dutch Republic. 
Culture in the Republic informed, and was shaped by, these military and economic enterprises. 
Accordingly, this dissertation concludes with an analysis of the cultural perception and reception 
within the Republic of what is today known as the Little Ice Age. “Culture” is a broad, contested 
term, prone to slip from the grasp of historians whose cultural history has grown to encompass 
all aspects of human experience. In this chapter, “culture” is limited to a way of structuring 
thought. It incorporates ways of perceiving weather, understanding the atmosphere, and 
conceptualizing climate change. It also includes methods of responding to weather that became 
more or less likely under different climatic regimes. Some of these intellectual responses were 
reflected through behaviour, and such behaviour can shed light on mental landscapes influenced 
by weather, if surviving sources explicitly describe a connection. However, the development of 
cultural norms and values usually reflect centuries of complex interactions between human and 
natural structures. This chapter explores the brief disruptions in these relationships, but 
identifying the influence of climatic fluctuation in their long-term evolution is beyond its scope.
4
  
 In the Dutch Republic, diverse understandings of weather and climate change informed 
dramatic but occasionally ambiguous cultural responses. The attitudes expressed and shaped by 
conceptions of, and responses to, weather may have contributed to the resilience of the Republic 
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during the climatic fluctuations of the Little Ice Age. Nevertheless, the cultural reception of 
weather and climate change was complicated by the social heterogeneity of the Low Countries.
5
 
Although popular culture and scholarly culture were less sharply differentiated in the Republic 
than they were elsewhere in Europe, weather was differently understood by members of groups 
that were divided by education and affluence. This general distinction was sharpened in the 
course of the seventeenth century. Dutch scholars gradually developed a more secular natural 
philosophy, but supernatural explanations for weather persisted much longer among other literate 
observers, while particularly practical attitudes dominated among the less educated. Still, 
conceptions of weather developed by citizens of similar social status were hardly homogenous. 
For example, the persecution of witches believed to be responsible for bad weather was rare in 
the Republic, but trials, when they did occur, were the product of local beliefs held by different 
social groups that did not necessarily reflect broader social attitudes.  
As Dutch observers sought to identify the spiritual significance, natural origin, and 
practical consequences of weather, they compared meteorological conditions in their present 
with events in the past. While limited to extreme weather, these comparisons were remarkably 
accurate, and they allowed some scholars to identify long-term meteorological patterns. Such 
academic inquiry contributed to an emerging understanding in the Republic that patterns of 
prevailing weather were unstable and had changed. That understanding was an important first 
step towards the perception of climate change, if not the scientific comprehension of the physical 
processes involved. However, surviving sources record no explicit awareness of changes in 
average weather patterns over the decadal scales relevant for climate history, although such 
changes were certainly recorded in ship logbooks and weather diaries.  
                                                 
5
 Indeed, as it is in all societies, past or present.  
417 
 
Artistic responses to weather in the Republic demonstrate the importance for Dutch 
citizens of storms, cold winters, and other meteorological conditions rendered more common 
during the minima of the Little Ice Age. On the other hand, depictions of such weather events in 
contemporary literature and visual art were shaped not only by the whims or commercial 
instincts of each artist, but also by social, economic, and cultural structures. Consequently they 
hint at, but do not necessarily reflect, the influence of contemporary climatic fluctuations. Like 
art, the concurrent development of new technologies and practices that exploited weather 
conditions more common during Little Ice Age minima was shaped by, and in turn helped shape, 
ways of structuring thought. These material expressions of culture may have been more directly 
encouraged than art by weather that accompanied the minima of the Little Ice Age, without 
which they would have been less effective. However, they were also mediated by a web of 
human structures, and, like contemporary art, do not necessarily demonstrate the influence of 
climatic fluctuation. Overall, some cultural responses to weather and climate change were fairly 
transparent in the Dutch Republic, while others were much more uncertain than many historians 
of climate have allowed. 
 In some respects this chapter follows recent trends in the large and dynamic 
historiography of the Republic’s culture; in other aspects it resists them. Cultural historians, art 
historians, and historians of science interested in the Dutch Golden Age increasingly explore 
social networks that were often transnational and included more than just the learned elite. 
Knowledge, in particular, was created and eagerly absorbed by artisans, merchants, sailors, 
soldiers, farmers, and labourers, who could, in turn, communicate their discoveries to those of 
greater social standing. This chapter explores the way conceptions of weather were developed 
and received by members of diverse “social networks,” primary in the Republic but also in 
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England.
6
 Nevertheless, it is limited by the unique constraints of historical climatology. 
References to weather abound in sources written by a diverse range of Dutch citizens, yet 
reflections on the significance of weather, let alone its long-term trends, were luxuries largely 
limited to the diaries and correspondence of the predominantly male elite.
7
  
 This chapter investigates diaries, correspondence, chronicles, and poetry written by Jan 
de Witt, Anthonis Duyck, Nicolaes van Wassenaer, Pieter Christiaanszoon Bor, Gerard Brandt, 
Michiel Adriaanszoon de Ruyter, Hans Svendsen, Cornelis Cornelis, Pieter Janszoon Twisck, the 
brothers Van der Goes, Claas Caescoper, Coenraad van Beuningen, Balthasar Bekker, Jan de 
Pottre, Pier Winsemius, Lieuwe van Aitzema, Hugo de Groot, Gustaaf Van Imhoff, Joost van 
den Vondel, Ralph Josselin, Robert Hooke, John Narbrough, and Francis Bacon. All of these 
men, even the miller Caescoper and the English captain John Narbrough, were relatively 
prosperous and respected in the context of their societies. The main source examined for the 
insights of the poor were thousands of letters written to sailors in the Republic’s fleet and 
intercepted by English vessels during the Anglo-Dutch Wars. Within that correspondence, only 
letters written by Janneke Aengenendt and Jan Tijssen Eikenboom described weather and its 
consequences with any detail.  
Pamphlets, popular poetry, illustrations, paintings, and newspaper articles have also been 
analyzed, and these were likely read or admired by Dutch citizens across boundaries of class and 
gender. However, much of the cultural responses to weather and climate explored in this chapter 
were composed by the Republic’s male elite. Certainly, the creation and reception of weather and 
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perhaps climate knowledge may have been a product of communication between diverse social 
networks in the Republic. However, this chapter suggests that the interpretation, and to a lesser 
extent the communication, of weather knowledge was still restricted by class and gender, 
especially when it had little practical relevance.
8
  
The character of knowledge developed in the Republic is also explored in this chapter. 
Eric Jorink has argued that historians like Jonathan Israel and Harold Cook have long described 
the intellectual culture of the Dutch Golden Age as “primarily rational, pragmatic, utilitarian and 
non-metaphysical, if not anti-metaphysical.”9 In making this claim Jorink simplified the 
arguments of Israel, Cook, and many other Dutch historians of science.
10
 Israel, for example, 
carefully considered the fiercely contested origin of the Enlightenment in the universities of the 
Republic. Cook examined utilitarian knowledge not because it characterized all intellectual life 
in the Republic, but because he was concerned with its connection to Dutch commerce. Still, 
neither Israel nor Cook examined the enduring importance of theology in the development of the 
new intellectual attitudes of the seventeenth century, and this is the focus of Jorink’s work. 
While this chapter does identify an increasing secularism in the meteorological attitudes of 
seventeenth-century Dutch scholars, it broadly supports Jorink’s conclusions. Well into the 
seventeenth century, supernatural explanations for weather and speculation as to its 
consequences remained influential among educated Dutch citizens.
11
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 Some historians have expressed considerable, and justified, skepticism about scholarship 
that identifies relationships between large material structures – like the environment – and broad 
cultural developments.
12
 Studies that discern relationships between environment and culture too 
often assume that the artistic representation of the natural world follows straightforwardly from 
its perception. In fact, the rich historiography of art
13
 in the Dutch Republic has revealed to what 
extent superficially realistic depictions of reality were never direct transcriptions of the natural 
world. Like literature, paintings and illustrations, usually created in studios far removed from 
depicted events, often had many meanings. Art reflected or defied cultural norms, and forged, 
disseminated, and resisted popular values. Time and space was altered even in many naval 
paintings, which represented environmental structures with unusual faithfulness but frequently 
portrayed major events in battles as if they occurred simultaneously. This chapter tests to what 
extent artistic reflections of weather in the Dutch Republic can be linked to early modern climate 
change, in light of the conclusions of Dutch art historians.
14
 
 The chapter opens by identifying understandings of weather in correspondence, diaries, 
ship logbooks, academic treatises, newspaper accounts, pamphlets, and chronicles written 
between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. It then investigates the extent to which climate 
change was perceived by contemporary observers. It continues by exploring whether visual art, 
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popular poetry, and literature written in the Dutch Republic reflected, and responded to, the 
climatic fluctuations of the Little Ice Age. The chapter concludes by examining possible 
connections between culture and practice that allowed the Dutch to adapt to the weather that 
accompanied Little Ice Age minima.  
 
Understanding Weather in the Dutch Republic 
 
 In the sixteenth century scholarly conceptions of weather still rested on an uneasy 
synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy and Biblical exegesis, although cracks in this foundation had 
grown increasingly obvious. In the Bible, the fashioning of man completed creation, the 
corruption of Adam and Eve ruined its perfection, and the salvation promised by Jesus ensured 
its restoration. Clerics and scholars whose Christian worldview situated man at the centre of 
creation naturally supported Aristotle’s deduction that Earth lay at the centre of the universe. 
According to Aristotelian cosmology, the Earth is encircled by the moon, sun, known planets, 
and a celestial sphere of stars, above which Christian adaptations situated heaven (Figure 7.1). 
The moon’s orbit distinguishes the stable perfection of the celestial realm from the inconstant 
tumult of terrestrial domains, which are roiled by the circulation of the four elements and their 
different exhalations. The elements and their wet and vaporous, or hot and smoky, exhalations 
are the material, or first, causes of meteorological phenomena. The efficient cause – the ultimate 
source of movement – lay in the motion of celestial bodies, especially the sun.15  
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Fig. 7.1. Aristotle’s cosmology. The elements circulate between Earth and moon. Peter Apian, Cosmographia. 
Landshut, 1524. 
 
 The authority of Aristotelian cosmology was most famously challenged in the fifteenth 
through seventeenth centuries by the deductions of Copernicus, the observations of Galileo, and 
the discovery of civilizations beyond the southerly “torrid zone” that Aristotle thought was 
uninhabitable. However, the influence of Aristotelian meteorology endured well into the 
seventeenth century, in part because Aristotle’s conceptualization of meteorology was explicitly 
conjectural and provisional, and consequently malleable in the face of new experience.  Of 
meteorological phenomena Aristotle confessed that “some puzzle us, while others admit of 
explanation in some degree.” These and other admissions of doubt inspired scholars across 
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Europe to challenge Aristotle’s meteorology long before the broader principles of his cosmology 
were called into question. Such challenges had yielded a complex hybrid of classical and 
experiential meteorological understanding among sixteenth-century scholars in the Low 
Countries.
16
  
The scholars of the Golden Age increasingly perceived themselves as belonging to an age 
distinct from, and intellectually superior to, the classical world. This belief encouraged, and was 
encouraged by, ever more rigorous observations that were enabled by increasingly sophisticated 
instruments. The relationship between apparatus and analysis was demonstrated with particular 
clarity in the study of meteorology during the Little Ice Age. In December 1624, as 
thermoscopes
17
 were developed across Europe, physician Nicolaes van Wassenaer of Amsterdam 
described his construction of a device that he named the “Drebbeliaans.” The Drebbeliaans 
faithfully responded to changes in temperature, and on 23 February its readings suggested to Van 
Wassenaer that a shift in the wind was the first cause of a cold wave that chilled the Republic. 
Van Wassenaer’s conclusion demonstrates not only the impulse to build instruments that could 
contribute to experiential knowledge of weather, but also the enduring influence of Aristotle’s 
hierarchy of causes.
18
  
Van Wassenaer’s artisanal tinkering reflected a more or less scholarly preoccupation with 
meteorology in the Dutch Republic that aligned with general European trends. On the other hand, 
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the studies of René Descartes helped revolutionize European conceptions of weather. Descartes, 
then living in the Dutch Republic, was the last natural philosopher to dominate the emerging 
science of meteorology. His theoretical understanding of weather emerged not from observation, 
or Aristotle’s cosmology, but rather his own scientific method. It was as factually incorrect as its 
intellectual forebears, yet for European scholars it encouraged a definitive and enduring break 
with Aristotle’s meteorology. Moreover, Descartes did not dismiss experiential knowledge. He 
developed barometers that were later constructed by Christiaan Huygens, and wrote a meticulous 
study of snow crystals during the lengthy blizzards of February, 1635 (Figure 7.2). In subsequent 
decades scholars across Europe refined the instruments that enabled new observations and 
ultimately helped overturn the deductive natural philosophies of both Aristotle and Descartes. 
New instruments included more than just reliable barometers and thermometers. For example, in 
1665 Robert Hooke used a recent Dutch invention – the compound microscope – to explore the 
full complexity of snow crystals.
19
 In the first decades of the eighteenth century, clocks were 
increasingly employed to bring weather events further into the realm of the rational, the orderly, 
and the quantifiable.
20
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Fig. 7.2. Illustrations of snow by Descartes (left) and Hooke (right), both dating from cold winters. Hooke, 
Micrographia, 7. Frank, “Descartes’ Observations,” 537. 
 
 
Such developments may have been encouraged by the distinct intellectual culture, and 
social structures, of the Republic. The relative tolerance of intellectual attitudes in the Dutch 
Republic allowed Descartes, for example, to develop ideas that were widely condemned in 
Catholic France. Moreover, historians have recently argued that careful observation was essential 
to the culture of the Republic’s Golden Age. Dutch scholars hoarded curiosities acquired through 
global commerce, and by the end of the seventeenth century their collections were increasingly 
composed of natural, rather than entirely cultural, artifacts. Eric Jorink has demonstrated that the 
assembly and interpretation of these collections, most of which were freely accessible to all, 
encouraged an empirical attitude towards nature that, in turn, stimulated the culture of 
observation in the Republic. Indeed, the acquisition, observation, and interpretation of rarities 
was an important expression of early modern Dutch affluence, encouraging not only the famous 
boom and bust of “Tulipmania” in the 1630s, but also such hobbies as the collection of exotic 
dogs. The culture of collection also contributed to the importance of visual art in the Republic, 
which often depicted the riches and rarities gleaned from Dutch commerce. Collection and 
detailed observation usually required leisure time and substantial wealth. It is therefore no 
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surprise that Dutch scholars, many of whom lived in the Republic’s coastal cities, were often 
relatively affluent members of the bourgeoisie.
21
 
Collections might have gradually contributed to increasing secularism in the Dutch 
Republic, but in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries they were often interpreted for 
what they revealed about God’s organization of nature. Indeed, the familiar teleology of 
increasing secularization, rationalization, and experimental sophistication in the development of 
early modern science is undermined by the complex but enduring influence of magical and 
religious belief in the meteorology of the contemporary Low Countries.
22
 Meteorology during 
the Dutch Golden Age was advanced by scholars who pursued ostensibly secular knowledge to 
better understand the workings of God. Moreover, most literate Europeans in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries still adhered to a metaphorical conception of the natural world, and 
extreme meteorological events in particular were often assigned to the will of God or the agency 
of the Devil. Learned conceptions of the demonic or divine meaning behind weather were 
informed by the teachings of Augustine, and especially Thomas Aquinas. Both Augustine and 
Aquinas drew some distinction between natural marvels and genuine miracles, which were 
distinguished by the explicit message they communicated. Aquinas in particular identified sharp 
divisions between the supernatural expression of God’s unmediated will, rare preternatural 
events incited by created beings, and the natural normality of everyday life. Preternatural 
marvels included unusual manifestations of the atmosphere in Aristotelian cosmology, which 
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encompassed not only meteorological conditions as they are understood today but also comets, 
meteors, and other astronomical phenomena.
23
  
The approximate scholarly consensus of the sixteenth century closely followed the 
distinction identified by Aquinas, and in theory supernatural miracles were recognized only 
when all other explanations failed. However, in practice the preternatural event was difficult to 
distinguish from the truly miraculous, even by the highly educated. For example, in the wake of 
catastrophic river floods during the frigid winter of 1595, Anthonis Duyck, head of the powerful 
Council of State, concluded his description of the disaster by explaining that the scale of human 
and animal misery “undoubtedly” reflected “the punishment of human excesses by the hand of 
God.” Writing in January during the severe winter of 1625/26, just over a year after his 
description of the Drebbeliaans, Van Wassenaer lamented that days of fasting and prayer in 
Amsterdam had done nothing to relieve the cold. Van Wassenaer determined that the citizens of 
Amsterdam had not prayed with all their hearts, but pastors had now resolved this problem. Of 
course, these attitudes were hardly confined to the Dutch Republic. On 1 February 1662, the 
vicar Ralph Josselin in Essex described “a publick fast to seeke god” encouraged not by cold 
conditions typical of the Maunder Minimum, but rather “warm moist unkindly” weather believed 
to raise the likelihood of disease and famine. Duyck, Van Wassenaer, and Josselin did not 
suggest that preternatural events were miracles, nor indeed that only miracles could answer their 
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prayers. Nevertheless, all identified the influence of God beyond the narrow constraints in which 
His influence could be proven according to contemporary theologians.
24
  
In this they adhered to the older and more broadly influential concept of the “sin 
economy.” According to this belief, extreme weather and other preternatural phenomena 
reflected God’s punishment for a negative imbalance in the virtue of a community. Members of a 
community could restore balance by curbing their ostensibly sinful behaviour and atoning 
through prayer or fasting. Alternatively, a religious, ethnic, or gendered minority was associated 
with demonic corruption and violently purged from the community. In particular, vulnerable 
members of a community could be charged with witchcraft, which many contemporaries 
believed provided the power to conjure meteorological extremes like hailstorms, frost, or 
torrential rain. Often God was appeased by a combination of inner renewal and external 
aggression, and as meteorological extremes are extreme precisely because they are short-lived, 
relief usually followed such traumatic housekeeping.
25
  
Nevertheless, God’s influence in natural phenomena involved more than punishment or 
even communication, especially for literate Dutch citizens who were nevertheless not scholars. 
In December during the frigid winter of 1572/73, the contemporary historian Pieter 
Christiaanszoon Bor wrote that a fleet manned by Dutch rebels had been trapped in the ice of the 
Zuider Zee, where it was in danger of being captured by the Spanish. As the Dutch sailors 
prepared to scuttle their ships, God sent a northerly wind that broke open the ice. The Dutch 
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vessels escaped, and God closed the ice behind them to prevent a Spanish pursuit. Similarly, as 
Spanish delegates arrived in The Hague to sign the Twelve Years’ Truce in 1608, Pastor Johan 
van de Sande described a cold wave of remarkable severity and duration that had frozen water 
across the Republic. The innermost citadels of the Republic were now exposed to the enemy, but 
it was a sign of the “marvelous workings of Almighty God that the frost arrived just as the truce 
was agreed to.” Indeed, Dutch citizens most frequently discerned the will of God when weather 
influenced military affairs. During the Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1665, Michiel de Ruyter and 
a small squadron of battered ships slipped by an English armada to successfully unite with the 
main Dutch fleet in the Republic (Chapter 5). Gerard Brandt, a contemporary Dutch biographer 
of De Ruyter, wrote that dense fog and variable winds frustrated English attempts at pursuit.  
According to Brandt, the fickle breeze and thick fog were clearly sent by God, and De Ruyter 
acknowledged that they were solely responsible for his homecoming.
26
  
However, God did not always take sides. At the conclusion of the Four Days’ Battle in 
June 1666, Dutch ships pursuing the broken English lines were thwarted by fog that was, to De 
Ruyter, “manifestly the work of Almighty God.” According to Hans Svendsen, a Danish captain 
in the Dutch fleet, De Ruyter heard a voice from Heaven that cried: “Back! Enough blood has 
been spilled.” On other occasions the preternatural expression of God’s will was less clear. 
According to a surviving pamphlet, a meteorite, then believed to be a rare meteorological 
phenomenon, fell on the town of Kampen on 7 March 1610. The pamphlet described how this 
particular meteorite descended on a young man who was surrounded by fire but emerged 
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unharmed. “What Almighty God wishes to communicate [with this sign],” the pamphlet 
concluded, “time will tell.”27 
Alongside the widespread conviction that preternatural events manifested God’s will, 
across Western Europe belief in their demonic origin, which adhered to the theological 
consensus, grew more common in the closing decades of the sixteenth century.
28
 This trend is 
reflected in Dutch documentary evidence. On 18 August 1586, a chronicle written in Ghent 
recorded a storm in which “many evil spirits were seen, like black crows, [which] inflicted much 
damage.” In the town of Emden on the northeastern fringe of the Republic, the farmer and 
chronicler Abel Eppens wrote that the frigid winter of 1586/87 was accompanied by gruesome 
apparitions in the sky that included a bloody arm above Groningen. On 16 August 1610, Cornelis 
Corneliszoon the Younger in Utrecht described a severe hailstorm in Amsterdam, Haarlem, and 
elsewhere that left behind a massive hailstone that was shaped like a skull. Like interpretations of 
severe weather that identified God’s displeasure, these darker conceptions of the preternatural 
often encouraged the persecution of the vulnerable for witchcraft or other sins.
29
 
In the context of the social turmoil of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, scholars 
and the popular press fuelled a widespread obsession about which preternatural wonders were 
miraculous, and which were demonic or entirely natural in origin. After all, the divine 
manipulation of the atmosphere could communicate not only displeasure or favour but also the 
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imminent future. Here magical epistemologies – particularly divination – blended uneasily with 
religious frameworks and Aristotelian cosmology in the interpretation of weather. For example, 
in the fall of 1607 the church official Pieter Janszoon Twisck associated the appearance of 
Halley’s Comet in Ursa Major with the impending onset of frigid temperatures and flooding. 
Since comets were atmospheric phenomena as much as storms or cold temperatures in 
Aristotelian meteorology, it was natural to assume that their appearance heralded a change in the 
weather (Figure 7.3).
30
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Fig. 7.3. A comet during the Maunder Minimum. In this painting, one of several on the same theme by artist Lieven 
Verschuier, citizens of Rotterdam gather in the snow to discern the significance of comet C/1680 V1. Lieven 
Verschuier, “The Great Comet of 1680,” painting, 1680, http://goo.gl/7F5piV.  
 
Guided by the same natural philosophy, astrologers followed the movement and 
alignments of the planets. Because these were ostensibly the efficient causes of meteorological 
phenomena, the annually published predictions of astrologers typically included weather 
forecasts. These predictions were often wrong, and on 26 December 1662 the lawyer Adriaen 
van der Goes complained to his brother that frigid temperatures had not conformed to the 
astrological forecast. On the other hand, most astrological prophecies were so broad that they 
were bound to contain some truth. Before 1652, for example, astrologers predicted “hunger, 
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starvation, floods, storms, war and unrest” across Europe, a prognosis that would have been at 
least partially accurate for almost any year during the crisis-ridden seventeenth century. The 
enduring influence of Aristotelian meteorology also influenced attempts to link unrelated natural 
phenomena even where no omen was perceived.  Earthquakes in particular were associated with 
a confluence of subterranean wind and elemental interaction that mirrored circulation in the 
atmosphere and could therefore accompany storms above ground. For example, in April 1640 
Wolter Joelinck in Zutphen marvelled over an earthquake that was somehow not accompanied 
by surface winds, and in April 1665 a ferocious storm on both shores of the North Sea was 
associated with simultaneous earthquakes in letters and newspaper reports.
31
 
Exploring the complex religious and magical epistemologies with which literate Dutch 
citizens understood weather events reveals the limitations of the increasing rationalization and, to 
some extent, secularization that accompanied emerging “scientific” conceptions of weather 
during the Republic’s Golden Age. Still, some accounts of preternatural meteorological events 
written by educated, but not scholarly, sources in the Republic did describe only observable, 
natural phenomena. For example, on 24 January 1666 English Ambassador Dudley Carleton 
wrote from The Hague that: 
 
I cannot omit a popular vanity of prognosticating change upon the coming here on shore of 
three whales 60 feet or thereabouts in length, and 30 in compass; whereof two of them being 
stranded upon the Brill island, and one here by Scheveling, in the very places and instant time 
of these tumults, they cause the more surprise; the rather because it is remembered, that at the 
first breaking out of these country war [sic], there were two of the like bigness driven on 
shore in the river of Schelde below Antwerp, and the framing of the truce one here in Holland. 
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But these are effects of the long and continual storms we have had here at the West, which 
have caused likewise many wrecks upon this coast.
32
 
 
 Carleton’s rejection of the supernatural origin of the preternatural was unusually explicit, 
and perhaps counterintuitively linked to the increasingly influential belief that extreme natural 
phenomena were wrought by the Devil to deceive humans with counterfeit miracles. Indeed, 
even as some writers described the divine or demonic nature of the preternatural, many 
emphasized its entirely natural character in order to undermine Satan’s attempts at misleading 
the naïve. The ultimate effect of such writing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may 
have been to naturalize all preternatural phenomena, including the unusual weather events that 
received most attention from contemporary authors. Some educated elites therefore joined 
scholars in identifying even extreme weather events with entirely natural processes. For example, 
letters between Jan de Witt and leading Dutch diplomat Coenraad van Beuningen in the 1660s 
repeatedly mentioned storms, but never reflected the belief that that they were God’s will. The 
contemporaneous Van der Goes correspondence includes countless references to severe gales 
and floods, but little suggestion that they were influenced by divine or demonic agency. 
Nevertheless, in the seventeenth century understandings of extreme weather among educated, 
literate Dutch citizens remained heterogeneous, and hardly demonstrated a general trend towards 
secularism.
33
  
Unfortunately, it is difficult for historians of climate to reconstruct perceptions of weather 
among illiterate, lower-class Europeans. On the other hand, some sources written between the 
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sixteenth and eighteenth centuries include generally scornful references to beliefs held among the 
rural poor. Such accounts suggest that proverbial weather lore, most often associated with 
classical writers like Theophrastus, Aratus, and Seneca, endured among rural peasants and 
artisans for centuries after it lost most of its “scientific” appeal. Historians like Stephen Wilson 
have associated popular superstition and magical custom with the traditional agrarian economy 
in early modern Europe. Certainly the Dutch economy was less traditional and less agrarian than 
those of its neighbours, but the modernity of the Republic was limited to its coastal cities. In the 
illiterate margins of the Low Countries, it is likely that the rich and sometimes paradoxical mix 
of religious, magical, and ancient weather beliefs lingered with the rest of popular magical 
wisdom until deep into the nineteenth century.
34
  
The most destructive aspect of those beliefs intersected with influential theological ideas 
to encourage witchcraft persecution. Between 1560 and 1630, the great witch hunt in Western 
Europe punished those allegedly responsible for harmful weather and transcended the boundaries 
of religion and class. Across Catholic and Protestant Europe, the persecution of witches was 
usually instigated by peasants, exacerbated by clergy, and encouraged by sympathetic 
magistrates. Here, too, the Dutch Republic was different. In the Low Countries, witchcraft 
persecution was concentrated in the Spanish Netherlands, and peaked with the brutal aftermath 
of the Roermond witch trials in 1613. In the Republic, death sentences for witchcraft were only 
rarely imposed after 1595, in the wake of the witch trials and executions in Amersfoort and 
Utrecht. In fact, at the Hekenswaag (“Witches’ Scales”) in the town of Oudewater, Utrecht, 
accused witches from across Europe were granted a relatively fair trial, and many seized that 
opportunity. Overall, the total number of trials in the Republic was low compared to the rest of 
                                                 
34
 Golinski, “Time, Talk and the Weather,” 30. Wilson, The Magical Universe, xxvii. 
436 
 
Europe, although witchcraft still fascinated Dutch citizens across different social groups and 
classes.
35
  
The relative scarcity of trials and convictions for witchcraft in the Republic suggests that 
the zeal for witchcraft prosecution was limited among Dutch citizens. Some of the skepticism 
towards witches expressed by literate thinkers like the Mennonites Jan Jansz Deutel, Antonius 
van Dale, and Abraham Palingh in the seventeenth century may have influenced popular 
attitudes. It is also possible that opportunities provided by the commercial and industrial 
prosperity of the coastal, urbanized Republic, even for the comparatively poor, diminished some 
of the impetus for witchcraft persecution. In the rest of Europe, persecution was predominantly 
rural and often fueled by festering antagonisms over the rights to land. Indeed witchcraft 
persecution was particularly muted in Holland or Zeeland, and there is little evidence of previous 
antagonism between accuser and accused in trials held elsewhere in the Republic. The weather 
that accompanied Little Ice Age minima may have also played a role. Historical climatologist 
Wolfgang Behringer has argued that the great witch hunt was stimulated by cold, stormy, rainy 
weather that grew more likely and more severe during the contemporaneous Grindelwald 
Fluctuation and was widely blamed on witches. Indeed, frigid weather coincided with economic 
depression in Amersfort and Utrecht during the witch trials there. In general, however, the 
distinctively ambiguous influence of the Little Ice Age in the Republic likely contributed to 
mitigating some of the stimulus for witchcraft persecution felt elsewhere in Europe.
36
 
                                                 
35
 Claudia Swan, Art, Science, and Witchcraft in Early Modern Holland: Jacques de Gheyn II (1565-1629). 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3. Lene Dres-Coenders, Het verbond van heks en duivel. Een 
waandenkbeeld aan het begin van de moderne tijd als symptoom van een veranderende situatie van de vrouw en als 
middel tot hervorming der zeden. (Baarn: Ambo, 1983), 227. Gary K. Waite, Eradicating the Devil’s Minions: 
Anabaptists and Witches in Reformation Europe, 1525-1600. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 90. 
Henricus Institoris and Jacobus Sprenger, Malleus Maleficarum Vol. II: The English Translation, ed. Christopher 
Mackay. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 43. 
36
 Dres-Coenders, Het verbond van heks en duivel, 196. Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra, “The European witchcraft debate 
and the Dutch variant.” Social History 15:8 (2008): 186. Pfister, “Climatic Extremes, Recurrent Crises and Witch 
437 
 
Certainly the Republic’s illiterate poor were not necessarily more inclined to secular 
reason than their counterparts in neighbouring countries.
37
 Still, letters dictated by illiterate but 
urban Dutch citizens, sent to and from the Republic’s warships, reflect a pragmatic and 
dispassionate approach to weather. Such correspondence followed a common template written by 
scribes according to the conventions of the time. Letters could be quite long, and many abound 
with repetitive expressions of affection that stand in stark contrast to shorter and less 
standardized gestures in elite correspondence. It is therefore especially noteworthy that such 
letters communicate a particularly practical concern with the consequences, rather than the 
abstract origins, of meteorological conditions. For example, in a letter written on 5 April 1672, 
Janneke Aengenendt curtly informed her son that the family could not bring many supplies to the 
farm, that winter was cold, and that local commerce was halted. Similarly, in a letter written on 
17 April 1663, Jan Tijssen Eikenboom informed his friend that unusually cold temperatures were 
hurting his wounded knee. Lingering ice also impeded his ability to use a walking stick, and he 
hoped that temperatures would warm soon. These sources do not indicate that illiterate, lower 
class Dutch citizens ignored the significance of the preternatural. However, such fragments of 
their correspondence as survive suggest that their consideration of weather was most concerned 
with the practical consequences of ordinary meteorological conditions.
38
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Perceiving Climate Change in the Dutch Republic 
 
Conceptions of weather are very different from the perception of climate change. 
Because a particular climatic regime influences humans through weather events, the ways in 
which weather is understood shape attitudes towards, and awareness of, climatic fluctuation. The 
relationship between the understanding of weather and climate remains implicit without a more 
or less systematic means of assessing the past. In order to clearly perceive changes in their 
climate, human beings must possess some understanding of meteorological conditions several 
decades prior. Continuous, quantified records of average weather across three or more decades 
are ideal, but not always strictly necessary. Indeed, statistical thinking, essential for the 
interpretation of long-term trends in average weather, need not accompany a partial 
understanding of climate change.
39
 Memories of extreme weather events in past decades can 
provide limited but still significant awareness that prevailing meteorological conditions have 
changed. Conceptions of past weather in surviving Dutch sources are often expressed through 
such memories of the preternatural. For the climate historian, these recollections can complicate 
attempts to distinguish anecdotal references to past weather from genuine awareness of climate 
change.  
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For instance, many letters, diary entries, and newspaper reports that describe particularly 
extreme weather events in the Low Countries conclude that none could remember events of 
similar scale. Such observations suggest that the authors, and the locals usually consulted for 
their memory, possessed at least some awareness that meteorological events had happened, and 
could possibly happen again, that did not occur in decades past. Severe winters during the 
minima of the Little Ice Age were most frequently described in these references. On 22 March 
1586, for example, Abel Eppens in Emden wrote that even older people could not remember a 
winter of the severity they had just experienced. Following the frigid winter of 1594/95, the 
merchant Jan de Pottre in Brussels recounted that “we had as cold a winter as anyone has ever 
survived.” Johan van de Sande wrote in 1608 that January and February in The Hague were 
marked by bitter freezing that was colder than any could recall. In February 1621, the wealthy 
farmer Dirck Janszoon in Friesland observed that ice cover during the frigid winter was more 
extensive than any could remember or read about. In the same month Pier Winsemius, a lawyer 
in the Court of Friesland, described the travails of sailors whose ships were trapped by the ice 
before concluding that no one had ever heard of such extensive winter freezing.
40
 
Just four years later, Van Wassenaer rhetorically asked who had ever experienced such 
widespread winter ice cover. According to Claas Ariszoon Caescoper, in March 1667 the Zuider 
Zee was still closed by ice, which even the very old could not remember. As the Republic 
suffered though a prolonged stretch of unusually cold weather, Adriaen van der Goes on 19 
November 1671 wrote that his ink was freezing in his pen, “which is unheard of.” Such 
reflections on particularly severe winters were also written in the cities of England. On 19 March 
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1658, for example, the writer John Evelyn in London recalled that “this had ben the severest 
Winter, that man alive had knowne in England.”41 
References to unprecedented weather were hardly confined to reports of especially frigid 
winters. Jan de Pottre introduced his account of the summer of 1590 by writing that it was 
“hotter than anyone could remember.” In 1599, the physician Dirck Velius in Hoorn wrote that 
the weather in April was warmer and more “beautiful” than even the elderly could recall. Velius 
used a nearly identical phrase in his description of the warm autumn of 1616. Similar reflections 
were elicited by many different kinds of precipitation across all seasons. In 1615, Velius wrote 
that more snow had fallen on Hoorn in February than anyone could remember. In a letter sent on 
25 November 1659, Van der Goes recalled no autumn that had ever been wetter. In December 
1664, the writer Tobias van Domselaer wrote that so much freezing rain had fallen on 
Amsterdam that a layer of ice the thickness of an arm had coated the trees, which nobody had 
ever seen.
42
 
Severe storms also prompted many across the North Sea region to scour their memories. 
On 5 July 1652 Evelyn wrote that “so violent a Tempest of haile, raine, wind, Thunder & 
Lightning,” had afflicted London “as no man alive had seene the like in this age.” A chronicle 
written in Flanders recalled that the ferocious storm of 5 May 1661 had been “such a dreadful 
storm of wind, thunder, lightning and hail, as anyone could find depicted in writing.” In 
December 1665, an article in the Hollantsche Mercurius newspaper reported a gale that affected 
both shores of the North Sea and was so severe that “two of the oldest inhabitants near the 
                                                 
41
 Van Wassenaer, Historisch Verhael Vol. 12., 57. Van der Goes, “Hage, den 19 November 1671.” Briefwisseling 
tusschen de gebroeders van der Goes (1659-1673) Vol II, 305. Buisman and Van Engelen, Duizend Jaar Vol. IV, 
612, 549. 
42
 De Pottre, Dagboek van Jan de Pottre, 1549-1602, 185. . Buisman and Van Engelen, Duizend Jaar Vol. IV, 186, 
301, 591. Van Wassenaer, Historisch Verhael aller gedenckwaerdiger geschiedenis . . . . Vol. 10, 116. Van der 
Goes, “Hage, den 25 Novemb. 1659.” Briefwisseling tusschen de gebroeders van der Goes (1659-1673) Vol I., 48.  
441 
 
Thames said they never heard of such a storm.” Similarly, on 22 September 1671 Van der Goes 
described a storm in the Republic that was more ferocious than any could recall. Even unusually 
thick and persistent fog could strike some as unprecedented. Van Wassenaer wrote that from 
Christmas until 17 January, 1626, thick mist shrouded the sun from view in a way that none 
could remember.
43
    
References to unprecedented weather were not unique to sources written on land, 
although the meteorological conditions that most concerned sailors were largely limited to the 
velocity and direction of wind. As the allied Franco-English fleet struggled through a summer of 
nearly unrelenting storms in 1672, Captain John Narbrough repeatedly described high winds and 
their consequences. In a logbook entry written on 6 August 1672, Narbrough reported more 
“gusty, stormy” conditions before concluding that, “never [was] such weather known in these 
seas at this time of the year before now.” Perhaps because their operations usually kept them in 
specific geographical regions for many years, naval officers were more likely to write such 
weather memories than civilian adventurers, or officers aboard East India Company ships.
44
 
The frequent recurrence in Golden Age documents of the claim that extreme weather had 
never happened before raises the possibility that such phrases were literary tropes written to 
express little more than the severity of contemporary weather. However, multi-proxy climatic 
reconstructions suggest that popular memory was a real and effective tool for ascertaining the 
severity of, and the lack of precedent for, extreme weather events. For example, the winter of 
1585/86 was as cold as any had been in two decades, while the winter of 1594/95 was even 
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colder, indeed the coldest in thirty years. The winters of 1607/08 and 1620/21 were equally 
frigid, and the three winters were colder than any had been since the first winter of the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation, in 1564/65. Meanwhile, the winters of 1657/58, 1666/67, and 1671/72 
were all as cold as any had been since 1620/21. Occasional references to written meteorological 
records might explain some of the impressive accuracy of the early modern contextualization of 
severe weather in the Republic.
45
 
 For those who experienced them, extreme weather events were also appreciated for their 
rarity, and they could interact with cultural or social structures to become chronological 
landmarks that attained lasting cultural meaning.
46
 On 22 March 1658, the historian Lieuwe van 
Aitzema in The Hague described the frigid winter and wrote that “everyone let their children 
stand on the ice, so they could say that the weather had really been so cold.” Even more striking 
was the response of Roemer Visscher to the Christmas Eve storm of 1593, which shattered many 
ships on the coast of Texel, the largest island in the Zuider Zee. Visscher’s daughter was born 
shortly after the tragedy, and accordingly he gave her the rather macabre name of Tesselschade, 
or “Texel Damage.” Memory of the severity of the 1593 storm was therefore woven into the core 
identity of the Visscher family. Moreover, the potential pitfalls of memory were not 
unappreciated by contemporary writers. After the moderate winter of 1660/61, Josselin in Essex 
wrote that “I observe how apt wee are to account a harsh time the hardest wee ever felt and a 
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mild the best.”47 Caution was therefore required, and it appears as though that caution was 
respected in at least some contemporary records of extreme weather.
48
 
It is therefore no surprise that memories of severe weather in Dutch documentary 
evidence often included specific references to the dates of past weather extremes. When Dutch 
citizens employed dates, they demonstrated knowledge that went beyond mere awareness that 
experienced weather was abnormal in the context of the past. By using dates, weather observers 
revealed an understanding of the history of severe weather events that may have amounted to a 
vague form of climate history.  Detailed references to dates are most common in descriptions of 
remarkably high or low water levels, particularly when such extremes were affected by weather 
events like drought, severe storms, or rapid thawing in the wake of unusually cold winters. For 
example, as the Zuider Zee region was lashed by severe storms on 12 January 1594, pensionary 
Françoys Maelson explained to grand pensionary Oldenbarnevelt that water levels “have not 
been so high in eight years.” On 23 January 1610, Velius in Hoorn reported that “high 
Northwesterly winds have driven the water to levels we have not seen in 40 years.”  In the midst 
of massive flooding across Holland in January 1624, Van Wassenaer wrote that water levels 
were also high along the Maas near the city of Venlo, in the southeastern periphery of the 
Republic. Van Wassenaer described how water levels had risen above the summit of a stone 
erected to commemorate water levels in 1571.
49
  
Natural or artificial landmarks were not always mentioned in descriptions of water levels 
that referenced the past, but it is likely that they were normally consulted. Stones and other 
landmarks were crude forms of instrumental record keeping that could supplement and improve 
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oral and written histories of past water levels. Following the All Saints’ Flood in 1675, Johannes 
Hudde, a scholastically-inclined mayor of Amsterdam, organized the daily measurement of water 
at The Waag, a fifteenth-century city gate. He also ordered the deployment of eight marble 
stones to record water levels at the sluices to the IJ. Less standardized examples of such 
landmarks were used elsewhere in the Republic, even if they were not always erected to record 
water levels. In March 1625, for example, Van Wassenaer wrote that houses built on dunes were 
swept away at Egmont aan Zee, a village on the western coast of North Holland, and the 
survivors were therefore able to discern that water levels were higher than they had been in 1570. 
Meanwhile, in the nearby city of Enkhuizen on the Zuider Zee, water levels had risen above the 
high water mark recorded in 1610 on the tower of the Drommedaris, which defended the 
entrance to the harbour. Similarly, during the severe river floods that accompanied the generally 
frigid winter of 1650/51, water levels in Nijmegen exceeded the highest level ever recorded on 
the city walls. While referring to extreme water levels, contemporary observers therefore did 
note when water levels had reached an unprecedented point, but they usually wrote such 
observations with precise reference to the past.
50
  
Far more common were references to extreme water levels that cited a specific year in 
which water levels had been at least equally unusual. On 5 December 1665, for example, 
Adriaen van der Goes described the devastation of the St. Nicholas Flood. Waves fanned by 
Northwesterly winds swept across the coast at Scheveningen near The Hague, until they reached 
the guest house at the De Goes estate. According to De Goes, water levels were therefore higher 
than they had been in 80 years.
 
Given the importance of water in the Republic, it is not surprising 
that the context and consequences of high water levels were remembered in many different 
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media. In 1696 historian Mattheus Smallegange and illustrator Jan Luyken collaborated on an 
illustration of Reimerswaal, a Dutch town that had been inundated during the great floods of 
November 5, 1530 (Figure 7.4). Reimerswaal was never reclaimed, and the illustration depicted 
the town at its height before the flood, and in its drowned, abandoned condition in 1696. As 
surely as correspondence, diary entries, or newspaper reports, the illustration reflects a detailed 
awareness of historical water levels and flooding. Floods, like all natural disasters, were a 
consequence of both environmental stimulus and social vulnerability. However, the illustration 
plausibly if not exclusively reflects a desire to compare the meteorological past with the 
meteorological present.
51
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Fig. 7.4. A depiction of changed water levels. Top: Reimerswaal in 1696. Bottom: the town before the flood of 
1530. Mattheus Smallegange and Jan Luyken, “Panorama op Reimerswaal,” print, 1696, Amsterdam Museum, 
http://goo.gl/w0rt7d.  
 
Water levels were precisely contextualized using landmarks not only when they were 
abnormally high, but also when they were unusually low. On Christmas, 1652, the painter 
Vincent Laurenszoon Van der Vienne remarked that the level of the Rhine had sunk beneath all 
the low water marks on city walls and ports. In December of 1669, observers described water 
levels so low that the receding water exposed ruins of which no memory existed. However, 
unusually dry conditions were most commonly described and contextualized by referring to 
transportation across landscapes that were once covered by water. Caescoper, for example, wrote 
447 
 
that June, July, and August in 1707 were so dry that people could travel by mule along the beds 
of former waterways. Strangely, the specific references to past events that are common in 
descriptions of high water levels are absent in observations of unusual dryness. Descriptions of 
cows walking across the former riverbeds in 1672, for example, make no mention of the 
conditions described by Van der Vienne just three years earlier.
52
  
According to multi-proxy flood reconstructions, when Dutch observers contextualized 
water levels in the present by citing water levels in the past they did so with great accuracy. For 
instance, regional storm surges did occur in 1586 and 1587, eight years before the flood Maelson 
experienced, although the more severe flooding in those years was actually stimulated by a dike 
breach near the city of Nijmegen, to the Southeast. Velius’s reference to floods 40 years before 
1610 corresponds to the devastating All Saints’ Flood of 1 November 1570, in which similarly 
high Northwesterly winds coincided with the spring tide. The stone described by Van Wassenaer 
marked high water levels during the catastrophic river floods that followed the frigid and snowy 
winter of 1570/71.  Meanwhile, when Van der Goes referred to high water levels 80 years before 
1665, he likely referenced storm floods that affected the northern coastal provinces in February, 
1585.
53
 
Unlike extremes in water levels, most severe or mild winters were not remembered 
using memorial devices that recorded unusual meteorological conditions and increased the 
accuracy and likelihood of recollection in the future. On the other hand, natural structures could 
contextualize winter severity with impressive accuracy. In December 1607, for example, Velius 
in Hoorn recorded the destruction of trees by freezing and concluded that a stretch of cold 
temperatures was unprecedented for as long as those trees had lived. In a sense, the lives of trees 
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were used as proxies for cold weather by contemporary observers in the Republic, in a way that 
foreshadowed the development of dendrochronology in the twentieth century. However, the 
extent of ice cover provided the most useful context for winter freezing. During the frigid winter 
of 1599/1600, Hugo de Groot wrote that Hollanders had not experienced such a winter in 35 
years. While only 16, De Groot likely accessed oral or written histories of extensive ice cover, 
snowfall, and hardship during the landmark winter of 1564/65, which can be considered the first 
of the Grindelwald Fluctuation. De Groot demonstrated the deep impression frigid winters and 
ice could leave on contemporary observers by describing how “beer was transformed into a solid 
mass, better as food than drink. Even our breath turned to ice. Across preternatural bridges horse 
hooves trample where ships once sailed.”54 
In the Republic, extensive ice cover was usually linked to changes in the kind, and 
possible extent, of available modes of mobility. Such changes were the most common proxies for 
the winters of the past. During the winter of 1620/21, Pier Winsemius wrote that horse-drawn 
sleighs could now be taken to the Republic’s North Sea islands of Terschelling, Ameland and 
Griend, which had not been possible since the equally frigid winter of 1607/08. Winsemius 
marvelled at how people were required to walk 12,000 steps from Harlingen on the coast of 
Friesland before they could see water. Similarly, during the severe winter of 1657/58 Van 
Aitzema described how people could walk over ice on the North Sea that stretched from 
Zandvoort to Schagen along the coast of Holland, which had not been seen in 50 years.
55
 
Multi-proxy climate reconstructions of winter severity indicate that sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century Dutch references to past winters, while generally accurate, were 
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nevertheless less precise than the contextualization of water levels.
56
 The winter of 1599/1600 
that De Groot described was, for example, slightly milder than the winter of 1672/73, although it 
was indeed one of the coldest of the Little Ice Age. Similarly, the winter of 1620/21 was as frigid 
as the winter of 1607/08 and therefore slightly colder than the winter of 1657/58 described by 
Van Aitzema. On the other hand, Winsemius was therefore correct in suggesting that the winter 
of 1620/21 was the coldest since that of 1607/08. The winter of 1607/08 observed by Velius was 
as cold as any that had affected the Low Countries since the beginning of the sixteenth century, 
except for the winter of 1664/65. The rough accuracy of references to past winter severity 
reflects the limitations of ice cover as a proxy for winter temperature. Ice cover, particularly 
along the coast, is affected not only by temperature but also by wind patterns, currents, and other 
environmental variables. More accurate ice cover proxies of winter intensity were provided by 
accounts that measured the cessation of trekvaart services owing to freezing. Trekvaart canals 
were shielded from many of the environmental influences that mediated the relationship between 
temperature and ice cover on larger waterways. However, no qualitative sources survive that 
interpret these statistics to contextualize cold or mild winters, let alone to trace long-term 
changes in the severity and frequency of winters.
57
 
High or low water levels, like severe winters, were not always more important for Dutch 
citizens than other sites of interaction between weather and the broader environment. However, 
in surviving documentary records of meteorological conditions, observers usually only described 
extreme winters and unusual water levels in the context of dated weather events in their past. 
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Most of these documents were written on land, perhaps because sailors had little interest in 
detailed weather history as they struggled with day to day concerns. It may be that winters and 
water levels were particularly important manifestations of weather in the terrestrial Low 
Countries, directly affecting life and death on a scale that could not be matched by, for example, 
summer heat. Consequently they were more easily recalled and more readily recorded in 
monuments and other media. Water levels and winter temperatures were also associated with 
many different weather variables. Accounts of freezing in fall, winter, and spring were often 
accompanied by observations of easterly winds, while references to storms, wind direction, 
temperature, or precipitation usually supplemented descriptions of high water levels. The dates 
of unusual meteorological conditions, like abnormally persistent westerly winds, were therefore 
often remembered in descriptions of past water levels or winter severity. The detailed weather 
history recorded in surviving qualitative sources is therefore more comprehensive than it initially 
appears.  
Still, the focus of sources that accurately contextualize experienced weather was 
overwhelmingly winter severity and water levels. Additional clues for the attention both winter 
severity and high water levels received may be found in the ways human activity exacerbated, or 
mitigated, their effects with particular force. Flooding could be influenced as much by a storm 
surge as a faulty dam or land subsidence in the wake of peat harvesting, while survival during 
winter was directly tied to the availability of necessary supplies. Shifts in water levels, like 
severe winters, were therefore accompanied by a complex suite of meteorological conditions and 
a variety of mediating human influences. In strengthening or weakening the Republic’s watery 
defenses, both could have military consequences, particularly during the lengthy sieges that 
characterized the Eighty Years’ War. They were also preternatural events for many in the 
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sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, commonly tied either to the will of God or the machinations 
of Satan.
58
  
Shifts in water levels and severe winters were therefore events that forcefully tied 
together relationships between weather and society with particularly memorable clarity. Most 
importantly, both shifts in water levels and severe winters were easily measured using natural or 
artificial structures. Ice cover expanded or retreated and water rose or fell in ways that were more 
easily quantifiable and memorialized than, for example, shifts in prevailing wind direction that 
did not have additional environmental ramifications. These changes in ice cover and water levels 
had practical consequences for transportation, the lifeblood of the Dutch economy, which further 
increased the likelihood that they would be precisely recorded.  
During the Golden Age of the Dutch Republic, interested observers accurately described 
past weather extremes to contextualize similar conditions in their present. These observers, 
usually educated men of moderate to high social standing, had access to weather histories that 
were stored in the archives of memories, landscapes, architecture, visual art, and literature. 
Consequently, they could accurately discern when, and to what extent, the extreme weather of 
the present differed from that of the past. Some observers sought patterns in these histories. In 
1597, Francis Bacon wrote that: 
 
They say it is observed in the Low Countries (I know not in what part) that every five and 
thirty years the same kind and suit of years and weathers comes about again; as great frosts, 
great wet, great droughts, warm winters, summers with little heat, and the like; and they call it 
the Prime. It is a thing I do the rather mention, because, computing backwards, I have found 
some concurrence.
59
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 Bacon’s suite of weather conditions is superficially contradictory, but the so-called 
“Prime” likely referred to a year of extremes, in which the seasons were disrupted by wild 
swings in temperature and precipitation. There is no scientific evidence for such a Prime, and 
indeed its effects would be felt at a finer temporal resolution than is provided by multi-proxy 
climate reconstructions. Still, Bacon’s summary of a peculiar belief in the Low Countries reveals 
the contemporary existence of at least the progenitors for an understanding of climate change. 
However, only extreme weather events were contextualized with reference to the past by the 
authors of surviving documents. These observers therefore lacked the awareness of long-term 
statistical patterns in average weather that allows for a full conception of climate change.  
On the other hand, policies followed in war and economic competition hint that climatic 
shifts may have been gleaned from ship logbooks in ways that allowed Dutch officials to respond 
strategically to changes in prevailing meteorological conditions. For example, De Ruyter’s 
tactics for exploiting the advantage given to Dutch war fleets in easterly winds were developed 
in a decade when such winds occurred more frequently than they had in earlier conflicts (Chapter 
6). More than seventy years later, recommendations for new ship designs and bounties for rapid 
passage to Batavia, presented by Gustaaf Willem van Imhoff to the VOC’s Heren XVII in 1741, 
suggest some awareness that wind patterns had shifted (Chapter 2). Ship logbooks were 
generally not kept by mariners plying the Baltic trades, but innovations designed to minimize the 
financial risk of shipwrecks for merchants did correspond to periods of increased storminess 
during the Little Ice Age. Such policies and practices offer tantalizing hints that climate change 
was recognized by the economic or military leaders of a Republic whose citizens were often 
keenly aware of, and dependent on, meteorological conditions. Firm conclusions are, however, 
impossible in the absence of qualitative accounts that reveal whether such strategies were 
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consciously or, perhaps, unconsciously crafted in response to shifting weather patterns. Similar 
impediments complicate but do not prohibit attempts to discern Dutch cultural responses to the 
shifting climate of the Little Ice Age.
60
 
 
Cultural Responses to Climate Change in the Dutch Republic 
 
Relationships between natural events and human consequences can be less tangible for 
cultural historians of climate than they are for climate historians studying economic trends or 
military confrontation. The latter must identify connections between material processes in 
human, natural, or hybrid worlds, and then develop long-term climate histories by exploring an 
abundance of reliable links between short-term weather and isolated human actions. It is not 
necessary that documents reflect a comprehensive understanding of the full scope of relevant 
material processes – a perception of climate change, in other words – because humans can be 
influenced by what they do not understand. On the other hand, cultural historians of climate 
change are explicitly concerned with relationships between material processes and ideas. They 
explore the understanding of weather and perhaps climate change, but they are also interested in 
the culturally significant notions such understandings inspired. 
 Cultural responses to climate change need not be accompanied by an awareness of 
climatic fluctuation. Moreover, it is difficult to identify the relationship between climatic shifts 
and cultural developments without the explicit articulation of climate change in surviving 
documentary evidence. For example, obsession with the preternatural in sixteenth-century 
Europe was encouraged by cultural developments including the influence of the popular press, 
the increasing challenge to Aristotelian cosmology, and the atmosphere of religious debate. 
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These cultural changes intersected with the shifting political attitudes, new technologies, and 
evolving economic structures that made them possible and therefore also informed new 
conceptions of the preternatural. On the other hand, it is likely that in many parts of Europe more 
common, and more severe, extreme weather during the Grindelwald Fluctuation directly 
prompted widespread interest in the significance of unusual meteorological events. The 
fascination with the preternatural contributed to the secularization of natural philosophy, and in 
this sense the climate of the Grindelwald Fluctuation inspired cultural change in early modern 
Europe, even if climate change was not fully perceived or understood by contemporary scholars. 
Still, writing on the preternatural in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Europe explicitly reflects 
its cultural origins and its concern with weather, but only very rarely mentions long-term trends 
in weather. While it is possible to gain clearer understanding of how contemporary Europeans 
perceived weather and perhaps climate change using these sources, it is much harder to discern 
exactly how their culture was transformed by climate change. Educated guesswork must 
substitute for the kind of analysis with which climate historians are more comfortable.
61
  
  Such speculation is particularly problematic in the burgeoning climate historiography of 
art in the Dutch Golden Age. In 1970 meteorologist Hans Neuberger famously analyzed more 
than 12,000 paintings completed from 1400 to 1967 and held in American and European 
museums. He concluded that cloudiness and darkness peaked in paintings created between 1550 
and 1849, which corresponds with the three minima of the Little Ice Age. His conclusions were 
repeated by Hubert Lamb, and in 1980 William Burroughs, also a meteorologist, published an 
article that expanded Neuberger’s hypothesis. According to Burroughs, the winter landscapes 
most famously crafted by Dutch artists were almost exclusively painted between 1565 and 1665. 
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Their inspiration and popularity were therefore influenced by the severity of winters during the 
Little Ice Age.
62
  
Burroughs argued that the iconic winter landscapes painted by Pieter the Brueghel the 
Elder were directly inspired by the frigid winter of 1565. Burroughs decided that Pieter Brueghel 
the Younger’s “slavish” copying of his father’s winter landscapes could not be tied to 
contemporary weather. However, he emphasized how Hendrick Avercamp spearheaded a new 
series of such paintings in the years following the frigid winter of 1608 (Figure 7.5). Burroughs 
slightly nuanced Neuberger’s conclusions, allowing that changes in artistic convention led to the 
decline of winter landscapes after 1665. His hypothesis, grounded in a particularly vivid source 
and ostensibly supported by rigorous quantitative analysis, has been repeated in many studies of 
the Little Ice Age. In recent years it has also inspired a new generation of interdisciplinary 
scholars to create their own art histories of the Little Ice Age, most of which are, again, 
concentrated on the painters of the Dutch Golden Age. Pieter the Brueghel the Elder’s Hunters in 
the Snow (1565) is even featured on the cover of Behringer’s A Cultural History of Climate 
(2010).
63
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Fig. 7.5. One of many winter landscapes depicted by Hendrik Avercamp. This one was painted during the frigid 
winter of 1619/20. Hendrick Avercamp, “Ice Landscape,” painting, 1620, Staatliche Museen, Schwerin, 
http://www.ibiblio.org/wm/paint/auth/avercamp/ice-landscape-schwerin.jpg.  
 
Nevertheless, newer art histories of the Little Ice Age are more cautious. Neuberger’s 
hypothesis was sharply criticized by art historians who pointed out that the golden backgrounds 
of medieval canvases discouraged depictions of clouds, landscape painting emerged as an 
established artistic genre in the early modern periods, and twentieth-century abstract art was 
hardly wedded to a faithful representation of reality. Consequently, there are more than sufficient 
cultural explanations to explain the rise of dark, cloudy vistas in the art of the Dutch Golden 
Age. Moreover, many of the names most associated with the remarkable artistry of the Dutch 
Republic, including Rembrandt van Rijn and Johannes Vermeer, actually painted very few 
winter landscapes.
64
  
The link between the popularity of winter landscapes and severe winters is also hardly 
straightforward. Icy landscapes certainly rose in popularity during the Grindelwald Fluctuation, 
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but not so during the Maunder Minimum, when Dutch consumers increasingly preferred bright, 
sunny landscapes. Many climate historians still conclude that the popularity of winter landscapes 
was influenced by the rising frequency and severity of Little Ice Age winters, yet most would 
acknowledge that contemporary climate change was one influence among many. In the new 
historiography, winter landscapes illustrate how contemporary Europeans perceived their cold 
climate, but they were not necessarily a cultural response to that climate. Anthropologist Brian 
Fagan provides an exception to this caution. In 2000 Fagan claimed that Neuberger was correct 
in his analysis of “6,500” paintings: changes in cloud cover in paintings created during the Little 
Ice Age were, “not mere artistic fashion but probably accurate depictions of increased cloud 
cover.”65  
 In fact, the historiography of climate change and Dutch winter landscapes demonstrates 
both the limitations and possibilities of the cultural history of climate. Winter landscapes provide 
a window into the ways in which Dutch citizens understood and exploited cold weather, yet they 
were not directly encouraged by that weather, and they can do little more than hint at the 
relationship between climate change and cultural trends. In some respects, contemporary Dutch 
winter landscapes are a uniquely problematic source for cultural historians of climate change, 
despite their seemingly obvious connection to the Little Ice Age. To link such paintings to the 
influence of climate change with the rigour that should accompany historical climatology, the 
creation of each painting should be thoroughly contextualized. Upon confirming that the artist 
intended to paint in response to a particular weather event, climate historians must test how 
faithfully each painting represented a weather event by verifying where the artist painted, and for 
how long. Leaving aside the unfathomable influence of the subconscious, historians can then 
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consider relationships between climate change and art, but only by applying their methodology 
to many paintings created across several decades. Such scholarship is, of course, impossible 
given the sources that survive to document the creation of paintings in the Golden Age. Indeed, 
unlike many seventeenth-century naval paintings and illustrations, most winter landscapes were 
imagined within an artist’s studio. Climate historians must therefore acknowledge the limitations 
of examining early modern art, while expanding their focus to include depictions of weather 
events beyond severe winters.  
 Similar issues plague the nascent scholarly analysis of contemporary literary responses to 
the Little Ice Age. Like the most famous Dutch winter landscapes, modern English drama was 
developed during the Grindelwald Fluctuation. The plays of Shakespeare in particular abound 
with references to unusual weather events like severe winters and ferocious storms, which grew 
more common in the North Sea region during the minima of the Little Ice Age. Shakespeare’s 
plays have been subjected to “ecocritical” readings that explore how his many references to 
weather responded to contemporary environmental change. Similar methodology can be applied 
when examining weather references in the theatrical productions of the Dutch Golden Age.
66
  
For example, in 1637 Joost van den Vondel, the Republic’s answer to Shakespeare, 
premiered his most famous work, Gijsbrecht van Aemstel. Written to inaugurate Amsterdam’s 
first city theatre, the play dramatized a siege of Amsterdam in 1304 that bore some similarity to 
the beleaguerment of Troy. Characters in the play occasionally refer to weather events that were 
more common during cold decades in Little Ice Age. Gijsbrecht van Aemstel is mayor of the 
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young town and the play’s ill-fated protagonist, but in the play’s third act his wife Badeloch 
gives the most lucid description of weather. Although the siege around Amsterdam appears to 
have failed, in a dream Badeloch’s niece warns her to flee, for the enemy is not defeated. Later in 
the act her dream appears to be confirmed, and she jealously lauds the fortune of small, poor 
villages that elude the storms and winds that threaten larger towns. Nevertheless, she remembers 
that “Since my marriage, since my engagement: / What storms have not blown over my head? / 
What tower is high enough to let me see / The waves, the sea of all I have endured?”67  
 Badeloch’s reflections are the product of a maritime  culture in which storms threatened 
life at sea and near the coast. Storms mattered to the worldviews of Van den Vondel’s characters, 
and served as apt metaphors for their violent lives. Certainly such storms grew more common 
during the nadir of the Little Ice Age, and some connection might exist between climate change 
and the expression of adversity in Golden Age literature. However, an analysis of Van den 
Vondel’s beautiful poetry also demonstrates the limitations of this ecocritical approach. Neither 
1637 nor the years that directly preceded and followed it were particularly cold, and indeed all 
were typical of the milder interval between Little Ice Age minima in the Low Countries. While a 
mild storm surge did flood some streets in Amsterdam in 1637, no significant inundations 
affected Holland in either 1636 or 1635. In fact, the meteorological context in which Gijsbrecht 
van Aemstel was written and initially performed appears to have been unusually mild and 
tranquil in the broader context of the seventeenth century. It is, of course, possible that Van den 
Vondel laid the intellectual groundwork for his play in years that were accompanied by weather 
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typical of the Little Ice Age. However, such mental fermentation is as opaque to climate 
historians as the intentions with which winter landscapes were crafted.
68
  
More importantly, descriptions of weather in literature rarely reflect attempts by authors 
accurately to depict reality. Weather can serve the interests of plot, or, when used 
metaphorically, highlight a character’s internal struggle. Meteorological descriptions in literature 
can therefore suggest contemporary attitudes towards weather, but they can, at best, merely hint 
at relationships between climate change and culture. In Shakespeare’s The Tempest, for example, 
the sorcerer Prospero raises a storm that advances the plot while providing a metaphor for 
upheaval and confusion. The preternatural agency behind the storm would have resonated for 
contemporary audiences (Figure 7.6), although Shakespeare was careful to distinguish 
Prospero’s scholarly knowledge of magic from its more occult variants. Descriptions of storms in 
Van den Vondel’s Gijsbrecht van Aemstel are almost entirely metaphorical, but they contribute 
to a theme of beleaguerment that is a product of a prosperous, urbanized Republic that was 
literally walled off from water, weather, and opposing armies. However, neither the narrative 
decisions taken by Van den Vondel or Shakespeare, nor their significance for contemporary 
audiences, can be convincingly tied to the climatic fluctuations of the Little Ice Age.
69
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Fig. 7.6. Frontispiece in a 1709 edition of Shakespeare’s The Tempest. The preternatural origin of the tempest is 
abundantly demonstrated. William Shakespeare, The Works of Mr. William Shakespear: Adorn'd with cuts. Revis'd 
and Corrected, with an account of the Life and Writings of the author, Vol. I., ed. Nicholas Rowe. London: Jacob 
Tonson, 1709.  
 
Short poems crafted by amateurs or professionals in response to contemporary events 
could include far more direct references to weather than plays. For example, on 23 February 
1602 a Northwesterly gale stimulated catastrophic storm flooding in Edam that, in turn, ignited a 
major fire. The disaster inspired the town’s chronicler to write: “Oh frightful night: that has 
swallowed the sweat / Of so many days, who would not take pity on the city? / That just 
yesterday stood so proudly, now has Fallen, / One storm, one flood, one fire destroyed it all.” 
Many short poems followed a similar template, and lamented the devastation, or simple 
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discomfort, caused by extreme weather. During the unusually wet summer of 1648, the poet 
Reyer Anslo wondered, “How could it be, / That raindrop after raindrop, / Crashes to the ground, 
/ Day and night?”70 A particularly lengthy poem was placed on the door of the office of the 
director of the herring fleet’s guild of pilots after the frigid winter of 1666/67. The poem reads:  
 
In January sixteen hundred sixty seven, 
It froze and snowed severely, 
For six weeks shipping ceased, 
For three weeks people sailed as they pleased, 
[But] the most important thing commemorated here, 
Is how much ice accompanied March. 
On the 16
th
 [of March] it started to freeze again, 
On the 17
th
 fishermen abandoned their trade, 
On the 18
th
 many walked on the IJ
71
 at the Laeg, 
On the 19
th
 people crossed the IJ on the ice, 
On the 20
th
 the weather and wind offered little relief, 
On the 21
st
 it seemed that weather and wind might shift, 
On the 22
nd
 the wind again ushered in freezing,  
On the 23
rd
 the sun began to melt the ice,  
On the 24
th
 the freezing lost its power,  
On the 25
th
 many crossed the IJ with deliveries, 
On the 26
th
 three people still walked across the IJ, 
After noon the boats sailed past the city, 
On the 27
th
 the easterly wind piled the ice high on Pampus,
72
 
On the 29
th
 [sic] shipping was therefore still delayed, 
On the 30
th
 some managed to managed to sail and walk across the ice, 
On 1 April some people still walked on the Zuider Zee,  
On the 2
nd
 a ship was trapped in ice at Urk,
73
  
This is recorded by M.T. the pilot’s man,  
To keep God’s wondrous power, 
In [everyone’s] thoughts.74 
 
 
 Extreme weather events could stimulate cultural responses that were tied to the memory 
of weather and the interpretation of its significance. Such cultural responses were certainly 
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mediated by cultural structures that encouraged poetry, for example, or economic frameworks 
that tied the Republic to waterborne commerce. Nevertheless, as extreme winters, severe storms, 
and catastrophic floods grew more common during the minima of the Little Ice Age, poetic 
responses also became more abundant. An unusually clear connection therefore exists between 
the climatic fluctuations of the Little Ice Age and these expressions of culture during the Dutch 
Golden Age. On the other hand, only a thin line separated poetry that responded directly to 
weather from poetry that employed descriptions of weather for narrative or metaphorical 
purpose. In poems about the “wind prince,” for example, Van den Vondel may have responded 
to storms and shifting wind patterns yet clearly employed his weather descriptions to serve 
patriotic Dutch narratives.
75
  
 Discerning connections between climate change and art in the Dutch Republic is 
therefore a complex and inevitably speculative endeavour. However, some forms of art pointed 
towards more concrete connections between culture, weather, and the Little Ice Age. Many 
Dutch winter landscapes portrayed the vibrant social spaces that emerged when frozen 
waterways allowed skating, sledding, and sport (Figure 7.5). Particularly severe winters were 
never routine, even during the minima of the Little Ice Age, and among Dutch citizens they 
encouraged a feeling of shared experience. Participation in icy new social spaces across all of the 
Republic’s social strata was therefore enthusiastic and widespread. On 25 January during the 
frigid winter of 1668/69, for example, Van der Goes informed his brother that “an unbelievable 
number of people are on the ice every day.” Other observers described how thousands of sleds 
took to the ice when large portions of the Zuider Zee froze. The “ice culture” that emerged from 
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subsequent social interaction could take the form of a carnival in which merchants sold their 
wares and social norms collapsed.
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 For example, on 22 February 1608 in the bitterly cold winter of that year, army 
commander Frederich van Vervou reported that merchants had erected tents near the Ems in the 
Northeastern Republic, where everyone could drink beer and wine. New social and commercial 
spaces were not limited to the Republic, and in the same winter thousands of people drank their 
beverages on the frozen Scheldt off Antwerp. Meanwhile, Hugo de Groot in The Hague 
described the egalitarian character of mass culture on the ice. In a poem that may have also dated 
from the winter of 1607/08, De Groot relished how “here [on the ice] people are honest and free, 
/ Here the farmer pushes aside the nobleman.”  De Groot concluded with a couplet that declared: 
“if anyone should ask from their heart who is really wise, / I say from my heart: only the ice.” In 
a Republic in which social stratification was already less engrained than elsewhere in continental 
Europe, the ice culture that emerged in severe winters further levelled existing class distinctions, 
if only temporarily. This ice culture arose only in severe winters when the ice was thick enough, 
and extensive enough, to support large social gatherings. Consequently it would have been 
impossible or, at least, far less likely outside the minima of the Little Ice Age.
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 The ice culture of the Low Countries in cold winters was not limited to socialization on 
frozen waterways. In a Republic that depended on the manipulation and exploitation of different 
environments, it is no surprise that icy new landscapes encouraged innovation. On 17 January 
1600 Adriaan Terrier received a patent for the construction of ijsschuiten or “ice boats” to 
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navigate across frozen water. A decade later, Pieter Janszoon Twisck described seeing an “ice-
wagon” that resembled a sailboat on skates. Stadhouder Maurice of Nassau permitted the 
construction of two such craft, which amazed onlookers by reaching the then-extraordinary 
velocity of 80 kilometres/hour. Linking the development and representation of such vehicles to 
cool winters during Little Ice Age minima is not as straightforward as it at first appears, for 
Dutch rivers can freeze even during warmer climatic regimes. Moreover, the ice wagon was soon 
adapted to function on land (Figure 7.7). On the other hand, it is significant that references to ice 
wagons appear in Dutch sources after two of the coldest winters of the Grindelwald Fluctuation. 
Any technology dependant on ice was naturally more practical when there was more ice, for 
longer, and so it is likely that ice wagons would not have been designed if milder winters had 
prevailed.
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Fig. 7.7. The ice wagon, adapted to function on land. Willem Isaacsz van Swanenburgh, “The Land Yachts of Prince 
Maurits,” print, 1603, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, http://goo.gl/qc75EF.  
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Conclusion: Cultural Vulnerability and Resilience during the Little Ice Age 
 
 Weather and climate change interacted with the Republic’s culture in ways that reveal the 
complexity not only of contemporary Dutch society, but also its cultural history. Encouraged by 
the tolerance and observational emphasis of the Republic’s intellectual culture, Dutch scholars 
developed an increasingly but not entirely secular understanding of weather. While some 
educated elites followed this scholarly trend, many others continued to interpret meteorological 
events as expressions of divine or demonic agency. Many among the less privileged may have 
adhered to a medley of magical and religious weather beliefs, although a pragmatic focus on the 
consequences of weather prevailed in their correspondence. Witchcraft persecution was muted in 
the Republic, perhaps owing to the distinct interactions between the climatic fluctuations of the 
Little Ice Age and Dutch socioeconomic, cultural, and environmental structures. Overall, the 
Dutch understanding of weather was complex and divided, however imperfectly, between social 
groups separated by their level of engagement in the Republic’s intellectual culture.  
Many literate Dutch observers employed their memories, memories of the elderly, and 
written sources to roughly discern the instability of patterns of severe weather. Extremes in 
winter severity and water levels, both of which were influenced but not determined by 
meteorological conditions, were recorded with remarkable accuracy using natural and artificial 
landmarks. However, there is little evidence suggesting that the detailed and continuous statistics 
of average weather listed in archived ship logbooks and toll accounts were interpreted using 
emerging techniques for quantitative analysis. Still, Dutch observers identified shifts in 
prevailing weather that represented a step towards perceiving, but certainly not understanding, 
contemporary climate change.  
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The visual art and literature of the Golden Age reflects the weather that was rendered 
more likely by the climatic minima of the Little Ice Age. However, these representations were 
mediated by the human circumstances in which they were created, and so do not clearly 
demonstrate the influence of contemporary climatic fluctuations. On the other hand, some 
popular poetry was written by observers in direct response to weather events that were common 
during Little Ice Age minima. Illustrations and paintings also depicted cultural spaces and 
technologies that were likely encouraged by severe winters during the coldest decades of the 
Little Ice Age. On the other hand, these were also shaped by cultural and social trends that were 
overlaid by personal agency in ways that obscure the precise influence of climatic stimuli. There 
were few straightforward cultural responses to the Little Ice Age, but the importance of weather 
in contemporary art hints at the influence of climatic fluctuations in the Republic.  
Overall, Dutch sources express remarkably diverse attitudes towards meteorological 
conditions that, in turn, reflect the social heterogeneity of the Republic in its Golden Age. 
However, most Dutch accounts of weather during the Little Ice Age share a universal 
appreciation for the agency and power of weather. Many sources also demonstrate an 
understanding that the consequences of weather could be changed. Dikes could be rebuilt, ice 
could be used, water could impede or improve military defenses, and wind patterns could aid or 
hinder shipping. Dutch art both literary and visual could express loss or bewilderment in the face 
of extreme meteorological events. However, more often weather was endured or even exploited 
by voices and characters in Dutch art. Even particularly religious accounts of meteorological 
events possessed a pragmatic element, as prayer was intended to mitigate the adverse impacts of 
weather.  
468 
 
According to environmental historian Georgina Endfield, “the lived world of experience . 
. . informs people’s understandings and perceptions of their own relative vulnerability or 
resilience [to climate change].”79 However, surviving Dutch sources suggest that cultural 
perceptions of weather and climate change did not just influence other cultural conceptions of 
adaptability. During the Little Ice Age, notions of environmental adaptability emerged within a 
Republic that was economically and militarily adaptable to shifting patterns of prevailing 
weather.  This correlation indicates that the understanding of weather and climate change among 
a society’s citizens shapes their capacity to successfully adapt to climatic fluctuations in the 
physical world. Ultimately, the distinctively Dutch approach to weather may have contributed to 
the overall resilience of the Republic during the climatic fluctuations of the Little Ice Age. 
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Conclusion: Conceptualizing the Influence of Climate Change 
in the Dutch Republic 
 
 Between approximately 1565 and 1720, the Little Ice Age reached its frigid nadir. In 
Northwestern Europe, temperatures declined, storminess increased, wind dynamics were altered, 
and precipitation patterns shifted during the Grindelwald Fluctuation (1565-1628) and the 
Maunder Minimum (1662-1720). Historical climatologists have demonstrated that the 
agricultural societies that dominated contemporary Europe generally suffered in the coldest 
phases of the Little Ice Age. By exploring both these minima and the warmer interval that 
separated them, the case studies in this dissertation have revealed that the influence of the Little 
Ice Age was more ambiguous across the Dutch commercial empire. The prosperity and security 
of the Republic were threatened by some meteorological conditions rendered more likely during 
Little Ice Age minima, but overall Dutch citizens resisted, and often successfully exploited, the 
weather that accompanied a cooler climate. 
The first part of this dissertation introduced case studies that investigated how early 
modern climate change affected mobility, commerce, and ultimately the acquisition of wealth in 
the Dutch trading empire. The first chapter in that case study examined the three expeditions for 
a Northeast Passage in the 1590s, which pushed back the periphery of the world known to the 
Dutch. New multidisciplinary reconstructions of the contemporary Arctic atmosphere, 
hydrosphere, and cryosphere reveal that the voyages were shaped by complex interactions 
between a cooler climate and regional environmental conditions. Journals written by the 
explorers demonstrate that environmental influences were, in turn, mediated not only by the 
agency of the adventurers but also by the culture, technology, and economy of the Republic. All 
of these entanglements contributed to the failure to find a Northeast Passage, but they also 
470 
 
enabled both the expansion of contemporary scholarly knowledge, and the discovery of islands 
that would later feature prominently in the history of the Dutch Golden Age.  
 The second chapter examined how the manifestations of Little Ice Age climatic 
fluctuations in the North Sea region affected VOC ship journeys. Company day registers and 
correspondence reveal that shipwrecks and mortality rates both increased as the frequency of 
regional gales rose during the Maunder Minimum. Nevertheless, East Indiamen were less 
affected by storms than smaller ships, and some of their journeys could actually be shortened by 
several days of very high winds. Ship logbooks record that, in the North Sea region, a rise in the 
frequency of easterly and perhaps northerly winds during the Maunder Minimum increased the 
velocity of outbound VOC ships, although inbound vessels were more ambiguously affected. 
Overall, day registers suggest that changes in prevailing meteorological conditions in the North 
Sea region, which may also have affected much of the northeastern Atlantic, influenced a 
substantial reduction in the overall duration of outbound voyages that was not balanced by a rise 
in the length of returning journeys. This decline benefitted the Company’s operations in Asia. 
More frequent easterlies likely also accelerated outbound voyages by rival East India 
Companies, but for most of the seventeenth century the VOC dominated Asian commerce. An 
advantage for the VOC was therefore more important to the Republic than advantages to other 
East India Companies were for the economies they helped support. Consequently, by 
accelerating outbound VOC journeys, weather conditions typical of the Maunder Minimum may 
have benefitted the Republic in the context of contemporary Europe.  
 The third chapter investigated mobility at the heart of the Dutch commercial empire. It 
began with an analysis of Dutch trade with the Baltic, which was more negatively affected by the 
meteorological conditions that accompanied Little Ice Age minima than the voyages of the VOC, 
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or even the expeditions of Arctic explorers. Dues paid by ships passing through the Danish 
Sound reveal that the rate of shipping in winter, spring, and autumn was strongly affected by 
prevailing temperatures and, in turn, the extent of local sea ice. Moreover, correspondence sent 
between Dutch government officials reflect the ways in which the complex manifestations of the 
Maunder Minimum in the Baltic could complicate Dutch diplomacy, encourage costly legal 
disputes, and hinder the supply of victuals to allied armies. More frequent storms could also 
devastate the ships that plied the Baltic trades, which often sailed close to lee shores. On the 
other hand, Dutch merchants creatively responded to the risks that accompanied more common 
gales by parcelling their commodities and investing in marine insurance. Cold winters may also 
have contributed to increases in grain prices, which could benefit Dutch merchants, and 
ultimately the Dutch economy.  
The third chapter continued by exploring mobility within the borders of the Republic, 
where most travellers in the coastal provinces still journeyed by water. In the seventeenth 
century, the sailboats that serviced the beurtvaart network were gradually supplemented by the 
horse-drawn barges of the trekvaart, which were less susceptible to changes in wind direction but 
were still hampered by storms and winter freezing. However, even when the beurtvaart or 
trekvaart systems could not function, small-scale travel through the Republic persisted by road, 
on skates, or by a mixture of small boats and sleds. Certainly, some weather events more often 
experienced during Little Ice Age minima threatened all forms of mobility within the borders of 
the Republic. Overall, however, diverse transportation networks in the Republic, when exploited 
by Dutch citizens, fostered a remarkable resilience to movement through the northern Low 
Countries.  
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 The second part of this dissertation examined the Anglo-Dutch Wars, to unravel 
connections between early modern climatic fluctuations and the Republic’s defence of its 
prosperity. The fourth chapter began by introducing environmental, social, and cultural structures 
in the North Sea region on the eve of the First Anglo-Dutch War, which coincided with the 
warmer interval between the Grindelwald Fluctuation and the Maunder Minimum. The chapter 
employed ship logbooks, correspondence, intelligence reports, and diary entries to demonstrate 
that, in the first war, frequent westerly winds associated with a warmer climate often allowed 
Commonwealth fleets to claim the weather gage. With it, English commanders repeatedly seized 
the tactical initiative necessary to arrange ships of great size according to newly refined line of 
battle tactics. Dutch fleets usually lost in the face of these disadvantages. Moreover, English 
privateers, likely exploiting westerlies that allowed them easily to leave port and ambush 
merchant shipping, seized far more prizes than their Dutch counterparts. While the outcome of 
the war did little to alter the unequal commercial relationship between the Commonwealth and 
the Republic, it was very costly for Dutch merchants.  
 The fifth and sixth chapters of the dissertation analyzed the Second and Third Anglo-
Dutch Wars, which were fought after the onset of the colder, wetter, stormier Maunder 
Minimum. In these wars, more common easterly winds frequently granted the weather gage to 
Dutch fleets that had adopted many of the most effective aspects of the English naval system. 
Easterly winds likely also contributed to the far greater success of Dutch privateers in the Second 
and especially the Third Anglo-Dutch Wars. High winds common during the Maunder Minimum 
forced English vessels to close their lower tier of guns, while thwarting attempts to blockade the 
Dutch coast. When France, Cologne, and Münster allied with England at the beginning of the 
third war, a complex suite of weather conditions that partially reflected the influence of a cooler 
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climate prohibited invasion from the sea but undermined the Republic’s perimeter defences on 
land. Overall, in the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars victory for the Republic was, in part, a 
consequence of meteorological conditions rendered more common by the coming of the 
Maunder Minimum.  
 The third part of the dissertation explored how what is now called the Little Ice Age was 
understood in the culture of the Dutch Republic, and how historical climatologists can 
conceptualize its influence in early modern Europe. The distinct culture of the Republic shaped, 
and was shaped by, the commercial acquisition and military defence of wealth during the Golden 
Age. Accordingly, the seventh and final chapter began by employing correspondence, diaries, 
newspaper articles, and other documentary sources to investigate the ways in which weather was 
understood across a diverse spectrum of Dutch society. As the Republic’s seventeenth-century 
scholars contributed to the emergence of a more secular natural philosophy, many literate Dutch 
citizens continued to favour supernatural explanations for the kinds of weather phenomena that 
grew more common during the minima of the Little Ice Age. Nevertheless, the ambiguous and 
mediated material influence of the Little Ice Age in the Republic may have dampened some of 
the impetus behind Dutch witchcraft persecution. Moreover, letters dictated by the poor reflect 
pragmatic attitudes to even extreme weather events that demonstrate a concern for the 
consequences, rather than the causes, of meteorological conditions.  
Among literate Dutch citizens, interest in the meaning of unusual weather likely 
contributed to the understanding that weather was prone to long-term fluctuations. Some Dutch 
observers employed their memories, documentary evidence, and natural or artificial landmarks to 
discern the weather history of severe winters and extreme water levels in particular with 
remarkable accuracy. However, there is no evidence that this rudimentary awareness of climate 
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change was accompanied by a perception of shifts in average weather conditions. Understanding 
of weather and perhaps climate change may also have stimulated cultural responses, but the 
influence of the Little Ice Age was, at best, indirect even in most of the art that represented 
weather rendered more likely in the period’s minima. Still, contemporary depictions of weather 
common in the Grindelwald Fluctuation and Maunder Minimum, like the development of new 
practices and technologies, signified the conviction that adverse meteorological conditions could 
be tolerated and even exploited. In this, the Republic’s culture may have contributed to its 
resilience in the face of the weather typical of Little Ice Age minima.   
 
Contextualizing and Conceptualizing the Dutch Experience of the Little Ice Age 
 
Dutch resilience was not shared by most inhabitants of contemporary Europe. In 1996, 
historical climatologist Jean Grove explained that “the impact of climatic changes on human 
society depends upon their scale on the one hand and the characteristics and sensitivity of the 
society concerned on the other.”1 Environmental historians have demonstrated that societal 
sensitivity was high, and climatic fluctuations were substantial, across much of early modern 
Europe. The cold, stormy, and often wet weather that accompanied the minima of the Little Ice 
Age contributed to famine, price increases, social unrest, and ultimately violence in France, 
England, Scotland, Scandinavia, the Holy Roman Empire, and elsewhere. On the other hand, in 
some parts of Europe, like the Swiss canton of Bern, social structures insulated populations from 
the worst demographic impacts of the Little Ice Age. Moreover, some agricultural societies 
prospered even in very cold decades, although these times of relative plenty rarely enter the 
largely declensionist historiography of the Little Ice Age. For example, by the waning of the 
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Maunder Minimum, England and France were certainly wealthier and more influential than they 
had been at the beginning of the Grindelwald Fluctuation. Sweden, like the Dutch Republic, 
reached the height of its power within Europe during the nadir of the Little Ice Age. Indeed, the 
much-studied shift in European economic primacy from the Mediterranean to the Northwest was 
only partially a reflection of Dutch economic expansion. While these examples can provide 
helpful corrections to climate determinism, in much of northern Europe economic vitality and 
demographic growth were slowed, and in some cases sharply reversed, by socioeconomic 
influences that cascaded from the weather common in Little Ice Age minima. Moreover, between 
the beginning of the Grindelwald Fluctuation and the conclusion of the Maunder Minimum, no 
European society experienced the seemingly miraculous economic growth, demographic 
expansion, and cultural dynamism of the Republic in its Golden Age.
2
 
 These case studies have explored some of the most important technologies, attitudes, and 
socioeconomic structures that helped the Republic prosper during the coldest decades of the 
Little Ice Age. They have demonstrated that the Republic succeeded not only in spite of, but 
often partially because of, the cooler, wetter, stormier climate of the Grindelwald Fluctuation and 
the Maunder Minimum. In the context of contemporary Europe, the Republic’s commercial 
economy provided networks of trade that responded very differently to changes in prevailing 
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weather than did agricultural production. The Dutch commercial system maintained the supply 
of essential commodities within the Republic, even in years accompanied by extremes in 
temperature or precipitation. Indeed, Dutch merchants could benefit from increases in the price 
of commodities such as wheat when meteorological conditions interacted with social forces to 
induce famine elsewhere in Europe. Moreover, changes in prevailing weather that accompanied 
contemporary climatic fluctuations could directly benefit movement of ships and, in turn, 
commodities, people, and information through the Dutch trading empire. Even when weather 
during Little Ice Age minima did impede some forms of travel, the Dutch transportation network 
was usually flexible enough to adapt. 
 The military capacity of the Dutch Republic was largely a consequence of its commercial 
pre-eminence. Dutch fleets were essential to the expansion and vigorous defence of the 
Republic’s trading empire, and so the war ship was as much an economic asset as the merchant 
vessel. The Republic was not the only European naval power, although for more than a century it 
was arguably the most effective. Its naval success was a product of interactions between distinct 
environmental, social, economic, and cultural structures, which were leveraged with relative 
success by experienced mariners and their political masters. However, in European waters the 
weather that accompanied Little Ice Age minima also provided critical advantages that 
contributed to the defence of the Republic’s commercial dominance. Moreover, by impeding the 
progress of armies, frigid winters and heavy precipitation rendered more common during the 
Grindelwald Fluctuation and Maunder Minimum could each hamper invasion of the heavily 
fortified Republic.
3
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Nevertheless, storms, frigid winters, and floods could still devastate the Republic’s 
commercial economy, its military operations, and ultimately the people who, by occupation or 
habitation, were vulnerable to extreme weather. Moreover, warmer decades during the Little Ice 
Age were accompanied by meteorological conditions that could reverse both the impediments 
and advantages of climatic minima for the Dutch. Accordingly, the influence of the Little Ice 
Age was profoundly ambiguous for the Dutch Republic. That ambiguity is reflected in aspects of 
contemporary Dutch culture. Surviving documents reveal a widespread fascination not only with 
the potentially devastating consequences of severe weather, but also with the possibility of 
explaining, and even exploiting it. This attitude towards the weather that frequently accompanied 
Little Ice Age minima may have been encouraged by a culture accustomed to both the prospect 
of environmental disaster, and the profitability of environmental manipulation.  
Overall, the ambiguous influence of the weather that accompanied the coldest decades of 
the Little Ice Age in the Republic contrasted with its largely detrimental effects elsewhere in 
Europe. Consequently, early modern climatic fluctuations contributed to the economic, military, 
and cultural influence of the Dutch state within seventeenth-century Europe. Comprehensive 
historical narratives of the Dutch Republic at its height must therefore incorporate an analysis of 
the Little Ice Age. Indeed, weather and climate should become as important within modern 
histories of the Dutch Republic as they were to its citizens. Moreover, surveys of the Little Ice 
Age in Europe must include the Republic to nuance otherwise declensionist, and therefore 
partially misleading, accounts of early modern climate change. 
The findings of this dissertation can also inform the creation of heuristic models that can 
help conceptualize relationships between climate change and human history. Such models need 
not necessarily accompany climate history, but their development and revision can provide 
478 
 
structured means for understanding the broader ramifications of otherwise isolated historical 
narratives. Many historians have a justified skepticism of explanatory models. Those detailed 
enough to reflect the nuances of history are often vulnerable to a host of historical exceptions, 
while those broad enough to avoid such exceptions usually reflect obvious and therefore banal 
relationships. However, conceptual or metaphorical models can, in climate history, provide ways 
of interpreting complex and sometimes counterintuitive relationships. They can also illustrate the 
synthesis of different interdisciplinary methodologies and results that necessarily inform 
historical climatology.  
In recent decades, environmental historians have introduced or adapted interpretive 
models and theoretical approaches, many of which were originally devised in other disciplines or 
historical fields. In particular, Viennese researchers associated with the Institute for 
Interdisciplinary Studies of Austrian Universities are continuing to create and refine some of the 
most sophisticated models in environmental history. Perhaps the most enduringly influential has 
been the concept of “societal metabolism,” which employs the metaphor of cellular metabolism 
to trace the flow and transformation of energy and material within a socioecological system.
4
 
This model can be readily applied to the Dutch Republic, a society that, in the context of early 
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modern Europe, was unusually reliant on the exploitation of energy and the manipulation of the 
environment for the large-scale movement of material. Moreover, the influence of Little Ice Age 
climatic fluctuations affected the ways in which the Dutch harnessed energy for transportation. 
However, the societal metabolism model does not provide an explicit illustration of relationships 
between the environmental structures involved in climate change.
5
 Moreover, the model cannot 
easily accommodate the study of, for example, Dutch military operations, journeys of 
exploration, or shifting cultural attitudes, all of which interacted with early modern climate 
change. It therefore has limited applicability for interpreting the influence of the Little Ice Age 
across the Dutch trading empire.
6
  
In 2000, Marina Fischer-Kowalski, Helmut Haberl, and other Austrian researchers 
introduced the conceptual framework of Material and Energy Flow Accounting (MEFA) to better 
understand societal metabolism. Contributing to that framework were heuristic models that 
identify the intersection of culture and nature in the flow of material and energy through 
society’s “biophysical structures,” including human bodies. In a 2013 study that explores the 
environmental history of the Danube, Verena Winiwarter introduced the concept of the “socio-
natural site,” which avoids ontological dichotomies between nature and culture by connecting 
them through so-called “practices” and “arrangements.” The MEFA framework, like the social 
metabolism model, incorporates the colonization of nature, but Winiwarter went further in 
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identifying how exactly nature can be colonized. These models and theoretical approaches have 
general applicability across the discipline of environmental history. Moreover, they distinguish 
between more or less colonized environmental systems in ways that are useful for climate 
history. However, they do not unravel the intricate relationships between natural phenomena that 
complicate the task of isolating the influence of climate in history.
7
  
Consequently, some climate historians have developed their own models for interpreting 
relationships between human history and environmental change. Climate historians are forced 
carefully to consider relationships between distinct environmental processes that can be entirely 
devoid of human influence. Seasonal changes in the cryosphere near Novaya Zemlya, for 
example, were linked to climatic shifts and, in turn, to volcanic eruptions, yet during the Little 
Ice Age these entanglements were probably not influenced by human colonization. Historians 
cannot identify precisely how these relationships operated, but they can conceptualize them in 
ways that have relevance for the narratives they construct. For connecting human and climate 
histories, it matters that, for example, a generally colder climate did not always increase sea ice 
north of Russia, or indeed that warm seasons and even warm decades could occur during the 
nadir of the Little Ice Age. Moreover, many climate historians believe that there is a distinct 
pattern to the social consequences of climate change, even if the societal influence of climatic 
fluctuations is not necessarily different from that of other environmental transformations.  
                                                 
7
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For example, one of the most recently published models in climate history was created by 
Christian Pfister to conceptualize the social impact of extreme weather. In Pfister’s model, 
climatic variability influences water availability, food production and demand, and the “state of 
health.” These variables then interact with one another and the properties of impacted societies, 
which include culturally-determined adaptive and adjustive mechanisms. However, the model 
does not conceptualize differences between climate, weather, and other natural influences. 
Moreover, it does not reveal the mechanism by which environmental change influences human 
history, and it omits meteorological conditions like wind, which were crucial to the early modern 
Dutch.
8
  
 In 2013, a team of interdisciplinary scholars from Europe and the United States 
introduced a much more comprehensive model for illustrating connections between climate 
change and human activity. In the model, a combination of climatic, natural, or human stimulus 
together creates drivers such as the emission of carbon dioxide, which can cause direct impacts, 
including warming, and indirect impacts, such as changes in crop yields or shifts in species 
phenology. Accordingly, the model differentiated climate change from other natural changes, 
distinguished direct from indirect impacts, and identified the kinds of influences that enable the 
co-evolution of climate, the broader environment, and society. It is probably the best conceptual 
model available to climate historians, but it still has some shortcomings. For example, it is 
heavily focused on explaining the consequences of anthropogenic global warming. It also does 
not identify the fundamental principle behind its drivers of change.
9
 
 The case studies in this dissertation have informed the development of a new heuristic 
model for conceptualizing, if not explaining, relationships between climate, environment, and 
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human history (Figure C.1). This model incorporates some of the insights of new models in 
environmental and climate history, but it adds important details. For example, gradual climate 
change and short-term, local environmental change (which includes weather) are distinguished 
from other environmental events that, like the movement of tectonic plates, can have climate 
impacts but are not inherently part of the climate system. Moreover, the model argues that 
human responses to climate change are a function of regional, short-term environmental changes, 
which are influenced in complex ways by broader environmental trends, like climatic 
fluctuations. Consequently, the model is helpful for visualizing the reality that relationships 
between natural phenomena are as complex, and as integral to climate history, as interactions 
between different aspects of society.  
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Fig. C.1. A simple model for conceptualizing broad interactions between climate change and 
human history.  
 
In the model, natural changes co-evolve with society through transfers of energy, which 
are most directly expressed in the shared space of human bodies. Energy also influences physical 
changes, which can be expressed both in different local environmental conditions, and in more or 
less direct, and shorter or longer-term, material responses by human beings. Matter does not 
move without energy, and therefore energy that ultimately derives from the sun and flows 
through the climate system is the essential mediator between different kinds of material change. 
Short-term material influences of climatic fluctuations typically respond more directly than long-
term material influences to local, short-lived environmental changes, because short-term natural 
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and social developments function on similar temporal and geographic scales. More direct, 
usually short-term, material influences on societies might include, for example, destruction 
caused by a storm, while less direct, usually longer-term influences could involve changes in 
transportation networks. Overall, the stimulus of energy in social change is always mediated by 
social structures and personal agency.  
Energy flowing between environment and society also affects culture, partially but not 
entirely through its influence on society’s material structures. Moreover, energy affects 
interactions between natural and social categories depicted in the model. These relationships are 
only visualized to link natural phenomena, because establishing such connections between social 
and cultural developments can as often complicate as clarify causality in human history. 
Ultimately, this is not a comprehensive model; it does not display all possible interactions 
between the environmental and social elements essential for climate history. However, it is 
detailed enough to help conceptualize the way in which climate change influences society, yet 
broad enough to be applicable across climate history.  
While this heuristic model is not presented here as an analytical tool, it does provide a 
method for visualizing some of the major findings and ideas of this dissertation. For example, it 
illustrates why climate historians should first identify relationships between climate and local, 
short-term environmental change, as well as between human activity and local, short-term 
environmental change, before they can discern broader connections between climate and human 
history. It also visualizes the potential social importance of weather that does not conform to the 
climatic trend, such as the relatively warm summer of 1594, which encouraged the Republic’s 
polar explorers. The model moreover includes the influence of changes in weather that 
accompany climatic fluctuations but are not usually examined by climate historians, like the 
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prevailing direction of regional winds. The model also accounts for differences between the 
direct and indirect material influences of local environmental change that are, in turn, affected by 
climatic shifts. This helps illuminate the distinct experience of the Little Ice Age in the Republic. 
For instance, the influence of weather on agriculture was often (if not inevitably) more direct 
than its influence in the transportation networks that supported the Republic’s economy, and that 
probably benefitted the Dutch in early modern Europe.  
Finally, the model illustrates that the ways in which energy is harnessed by a society can 
shape its social vulnerability to climate change. Survival for humans depends on energy derived 
from nutrients that are, in turn, created by photosynthesis and ultimately solar radiation. The 
production of these nutrients was central to the economic performance of the agricultural 
societies that dominated early modern Europe. However, the Dutch economy was largely 
sustained by commerce, and therefore energy was generally exploited differently in the coastal 
Republic than it was elsewhere in Europe. Weather conditions that reduced the amount of 
useable energy in agricultural societies did not necessarily reduce the energy available to the 
Dutch commercial economy. Visualized in the model, a consideration of energy provides a 
useful way of conceptualizing, if not explaining, the distinct experience of the Dutch during the 
Little Ice Age.
10
  
The continued development and refinement of heuristic models in climate history is 
important for an area of study in which new work too often trends towards determinism. Indeed, 
by introducing the significance of early modern climate change within the Dutch Republic, this 
dissertation has raised many questions that promise to inform future climate histories of 
premodern Europe. Its case studies on mobility suggest the potential of research into the 
interactions between the maintenance of transportation infrastructure – like roads or docks – and 
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climatic fluctuations. Its analysis of the Anglo-Dutch Wars raises the possibility of climate 
histories that holistically examine tactical operations, strategic planning, and resource flows in 
their analysis of premodern war. Even more pressing in a Dutch context is the need for studies 
that connect shifts in different kinds of agricultural and industrial production to the weather that 
accompanied Little Ice Age minima. Such research could incorporate relationships between 
domestic animals, weather, and climate change, which have scarcely been examined by climate 
historians.
11
  
 More broadly, this dissertation has demonstrated the pressing need for further research 
that explores not only vulnerability but also resilience in past societal interactions with climate 
change. Sometimes the environmental manifestations of climatic fluctuations did worsen life for 
most people in, for example, parts of early modern Europe. However, declensionist assumptions 
too often simplify climate history. How did past societies and social groups adapt to, or even 
exploit, times of climatic transition? Are there any common characteristics shared by these 
peoples? This study has revealed that the continued high-resolution reconstruction of 
meteorological conditions beyond seasonal temperature and precipitation will be essential to 
answering these questions. In no way can historians contribute more to climate reconstruction 
than in the interpretation of past meteorological observations relevant to, for example, patterns of 
prevailing wind and daily changes in weather.  
Precisely identifying the full spectrum of weather at a particular time, and in a particular 
place, will also allow climate historians to examine relationships between individual decisions 
and societal vulnerability to climate change. This dissertation has demonstrated that occasionally 
counterintuitive decisions made by individuals mitigated, or exacerbated, the socioeconomic and 
military influence of weather that was, in turn, shaped by climate change. Acknowledging the 
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importance of human agency and accidents can lead climate historians towards a more explicit 
treatment of chance in their narratives, and towards more complex descriptions of historical 
change. Historical climatology has evolved tremendously in the past decade, yet there is great 
potential for research that will render it even more relevant for historians and climatologists 
alike.  
Ultimately, climate history can inform modern attempts to predict, and respond to, the 
consequences of anthropogenic global warming. The primary contribution of this dissertation to 
that crucial endeavour lies in the troublesome questions and complexities that it has unearthed, 
which are not always addressed by scientists. While interdisciplinary reports by the IPCC and the 
World Meteorological Organization explicitly identify uncertainty in their projections, many 
scientists have published deterministic assessments of life on a warmer planet. Such determinism 
has subsequently been propagated by journalists, non-governmental organizations, and 
policymakers. For example, in 2009 the prestigious but now-defunct Global Humanitarian 
Forum, an NGO based in Geneva, published a report documenting the current global impact of 
anthropogenic climate change. According to the report, “every year climate change leaves over 
300,000 people dead, 325 million people seriously affected, and [causes] economic losses of US 
$125 billion.”12 Such determinism is usually tempered in the most high-profile scientific studies, 
many of which are more explicit in their treatment of possible uncertainties. Nevertheless, even 
most of the more sophisticated, nuanced studies of current and future relationships between 
humanity and climate change lack historical context and depth.
13
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Determinism is not the same as alarmism, and indeed there might be value in both given 
the glacial pace of climate change mitigation today. Still, projections of relationships between 
climate change and future societies, when developed for policymakers, should be as accurate as 
possible. To this end, the insights of climate history, and the findings of this dissertation, can 
play an important role. An analysis of the Dutch Republic in the Little Ice Age reveals above all 
that climate change influences society in complex, often counter-intuitive ways that, in 
considerations of the future, resist confident prediction. For example, weather rendered less 
likely in a particular climate can have the greatest social consequences; climatic fluctuations  
can be expressed very differently in different regions; environmental crisis for some can provide 
opportunities for others; and possibilities precluded by climatic stimuli can prompt decisions that 
would have been better all along. Global warming is perhaps the greatest crisis of the coming 
century, yet the future, like the past, is sure to be non-linear. 
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